

A SOLDIER'S HONOR



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BY
HIS COMRADES



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A
SOLDIER'S HONOR,

WITH REMINISCENCES OF
MAJOR-GENERAL EARL VAN DORN,

BY
HIS COMRADES,

THE
Abbey Press

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A Soldier's Honor.

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“ I desire to call your attention to these facts :—That I have been a soldier for nearly a quarter of a century ; that my career has been an eventful one ; that I have accumulated nothing of the world's wealth, having devoted my whole life and energies to the service of my country ; and that, therefore, my reputation is all that belongs to me, without which life to me were as valueless as the crisp and faded leaf of autumn. I asked no sympathy, but I do ask at your hands a patient, full, and searching investigation.” (Page 158.)

“ In this tribunal I know that my character is safe, but the accusations against me will take an enduring form, by becoming part of the archives of the nation ; and the jealousy with which a soldier guards his reputation, prompts me to place by their side an antidote to the poison they contain.” (Page 156.)

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A SOLDIER'S HONOR.

CHAPTER I.

A ONCE FAIR SECTION.

FELLOW pilgrim of earth, in this work-a-day world, let us for a brief time turn back the wheels of "progress" from the tumult and turmoil of trade, the roar of factories and noise of commerce, the odors of coal oil and smoke, the rush and scurry of business, and return to the beauty and repose of the long ago, before industry had taken the place of art, the useful the place of the beautiful, and arithmetic the place of poetry, and take a plunge into the joys of the infinite, feel a sense of the blessings of the God of life, and become, as it were, drunk with poetry,—and go to a green spot of earth where a bit of the kingdom had come down, and the men, women and children loved God and kept His commandments; where the sun and moon shone unobstructed, the blue vault was magnificently starred, the air vibrated with the melody of birds and the incense of flowers, and where all nature smiled in love and crowned humanity with exquisite joy and ineffable peace.

I should be glad to put such magic words into these lines as would transport you, like the magic carpet of fairy land, to this once fair section of America, and acquaint you with the surpassing beauty of its natural and human aspects; acquaint you with its once regal homes, lovely women and noble men. I would dazzle you with tales of their heroism, and portray the delicately gifted and lofty qualities of the people that made life splendid and impressive, and gave them a force and influence all their own. Honor, truth, integrity,—virtue, gentleness, purity, formed the triumvirate basis of character and the pivot round which their daily lives revolved.

Not that these people were exclusive and apart from the outside world, for like the robins they fled in season to cooler climes and built summer nests, to return in autumn with the spoils of graceful contact with the gay world, its culture and literature. The women never forgot to replenish their wardrobes with the latest fabrics and fashions, and the men with outfits from the tailors of Paris and London. European travel was included in their summer tours as well as the resorts of this country, and the possession of wealth afforded gratification of every desire. The men and women were not absorbed by but were simply martyrs to tailors, modistes and milliners, wearing whatsoever they prescribed, taking no thought or care as to style, color or cost, any more than as they made up the concomitants of a proper and becoming appearance. To explain the meaning of this, a lady who was an active worker in a church was fitted out by her milliner with a hat of the then prevailing "corn-color"; she donned the appendage to her toilet entirely oblivious as to its color or mode, and wore it to church. The minister at once observed the color and remarked with an air of pity, that "poor Miss Jane had to wear a *yellow* bonnet because it was the fashion!" But the "yellow" hat failed to claim the thoughts of the wearer or to cool her ardor in church work, donning the hat simply as a covering to her head and because her milliner had supplied it.

The section of country in question was once part of a picturesque tract of land owned by a Mr. Gibson. It was intersected and made fruitful and luxuriant by a stream known as the "Bayou Pierre," which was a tributary of the Mississippi River, and when that "father of waters" was on a rampage outside of its banks, backing up the lesser streams and overflowing a vast extent of the contiguous country, the Bayou was navigable for small boats which brought in produce from Ohio and other Western States to exchange for cotton, which was the staple product of this section. A town site was donated by Mr. Gibson, located on the banks of the Bayou about six miles from the river. It was regularly laid out at right angles with the Bayou in broad streets, and planted with ornamental shade trees, and rapidly private and public houses, churches, court-house, and academies were erected, as well

as handsome suburban residences by the Archers, Humphreys, Magruders, Vertners, Van Dorns, Parkers, Bertrons, Stamps, Spencers, and many others,—whose names are familiar to the older people of that country,—and which were adorned with all that nature offered, together with all that wealth could supply to make ideal homes of hospitality and luxury. Trained servants of “African descent” made the homes glisten with neatness and comfort; and with their own little houses and gardens, poultry, etc., seemed as happy as lords and ladies,—toiling with the sun, and to rude music “dancing down the moon with jocund laughter,” never thinking or caring what the cost of food, raiment, shelter, or doctors’ bills might be! Henry Hughes, a native author, in a book entitled “Sociology,” calls the slaves “Warrantees”—being warranted shelter, food and clothing,—and the planters “warrantors”; and he considered Southern slaves greatly improved in condition when they were brought from barbarous Africa and “elevated into slavery.”

In honor of the former owner of the town site and his generosity, added to the natural port of entry afforded by the Bayou Pierre, the town was named “Gibson Port” or Port Gibson. This beautiful town became the county seat of Claiborne County, Mississippi, was duly incorporated, and in later years became the historic battle-ground of General Grant when fighting his way to besiege Vicksburg from the south side, every other point having proved impracticable. He landed his troops (60,000 it was said) some twelve miles below Port Gibson and marched to within two miles of the town, where he was met by a body of 4,500 Southern troops, which, after maintaining their ground from twelve o’clock at night (the moon shining brilliantly) up to sunset the next evening, and setting fire to the iron suspension bridges that surrounded the town, retreated in the direction of Vicksburg. On the morning of the 2d of May, 1863, an advance army of 10,000 men, commanded by the much esteemed and generous foe, General MacPherson, marched into the town and made their headquarters there until pontoon bridges could be placed on the stream to enable the larger army to pursue the small body of Southern troops. This old peaceful town could tell many grim and amusing stories and incidents connected with this great invasion of 60,000 blue coats, so far exceeding the capacity of the village of 2,500 souls, to entertain that number of visitors.

Port Gibson is also noted as having been the home or hiding place ("La C  che") of Blennerhasset; not on the Mississippi River, as has been stated, but six or eight miles back of the town in the interior, surrounded by magnificent tall oaks and forest trees, a place once renowned for its beauty, comfort and hospitality. The people of this Eden-like village and surrounding country, in the years before the Civil War was dreamed of, enjoyed the blessings of peace, prosperity, culture and wealth in a large degree. Here were men of brilliant attainments, lawyers of eminence, orators who made the welkin ring with their eloquence, good-humor and wit, together with native authors and poets galore,—young Irwin Henry Russell, a charming poet, being a native of that place; ministers of the pulpits pointed out in no uncertain language the way of life,—one of whom was almost contemporary with the founding of the village, baptizing, marrying and burying the people until just before the Civil War commenced, in his dying moments, seeming to foresee the ruin that was impending exclaimed, "O, my unhappy country!"—Rev. Dr. Zebulon Butler will never be forgotten by the people of Port Gibson. There were women there, too, who crowned the whole with modest worth and beauty, and a grace that eclipsed the world. The most perfect types of beauty were to be found,—the Titian beauty, the Grecian, the Spanish, the French, the pure delicate and refined American beauty. These types centered here from the four points of the compass, and while all were fair many were beautiful. The men were of the same type in manly form, and added to their physical features masculine strength, force of character, and principles which gave them marked individuality, in accordance with which they shaped their lives.

On an eminence overlooking the town of Port Gibson was located the home of Judge P. A. Van Dorn, which was known as "The Hill." The Hill was a rare old place. The judge had built the almost square double brick mansion after a simple model adapted to comfort, ventilation and sunlight; one arrangement being unique in having at the top of each window a space filled in with Venetian slats, without glass, in order that pure air could not be excluded nor impure air prevented from escaping. There



THE VAN DORN HOME.

were two porches forming front entrances, and a large covered porch at the side with colonial pillars and stationary seats. Paved walks led from the carriage-way to the porches, each walk lined with rows of gay jonquils that in springtime looked like troops of yellow-plumed cavalry drawn up for inspection. On the left was the garden with its terraces, grape arbors, jasmine, roses of every name flanked by flowers of every hue and perfume; and hidden from view by the horticultural display were the more useful beds of vegetables and fruits, carefully tended by a German gardener. On the same side was the winding carriage-way through a grove of stately poplars, which seemed as straight and dignified as the old carriage driver "Beverly," as he sat upon the seat like a monarch on his throne, and was a trusted, faithful servant whose authority over the carriage domain was never disputed. On the right of the house, commanding a view of the village from the side porch, were two ridges or hills that ran parallel and sloped gradually down to a meadow, forming midway a gentle declivity, at the foot of which was a spring and spring-house, where the water flowed as cool as a mountain stream into the dairy, and converted the spring-house into a refrigerator for the use of the good housewife. The hollow between the hills was filled with tall spreading trees that waved and flaunted their branches over the eaves of the mansion, giving a grateful shade when the sun was at high noon. A pathway wound down to the spring, where there were rustic seats and tables, and here often the midday luncheon or evening meal was supplemented by the fruit of the dairy, and melons made ice-cold by the water of the spring.

"The old spring under the hill is cool,
With blotches and rifts of sun;
Its air is as grateful and fresh and sweet
As the air of a summer dawn.
The song of a bird in the trees above,
Below the song of a rill,
Are the only sounds that are heard around
The old spring under the hill.

"How oft we have trudged in other days,
When boys and girls at our play,
To the shade and stillness of that old spring,
Remote from the garish day!
How oft by its sparkling waters clear
We have knelt and quaffed our fill!
And never a draught was as sweet as that
From the old spring under the hill.

A Soldier's Honor.

“The years are many, the years are long,
Between us and that fair time ;
We hear no more the tinkling song,
Nor the water's silver chime ;
But oft in the mirror of memory
We can see the image still
Of the winding pathway, the shadows deep,
And the old spring under the hill.”

The old spring is there still; the old mansion stands a wreck of its former glory; some of the live oaks planted by the mother as acorns are there, the fair skies that greet the eye are as blue as of old,—but all else is changed, and decay has marked the old home for its own. The terraces, the stately poplars, the winding driveway, the yellow jonquils, the roses,—all are gone, and the fair forms that once brightened the home now lie under the sod, not far from the old homestead, and make it holy ground to surviving friends and admirers of this once well-known family, which was one of the oldest and most prominent in the history of the State. The home circle consisted of the father and mother,—Judge and Mrs. Van Dorn,—three sons and six daughters. In the order of birth were Mary, Jane, Octavia, Earl, Aaron, Mabella, Sarah, Emily and Jacob. The two elder daughters married early, Mary becoming Mrs. John O. Lacy; Jane, Mrs. John D. Vertner. When the youngest child was about a year old the mother died and left Octavia, then a girl of fourteen years of age, in charge of the household. The sons were sent to an academy near Baltimore to be educated; in a few years the father died, and the home was entirely broken up, “some at the altar and some at the tomb.”

Can it be possible that human beings are born under lucky and unlucky stars; that there is a destiny that shapes our ends; that the influence of a star will lend brilliancy to a life, permit it to ascend to the zenith of prosperity and happiness, to go down in darkness and sorrow forever? Some lives give color to the truth of these aphorisms, and the lives of many men and women bear testimony to the basis for such a creed.

As the name implies, Judge Van Dorn was descended from a Holland ancestry,—Baron Van Doorn, Lord High Chancellor to the King, being a direct ancestor. The family came to America early in the seventeenth century and bought lands from the Indians in Monmouth and Somerset Counties, New Jersey, which have been continuously in possession of their descendants to the present

time. The Judge's pious parents said he was so "no account on the farm, being always off with a book, that they would send him to Princeton College and make a preacher of him." So the Judge passed through the classical and theological training, but when he had finished he said he "could preach but could not pray." At the age of twenty-one he removed to Mississippi when that part of the country was yet a territory, and turned his attention to the law; received a life appointment as Judge of the Ophans' Court for the southern district of Mississippi, making his home at Port Gibson. He was a man of unswerving integrity, unimpeachable veracity, and redoubtable courage, with a quaint humor that made him a pleasing acquisition to any circle. The older people of the State never tire of recounting his witty sayings, anecdotes, and amusing jests. He was a Mason of high degree, and when he died in 1837, the fraternity published his death in these tender words:

"On Sunday morning the 19th ult. the remains of Judge P. A. Van Dorn were brought to this place and interred, with every manifestation of respect, that the worth of the deceased and the public estimation for his numerous descendants could inspire. The Masonic fraternity attended to pay those last and affecting attentions to a departed Brother, for which they have ever been most honorably distinguished. It must be consolatory to the relatives of Judge Van Dorn to look back on his well-spent life. covered with the testimonials of the approbation and the honors of his fellow citizens. This is a legacy which his children should value above all price; the last service a good man can do is to furnish an example, to cheer and to stimulate those left behind. This gentleman was born in New Jersey on the 12th of September, 1773, and descended, as his name indicates, from a Holland family. After graduating at the eminent school of Nassau Hall, at Princeton, N. J., the deceased removed South and settled first at Natchez, Mississippi, and soon engaged in the practice of law. His legal knowledge and exemplary business habits promoted him to be Judge of the Probate Court in Claiborne and Adams County. He departed this life on his way to his plantation on the Yazoo River, the 12th of February 1837, in the 64th year of his age. The absence of the kind attentions which tender affection can alone render on a deathbed must no doubt have been distressing; still let us not forget that the consolatory spirit of God

is present with His children, when they are most destitute of earthly friends."

Mrs. Van Dorn was a granddaughter of Colonel John Donelson of General Washington's staff, and a niece of Mrs. General Andrew Jackson. In appearance she was a fair brunette with dark hair and eyes, while Judge Van Dorn inherited the Saxon blond type of his ancestors,—some of their children resembling one and some the other parent. Mary was fair with light brown hair and blue eyes and was counted very pretty; Jane was a noble woman with lustrous brown hair and blue eyes, while Octavia was like the mother with dark hair and eyes. The first-born son, like the father, had light flaxen hair and bright steel-blue eyes; and so on the children varied in style, feature and color. The Donelson family went from Virginia to Tennessee and from there into Louisiana and Mississippi. Mrs. Van Dorn was a Miss Caffery and was an aunt of Senator Caffery of Louisiana. After the death of Mrs. Van Dorn, Octavia, then only fourteen years of age, journeyed with her father to New York and Washington, visiting President Jackson at the latter city. She was in mourning for her mother. When a small child, she and a younger sister were critically ill, the physician giving no hope of life, but prescribed a remedy which he said might relieve the children if they could be induced to take it, but not to force it. The mother offered every inducement to the little girls to take the nauseous dose; the younger child chose a "new white dress," while, strangely, Octavia selected a "new black dress." Mabella died and was dressed in her new white dress; Octavia survived and wore mourning all her life, the children thus seeming unwittingly to select their own fate.

General Jackson idolized his wife, and was interested in her kindred; he fancied that the beautiful young girl resembled his wife, then deceased, and paid her much attention. On one occasion in driving on Pennsylvania Avenue, he stopped the carriage at a jeweler's and selected a ring set with pearls, had a lock of his hair placed in it and presented it to his fair visitor, who treasured it as a souvenir of her memorable visit to the White House.

CHAPTER II.

BIRTH, EDUCATION, MARRIAGE.

IN the bright and happy home of Judge Van Dorn, which was embowered in foliage that never changed, and where the mocking-bird sang its love song to its mate, blended with the minor notes of the whippoorwill from the willows that dipped into the stream near by, as it rippled and gurgled to the sea; where the roses ran riot over the walls, and the breath of a thousand flowers filled the air; where the harvest moon shone over a happy household, and the stars kept watch and marked the destiny of its inmates,—in this beautiful and supernal atmosphere was born, on September 17th, 1820, the soldier, Earl Van Dorn, who was to become the pride of his house and one well beloved by his comrades in arms. The blood of a noble Holland ancestry and patriot fathers of the American Revolution coursed through his veins, and he was destined to become an American warrior in more than one of the nation's battles, in Mexico, and in Texas against the savage Comanches, and in the war between the States. In his early youth he chose the profession of arms for his life work, and at the age of sixteen, unprompted and unaided by an older head, addressed a letter to ex-President Jackson, at the Hermitage in Tennessee, stating his desire to become a military man; and at length, after waiting several months, while sitting under a tree on the playground near Baltimore, feeling melancholy and homesick, the principal of the academy appeared holding up a large official envelope, with a big red seal, and called for Earl Van Dorn. It proved to be a commission to enter West Point, obtained by General Jackson, and with hurried eagerness he packed his trunks and was soon on his way to the Military Academy. There he remained for the four years' course, never during that time visiting his native place,—being one of the few Southern students that could endure the restraint and rigid training of the school. How he

passed his time, the following letter indicates, as well as his personal feelings concerning his old home, his duties at the academy, and his affectionate disposition. This letter is addressed to his widowed sister Octavia, who was then residing in Maryland, having married a native of that State, Dr. Vans M. Sulivane, and where the young cadet often spent his vacations.

“ WEST POINT, April 6, 1841.

“ MY DEAR OCTAVIA :

“ I have made several attempts to answer your kind letter, but have not been able to write with such buoyancy of spirits as I would like, or as would give any pleasure to even my sister. I have felt it impossible after a week of exercising and hard study, together with the hard drills of a soldier, to sit down and write with fresh spirit to any one, and now at this season of the year when such things are more severe, I put off from day to day hoping to find some moment of revival, but have to ask your forgiveness for the late date of my letter, and to offer an humble apology for an unsoldierlike procrastination. Life is monotonous here and I can only write of my feelings, thoughts, and love for my sisters and brother. I wish I were in active service, that I might write of hairbreadth escapes in the deadly breach, and such things from the fields of war. This piping time of peace to one of my vocation is trying, and I long with a great longing for something to dissipate a heavy cloud of melancholy which hangs over me. In spite of the society of gay friends it will not go. I find a want of congeniality among them, although they are gay and happy—but there is something wanting. Perhaps it is their very joyousness, their hopes of future happiness expressed in the word, *a happy home*, good father, kind mother—all that make them happy and myself thoughtful and sad, as they recall associations and reminiscences of times when I, too, had a home of my own as bright and happy. But to dwell upon these things is weak and not worthy of a soldier. I am something like the Black Knight, hard to put in motion but as hard to stop when in motion. To-day I am at my studies and cannot quit, for there is a break in them I must repair. So adieu.”

Earl Van Dorn thus became a military man, devoting his whole life to the study of military tactics, living in U. S. garrisons and

forts, and became cosmopolitan in his citizenship as an officer educated for the army. Subsequently, when his native State had need for his services he became an officer of the Confederate army. The life and incidents connected with public men who have been associated with momentous periods of American history are interesting inheritances of the nation, and their birth, home-life and education are sought to lend color, as it were, to their claim to distinction.

General Van Dorn graduated at West Point with men who became distinguished, and at a time when great men abounded. When he returned South to visit his sisters, he appeared in the uniform of a second lieutenant of the U. S. army, and with his graceful physique, handsome regular features, fine blue eyes and waving blond hair, he looked every inch a soldier of whom the country might well be proud.

He was first assigned to duty at Fort Pike on the Gulf of Mexico, and from there to Mount Vernon, Alabama, where at the early age of twenty-three he married the only daughter of Colonel Godbold, an esteemed citizen of that neighborhood. As the only child, the parents of Mrs. Van Dorn were averse to being separated, and consequently the young Lieutenant was often left alone at his barracks. Mrs. Van Dorn, as a bride, was a girlish looking little woman, sixteen years of age, modest and shy, slight and graceful, and the youthful heart of the soldier soon fell a victim to her romantic charms. Two children were the result of this marriage, a boy and a girl. The daughter married at an early age, several years after her father's death, and died leaving four children. The boy reached manhood, and died at Monroe, Louisiana, and was buried there, the good people of that city giving him every attention in his illness, and strewing his grave with flowers, for the sake of his father. A paper announced his demise as follows:

"Earl Van Dorn, the only son of General Earl Van Dorn, died in this city yesterday morning, April 30th, 1884. Mr. Van Dorn had been for some time employed as sub-contractor on the railroad west of the river, and from the exposure incident to his business contracted pneumonia, and neither the skill of his physician nor the kind attentions and nursing of devoted friends could stay the certain approach of death. Mr. Van Dorn's funeral took place from the Episcopal church, where a large number of our citizens

gathered to honor the remains of the son of an illustrious father, and the casket, decorated with the flowers of early spring, was borne thence to Monroe Cemetery, where the lives of young and old alike find a close."

In 1876, the young son announced, in touching words, his mother's death:

" MOUNT VERNON, ALA., Feb. 10, 1876.

" It is sad to announce the death of my dear and beloved mother. She departed this life the 19th of January.

" I received your kind letter and answer immediately. I appreciate your effort to get employment for me, and would like to accept, but I feel so incapable of any kind of responsible business on account of my inferior education that I should be at a loss what to do. I will leave Alabama soon. I do not feel that there is anything more on earth dear to me since I lost my dear mother,— you are next to her, and I look on you as a second mother to me. I must love one my mother loved as she did you. Please have my mother's death announced, and will you write her obituary?

" EARL VAN DORN, Jr."

CHAPTER III.

MEXICAN WAR.

SOON after the marriage of General Van Dorn, war was declared between this country and Mexico, and he left his bride for the field of war. In the campaigns in Mexico his name was frequently mentioned for gallantry in action, and at Fort Brown, Texas, he performed a deed similar to one which made Sergeant Jasper famous at Fort Moultrie, S. C., in the War of the Revolution. But such deeds of daring are so common with American soldiers that they have ceased to be noticed. At Fort Brown, while the siege was in progress, it was observed that the U. S. flag had been shot down outside the fort. The fact was called to the attention of the commanding officer, Major Brown, who at once asked for volunteers to go out and hoist the defiant emblem. Lieutenant Van Dorn promptly responded, and with an assistant went outside to raise the flag. Amid a storm of shot and shells, tearing up the ground at his feet, he triumphantly raised the flag, flung it to the breeze, and returned to the fort unharmed, amidst shouts of applause from his comrades.

At that time he was attached to the 7th U. S. Infantry, but was soon after appointed on the staff of General Persifer F. Smith; and at the storming of Chapultepec, as General Smith was too ill to participate in the engagement, Lieutenant Van Dorn asked permission to join his regiment, did so, and was among the first to scale the wall, and with his sword to cut his way into the citadel. He was with General Quitman at the battle of Monterey, and entered the city of Mexico with General Scott, receiving his only wound at Belen Gate.

As is well known, Texas was originally a State belonging to the republic of Mexico. It was an empire in territory, but its sparse population was American and they had received authority from Mexico to colonize it. They soon set up an independent territory,

and war ensued between Texas and Mexico, until, in 1836, Santa Anna was captured and a treaty was made with him. The Texans then offered annexation to the United States, and in 1845 it was accepted, and resulted in war with Mexico. This was a political war, and was considered by many persons as a most unholy war on the part of the United States, "presenting an instance," General Grant states in his interesting *Person:1 Memoirs*, "of a republic following the bad example of European monarchies in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory." And in this connection he adds, that "the Southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the Mexican war. Nations like individuals are punished for their transgressions,—we were punished in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times."

The usual incidents of camp life attended this "army of occupation" in Texas and Mexico, and deeds of daring were reported; many flattering reports of gallantry reached Washington, and the heroes of the Mexican battles were recommended for promotion. General Van Dorn received several brevets. Among the letters written from the seat of war are the following, which may be of interest to those who live to recall the scenes therein described.

"COMARGO, MEXICO, July 20, 1846.

"MY DEAR OCTAVIA:

"I received your kind letter a day before I left Matamoras, but could not answer on account of the great worry we were in. You may judge of this when I had to get a friend to write to my dear wife for me. I thank my friends in Cambridge for their kind messages, which will be another spur to my ambition. I would be proud to hit the mark of their hopes for my distinction and shall assuredly try to do so.

"The army is about moving forward upon Monterey. The 7th Regiment of Infantry, to which I have the honor to belong, and a section of Lieutenant Bragg's Artillery, arrived at this place on the 15th and took possession of the town without opposition. This is but the vanguard of the army and a cover to the depot established at this place. Day before yesterday three companies of the 5th Infantry also arrived; the others will soon follow—in fact the whole army will soon be here, and then *on* to Monterey and Leona Vicario, where glory awaits us. I long to stand on the heights of Sierra Madre and take a peep into the rich valleys of

Chihuahua, and see the stars and stripes flying around me. Don't you poor helpless female population wish you were *men* that you might snatch a sword and join in the game for glory? What does the gambler know of excitement who has millions staked on a card? He loses but millions, he can win but millions. But here *life* is to lose—glory to win. Who can know what the bosom feels, how the heart swells with burning emotions, hopes, proud longings for distinction. I have always looked on what is called a soldier's glory with indifference, and imagined that I could never value it except as a puff to my *vanity*. I did not know then the fire that was in my heart—it had never been kindled. The hot sigh of death which first passed by me awakened what had always slumbered, and set fire to my ambition. It rages now like a house on fire—but *you* do not love excitement—I had forgotten that.

“Comargo was a pretty town before the flood—I mean before a recent one—not the *big* one. Most of the houses have been injured by the water which swept through the streets and plaza. Many of the people were driven to the mountains for protection; some remained and crawled upon the housetops, some lived in arks or rafts, and swung around with the tide, and fished. The water has now subsided, and the American camp is in the plaza—a pleasant change to the patriotic portion of Los Mexicanos. The people are very strange in their customs, especially the ladies. They do some things and leave undone other things, which would make one of you faint, yet to them it is natural—they are so *naïve*. The only part of dress which they are at all particular about is the skirt, but a bodice they scorn to wear. The plunge at twilight into the river and bathing is their principal amusement—*al fresco*. Comargo is on the San Juan, about six miles from the Rio Grande, half way from Matamoras to Monterey. During the bombardment of Fort Brown I had the honor to be shot at several times *outside* of the fort, when I went out to hoist the stars and stripes, which were some hundred yards or more off. I dodged several bomb-shells which threatened to fall on my head. I skipped out of the way of a rolling howitzer ball; and stooping one day accidentally, a cannon ball passed over my head which would have cut me in two;—musket balls flew around me at one time like a thousand humming-birds—so I had the sound of all kinds of music. The only wound I received was a scratch on the ankle in dodging a shell.

"My facilities for writing are poor. I looked all around for a barrel top to write on, but could only borrow an old woman's tub for an *escritoire*. We have been in tents now eleven months—our lodgings on the cold, cold ground. How do you think I stand the separation from my dear wife? I wonder if she can still love me when I married her only to leave her in distress at my absence. But she encourages me to great deeds, and if Heaven wills it, I will win a smile for my return.

"YOUR AFFECTIONATE BROTHER EARL."

"COMARGO, August 20, 1846.

"MY DEAR OCTAVIA:

"We are off for Monterey—the first brigade has already taken up the line of march; the second crosses the San Juan to-morrow,—the one I am attached to. I have the honor to be aide-de-camp to its commander, and the satisfaction of having a horse to ride instead of the pain of walking so many miles. We go through Mier to Seralvo, where we will probably stop a while; thence I know not where. But it is unmilitary to write about these matters; besides being against Army Regulations. It is said we will have a big battle somewhere about Monterey. Then is my chance—that cooping up at Fort Brown was not pleasant. We will remember it—and our battle cry shall be, 'Remember Fort Brown!' I don't know when I can write again—perhaps at Seralvo, or on the summit of the Sierra Madre, or at Leona Vicario.

"EARL."

"VERA CRUZ, April 15, 1847.

"DEAR COLONEL GODBOLD:

"I presume you have heard of the fall of the great Castle of San Juan d'Uloa and Vera Cruz. It is true that our victorious flag waves over every battery in sight. It was not as hard to take either as Monterey. We lost only forty or fifty in all, killed and wounded, but the city in some parts is absolutely demolished and in ruins by our shells and cannon. We were all spectators merely whilst our cannon did the business. I knew it would be bloodless or a bloody affair according as we had to storm it or not, as there were upwards of 300 pieces of cannon in the defenses, and the thunders of artillery were terrific. At times four or five shells went streaming into the city, and their explosion and the tumbling

in of walls, the shrieks of women and children, made a pandemonium. The city looked like a cloud of smoke throwing out flashes of lightning and roaring with thunder. This lasted several days and nights. But it is now ours. I went in to see the ruins and found it a splendid city, but now full of rubbish and dirt. Our stay will be short, and we will leave, as soon as transportation can be got ready, for 'La Puerta Nacional,' about thirty miles on the road to Mexico. We may go as far as Jalapa, thirty miles farther, the most healthy and delightful climate in the world. We can see the snow on the top of Orizaba, near Jalapa. I think we will march in about five days. You will be glad to know that I am now a first lieutenant, so some little promotion at last; and when I am appointed aide-de-camp to General Smith, the duties of which I have been performing so long, my pay will increase as well. Of course you have heard of General Taylor's big fight at Buena Vista. We hear that some of the volunteers behaved badly, which I was sorry to hear. We do not expect much resistance until we reach the city of Mexico, and that place will be taken pretty much as this place was. We have many large guns and mortars, and life will be more regarded in consequence."

"NATIONAL PALACE, MEXICO,
"January 13, 1848.

"MY DEAR OCTAVIA:

"There is a great deal of talk about peace, but there is no foundation upon which to build a reasonable hope, or to raise up despair. Were the Mexicans wise or civilized we should have had peace long since; as they are not, who can count upon their councils or their whims? Those in power want peace to get rid of our army, which weakens them; the intelligent want war to keep our army here to destroy theirs and to protect them, and to give just laws. The poor, God bless their weakness, do not care a claco about the affair, further than that they are taught to look upon us as their barbarian enemies who would cut their throats for amusement. Between all this no one can foretell the future, and I would not be surprised to find our faces turned to-morrow from the 'dew-dropping South' towards our happy homes, or to be standing in a few weeks on the silent shores of the great Pacific, sighing across the stranger hemisphere to my wife and yourself.

"You ask me who I think will be our next President? I care

so little about it that I never have turned a thought to the subject. I know General Taylor to be honest now, but whose honesty, whose principles can stand the test of *Power*—of high places? A man who has been sober all his life will grow dizzy, and perhaps fall when he looks down from a height into chasms below him. I do not know and do not care who will be our next President.

“I have not known what sickness is in this country. My sister Jane wishes me to resign and come home. I never could be happy out of the army. I have no other home—could make none that would be genial to my feelings. The minds of civilians and ours run in different directions. It would be a hard task at this late hour to make them run together, or to change one into the other. To make myself unhappy would be to make you all so—my wife and my sisters. I shall return home when honor flings me loose from Mexico. I am really delighted to know so many of our loved ones remain in Port Gibson. My love to all.

“EARL.”

CHAPTER IV.

TEXAS, INDIAN FIGHTS.

AFTER many bickerings and conflicts between the political parties concerning the claims of General Scott and General Taylor, the administration and Congress, on the basis of a money consideration, peace was finally declared between Mexico and the United States, and Texas became an undisputed star upon the banner of the Union. The volunteers returned to their homes covered with the laurels of conquest, while the regular army repaired to their several garrisons and barracks, many of them rejoicing in honorable brevets won on battle-fields. General Taylor, the hero of this war, was nominated for the presidency and elected, going from the barracks at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to the White House.

Brevet-Major Earl Van Dorn at this period was stationed at Baton Rouge and the appended letter expresses in a measure the situation. The U. S. barracks at this place are composed of spacious buildings forming a square, surrounding a court, and lying in the midst of handsomely improved grounds, located on the banks of the Mississippi and commanding fine views up and down the river. The writer visited Major and Mrs. Van Dorn during their stay at these barracks, and reaching the station in their absence, and finding the doors of the officers' quarters opening on a balcony common to all, was guided to Major Van Dorn's quarters by objects familiar to his home life, such as a large vase decorated with a bust of Napoleon, books and pictures, and entered, feeling assured of being in the right place and of a hearty welcome. These letters were written from this point.

"BATON ROUGE, LA., November 12, 1848.

"MY DEAR SISTER EMILY:

"In my letter of a few days ago I told you that I was on my way to join my regiment at Jefferson barracks near St. Louis, and that I should call by and see you all on my way up the river. I,

however, reported here to General Taylor for orders, and he has assigned me to duty with a company of my regiment now stationed here until I can hear the result of an application for transfer to the company. So you will perceive that if I am lucky I shall be stationed very comfortably and near home, and that you can without any difficulty move down whenever you can detach yourself from Octavia and have as pleasant a place to live in, almost, as Port Gibson. I have not heard whether or not Octavia has reached home; if she has you will not wish to leave her before about the 28th instant. I regret very much that we cannot visit her as we had anticipated.

"We have now been here almost a week and are pretty well established in garrison, which is a very pleasant one. There are several very agreeable families near us and everything promises well. Miss Betty Taylor was the first lady who called on Carrie, and we have had, of course, the honor and the pleasure of paying our respects to the General and his wife. They are both plain, unassuming and agreeable old folks, beloved by all who know them personally. It is said here that the General is elected and destined for the White House. I am rejoiced of course.

"We enjoy ourselves in garrison as much as possible for those who have participated in such soul-stirring scenes as we have, but find it rather hard to become settled and satisfied with calmer pursuits. However, time changes all things, even the sterner longings of men. Carrie and myself now sit down to our meals opposite each other alone, and present a perfect picture of domestic felicity—all by ourselves, and we have nobody to strike our elbows when carving our ducks or pouring out our tea and coffee. I wish you and little Earl and Marshall were here to fill up the vacant seats and let us hear some noise,—everything is so silent. I feel too much the passing wing of time—almost hear it. Carrie will enjoy your company and I can have then more freedom in going out; I do not leave her now lest she should be too lonely. I have some music for you and some pictures brought from Mexico. I will not trust them to the mail or packets for fear they will be lost. Carrie joins me in love to Octavia and all at Burlington."

"MY DEAR OCTAVIA:

"Will we see you South this winter, and can we not have a

family Christmas dinner at Burlington,* Aunt Nancy at the head of the table, Miss O. Van Dorn on the right? (I think she will be as pretty as you were when you bore that name, with more temper though, and assurance.) It would be a melancholy pleasure to meet once more and call the roll. Alas, how many absentees! Aunt Nancy is with them at Burlington, and they seem cheerful under the circumstances. We bend but never break. We are like those tall Lombardy poplars on 'The Hill,' whose leaves were constantly quivering in the slightest breeze, and whose high tops were constantly bending low to the ruder winds, but whose heart was never injured, however strong the storms might visit them.

"Will you not write to Uncle William Van Dorn at Peapack, New Jersey, and get him to give or lend us our father's portrait? I think I could copy it. Give my love to all who were so kind to me at Cambridge, and kiss pretty little Octavia for me. I was very proud of her in Cincinnati, and hope the promise of her young days will be realized, both for her beauty, modesty, lady-like bearing, and accomplishments. She must be my Olivia's model, and so I hope to see her '*une femme comme il y en a peu, et fait a peindre.*'"

The military record of Earl Van Dorn at the close of the war with Mexico was kindly furnished by the U. S. War Department, as follows:

"Graduated from the Military Academy and appointed Brevet 2d Lieutenant, 7th Infantry, July 1, 1842; 2d Lieutenant, 7th Infantry, Nov. 30, 1844; 1st Lieutenant, 7th Infantry, March 3, 1847; Service in regiment at Port Pike, La., September 28, 1842, to Dec., 1842; Fort Morgan, Ala., to July 6, 1843; Mount Vernon Arsenal, Ala., July 8 to Nov. 15, 1843; Fort Morgan, Ala., Nov. 16 to Dec. 13, 1843; Mount Vernon Arsenal, Ala., to December, 1844; Camp Barraneas, Fla., Dec. 29, 1844, to April 4, 1845; on leave to June 4, 1845; with regiment at Fort Pickens, Fla., to Aug. 24, 1845; in Texas, Aug. 30, 1845, to July, 1846 (engaged in defense of Fort Brown, May 3--9, 1846); Mexico, to July 9, 1848 (Adjutant 2d Brigade, 2d Division Army of Occupation, Aug. to Nov., 1846, and on staff of General Persifer Smith to Nov., 1848);

* The beautiful suburban residence of Mrs. Vertner.

engaged in battle of Monterey, Sept. 21 to 23, 1846; Siege of Vera Cruz, March 9 to 29, 1847; battle of Cerro Gordo, April 17, 1847,—battle of Contreras, Aug. 19,—20, 1847; battle of Cherubusco, Aug. 20, 1847; Storming of Chapultepec, Sept. 13, 1847; Assault and capture of the City of Mexico, Sept. 13--14, 1847, where he was severely wounded on entering the Belen Gate, Sept. 13, 1847; with regiment at Baton Rouge, La., Nov. 6, 1848, to May, 1849; Jefferson Barracks, Mo., to Aug. 31, 1849; in Fla. Sept., 1849, to June, 1850; on recruiting service to Nov., 1851; at New Orleans, La., as Secretary of Military Asylum, Nov. 6, 1851 to, May, 1855.*

"On recruiting service May to July 1855; with his regiment at Jefferson Barracks, July 22, 1855, to October 27, 1855; in Texas at Camps Cooper and Colorado and Fort Chadbourne to Aug. 15, 1858 (engaged with Comanche Indians July 1, 1859); on Scout to Nov., 1859 (engaged in action Oct. 1, 1858, with Indians near Washita Village, where he was severely wounded); at Camp Rad-miniski, Ind.Ter., Nov. 14, 1858, to June 12, 1859 (engaged in action with Comache Indians May 13, 1859); at Camps Cooper and Colorado to Sept., 1859; Fort Macon, Texas, to Nov. 1, 1859; on leave to March 1, 1860; with regiment at Fort Mason to December 25, 1860; on leave to January 3, 1861, when he resigned."

"Official Commendation: The officers of brigade and regimental staff were conspicuous in the field. Of those in their particular departments, Lieutenant Van Dorn (and others), aide-de-camp 7th Infantry, etc., are highly commended by their respective chiefs, to the justness of which I have the pleasure to add my personal observation." (Report of Bvt. Brig.-Gen. W. J. Worth, Battle of Monterey.)

"The events of Fort Brown, Monterey, Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo had already afforded to my aide-de-camp, Lieut. Earl Van Dorn opportunities of calling forth the commendations of his commanding officers. He has not let pass the present one; but though his gallantry was again shown in a personal conflict with the enemy it is far from being the highest quality of a soldier that

* At this point he was pleasantly domiciled with his wife and one child, when the dreaded "yellow fever" became epidemic, and after taking his family to a place of safety in Alabama, returned to nurse the sick, and thereby proved himself as humane and fearless in a panic of disease as he was heroic in war.

he possesses." (Report of Bvt. Brig.-Genl. P. F. Smith of Battles of Contreras and Cherubusco.)

"In adding to the list of individuals of conspicuous merit I must limit myself to a few of the many names which might be enumerated Lieut. Van Dorn (7th Infantry), aide-de camp to Brig.-Genl. Smith." Report to Gen. Winfield Scott of General Quitman of Capture of City of Mexico.

"I take great pleasure by extending my cordial concurrence in the high commendation bestowed in the official reports of their respective chiefs upon the good conduct of and Lieutenant Earl Van Dorn, aid to General Smith." (Report of Major-General Quitman of Capture of City of Mexico.)

From this official record it will be seen that this officer devoted the greatest part of his life to the service of the country, answering every call to arms, and never failing to respond, however great the difficulty or danger, nor shrank from any duty imposed upon him, from the time he graduated from the Academy in 1842 to the time of his resignation in 1861.

After the close of the war with Mexico Major Van Dorn visited his native place and received cordial congratulations and encomiums from all sides. The legislature of the State, citizens of Port Gibson, and Claiborne County, presented him with costly swords in honor of his achievements in Mexico. Years after, in a public parade at Cincinnati with General Scott by his side, he wore one of these swords, and it was so much handsomer than the one General Scott wore which had been presented by the State of New York, that the young officer felt no small degree of pride and gratitude for the honor his own people had conferred upon him. In a subsequent visit to Port Gibson the citizens presented him with a handsome silver service in recognition of his gallantry in Texas against the Indians. During the Civil War Mrs. Van Dorn managed to save this gift of silver, but the swords were captured or abstracted from her home by Union soldiers encamped on her mother's place in Alabama, and the correspondence that in after years took place is given in the Appendix. After the war the swords were offered for sale by their captors, first to the State, and then to members of General Van Dorn's family. The Governor waited on a member of the family and asked if he should recommend their purchase, but the answer was that the State was too poor to buy them again, and the family could not see the jus-

tice of having to purchase articles from a party to whom they did not belong. Mrs. Van Dorn was a widow at the time the swords were taken.

Still another sword was presented to General Van Dorn during the Civil War by the State of Mississippi, for his "noble defense of Vicksburg." This sword was also captured at Jackson by a Union soldier, who left the scabbard, which now lies in that city awaiting the return of the sword to its proper owner,—the State, if it so pleases. The present holder of the sword resides in a village of Illinois, and offers one of them for sale for the consideration of \$250. The correspondence speaks for itself. (See Appendix.)

The following account of the formation of two cavalry regiments organized and equipped for the defense of Texas against the attacks and depredations of the savage Comache and Apache Indians, is reproduced from the *Magazine of History*, New York, and gives somewhat in detail the services of those regiments and their brave officers, in which engagements with the Indians Major Van Dorn's services are conspicuous.

CAVALRY FIGHTS WITH THE COMANCHES.*

Soon after the war with Mexico the United States territory became so extended and the hostile Indians on the frontier of Texas so dangerous and troublesome that an increased military force was deemed necessary for the protection of the border States, and Congress adopted measures for raising and equipping two regiments of mounted men, called the First and Second Cavalry. In forming these regiments great care was used in selecting only such officers as had "won their spurs" in the recent war with Mexico; and no more chivalric names adorn the annals of history than this arm of the military service—names which have become as familiar as the strains of "Home, Sweet Home," and at the mention of which the heart of the nation must thrill with pride while the nation endures; and though in after years some of them pass in review as having worn the "Gray" instead of the "Blue," they remain no less American in their heritage and valor, and may still be claimed as our own military chieftains.

* By this writer.

In the formation of the First Cavalry were enrolled the names of Col. E. V. Sumner, Jos. E. Johnston, Ben McCullough, Geo. B. McClellan, Ransom, Walker, J. E. B. Stuart, McIntyre, Crittenden, Lomax, Church, and others. In the Second Cavalry were Albert Sidney Johnston, Robert E. Lee, Geo. H. Thomas, Wm. J. Hardee, Earl Van Dorn, E. Kirby Smith, Theo. O'Hara (the poet), John B. Hood, Fitzhugh Lee, Lieuts. Kimmel, Van Camp, Evans and others. After these regiments were formed they were stationed in Texas, the theater of the principal Indian depredations, and their dashing officers, who had made themselves conspicuous for gallantry on numerous battle-fields in Mexico, were frequently engaged in hand-to-hand fights with the savage Comanches on the borders of Texas, and their trophies of battle bore testimony to the cruel and deadly foes they had to meet and fight to the death rather than be captured and tortured. Scalps of men, women and children hung from belts of the savages, gaudy trappings of bright feathers woven into fantastic designs with shells and beads; their skin and that of their horses stained with gay colors, giving them an unearthly appearance. In time of battle their rude weapons were brandished with demoniacal glee and ferocity, and excited the gravest horror.

Among the engagements that occurred in 1856 was the battle of "The Four Lakes," which was one of necessarily cruel slaughter. It was in this conflict that the Comanches were first introduced to the Minie ball and the long-range rifle. The roar of artillery and the flashing of sabers were only equaled by the savage antics and war-whoops which served to render the fight weird and furious,—our heroes resolving to perish rather than be captured. The Comanches advanced with so much celerity and irregularity that it was difficult to reach them, and each Indian seemed to fight on his own account; but the organized firing of disciplined troops even here tested the art of trained warfare, and without much loss they finally put the enemy to flight.

In the same year an important engagement was led by Lieutenant Jno. B. Hood, with a command of twenty-five men from the Second Cavalry. The general orders were to attack any hostile Indians away from their reservations. Lieutenant Hood had discovered a trail, but, being weary and thirsty, and his horses jaded from a long march, he went towards a river for water. Not far off he saw a few horses grazing and a flag waving over some brush.

This proved a decoy. As he advanced within a few paces the flag suddenly dropped and a large body of Comanches setting fire to the brush, rushed from their ambush, some armed with Spanish bayonets, some with rifles and lances and many with bows and arrows, and raising a wild, desperate war-whoop, attacked the surprised party of cavalry. Hood's men fired volley after volley until their shots were expended; then they fell back, leaving six of their comrades on the field, and Lieutenant Hood himself was borne away badly wounded. The plains and ravines to which they retreated seemed literally alive with savages, and that any of this brave command escaped death was a miracle. From the heights near by they witnessed the horrors of the Indian war dance around the slain, and their hearts were filled with a desire for quick revenge. On this occasion messengers were sent to headquarters, and soon reinforcedments were at hand, when a few discharges from a howitzer forced the Indians from their cover to the plain, where they were compelled to cope with batteries supported by dismounted men and cavalry. Companies moved against them with the coolness and precision of a parade; chief after chief of the enemy fell in rapid succession, and their gay trappings and plumage were draggling in the gory dust. Many Indian women were observed swiftly dragging their dead and wounded from the battle-field; and it was a relief to see them finally give way and fall back in confusion and alarm before their conquerors, whom they outnumbered ten to one. During this fight, or rather flight, Major Earl Van Dorn with a few men rode in pursuit of a party of fleeing Comanches, who were mounted on fleet mustangs and riding in some instances two on one horse. Major Van Dorn's horse was a spirited gray, which stopped at neither branch nor marsh, but cleared every obstacle, and plunging ahead placed his rider, who was a superior horseman, far in advance of his followers; and when the Indians in the rear of the retreating party were within range of his fire, he killed the horse the two Indians were riding. Finding themselves on the ground and hotly pursued, they quickly fell to their knees and took deliberate aim at the heart of their pursuer. He held the bridle reins in the left hand directly over his heart, and felt one arrow penetrate the two bones of the wrist, another arrow glance upward, entering the right side and passing out at the left, seriously injuring the lung. These arrows he drew from the wounds himself, the blood flowing in torrents.

At this juncture the sergeant of his company came to his rescue and threw his own body and that of his horse between the Major and the flying arrows. This act of self-sacrifice and heroism on the part of the sergeant was recognized by the Government by pensioning him for life.

Major Van Dorn was regarded as the most successful and daring Indian fighter of the time, and his campaigns secured for Texas a quiet period against the depredations of these tribes, but his name was one of terror and hatred to the Indians.

In 1858 hostilities were renewed and many murders were committed. Again Major Van Dorn was ordered by General Twiggs to equip four companies and go out on a scouting expedition and penetrate the heart of the Indian country. This he did, and after reaching the interior proceeded to build a stockade and place within it all the pack mules, extra horses and stores, and then left them in charge of the infantry. Friendly Indians soon discovered that a large Comanche camp was located near the village of Wichita, 90 miles away. The four companies, attended by guides, started for the camp, and the march of 90 miles was made in 36 hours, causing the men to be continuously in the saddle the latter sixteen hours of the ride. At daylight on the morning of October 1, 1858, they reached the village. The four companies were formed into four columns to enter the village, with orders to deploy and charge when in sight of the camp. The charge was sounded on the left and a sudden and deadly swoop was made on the unsuspecting enemy. The Indians rose up with a wild war whoop and made an obstinate defense; there were many hand-to-hand fights, but the battle resulted in a decisive victory to the cavalry. Eighty or ninety warriors were slain and many were captured. General Scott reported to the War Department these victories in the following words:

“HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
“ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE,
“WASHINGTON, D. C.

“Near the Wichita village, Brevet Major Van Dorn, Capt. 2d Cavalry, commanding A, F, H and K companies of his regiment, after a forced march of ninety miles in thirty-six hours, came, a little after daylight, upon the camp of the hostile Co-

manches, consisting of one hundred and twenty lodges, and between four and five hundred Indians. He immediately charged upon it, and after a most desperate struggle of an hour and a half, during which there were many bloody hand-to-hand encounters, achieved a most decisive and important victory.

" Fifty-six Indians were left dead on the field; one hundred and twenty lodges were burned; over three hundred animals taken; a large quantity of supplies appropriated or destroyed; and the surviving Indians dispersed among the mountains in a destitute condition.

" With this victory it is painful to record the death of 2d Lieut. Cornelius Van Camp, 2d Cavalry, an active young officer of exceeding promise, once before named in this order for gallantry, who was shot through the heart with an arrow, while charging the enemy.

" Sergeant J. E. Garrison, of company F; Privates Peter Magar and Jacob Echard, of company H, were also killed. Private Henry Howard of that company, missing, supposed to have been killed.

" The following were wounded: Company A, Brevet Major Van Dorn, severely, four wounds.

* * * * *

" During the combat Capt. N. G. Evans, Second Lieuts. Harrison and Phifer, each killed two, and Lieut. Major killed three Indians in hand-to-hand encounters.

" The other officers who were under Major Van Dorn are Captains Whitney and Johnson, Second Lieut. Porter and Acting Assistant Surgeon Carswell, all of whom, together with the non-commissioned officers and privates of companies A, F, H and K, 2d Cavalry, are entitled to great commendation for their gallantry.

" By command of Brevet Lieut.-General Scott,

" L. THOMAS,

" *Asst. Adjt.-General.*

" ED. D. RUGGLES,

" *Asst. Adjt.-General.*"

REPORT OF GEN. TWIGGS.

"HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,

"SAN ANTONIO, October 19, 1858.

"Orders No. 25.

"The General commanding takes great pride in publishing to the Department the signal success of the command under Brevet Major Earl Van Dorn, Captain 2d Cavalry, over the Comanche Indians, at their camp near Wichita Village, on the 1st instant.

"Major Van Dorn, with his command, left Fort Belknap on the 15th ultimo, and marched in a northwest direction to the point designated in Special Orders No. 71, current series, where he established his depot, and threw up a field work for its protection: he had scarcely completed this work when, on the 29th ultimo, learning from his Indian spies that the Comanches were in force at a point about 90 miles due east from his position, he at once proceeded to secure his property and stores, and left with four companies of cavalry and a hundred and twenty-five friendly Indians in search of the enemy. After a forced march of over 90 miles, which was accomplished in thirty-six and a half hours, he came upon the enemy's camp, consisting of 120 lodges and between 400 and 500 Indians, a little after daylight on the 1st instant, charged it, and, after a most deperate struggle of an hour and a half, during which there were many bloody hand-to-hand engagements, achieved a victory more decisive and complete than any recorded in the history of our Indian warfare. *Fifty-six Indian warriors were left dead on the field*, one hundred and twenty lodges were burned, over three hundred animals taken, and a large quantity of supplies either appropriated to the use of the command or destroyed; the surviving Indians were dispersed among the mountains in a destitute condition.

"The General commanding the Department hoped much from this command, and he is most happy to say that the brilliancy of its success has been such as to exceed his most sanguine expectations.

"He deeply sympathizes with the officers under his command in the death of 2d Lieutenant Cornelius Van Camp, 2d Cavalry, a young officer of exceeding promise, who fell, pierced to the heart by an arrow, while gallantly charging the enemy in this engagement.

"He is pained to state, too, that Sergeant J. E. Garrison, of company 'F,' 2d Cavalry, who was mortally wounded, has since died, and that Privates Peter Magan and Jacob Echard of company 'H,' 2d Cavalry, were killed, and Private Henry Howard, of same company, is missing and supposed to have been killed.

"Brevet Major Earl Van Dorn, 2d Cavalry, was severely wounded, and one of his company, 'A,' Corporal Joseph P. Taylor, was dangerously so. Privates C. C. Alexander, of company 'H,' and C. C. Emery and A. J. McNamara, of company 'F,' 2d Cavalry, were severely wounded; whilst Sergeant C. B. McClellan, Corporal Bishop Gordon and Bugler M. Abergast, of company 'H,' Privates W. Frank, of company 'F,' and Smith Hinckley, of company 'K,' 2d Cavalry, were slightly wounded.

"The sutler, Mr. J. F. Ward, who was slightly wounded, and the special agent in charge of the friendly Indians, Mr. S. Ross, who was severely wounded, and both of whom were voluntarily with the expedition, are deserving the highest praise for their gallantry during the action.

"During the fight Captain N. G. Evans, Lieutenant Harrison and Phifer, each killed two, and Lieutenant Major killed three Indians in hand-to-hand encounters.

"The other officers of the command were Captains Whiting and Johnson, Lieutenant Porter and Act. Asst. Surgeon Carswell, U. S. Army; these officers, as well as the non-commissioned officers and privates of companies 'A,' 'F,' 'H,' and 'K,' 2d Cavalry, were engaged in the conflict, and are alike deserving the highest meed of commendation that can be bestowed upon them.

"The friendly Indians who were under Mr. Ross rendered essential service in first stampeding, and afterwards securing the enemy's animals, and are deserving of like praise with the regular troops.

"By order of Brevet Major-General Twiggs,

"JOHN WITHERS,
Assistant Adjutant-General."

These subjoined letters are expressive of his affectionate solicitude for his family during his long absences, and one especially

is written far from the comforts and privileges of his home and its associations.

TO HIS WIFE.

CAMP ON OTTER CREEK, C. N., October 12, 1858.

"You will have received news of my fight and of my wounds. I requested Mr. Porter to write to you for me the day I was shot, fearing you might receive exaggerated accounts of my condition. I thought at first myself that I should die, but soon discovered that I was not in a dangerous condition. My first wound was in the left arm; the arrow entered just above the wrist, passed between the two bones and stopped near the elbow. The second was in my body; the arrow entered opposite the ninth rib on the right side, passed through the upper portion of the stomach, cut my left lung, and passed out on the left side between the sixth and seventh ribs. Taylor came up just in time to attract the Indians' attention from me and probably saved my life. He is also seriously wounded. I killed the Indian that shot me, and his horse, in two shots, going at full speed. My little horse *Fink* acted nobly, and when I pulled the arrows from me, staining his shoulders and mane with my blood, and dismounting, the poor fellow stood perfectly still over me and seemed to feel sorrow for me. I love him better than any horse I ever had. I am now sitting up in my bed, and sometimes forget that I have been hurt. I shall be walking about in a few days. We got here yesterday from the battle ground, where we were compelled to stay some time on account of the wounded, who could not be moved. I was brought here eighty miles on a litter swung between two mules. I came very comfortably, though, and feel no fatigue. I had a 'big fight,' and you will see the papers full of it and of myself. Don't you feel proud of me? We killed more than sixty Indians. Poor Lieut. Van Camp was killed. It was a bad day for the *Vans*. Five of our men were killed and ten wounded. The doctor says that if my stomach had been full, instead of being perfectly empty, as it was, I would have died. I don't know how true this may be, but I am certainly in a fair way to get up now. You will see full accounts of the fight in the papers, so will say nothing about it.

"When I returned to the camp I found your long, kind letter telling me all about my little children and yourself. This letter made me feel well again. I was glad to hear of Olivia's spelling, and her good behavior. With all the boy's smartness, don't allow him to get impertinent—'tis not pretty. I was pleased at your wish to visit my sisters in Port Gibson. I hope you will do so. . . "

I am kindly furnished the following extract from a letter of Major Van Dorn's descriptive of his perilous position in the battle of Wichita. The Major says:

"I charged a party of Indians during the battle, which lasted about an hour, and after shooting one of them, got shot myself—one arrow entered my arm a little above the wrist and lodged near the elbow—another entered my right side, passed through the upper part of my stomach, ranging upwards, cut the lower part of my left lung, and came out on my left side.

"When I pulled the arrows from me, the blood followed as if weary of service, and impatient to cheat me of life—spilling like red wine from a drunkard's tankard.

"It was sublime to stand thus on the brink of the dark abyss, and the contemplation was awful. It was doubtful for some time if I should survive. I had faced death often, but never so palpably before—I gasped in dreadful agony for several hours, but finally became easy, and am now well. My noble, faithful horse, sprinkled with blood, stood over me where I fell and looked the sympathy he could not utter, and if I had died there I would not have been friendless. If several soldiers had not come up as I was shot, I would have been stuck as full of arrows as Gulliver was by the Lilliputians and my best friends could not have picked me out from among a dozen dead porcupines."

The return of this victorious little army was hailed with enthusiastic rejoicing and congratulation, and the Wichita fight and Van Dorn were the themes of song and story for many years along the borders and in the halls and banqueting rooms of the cities of Texas, and the martial music of the "Wichita March," composed by his sister and dedicated to him, resounded through the plains of Texas wherever the Second Cavalry encamped or rode on scouting expeditions in after years.

After these sanguinary engagements in Texas, Major Van Dorn visited his native place, and contemporaneous newspapers published his presence in flattering terms:

MAJOR EARL VAN DORN.

"We had the honor yesterday to make the acquaintance of this distinguished soldier, who is now in the city. Major Van Dorn is now enjoying a short respite from the arduous duties incident to the service of our Western frontier, in which he has been so actively engaged for several years past. No man connected with the United States Army, since the termination of the Mexican war, has achieved for himself such brilliant renown as has this gallant son of Mississippi. His name is a terror to all the fierce tribes that infest the vast plains that lie between San Antonio and El Paso.

"Major Van Dorn has recently been on a visit to his native State, and we see from the *Southern Reveille*, published at Port Gibson, Miss., that he was presented with a splendid silver service by his old friends and acquaintances, as a testimonial of their appreciation of him as a gentleman, and of the distinguished service that he has done the country 'on the tented field.'

"We bespeak for him the hospitality and amenities of our citizens."

(From the *Natchez Democrat*.)

This gallant young officer, in consequence of his late brilliant action on the frontier of Texas, in which he achieved a complete victory over a superior and well-trained force of Comanches, is attracting the public attention and many encomiums from the press. We rejoice at it, for he is well known in this community, and the columns of this paper, from the time he graduated with distinction at West Point, during the Mexican war, and down to the period of his late expedition, will show the appreciation in which he has always been held in this city. His father, the late Judge P. A. Van Dorn, was an old-time citizen of Natchez; he was a native of New Jersey, a man of great ability and influence, who came to Mississippi in 1771, and whose descendants are among the most distinguished citizens of this State and Louisiana.

Judge Van Dorn presided over the Court of Probate, one of the most important tribunals known to our jurisprudence. He was an excellent scholar, a man of extensive information, remarkable for his wit and convivial qualities; and his mansion, adorned by a most attractive and interesting circle of household divinities, was the abode of hospitality. He married a Miss Caffery, a near kinswoman of Mrs. General Andrew Jackson, and an aunt of the late John Jenkins, Esq., and D. C. Jenkins, both editors of papers, and among the most brilliant men the State ever produced. The parents of this household possessed all the attributes that go to make up a perfect humanity, and under the influences of this home young Van Dorn was nurtured, early exhibiting a penchant for military life.

At the commencement of the Mexican war he was ordered to the Rio Grande, and first distinguished himself in the defense of Fort Brown. During that bombardment the flagstaff, thirty yards in front of the breastworks, was struck down by a cannon ball, and in the face of a terrible fire he went out and rehoisted it.

May 13, 1859.—Brevet Major Earl Von Dorn, Captain 2d Cavalry, commanding "A," "B," "C," "F," "G," and "H" companies 2d Cavalry, and fifty-eight friendly Indians from the Brazos Agency, after a march of over two hundred miles, came up with a party of ninety or one hundred Comanches, occupying a strong defensive position. Major Van Dorn, by gallant and skilful dispositions swept the ravine, occupied by the Indians, with dismounted skirmishers, while the mounted troops on the crest of hills commanded the outlets above and below the position of the enemy. The fight was sharp and bloody, and took place on foot in a thick jungle. The results were killing, wounding and capturing nearly all the Indians.—Fifty being killed, five wounded, and thirty-six made prisoners, and more than a hundred animals captured.

Major Van Dorn notices the conspicuous gallantry and energy of 2d Lieutenant Fitzhugh Lee, Adjutant of the expedition.

CHAPTER V.

CIVIL WAR.

“ Not hate, but glory, made these chiefs contend,
And each brave foe was in his heart a friend.”

THE sublime and tragic period of American history between the years 1861 and 1865, when “Greek met Greek” in a clash of arms for a principle, is one that will be reverted to by future generations as unparalleled in the annals of the world, for the military genius displayed, the heroic deeds performed, the immense sacrifice of human life, together with the loss of fabulous fortunes. The election of Abraham Lincoln by a sectional majority thought to be inimical to the interests of the South, and the threatened danger to its institutions, wrought a common sentiment of resistance, self-protection and a resolution to defend the country against the aggressions of other states of the Union. Mr. Lincoln was elected in November, and on the 20th of December, 1860, South Carolina took the initiative step by passing an ordinance of secession. On January 9th, 1861, Mississippi followed, and rapidly state after state seceded until thirteen Southern States had joined in a confederation for a common defense. The convention of Mississippi elected officers to organize equip and command the State troops. Hon. Jefferson Davis had resigned his seat in the United States Senate, and Major Earl Van Dorn, Brevet-Major of the U. S. Second Cavalry, had also resigned his commission in the army, and their resignations had been accepted by the Washington authorities. Mr. Davis was elected Major-General of the State troops, and the four brigadiers chosen were Earl Van Dorn, Charles Clark, J. L. Alcorn and C. H. Mott. It was a painful duty to Major Van Dorn to thus sunder the ties of a lifetime, and all the aims and hopes of his profession, but it seemed that to the spot that gave him birth was due his first love and allegiance. The State had presented him

with swords in honor of his achievements in the war with Mexico, and again against the Indians in Texas, and in accepting them he had pledged his life and honor and service to the State, should occasion ever offer, little dreaming that a dissolution of the Union would be the occasion.

The election of Mr. Davis to the presidency of the Confederacy soon followed the secession of the states, and Major Van Dorn was then elected Major-General of the State forces of Mississippi. One member of the convention voted against his election, saying he looked too young for such a responsible position. When informed that the Major was forty years of age he withdrew his objection and the election was made unanimous. He told them that he might not be able to arrange the details of a large army, but he would promise that when they were equipped and in the field he would "lead them where they would get well peppered."

Rapidly regiments and brigades were formed throughout the states, and the beautiful city of Montgomery, Alabama, became the temporary seat of government. Thus, with a president, vice-president, cabinet, and army, the new confederacy sprang into existence like a full-grown Athené from the brow of Zeus, or "like a new sun risen on mid-noon" in its new-born glory and hope of independence. The old spirit of '76 pervaded the hearts of the people, and with one accord they prepared to resist the humorous Bill Arp said, "the more Mr. Linkhorn ordered them a proclamation ordering their troops to disperse, but, as the humorous Bill Arp said, "the more Mr. Linkhorn ordered them to disperse the more they gathered together."

The U. S. transport "Star of the West" arrived at Fort Sumter with reinforcements and supplies, and then according to orders proceeded to Galveston to bring away the U. S. troops stationed in Texas. General Beauregard, an engineer officer who had been with General Scott in the war with Mexico, had fortified Charleston and mounted guns for the defense of the harbor. It is said that over forty per cent. of the educated military men of the U. S. Army joined the Southern army in this cause.

Thus the unequal struggle was inaugurated. Blockades shut the South in, and shut it out from the outside world, save in such way as supplies could only be obtained at great risk by running the blockade, while "our friends the enemy" possessed resources

that were inexhaustible, recruiting at home and abroad, and exerting every scheme and device to starve the rebellious "subjects" into submission. For four long, memorable years, the strain continued, until with diminished numbers, hunger and exhaustion, the little army yielded to its superior foe,—superior alone in numbers and well fed, strong right arms. Surely never was victory more barren of glory nor defeat more fraught with honor. For the first time in the history of wars does the world award the palm to the vanquished. In the personal memoirs of General Grant, then commander-in-chief of the U. S. Army, he expresses an opinion that is startling and interesting to the Southern reader. He says of the policy pursued by General Joe Johnston before Atlanta, "For my part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted the northern section to such an extent that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation." (Page 167, Vol. I.)

The fierce and protracted struggle on the part of the South has been aptly compared to that of a proud animal of the forest, pursued and bayed until worn out and famished, the fierce fire dies out from the eye, the noble frenzy gasps from the dying breast, and it falls exhausted.

When secession took place the South was enjoying a life full of splendor, presenting a political and social problem to the whole world. Slavery existed in the midst of boasted freedom (celebrating the 4th of July!); the inferior race germinating the wealth, the superior race dominating the nation. This condition of things, opposed as it was by the world, as well as a sectional part of the country, was doomed to pass away; and the instrument to accomplish the purpose of the Power that rules the destiny of nations and peoples was the pen of Abraham Lincoln, added to Federal bayonets, that destroyed this once prosperous and happy section of the country; property in slavery was wiped out, the slave was free, and the South became for a time a nation of landlords without tenants.

General Van Dorn preferred to unite himself with what was supposed to be the regular army of the C. S. A., and asked to be assigned to a rank in such army rather than remain in command

of State troops; hence he received the rank of Colonel of the C. S. A., and was ordered to Texas to capture the U. S. forts and arms in that State, together with the "Star of the West," then anchored in the harbor at Galveston. The following letters addressed to his wife give an outline of his movements about this date:

"NEW ORLEANS., LA. April 14, 1861.

"I know you will feel sad and disappointed when I tell you that I am ordered off, at once, and without a moment's delay, to Texas again. I went to Montgomery by order, and received instructions to come to New Orleans and assume command of the defenses of the city, and was on my way down the river to Mobile, rejoiced that I would have you here with me, and have at least a short time together after our long separation; but when I got to Selma a telegraphic despatch intercepted me, from the Secretary of War, directing me to return at once to Montgomery. Upon my return the President had directed that I should be sent to Texas without a moment's delay, to raise an army to take prisoners of war all the troops of the Government left in the State. I must, therefore, leave to-morrow morning. Yours has been, I know, a trying life. Mine has been one of excitement, long patience, and hope deferred—God bless you. I hope yet that you will be happier with a good cause.

"I shall be in the field, but will receive my letters from San Antonio, where I hope you will write to me often. I can't tell you how long I shall be there. It will depend upon my success. If I find the troops in good positions to be captured, I shall return in a short time, I think, unless new and unforeseen troubles arise. If I have to remain in Texas in command, my headquarters will be in San Antonio, where I shall remove you, and will come for you. It is hard to anticipate in these times what we shall do a month hence. I presume you prefer to remain where you are for the present, do you not? I think you had better, for the benefit of the children. If you get tired, visit Sallie a while. I send you a hundred dollars and have left a horse in New Orleans to be sold (not 'Fink'), with instructions to send you the money. Write to me and say when you want more. I will send anyway all I can spare.—God bless you and my children. Be still patient, for we are in hard times, when no man can rest—especially

soldiers. Pray for us and for our noble country. Tell my little Olivia not to forget me in her prayers, for she is an angel and her least word will be heard in heaven. Good-by and best love.

"It may be that in this sad war I shall have to fight some of my old comrades—that would be hard; but it cannot be helped. I hope I shall be enabled to raise a force so large that there could be no hope of resistance, and that they will yield to me. I sincerely hope so. The President was very kind to me, so much so that I was made quite a Lion of at the seat of Government by his manner to me. He even walked down to the boat with me to see me off, and I was of course the observed and envy of hundreds. He begged me to present his best regards to you when he said 'good-by,' and added, 'God bless you,' with a warm grasp of the hand. He is a great and good man, and God will be with us. These are times to try men's souls,—and women's, too. Bear up and hope for us and pray for us. If Heaven carries me safely through these coming storms, I shall be the more valuable to you and ours. I shall win honors and reputation and a name, and shall redeem the hardships of the past. The sad war has commenced, and the hope I had of rest and happiness in being with my family is again denied me. It seems our fate. But still let us hope. It may be that I shall have my hopes realized some day."

"JACKSON, MISS., February 3, 1861.

"You are disappointed as well as myself by the non-appearance of the cars. The rains have washed up the roads in every direction, and we are isolated from all the world 'and the rest of mankind.' I hope you are well. I was uneasy about my little jewel daughter, but as you did not write I hoped that she had recovered from her little spell of sickness. 'Do don't' let her be imprudent in *anything*, studying, or anything else that might injure her health. She is so fragile, so delicate. She is the 'pearl that has been washed on my tempest-beaten shore,' and I love her,—I am afraid, too much. The boy is a pine knot and nothing can hurt him, being a chip of the old block! Are you still pleased with your domiciliary arrangements? (By the by, I have been assigned to the eastern district of the State, all the counties bordering on the State of Alabama from Aberdeen and Columbus to Mobile and Pascagoula, along the railroad from Mobile to Ohio.

But I have been ordered on duty here to aid the Governor in organizing, equipping and putting things in shape generally, for the approaching storm (temporarily). My aide-de-camp goes to Columbus to-morrow to muster in troops for me, and he says I will receive a grand reception when I go there. He says also that the ladies there are making me a flag already. Who knows but that *yet* out of the storms of revolution—the dark clouds of war—I may not be able to catch a spark of the lightning and shine through all time to come, a burning name! I feel a greatness in my soul—and if I can make it take a shape and walk forth, it *may* be seen and felt. Heaven guide my footsteps through the labyrinth ahead. Pray for me.

“Jefferson Davis expressed himself very much pleased at my election, and showed me the greatest kindness, and even attention, asking me to dine with him that I might make the acquaintance of Mrs. Davis and his children. He is without doubt a strong friend.

“I have received letters from a number of friends asking for positions on my staff. I would like to have them all, but what can I do? Staff officers are to be elected by the Board, and I have but one voice, and have many, many applications from men of very high standing, and they will be candidates hard to compete with.

“I am on duty with pay, I presume, as the Board ordered it, but it is to be seen. I am nearly out of funds, and if I do not hear from the Board soon will have to make a run down to ‘raise the wind.’ I expect that my duties will also compel me to run down to New Orleans before long. I have charge of the quartermaster, commissary and ordnance departments, and everything else, and in addition to all, to go to work to-morrow to build an arsenal for the State arms, etc.—*Hands full*.

“Say to our friend, Mr. Bowen, late of the Navy, with a proclivity for piracy, that I saw a Navy acquaintance of his here the other day—Capt. Lovell of Natchez (brother of my friend), and that he gave me such a good account of him that I shall make extra efforts to get him a place in the staff corps, and to write which of them he would prefer—adjutant-general, or quartermaster-general's department?

“Give my best love to Sister Emily and tell her to pinch you when you get gloomy and keep you in as good spirits as she

forces upon herself. God bless her—she has a nobler, least selfish soul than nine-tenths of all the world. Love her and put her near your heart and keep her there. Kiss my dear little ones and yourself—Good-by.”

The first gun fired by the Confederates was directed at the “Star of the West,” which had been sent to reinforce Fort Sumter at Charleston harbor, and she was captured at Galveston shortly afterwards as the first prize of the war. The ship carried at least one shot hole, received at the time it was landed at Fort Sumter. The troops of the United States then in Texas had been commanded by General Twiggs; that officer had resigned his commission in the Army, and the troops had been marched to the seashore preparatory to embarking on this transport.

In obedience to orders, Col. Van Dorn, on the 15th of April, 1861, took passage on the steamer “Matagorda,” at Brashier City, *en route* to Galveston, his purpose being to intercept the troops at Indianola, and capture them before they reached the transport “Star of the West.” On arriving at Galveston Col. Van Dorn kept possession of the transport “Matagorda,” and detained it while he made his preparations to arm and equip men to aid him in the capture. He was soon well in command of a gallant band of volunteers enlisted at Galveston, consisting of the Wigfall Guards, 40 men; the Island City Rifles, 45 men, and Galveston Artillery, 40 men, with their guns. Captain McGrath of the Wigfall Guards, offered to double his men, but there was no time to delay. By 12 o'clock at night the troops were on board the steamer, and by 3 A. M. she was outside the bar. The vessel then sailed for Indianola. On reaching Pass Cavallo the “Star of the West” was found anchored in the bay waiting to receive the troops then on the wharf at Indianola, expecting to take passage on the steamer “Fashion,” to be transferred to the U. S. transport, that vessel being unable to cross the bar. About two miles away Colonel Van Dorn left his own men until the “Matagorda” returned from Indianola after discharging freight for that point. But in order to lose no time he released the ship and secured the steamer “General Rusk,” a vessel belonging to the Morgan line. He took on board his men, and as night came on the ship crossed

the bar and ran alongside the "Star of the West." A request was made of the captain to throw out a line to the "General Rusk," which was done, the captain suspecting nothing, and the ship was made fast to the U. S. transport. At once an officer stepped aboard and was quickly followed by the rest of the men. The captain of the vessel was placed under arrest and Col. Van Dorn took possession of the ship. This was the first prize of the Confederates. The crew was hired to take the ship to New Orleans, where she remained as a receiving ship until sent up the river, where she was reported burned to keep her from falling into the enemy's hands.

After this capture and despatching the prize to New Orleans, Colonel Van Dorn organized a second expedition of 800 men and proceeded with great celerity against the troops at Indianola awaiting the transport. On the 24th of April, just six days later, he surprised the steamship "United States" and "Fashion" with thirty men, and taking these two vessels and protecting them with cotton bales and armed with one gun, he came upon the troops on the two sailing vessels at Saluria and demanded their surrender. The demand was complied with, many of the prisoners weeping as they delivered up their arms.

The startling and daring courage of this officer filled the Southern papers with applause and made him the hero of the day, while the Northern press denounced him as a pirate and highwayman, and the gallant hero of the Mexican war, General Twiggs, was denounced as a traitor. Some Northern papers referred to Colonel Van Dorn as "that Van Dorn," and offered \$5,000 for his head, while they offered but \$3,000 for the head of General Beauregard. General Smith, then on the Pacific coast, said it would be "like Van Dorn to come over there after he had finished with Texas," and added that he was more to be feared than any other officer in the Southern army. The following order was issued to the Texas troops who had so gallantly rushed to his aid when he called for volunteers:

GENERAL ORDER No. 5.

"It is the pleasing duty of the Colonel Commanding to thank the volunteer troops of Texas for the valuable services they have again rendered to the Confederate States.

"Being called upon at short notice to take the field, they responded with that promptness which proved how high is the military spirit of the State, and how ready her people are to seize arms in defense of her honor, and in vindication of their rights. It was not the wish of the volunteers of Texas, however, to fight against those troops of the United States who had been defending their frontiers for years, and who found themselves on their soil in the attitude of enemies, only because of political changes which they did nothing to bring about—many of whom had been personally endeared to them by long association, and by their gallant deeds (well remembered), as their old comrades in the war with Mexico. With the true spirit of brave men who know how to appreciate a soldier's honor, they marshaled in such numbers before them that the rugged necessities of war might be accomplished without bloodshed and without the loss of reputation to their gallant opponents. *There was no exultation over the surrender of the troops of the old 8th Infantry.* This would not be the case were the volunteers of Texas called out under arms to contend with an invading force sent against them from the North. Far from it. There would then be no regrets, no affection, and no disparity of numbers; and 'death to the foe and victory after the fight' would be the object and the aim of every true Texan."

Detailed accounts of the capture of the "Star of the West" are given in the Appendix, one by the captain of the transport, published in the New Orleans *Times-Democrat*; another in an article from the Galveston *News*, giving its version of the capture.

A ball and banquet were tendered General Van Dorn by the people of Texas at San Antonio, and at the banquet he responded to a flattering toast in these words:

"I have been a soldier from early youth, and have never learned the art of expressing myself in smooth and courteous language on occasions like this. You will excuse me, therefore, if I do not attempt to flounder through an awkwardly expressed speech in reply to the flattering remarks I have just heard. No words are necessary to convey to me the kindly sentiments of the people of San Antonio, for I have heard them in your streets, and have seen them in your eyes—those never-failing indices of the heart.

"This assemblage of beauty and chivalry is more than a foun-

tain to the thirstiest ambition—one smile from the beauty around me here—one kind and approving glance from the eyes of those here, who, like myself, contend in the rougher arena of life—were more than sufficient to compensate me for all my humble labors on the tented field. The smiles of women, and the approbation of men, are the earth-marks of our loftiest aspirations. To win them the student burns the midnight lamp, the soldier sheds his blood on the battle-field—and for them all are willing to die. They are the sweetest apples of the Hesperides.

“However unworthy, I humbly thank you for your smiles and expressions of approbation. I would be dead indeed to every sentiment of honor and kindness did I not feel sincerely what is here offered me. Allow me to propose: ‘The Women of the South—the safeguards of our honor—wherever they point there our honor lies.’”

These letters to his wife express his position at this time, and the feelings that prompted his action.

“SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, May 10, 1861.

“I was delighted to hear from you the day before yesterday. I had been in fear lest the mails should miscarry, as they are irregular. Your letter reached me as I was about to march out to meet the U. S. troops, and I deferred answering until to-day, that I might write you of my success. I have taken all the U. S. troops in Texas prisoners of war, and now lean back in my chair and smoke my pipe in peace, so far as campaigning is concerned, for the present. I received this evening the tender of a ball in honor of my successes, on behalf of the citizens of this city. I also received the proclamation of Mr. Lincoln, in which I find that I am a ‘pirate.’ So that I shall dance with a sort of Corsair gravity becoming the occasion.

“I am yet to hear whether or not I am to remain in Texas. Office duties are not congenial to my taste or proclivities. Buying and supplying provisions, clothing, etc., for troops is not my forte. But in these times my *all* is with our cause, and I have no murmur for any order that the Government may give. I hope, however, that I may find myself before long at the head of my regiment, where I feel I properly belong, and where my services would be more valuable to my country. I am as restless as a

panther caged, in an office, and have not the patience to attend to the duties required of me. The free air, a brave troop and a bright sword on the plains, and I breathe again! I am getting young once more at the thought that my soul shall be awakened again as it was in Mexico. I have a destiny, and I yet shall fling at your feet a wreath worthy of so good a woman."

"GALVESTON, TEXAS, July 23, 1861.

"It has been an age since I have heard from you. But I am not surprised, as the mails but seldom reach us here since the blockade. I hope, however, that you have written and that your letters will reach me in the course of time. I have just recovered from a spell of sickness. I was called to Austin by the Governor, and on my return to San Antonio was compelled to come down to the coast again, and on my way was taken sick with fever and had to stop at Eagle Lake, where I was laid up several days. I am now well again.

"I am so much on the go, so much worried and troubled by a thousand duties and a thousand annoyances, that I have not been able to write often. I have more to attend to than I can do well, and am much fatigued in mind and body. I see no prospect of a termination of it either; on the contrary, the trouble thickens. We expect the landing of an army on our coast and to meet it is our constant thought. Upon my shoulders rests all the responsibility. Everybody looks to me and my mind is strained day and night in thought that all may go well with us. God lead us aright. We are badly armed and poorly equipped, but with stout hearts and strong arms we hope to repel the enemy. We hear that 500,000 men are being raised to send against the South. What a future is before us! What an infamous war! But we must meet it. If it comes many a tear will be dropped before it closes; but better that than dishonor and the loss of liberty. Let their victories sit upon the ruins of our homes, but let them not see us live to pander to their pride or to shrink beneath their laurels. I feel the weight of my responsibility terribly, but I must bear up under it. *I must win*—there can be no such thing as fail. You are unhappy, but you are safe, and I feel grateful that you are in good hands. Your parents must feel the greatest kindness and affection for you, situated as you are. I hope your health is now good. Why don't you write to me often?"

CHAPTER VI.

IN VIRGINIA.

IN September, 1861, after his expedition to Texas, General Van Dorn was ordered to report without delay to headquarters of the army at Richmond, Virginia, and was relieved of the command in Texas for the purpose of organizing cavalry troops to operate in Virginia. He was then promoted to the rank of Major-General. Consequently, without pausing to visit his family, he hurried on to Richmond. *En route*, he telegraphed to his sister at Port Gibson to bring his little daughter, who was attending school at that place, to the railroad some thirty miles distant, that he might see her. But greatly to the disappointment of each, a storm had swollen the streams and prevented the meeting. The letters inserted in the Appendix set forth many facts, and describe somewhat the condition of things around Port Gibson. A picture of the beautiful little daughter, Olivia, was forwarded as a substitute for the disappointed meeting, which adorned and refreshed the camp of her father in Virginia for many weary days.

This letter, written at the request of his chief, in order to keep in touch with his family, is from a nephew, Colonel Clement Sulivane, the son of General Van Dorn's sister "Octavia," whose beauty and gentleness of manner and character had been the theme of many admirers North and South, and who had been the pride and best loved of the family group of "The Hill" in her youth, and afterwards in middle life down to old age. She died at a ripe age, lamented by hosts of friends and surrounded by her interesting family. (See Appendix.)

"RICHMOND, VA., Nov. 19, 1861.

"MY DEAR AUNT:

Last week, while toiling among the mountains of Northwestern Virginia, I received a letter from General Van Dorn informing

me that he had obtained for me a lieutenancy in the army, and offering me a place on his staff. I accepted, of course, with gratitude and pleasure and went down to Manassas immediately. I came from there to-day in order to purchase my equipments, and write to you in his place that his family may be informed of his continued welfare. He is too busy to write himself. He sends much love to you all and takes the greatest delight in the likeness of his admirable little girl. It is a pleasure to us all, forming such a contrast as it does to the stern visage of war around us.

"I find A. Verner is also with us. He informed us of Doug's arrival in New York from California. Henry Hughes has been elected Colonel of his regiment. It is thought Shoemaker will succeed him as Captain. The contest lies between him and Willie Martin. I have not seen our boys as yet, but intend going over as soon as I get back.

"It is thought that the big battle will take place about Sunday or Monday. The Generals appear confident of victory. God in Heaven grant they may not be disappointed.

"I have had the honor to be under fire, and have stepped over the bodies of the slain. Up to this time I have been spared the disagreeable necessity of running from Yankees, and have only run after them. I earnestly hope it is not written for me to learn another lesson at Manassas.

"I have heard from my mother lately through friends coming over from Maryland, and all were well. . . . The General joins me in love to all.

"CLEMENT SULIVANE."

"CULPEPER C. H., Va., December 12, 1861.

"MY DEAR BROTHER:

"I heard in Richmond for the first time of Clem's being with you, and my heart overflowed with gratitude to you for having rescued him from the hardships in Western Virginia and given him so desirable a position near your person. That feeling has been enhanced since I have seen him and heard him relate the adventures of his company. I was not before able to realize what their trials and privations were. But Clem has thrived under them all, and only tells of it, laughs over it as though he were speaking of the funny adventures of some sporting excursions. My heart is now at rest about him, for I know that if God spares

his life he will make himself so useful to you and to his country that his fortunes in life were secured from the day the opportunity was given of devoting himself to the happy task. From my inmost soul I am glad of your advancement in your profession and congratulate you most sincerely on the attainment of your high position. You have already impressed Clem with the opinion that you have but *one equal* in the Army, and he is your junior in command. This is not intended for flattery, but merely what he has said to me in private. I don't know what you think, but I have a high opinion of his judgment, if he is my son. Are you not going to give me the pleasure of seeing you at your headquarters? Do try to make such a thing possible, for I cannot return satisfied until I have done so. . . . It will be a happy day when you come into Maryland. I shall return after hearing from them at home. I must do something for you while I am here. Tell me what I can do?

“Your affectionate sister,
“OCTAVIA.”

The following interesting correspondence is from a contemporary Virginia paper and will explain itself.

One of the pleasantest episodes of the war is embraced in the accompanying correspondence between Miss Constance Cary, an exile from Alexandria, and General Van Dorn. Miss Cary is a young lady whose personal charms are eclipsed by her own intellectual brilliancy alone—one of those rare creatures whom Titian loved to paint, Shakespeare to personify:

“CULPEPER C. H., Nov. 10, 1861.

“Will General Van Dorn honor me by accepting a flag which I have taken great pleasure in making, and now send forth, with an earnest prayer that the work of my hands may take its place near him as he goes out to a glorious struggle, and, God willing, may one day wave over the recaptured batteries of my ill-fated home—the down-trodden Alexandria.

“I am, very respectfully, General Van Dorn's obedient servant,
“CONSTANCE CARY.”

“ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, MANASSAS, Nov. 12, 1861.

“To Miss Constance Cary, Culpeper C. H., Va.:

“MY DEAR MISS CARY:—The beautiful flag made by your hands

and presented to me, with the prayer that it should be borne by my side in the impending struggle for the existence of our country, is an appeal to me, as a soldier, as eloquent as the alluring promises of glory; but when you express the hope, in addition, that it may one day wave over the recaptured city of your nativity, 'the down-trodden Alexandria,' your appeal becomes a supplication so beautiful and holy that I were craven-spirited indeed not to respond to it with all the ability that God has given me. Be assured, dear lady, that it shall wave over your dear home if Heaven smiles upon our cause and I live, and that there shall be written upon it, by the side of your name, which it now bears, 'Victory, Honor and Independence.'

"In the meantime, I shall hope that you may be as happy as you—who have the soul thus to cheer the soldier on to noble deeds and to victory—should be; and that the flowers that were wont to bloom by your window, may bloom as sweetly for you next May as they ever did, to welcome you home again.

"Very truly and respectfully, dear lady, I am your obedient humble servant,

"EARL VAN DORN,
"Major-General P. A. C. S."

"CULPEPER C. H., Dec. 4, 1861.

"It would be but a vain task for me to attempt to give expression to all the pleasure I have experienced upon the receipt of the testimonial of the friendly feeling with which General Van Dorn has honored a comparative stranger, but I must take advantage of Mr. Bulong's kindness to return my sincere and grateful thanks for the interest and forethought which has dictated this mission, whose results will be trifling indeed compared with the reflection that it was undertaken for me.

"In regard to the banner, I can only say, that henceforth I shall be doubly proud and glad to claim it as having gone forth from my hand to be enshrined in the heart and affections of a Van Dorn!

"In conclusion I would add the hope that at some future day I shall have an opportunity to express to General Van Dorn in person all that my pen has failed to do. Then I can better assure him than now, how sincerely I remain his friend,

"CONSTANCE CARY
"(MRS. BURTON HARRISON)."

LETTER TO HIS WIFE.

“UNION MILLS, MANASSAS, VA., Nov. 29, 1861.

“I have delayed several days from my usual time for writing that I might get some money to send you. I have at last got some money and enclose you \$150, which I hope will do until next month, when I will send you more. If you go to Port Gibson write when you start that I may send to you there. I got a letter from sister Emily a few days since, in which she says that she had written to ask you to come over and be with her and Olivia. You can go very easily by taking the cars at Mobile and go to the junction of the Vicksburg and Brandon road, passing through Jackson, go to Vicksburg and thence by steamboat to Grand Gulf. I would not go, though, until about the middle or the 20th of December. It will be determined by that time whether or not we are to have a great battle here; besides, I will be able, probably, to send you more funds by that time. It is believed that the enemy must come out against us soon. It is the belief here that they are making vigorous efforts to get in readiness to march against us. They know our strength and are afraid of us. It is said that they will march with about 80,000. We can, I think, oppose them with 60,000 men, in position, and will defeat them without doubt. It will be a terrible affair, but I have no fears whatever of the result. I had a review of my division a few days ago—the first we have had in the army here. It was a splendid pageant—about 7,000 men and several batteries of artillery. When my division is completed, that is, when all my brigades and regiments join, I will have command of about 20,000 men. So you see that I will have both enough to do and to think about. I am glad that my division increases by degrees, as it gives me the opportunity of learning the necessities of the service by degrees. Ideas expand by degrees. I hope, my Carrie, that your health is restored. It is a hard destiny to be separated so much, and I am sorry that your health is, or has been so bad. If you were well you would feel happier. Try and cheer up. It may be, I think it probable, this war will not last longer than this winter. I pray that it may not. If you go to Port Gibson you will be so glad to see Sis' that you will feel less our separation. I hear from all sides of her increasing beauty and intelligence. I am very proud of her, I can tell you! We

should be proud of such children. I hope my dear little boy is well again and that he will be a smart fellow and a great man some day. How comes on that yard in front of the house? Is it laid out right? Is the house finished? I wish I could fly, that I might come and spend the evenings with you and give the days to my country! War brings trouble upon everybody. I am fortunate in being high in rank, for my trouble is light comparatively, except the uneasiness of mind with the cares of a division. I had a beautiful flag sent to me by a lady of Alexandria, now exiled from her home. She wrote me a pretty note and asked me to accept it and recapture her home. Her letter and my reply were published in the papers. Did you see them? I have never seen her, but it is said that she is one of the first ladies of the country—Miss Cary. The people of Maryland and this part of Virginia in the Army here think well of me for the opinions I have in regard to the war. They correspond with *theirs*. Kisses to the boy. I wish I could be with you."

DESCRIPTION OF A GRAND MILITARY REVIEW IN VIRGINIA.

CENTREVILLE, VA., December 3.

The brilliant military display of yesterday shone out in striking contrast against the leaden colored sky, which had overhung the camps near Centerville for several consecutive days. 'Tis seldom we have a gala day. Camp life, in the Army of the Potomac, is without romance; and one gets so used to "reveille," "roll calls," and "tattoo," that a field day, such as that I witnessed on Monday, was the next best thing to a fight. The ceremony was a novel one; arms were burnished, guns polished, and caissons subjected to a scrupulous scrubbing. Generals, with "stars," on richly caparisoned horses, galloped from point to point, and as the hour grew near, column after column could be seen crossing McLean's Ford, on Bull Run, and wheeling into line in the "Old Fields," on the southwest side.

Riding over, soon after breakfast, to General Van Dorn's quarters, I met for the first time this youthful looking field marshal. The General is rather undersized—of a spare frame, erect and graceful in his movements; his mustache is long but light; otherwise he is closely shaven, which is one cause of his youthful appearance. His uniform was a gray tunic, with buff collar

and cuffs, heavy gold braiding on the sleeve, and three stars on each side of the collar, the one in the center the largest; as he drew on his buck gantlets, I caught sight of a cross, embroidered thereon in scarlet silk, an ancient symbol of rank. Business despatched, I took leave, mounted my horse, and joined in the general movement towards the rendezvous, where the strange ceremony was to be solemnized of presenting *battle flags* to a dozen regiments. Think of England preparing for battle without the "*Red Cross of St. George*," or France substituting any standard for the *Tri-color*, and then judge how singular the making up of a new flag to take the place of the one recently adopted by our Congress. Ask for the reason of this inconsistency—you have it in the language of General Beauregard, who recently stated that "he never wished to see the Stars and Bars on another battle-field." The General is right; he wants to know, by the colors, what column approaches; and this, it may be added, is next to impossible, with the Confederate and U. S. flags so similar in design and color.

At twelve o'clock a salute of fifteen guns announced the arrival of the Generals. The division line had been formed and extended for nearly half a mile—Bonham's S. C. Brigade on the right, Rhodes' in the center, and Early's on the left. Kemper's battery was near this point on a hillside. First in order was the review. General Johnston, General Beauregard and General Van Dorn, with their adjutants, rode abreast, followed by a numerous and splendid staff. In this order they passed up and down the line, the band playing spirited airs. On arriving at the right of the division, General Van Dorn assumed command, and at once prepared to march in review in front of the Generals, who had taken up a commanding position near the center. The column in motion presented an imposing display—the ground was rolling, and as the solid mass of bayonets would glisten above the hilltop, the scene was really very inspiring. After passing, each brigade closed column in mass, and formed three sides of a square, the open space being occupied by the Generals and their cortége. An *impromptu* stand was soon furnished by a caisson from Kemper's Battery, upon which the Rev. E. Saunders, the Catholic chaplain of one of the Louisiana regiments, took his stand, and in a fervent manner blessed the banner "with the Southern Cross," and afterwards addressed the troops. Dur-

ing this impressive ceremony, every head was uncovered and every voice hushed.

Colonel Jordan, Adjutant-General of the 1st Corps of the Army of the Potomac, then rode forward and made an appropriate address, accompanied by Generals Johnston, Van Dorn and their staffs. General Beauregard then dismounted, and advancing to the center of the square, was met by the colonels of the several regiments, and in heartfelt utterance delivered to each regiment its sacred trust. All of the officers, on receiving the "Southern Cross," made their acknowledgments in patriotic pledges to do their duty. The bands then played the familiar air from the opera of *I Puritani*, to which music some soul-stirring lines, suggestive of the rescue of Maryland, had been written by J. R. Randall, a young poet of New Orleans, whose fugitive verses have already attracted much attention. Printed copies of these verses were distributed among the several regiments. The parade was then dismissed, and a large party accompanied General Van Dorn to his quarters, where, around his hospitable board, the dangers of the field were forgotten for a time, giving place to "the feast of reason and the flow of soul."

Altogether, it was one of the most imposing military spectacles I have ever seen. I have spoken of General Van Dorn's personal appearance; and this reminds me that whenever I see General Beauregard, who, by the way, is getting a little frosted, I am struck with his look, as of one thinking over some matter of moment; he has not less of the military air, however, although he does not look so entirely military as General Joe Johnston. I noticed the latter, particularly, on Monday; his upright position, military beard and mustache, just *grisly* enough to look beligerent; his *kepi*, with the strap resting jauntily on his heavy mustache, his bright eyes, and strong frame, impress you with an idea of action—just such a figure as, if seen on a battle-field, would suggest the idea, "At your service, sir! Which column shall I lead?"

KIAWAH.

CHAPTER VII.

ARKANSAS CAMPAIGN.

AFTER the battle of Manassas there was a lull in military movements in Virginia, the Southern army resting on its defensive attitude, and the Northern army, after a rest, preparing to spring upon its prey with renewed energy. But in Missouri and Arkansas, where General Price was being threatened with an attack by General Curtis, matters were not so quiet, and General Van Dorn was ordered to go to the assistance of General Price, and was given command of Missouri, Arkansas, the Indian Territory west of Arkansas, and Louisiana as far south as Red River, with authority to recruit his forces in Texas. The following letter was written on his way to the Trans-Mississippi department:

LETTER TO HIS WIFE.

“KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE, January 18, 1862.

“I am here on my way to Missouri, where I have been ordered to take command. I have Louisiana, as far south as Red River, Arkansas, the Indian country west of Arkansas, and the State of Missouri for my district. A large command. I am also authorized to call on the State of Texas for troops. It was my hope that I could go by to see you when I heard of the rumor that I would be ordered there, but the President and Secretary of War told me to hurry off and get at the head of affairs in Missouri as quick as possible, as great events were hanging on the times. My headquarters will, I think, be at a point on White River in Arkansas, near the Missouri line, but direct your letters to me at Napoleon, Arkansas, care of C. S. Agent for the Army. I have but a moment to write, as I must be ready to go off with the

train to Nashville and thence to Bowling Green to see General Johnston. If you go to Port Gibson, I will send you regularly a hundred dollars a month, which will, I think, keep you going; if not, I must manage to send more, if possible. You must come by Jackson, Miss. I am now 'in for it,' as the saying is—to make a reputation and serve my country conspicuously or to fail. I must not, shall not, do the latter. I must have St. Louis—then Huzza! Kiss my little boy, God bless him!"

GENERAL VAN DORN'S REPORT OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ARKANSAS.

"HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT,
"JACKSONPORT, ARK., March 27, 1862.

"COLONEL:—I have the honor to report that while at Poca-hontas, I received despatches on the 22d of February, informing me that General Price had rapidly fallen back from Springfield, before a superior force of the enemy, and was endeavoring to form a junction with the division of General McCulloch, in Boston Mountains.

"For reasons which seemed to me imperative, I resolved to go in person and take command of the combined forces of Price and McCulloch. I reached their headquarters on the 3d of March, and being satisfied that the enemy, who had halted on Sugar Creek, fifty-five miles distant, was only awaiting large reinforcements before he would advance, I resolved to attack him at once. Accordingly, I sent for General Pike to join me with the forces under his command, and on the morning of the 4th of March, moved with the divisions of Price and McCulloch, by way of Fayetteville and Bentonville, to attack the enemy's main camp on Sugar Creek. The whole force under my command was about 16,000.

"On the 6th we left Elm Spring for Bentonville, and from prisoners captured by our scouting parties on the 5th, I became convinced that up to that time no suspicion was entertained of our advance, and that there were strong hopes of our effecting a complete surprise and attacking the enemy before the large detachments encamped at various points in the surrounding country could rejoin the main body. I therefore endeavored to reach Bentonville, eleven miles distant, by a rapid march; but

the troops moved so very slowly that it was 11 A. M., before the head of the leading division (Price's) reached the village, and we had the mortification to see Siegl's division, 7,000 strong, leaving it as we entered. Had we been one hour sooner, we should have cut him off with his whole force, and certainly have beaten the enemy next day.

"We followed him, our advance skirmishing with his rear guard, which was admirably handled, until we had gained a point on Sugar Creek, about seven miles beyond Bentonville, and within one or two miles of the strongly intrenched camp of the enemy.

"In conference with Generals McCulloch and McIntosh, who had accurate knowledge of this locality, I had ascertained that by making a detour of eight miles I could reach the telegraph road leading from Springfield to Fayetteville, and be immediately in rear of the enemy and his intrenchments.

"I had resolved to adopt this route, and therefore halted the head of the column near the point where the road by which I proposed to move diverges, threw out my pickets and bivouacked as if for the night; but soon after dark I marched again, moving with Price's division in advance, and taking the road by which I hoped before daylight to reach the rear of the enemy.

"Some obstructions which he had hastily thrown in the way so impeded our march that we did not gain the telegraph road until near 10 o'clock A. M. of the 7th.

"From prisoners with forage wagons, whom our cavalry pickets brought in, we were assured that we were not expected in that quarter, and that the promise was fair for a complete surprise.

"I at once made dispositions for attack, and directing General Price to move forward cautiously, soon drew the fire of a few skirmishers, who were rapidly reinforced, so that before 11 o'clock we were fairly engaged, the enemy holding very good positions and maintaining a heavy fire of artillery and small arms upon the constantly advancing columns which were being pressed upon him.

"I had directed General McCulloch to attack with his forces the enemy's left, and before 10 o'clock it was evident that if his division could advance, or even maintain its ground, I could at once throw forward Price's left, advance his whole line, and end the battle. I sent him a despatch to this effect, but it was never

received by him. Before it was penned his brave spirit had winged its flight, and one of the most gallant leaders of the Confederacy had fought his last battle.

"About 3 P. M. I received by aide-de-camp the information that Generals McCulloch and McIntosh, and Colonel Hébert, were killed, and that the division was without any head. I nevertheless pressed forward with the attack, and at sunset the enemy was flying before our victorious troops at every point in our front, and when night fell we had driven him entirely from the field of battle. Our troops slept upon their arms nearly a mile beyond the point at which he made his last stand, and my headquarters for the night were at the Elkhorn Tavern. We had taken during the day seven cannon and about two hundred prisoners.

"In the course of the night I ascertained that the ammunition was almost exhausted, and that the officer in charge of the ordnance supplies could not find his wagons, which with the subsistence train, had been sent to Bentonville. Most of the troops had been without any food since the morning of the 6th, and the artillery horses were beaten out. It was, therefore, with no little anxiety that I waited the dawn of day. When it came, it revealed to me the enemy in a new and strong position, offering battle. I made my dispositions at once to accept the gage, and by 7 o'clock the cannonading was as heavy as that of the previous day.

"On the side of the enemy the fire was much better sustained, for being freed from the attack of my right wing, he could now concentrate his whole artillery. Finding that my right wing was much disorganized, and that the batteries were, one after the other, retiring from the field with every shot expended, I resolved to withdraw the army, and at once placed the ambulances, with all of the wounded they would bear, upon the Huntsville road, and a portion of McCulloch's division, which had joined me during the night, in position to follow, while I so disposed of my remaining forces as best to deceive the enemy as to my intention, and to hold him in check while executing it.

"About 10 o'clock I gave the order for the column to march, and soon afterwards for the troops engaged to fall back and cover the rear of the army. This was done very steadily; no attempt was made by the enemy to follow us, and we encamped, about 3 o'clock P. M., about ten miles from the field of battle. Some and the batteries of artillery which returned by different routes

demonstrations were made by his cavalry upon my baggage train from that taken by the army, but they were instantly checked, and, thanks to the skill and courage of Colonel Stone and Major Wade, all of the baggage and artillery joined the army in safety.

So far as I can ascertain, our losses amount to about six hundred prisoners, and one cannon, which, having become disabled, I ordered to be thrown into a ravine.

"The best information I can procure of the enemy's loss places his killed at more than seven hundred, with at least an equal number wounded. We captured about three hundred prisoners; so that his total loss is near about two thousand. We brought away four cannon and ten baggage wagons, and we burnt upon the field three cannon taken by McIntosh in his brilliant charge. The horses having been killed, these guns could not be brought away.

"The force with which I went into action was less than 14,000 men; that of the enemy is variously estimated at from 17,000 to 24,000.

"During the whole of this engagement I was with the Missouri division under Price, and I have never seen better fighters than those Missouri troops, or more gallant leaders than General Price and his officers. From the first to the last shot they continually pushed on, and never yielded an inch they had won; and when at last they received the orders to fall back, they retired steadily and with cheers. General Price received a severe wound early in the action, but would neither retire from the field nor cease to expose himself to danger.

"No successes can repair the loss of the gallant dead who fell on this well-fought field. McCulloch was the first to fall. I had found him in the frequent conferences I had with him a sagacious, prudent counselor, and a bolder soldier never died for his country.

"McIntosh had been very much distinguished all through the operations which have taken place in this region; and during my advance from Boston Mountain I placed him in command of the cavalry brigade and in charge of the pickets. He was alert, daring, and devoted to his duty. His kindness of disposition, with his reckness bravery, had attached the troops strongly to him; so that after McCulloch fell, had he remained to lead them, all would have been well with my right wing; but after

leading a brilliant charge of cavalry, and carrying the enemy's battery, he rushed into the thick of the fight again at the head of his old regiment, and was shot through the heart. The value of these two officers was but proven by the effect of their fall upon the troops. So long as brave deeds are admired by our people, the names of McCulloch and McIntosh will be remembered and loved.

"General Slack, after gallantly maintaining a continued and successful attack, was shot through the body. But I hope his distinguished services will be restored to his country. A noble boy, Churchill Clarke, commanded a battery of artillery, and during the fierce artillery actions of the 7th and 8th, was conspicuous for the daring and skill which he exhibited. He fell at the very close of the action. Colonel Rives fell mortally wounded about the same time, and was a great loss to us. On a field where were many gallant gentlemen, I remembered him as one of the most energetic and devoted of them all.

"To Col. Henry Little my especial thanks are due for the coolness, skill and devotion with which for two days he and his gallant brigade bore the brunt of the battle. Col. Burbridge, Col. Rosser, Col. Gates, Major Lawther, Major Wade, Capt. McDonald, and Capt. Schaumberg are some of those who attracted my especially attention by their distinguished conduct.

"In McCulloch's division the Louisiana regiment under Col. Louis Hébert, and the Arkansas Regiment under Col. McRae, are especially mentioned for their good conduct. Maj. Montgomery, Capt. Bradfute, Lieut. Lomax, Kimmel, Dillon, and Frank Armstrong, A. A. G., were ever active and soldierly. After their services were no longer required with their own division, they joined my staff, and I am much indebted to them for the efficient aid they gave me during the engagement of the 8th. They are meritorious officers, whose value is lost to the service by their not receiving rank more accordant with their merit and experience than that they now hold.

"Being without my proper staff, I was much gratified by the offer of Col. Shands and Capt. Barrett, of the Missouri army, of their services as aids. They were of very great assistance to me by the courage and intelligence with which they bore my orders; also, Col. Lewis, of Missouri.

"None of the gentlemen of my personal staff, with the excep-

tion of Col. Maury, A. A. G., and Lieut. C. Sulivane, my aide-de-camp, accompanied me from Jacksonport, the others having left on special duty. Col. Maury was of invaluable service to me both in preparing for and during the battle. There, as on the other battle-fields where I have served with him, he proved to be a zealous patriot and true soldier. Cool and calm under all circumstances, he was always ready, either with his sword or his pen. His services and Lieut. Sulivane's are distinguished; the latter had his horse killed under him while leading a charge, the order for which he had just delivered.

"You will perceive from this report, Colonel, that although I did not, as I hoped, capture or destroy the enemy's army in Western Arkansas, I have inflicted upon it a heavy blow, and compelled him to fall back into Missouri; this he did about the 16th inst.

"For further details concerning the action, and for more particular notices of the troops engaged, I refer you to the reports of the subordinate officers, which accompany this report.

"Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

"EARL VAN DORN, *Major-General.*

"*Col. W. W. Mackall, A. A. G.*"

NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OF THE SITUATION IN ARKANSAS.

The report of General Curtis, claiming a decisive victory in his battle with the Confederate forces, is another illustration of the chronic deceit which afflicts the Federal officers in their accounts of their campaigns and engagements. Were it not for some glaring contradictions, and a lurking diffidence of even his own statements, the reader might imagine that the Confederates had suffered a total overthrow, and that General Curtis was preparing to resume a triumphant march through a conquered and suppliant country. Yet there are evidences in his report that he was surprised by an attack from an enemy whom he had considered demoralized and subdued and that nothing was more unexpected by him than a battle with an army which he had pursued for days from Springfield to the Boston Mountains.

Gen. Van Dorn's report, while it does not claim a victory, does

not confess a defeat. Neither does it contain anything to confirm Curtis's assertion that the Confederate army scattered in all directions. On the contrary, Gen. Van Dorn distinctly informs us that he drew off his forces in good order under cover of an engagement undertaken by him for the purpose of effecting this very movement. Indeed, it is not at all probable that Gen. Van Dorn, in making his first attack on Curtis's army, anticipated a victory on the field. With 14,000 men he could not expect to capture 30,000 splendidly equipped troops, or even to inflict upon them any decisive defeat. But he could reasonably hope to embarrass the enemy by menancing his communications; by forcing him to fight at unforeseen time and place, and above all, by encumbering him with wounded. Annoyances of this kind inflicted on an invading army, seeking to overrun a country destitute of supplies and wanting in facilities for transportation, are as disastrous as a defeat in the open field. These were probably Gen. Van Dorn's reasons for attacking Curtis immediately on assuming command of the army. At all events we shall soon know whether our surmises are well founded; as Gen. Van Dorn, in his report, promises to give an explanation of his movements. In the meantime we have no fears for the results of his campaign against Curtis. We have unlimited confidence in his skill, courage, enterprise and caution, and we are confident that he will manifest these qualities in a manner so effective as to bring his operations to a successful conclusion, and to force the expulsion of Curtis's army from the country it has invaded.

THE FIGHTING IN ARKANSAS.

The perplexing rumors we have had for four or five days in reference to a victory obtained by Gen. Price are doubtless explained, if they are not fully confirmed, by the despatch which we publish from Fort Smith, Arkansas. But whether the rumors in question were or were not founded upon the intelligence contained in this despatch, it cannot be doubted that one of the fiercest and bloodiest engagements of the war has been fought by the Confederate forces under Generals Van Dorn and Price, and the Federal army of Gen. Curtis. Extending through three days, attended by the killing of Generals McCulloch and McIntosh, and the fall of Gen. Slack mortally wounded, we can

well conceive that the Confederate loss was heavy, and that the Federal loss was at least of corresponding magnitude.

We can only infer the positions of the two armies toward each other, as regards advantage or reverse resulting from the engagement, from their relations to each other at the moment to which the dispatch brings the account of their movements. According to this account the Confederate army was in the rear of the Federal army, driving it southward, and confident of success. For one army to be in the rear of the other, is a very significant circumstance. But the significance depends greatly upon how the army in the rear got there. In military parlance, the rear of an advancing army is its line of communication with the base from which it derives its supplies, and to which it expects to fall back for safety in the event of defeat. If it be cut off from that base by an army which is too powerful to be successfully encountered, or which has been victorious in a battle, its situation is obviously hopeless. It must either surrender or be cut to pieces.

We have no reason to suppose that the army of Generals Van Dorn and Price did not get in the rear of the enemy by design—that the position was not the result of a maneuver introductory to the engagement, or the result of advantages gained in the engagement. But we have little doubt that Van Dorn and Price forced the enemy to fight in order to open his communications. It would seem that they placed him in a situation where it was too late for him to consider whether he would fight or retreat, and where he had no choice but to fight, even if he wished to retreat, in order to gain a road by which he could retreat. He did fight, it appears, but he failed to gain such a road. On the contrary, the despatch from Fort Smith represents him as being driven southward, after the engagement before the army of Generals Van Dorn and Price. Not to succeed in an engagement under the circumstances described, was itself a disaster. To be flying before the Confederate army in his rear would indicate that he was on the road to irretrievable discomfiture.

LETTER TO HIS WIFE.

“DES ARC, ARKANSAS, April 6, 1862.

“Please pardon me for not writing for so long a time. If you could imagine even the trouble of mind and body I have to undergo constantly I know that you could not wonder that I do not

write often. I have had to command an army almost disorganized and without discipline, staff departments defective, and supplies deficient, the enemy near and threatening, and with all this I have been suffering with chills and fevers again, as I did in Texas. I rode on horseback from Jacksonport to Boston Mountains, about two hundred miles, fifty miles a day, and thence marched the army to Elkhorn, sixty miles, fought the enemy and returned to Van Buren, more than a hundred miles; all this time I was sick. I was even hauled in an ambulance to the battle-field. I am continually beset by all sorts of people for position, place, promotion, contracts, adjustment of difficulties, etc., and I cannot go out of my room that I am not stopped and pulled at until I am getting as short and crabbed as though I had never been a good-natured man. I sometimes wish that I could fly to some wilderness and give up the world and its cares. But as long as our contry needs my services they are hers, even to my life. I expect to grow gray before the war is over. I never knew what care was before. I am here preparing to move the army to join Generals Johnston and Beauregard in Tennessee—or rather in Mississippi, for they are at Corinth. I carry with me about 25,000 men and about eight pieces of artillery. With the addition to them we hope to drive the enemy not only out of Tennessee, but out of Kentucky, and attack Cincinnati. Then huzza for the Southern Confederacy! I will probably get off about the 12th or 14th of this month; the troops are already moving in boats as fast as they can be transported. I sent Clem to Richmond the other day with my report of the battle of Elkhorn and gave him a letter to the President informing him of Clem's gallantry on the battle-field, and requested him to promote him to the regular army. I have no doubt but that he will do so. Clem will rejoin me at Memphis. I was at Corinth the other night to consult with Generals Johnston and Beauregard. I arrived there at 10 o'clock at night and left at 1:30 same night. I have been on the go ever since my arrival in command of this District, and being sick a great deal, I am a little worn out. You must pardon me for not writing as often as I have thought of you and in proportion to my love for you and my dear children, and my sisters who are so kind to you. God bless you all. I hope you will meet with no harm or unhappiness until I can rejoin you. This is a terrible war, but we must see it through, and have our


country come out of the struggle with honor and independence. If we do not I must look for a home in some other climate—South America or Mexico. But I look for better results and they *shall* be ours. I long to see you and my dear sweet daughter, and my boy; but this longing is but a part of the troubles of the war, and I must not think of it. Be patient and watchful—see to our children's education and good breeding; let these be your cares. I will try to write, but you must be indulgent, for I have but little time of my own. You will even see in this letter how hurried I am to get you a letter before I am called off. Be assured though that I often, often think of you and love you continually. When you write direct your letters to Memphis, to the care of the Quartermaster there.

"I sent you some eight or ten days since two hundred dollars, also the same amount to Olivia. I hope you have received the money safely. I am glad you brought Frank with you."

"Tell my Libbie to write to me every week. I love her so much that I would like to hear from her every day. Send me hers and the boy's likenesses again, with yours. I would like to have my sister's too. Ask them to send them to me. They will be a comfort to me. Remember me to all my friends at Port Gibson. I send you and the children a thousand kisses, and best wishes for your welfare and happiness."

AN INCIDENT CONNECTED WITH THE CAMPAIGN IN ARKANSAS.

"A few incidents or anecdotes occur to me. General Van Dorn was so uniformly gentle yet animated in his manner that I never knew one to have passed a half-hour in his company without, so to speak, falling in love with him. Of course his regular, handsome features, waving light brown hair and bright blue eyes contributed to this, as well as his wide-spread reputation for dauntless personal courage, so in contrast with his extreme gentleness of voice and expression. Alcibiades, the Athenian, was among the heroes of the past his favorite ideal of the gentleman, the scholar and the soldier. He had a great deal of romanticism in his character, was fond of repeating fine poetry, and he had no little artistic talent. In battle, on the other hand, he was the very incarnation of energy of action and loftiness of soul. His eyes would seem to flash fire like sparks from blue



steel, and his whole person appear to enlarge, and radiate courage all about him.

"During our two months' sojourn near Manassas, where I first joined him, I saw but one side of his character. We had nothing whatever to do, but remained idle in our camp as the enemy did in theirs, and the time was mainly spent in a round of visiting from one General's quarters to another. And it was only after he had been ordered in early January, 1862 to cross the Mississippi River, and assume command there that the real energy of his character was presented to me.

"Going to Jacksonport, Arkansas, on the White River, he began to make the most active preparations for the assembling of the trans-Mississippi troops at that point, preparatory to a campaign up the west bank of the Mississippi River on St. Louis, when one day in February he received letters from both Gen. McCulloch and Gen. Price, then in camp in the extreme northwestern corner of the State, that Gen. Curtis with the main United States Army in Missouri was in their immediate front, that a good opportunity was presented to attack him, but Price would not obey McCulloch and the latter would not obey Price, and both urging him to come to them at once, and taking command, to move against Curtis.

"The very next morning he set out on horseback to ride the whole width of the State of Arkansas, taking with him Col. Dabney Maury, myself, a courier and Milton (his body servant), and arrived at Van Buren, but six miles from the Indian Nation, a distance of two hundred miles from Jacksonport, at noon on the fourth or fifth day (I am not sure now which, but it was a remarkable ride for a general officer no matter which it was). And on the night of the following day we rode into Gen. Price's camp, over forty miles north of us, and on the very next morning, the now united army moved against Curtis.

"On our way across Arkansas, we were obliged late in the evening of the second day out to cross the Little Red River—the horses by swimming and we one by one in a light canoe, the river being so swollen by rains that the usual ford was impassable—and the General, going over first, was upset in the river about ten yards from where he left us on the eastern bank. Seeing me hastily throwing off my cloak, sword and boots to swim to his assistance, for I thought he would surely need it, encumbered as

he was with not only heavy clothing but heavy military boots, heavy cloak, sword and spurs, he called to me to stay ashore, and all accoutered as he was swam to the bank—a feat which only an unusually vigorous and strong man could have accomplished, especially considering the powerful current of the deep and swollen river. As he emerged, dripping from the stream and stood on the bank, he smilingly quoted to me the words of Cassius:

“ Once upon a raw and gusty day
The troubled Tiber chafed within her shores :
Accoutered as I was, I plunged in,
The torrent roared, and I did buffet it
With lusty sinews.”

“ It was night when we at last all got over and we passed the night in the humble residence of our ferryman. In consequence of his immersion, the General contracted a heavy chill and fever, which lasted him to Van Buren and beyond, but at the end of the first day out from the Red River he secured an ambulance and he and Maury rode in it the remainder of the way to said town.

“ The battle of Pea Ridge, or Elk Horn Tavern, which immediately followed (the 6th, 7th and 8th of March, 1862), was admirably planned and executed. Both wings of our army were successful after having marched clear around the enemy, so that they had no possible means of escape, and their entire army must have fallen into our hands, thus leaving us an unobstructed march to St. Louis, but for the death of General McCulloch, and then of General McIntosh who succeeded him, in the hour of victory. The right wing was separated from the left where we were, with Price, by a high mountain, and both wings were converging on Elk Horn Tavern where we arrived at sunset after triumphantly pushing back the enemy in our front, and where the right wing would even have arrived before us but for the unfortunate deaths referred to above.* The enemy had given way over there also, but as they found they were not pressed they rallied, and assumed the offensive, and as our people had no head, and our brigades

* At this battle Gen. Van Dorn was charged with being intoxicated for the reason that he was taken to the battle-field in an ambulance when too ill to mount his horse ; so was Gen. Grant charged with the same offense at the battle of Shiloh, when a fall of his horse the day before had disabled him.

were attacked in turn, first one and then another gave way from want of support and cohesion, until the whole wing was finally routed and shattered. Then both wings of their army next morning turned on our left wing and beat us. No general ever deserved success more than General Van Dorn did on that occasion. And so with his military operations before Corinth. It is capable of demonstration that it was through no fault of his (beyond his relying on his general officers to carry out his instructions punctually on time so as to move together against the enemy's works, instead of seeing in person that they did so—a reliance against which, warned by previous experience, I took the liberty of warning him on the morning of the assault), that the battle was not won, and then we would have had a clear march to join General Bragg before Louisville.

“COL. CLEMENT SULLIVANE,
“*Aide-de-Camp.*”

General Van Dorn and General Price were rallying their forces and planning to renew the campaign against General Curtis, when orders were received to go immediately to the support of General Johnston and General Beauregard at Corinth, Mississippi. They soon joined the forces at this important strategic point, which both armies were striving to occupy. The report of General Beauregard's position at this place, and the rapid way in which the enemy was drawing his coils around the fortification, forced an evacuation of the doomed position, and the Southern army retired, cheering as the trains entered empty, and remaining silent as they left with the retreating army,—an example followed by General Rosecrans in 1862, when attacked in the same position by General Van Dorn, but reinforcing instead of evacuating.

CHAPTER VIII.

VICKSBURG.

"Popular enthusiasm is but a fire of straw,
The gale from the east to-day is a gale from the west to-morrow."

IN the month of April, 1862, the Trans-Mississippi combined army of Van Dorn and Price, consisting of upwards of 25,000 men, were ordered to immediately join General Beauregard at Corinth, Mississippi, expecting to drive the Federal army out of Tennessee and Kentucky. Upon reaching this place, under the command of General Van Dorn, this army made several sorties from Corinth, driving back the enemy and cutting railroads, destroying bridges, and cutting their communications. While at this important stronghold, which was deemed so important a strategic point, General Van Dorn took the opportunity to study the topography of the country, make maps of the same, and examine intersecting roads. He wrote and received many telegrams and letters from this place, a few of which will be found in the Appendix.

The Federal army under General Grant gradually drew its coils closer and closer around this stronghold, and finally compelled General Beauregard—after all his labor and effort—to evacuate Corinth, after which the place was speedily occupied by the enemy, more strongly fortified, and later was placed under the command of General Rosecrans.

After the evacuation of Corinth by General Beauregard, General Van Dorn was assigned to the command of Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana, with special reference to the defense of Vicksburg, making his headquarters first at Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, and afterwards at Vicksburg. On June 24th, 1862, he assumed this command in the following orders:



VICKSBURG, FROM THE RIVER.

"GENERAL ORDERS, No. 1.

"HDQRS. DEPT. OF LA., MISS., AND E. LA.,

"JACKSON, MISS., June 24, 1862.

"By order of the President the undersigned assumes command of this department. It is recommended to all persons living within eight miles of the Mississippi River to remove their families and servants to the interior, as it is the intention to defend the department to the last extremity.

"EARL VAN DORN,

"Major-General."

"GENERAL ORDERS, No. 3.

"HDQRS. DEPT. OF S. MISS. AND E. LA.,

"JACKSON, MISS., June 26, 1862.

"I. The major-general commanding announces the following-named officers as members of his staff. They will be respected and obeyed accordingly: Col. Philip Stockton, chief of ordnance; Maj. J. D. Balfour, inspector-general; Maj. Edward Dillon, chief commissary; Maj. Claud McGivern, chief quarter-master; Maj. M. M. Kimmel, assistant adjutant-general; Surg. John M. Haden, medical director; Asst. Surg. Howard Smith, medical purveyor; Lieut. Clement Sulivane, and Rufus Shoemaker, aides-de-camp. All persons having communications with any of the staff departments will address them to the respective heads of the departments.

"II. Col. Fred. Tate is hereby announced as provost-marshal-general for this department. He will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

"EARL VAN DORN,

"Major-General."

"GENERAL ORDERS, No. 5.

"HDQRS. DEPT. OF S. MISS. AND E. LA.,

"VICKSBURG, June 29, 1862.

"The general commanding regrets that it has become necessary to call the attention of the troops encamped in this vicinity to the Articles of War in regard to the destruction of private property. It was hoped that respect for the heroic people who have given up all to bombardment in such a glorious cause would have checked anything like marauding or wanton destruction

of their property. For the sake of your honor let it not be said that you have damaged this city more than the enemy's guns. Officers of regiments encamped near private property will be held responsible for its safety. Injuries done will be assessed, and the regimental officers will be required to pay for it in proportion to the amount of their pay.

"By order of Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn:

"M. M. KIMMEL,

"Assistant Adjutant-General."

The selection of Earl Van Dorn for this command was a special one made by President Davis, knowing as he did the ardent spirit of patriotism that would actuate this officer in the defense of a city of his native State, and nothing but applause and goodwill greeted the new commander. His assignment was hailed with acclamation, and the press and people accorded only kindness, and approval, that amounted to enthusiasm. The newspapers praised, while poems and votive thanks were heard on every side, and a glow of proud love filled his heart with a determination to defend Vicksburg, as he said, "though the beautiful city be laid in ruins and ashes in the struggle." A number of handsome private houses situated on commanding sites, Vicksburg being a city of hills, were leveled to give place to fortifications.

Vicksburg was threatened in front by a strong fleet, and armies were pressing against the doomed city from every point. The enemy was working his way south of the city, and every inch of ground had to be contested. Vigilance was the watchword. General Van Dorn made the following report of the defenses and his determination to protect the city, including an account of his operations in full; also those regarding the daring exploit of the ram "Arkansas" (which raised the first siege of the city), together with his plan to take Baton Rouge and recapture New Orleans. The failure to carry out the latter plan being due to the breaking of the shaft of the ram "Arkansas,"—thus confirming what General Grant so aptly says—that "many an accident wins or loses a battle."

The army and the people were so joyous in their applause at



CAVES IN VICKSBURG DURING THE SIEGE.

the success thus far of their commander and his nativity, that the legislature voted him a sword upon the recommendation of the governor, who presented it in terms of graceful comment. *At this period, April 8, 1862, it would seem that the name of Earl Van Dorn was "sans peur et sans reproche."*

GOVERNOR PETTUS (MISS.) TO THE LEGISLATURE.

"The Commander, Major-General Van Dorn, is one of the most active and brilliant officers in the service—a man of high character, and the State of Mississippi owes him a sword. We make the motion and the people of Mississippi and the legislature will second it."

"EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
"JACKSON, MISS., April 8, 1862.

"TO GENERAL EARL VAN DORN:—

"DEAR SIR:—I have the pleasure to inform you that I this day send Mr. T. W. Johns with the Sword presented you by the State of Mississippi. I have sought to have it made in a style worthy of yourself and the State, and am pleased to be able to send it to you just now in time to flash defiance in the face of the enemies of Mississippi, and point our armies the road to victory. Permit me to take this occasion to express the proud confidence I feel that this beautiful gift has been worthily bestowed, and that it will yet wave in triumph over battle-fields which will be the theme of the sons of other years, when you and I will have ceased to play any part in the affairs of men.

"Very respectfully, your friend,

"JOHN J. PETTUS,
"Governor."

At the same time, Paul H. Hayne addressed General Van Dorn a courteous letter containing expressions of admiration, and even affection, asking his permission to dedicate these lines to him.

VICKSBURG.

"For sixty days and upward
A storm of shell and shot
Rained round us in a flowing shower
But still we faltered not,

'If the noble city perish,'
Our bold young leader said,
'Let the only walls the foe shall scale
Be ramparts of the dead.'


"For sixty days and upward
The eye of Heaven waxed dim,
And e'en thro'out God's holy morn,
O'er Christians' prayer and hymn,
Arose a direful hissing sound
As if the fiend of air
Strove to engulf the voice of faith
In shrieks of wild despair,

"There was wailing in the houses
Tears were trembling in the hearts,
While the tempest raged and thundered
'Mid the silent thrill of hearts,
But the Lord, our shield, was with us,
And ere a month had sped,
The very children walked the streets
With scarce a throb of dread.

"And the little childrem gamboled,
Their faces purely raised
Just for a wondering moment
As the huge bombs whirled and blazed,
Then turned with silvery laughter
To the sports which children love,
Thrice mailed in the sweet instinctive thought,
That the good God watched above.

"Yet the hailing bolts fell faster
From the scores of flame-clad ships,
And about us, denser, darker,
Grew the conflict's wild eclipse,
Till a solid cloud grew o'er us
Like a type of gloom and ire
Whence shot a thousand quivering tongues
Of forked and vengeful fire.

"But the unseen bands of angels
Those death shots turned aside,
And the dove of Heavenly Mercy
Ruled o'er the battle tide.
In the houses ceased the wailing,
And thro' the war-scarred marts
The people trod with the step of Hope
To the music in their hearts."



STREET IN VICKSBURG.

GENERAL VAN DORN'S OFFICIAL REPORT.

"HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI,

"JACKSON, MISS., September 9, 1862.

"GENERAL:—I have the honor to submit for the information of the War Department the following report of the defense of Vicksburg and of operations in this district up to the present time:

"Pursuant to orders, I assumed command of this district and the defenses of Vicksburg on June 27. Prior to my arrival Major-General Lovell, having resolved to defend the city, had ordered a detail of his force, under the command of Brigadier-General M. L. Smith, to garrison the place and construct works for its defense. I found the city besieged by a powerful fleet of war vessels and an army. The inhabitants, inspired by a noble patriotism, had determined to devote the city to destruction rather than see it fall into the hands of an enemy who had abandoned many of the rules of civilized warfare. This voluntary sacrifice on the altar of liberty inspired me with the determination to defend it to the last extremity. Orders to this effect were at once issued, to which my army responded with the liveliest enthusiasm. The citizens retired to the interior while the troops marched in and pitched their tents in the valleys and on the hills adjacent in convenient position to support batteries and strike assailants.

"The batteries of heavy guns already established by the skill and energy of General Smith on the crest of the hills overlooking the river were placed in complete readiness for action. Other guns were brought up from Mobile, from Richmond, from Columbus, and elsewhere, and put in battery. Breckinridge's division occupied the city. Smith's brigade, which previous to my arrival had furnished the garrison of the place, manned the batteries, and with details from Breckinridge's division guarded the approaches in front and on the flanks. Withers' light artillery was placed in such positions as to sweep all near approaches, while Starke's cavalry watched at a distance on our flanks on the Yazoo and below Warrenton on the Mississippi.

"Prior to my assuming command the attacking force of the enemy was confined to Porter's mortar fleet and Farragut's gun-boats (with their attendant army in transports), which had ascended the river from New Orleans. For the operations of this

force in attack and for the successful and heroic resistance made by General Smith and the troops under his command I refer the Department to the satisfactory and graphic report of that officer.

"The evacuation of Fort Pillow and the fall of Memphis opened the new danger of a combination between the upper and lower fleets of the enemy. This junction was effected early in July, and thus an added force of more than forty gun-boats, mortar-boats, rams, and transports lay in menace before the city. On July 12 it opened fire and kept up a continuous attack until the bombardment of the city ceased. Having received authority from the President to use the ram 'Arkansas' as part of my force, some days prior to July 15 I issued an order to Captain [I. N.] Brown to assume command of her and prepare her for immediate and active service. From all reliable sources I learned that she was a vessel capable of great resistance and armed with large offensive power. Making the order imperative, I commanded Captain Brown to take her through the raft of the Yazoo, and after sinking the 'Star of the West' in the passage to go out and attack the upper fleet of the enemy, to the cover of my batteries. I left it to his judgment to determine whether on reaching the city his vessel was in a condition to proceed down the river and destroy the lower mortar fleet. Captain Brown properly substituted a vessel of inferior quality in place of the 'Star of the West,' entered the Mississippi, and on the memorable morning of July 15 immortalized his single vessel, himself, and the heroes under his command by an achievement the most brilliant ever recorded in naval annals. I deeply regret that I am unable to enrich my report by an authentic account of the heroic action of the officers and men of the 'Arkansas.' Commodore [Wm. F.] Lynch declines to furnish me with a report of the action, on the ground that he was an officer out of the scope of my command. The glory of this deed of the 'Arkansas' stung the pride of the Federal Navy, and led to the most speedy but unsuccessful effort of the combined fleets to destroy her. I refer the Department to the report of General Smith for an accurate detail of those efforts, as also for a connected and faithful relation of the important events which make the history of the siege and defense of Vicksburg. With the failure to destroy or take the 'Arkansas' the siege of Vicksburg practically ended. The attack on the bat-

teries soon ceased, and the enemy, baffled and enraged by an unexpected, determined, and persistent defense, vented his wrath in impotent and barbarian efforts to destroy the city. On July 27 both fleets disappeared—foiled in a more than two months' struggle to reduce the place.

"The casualties on our side during the entire siege were twenty-two killed and wounded. Not a gun was dismounted and but two were temporarily disabled.

"The successful defense of Vicksburg is due to the unflinching valor of the cannoneers, who, unwearied by watchfulness, night and day stood by their guns, unawed by the terrors of a fierce and continuous bombardment; to the sleepless vigilance and undaunted courage of the troops, who lay at all hours in close supporting distance of every battery, ready to beat back the invader so soon as his footsteps should touch the shore; to the skilful location of scattered batteries, and last, but not least, to that great moral power—a high and patriotic resolve, pervading and swelling the breasts of officers, soldiers, and citizens—that at every cost the enemy should be repelled. I refer the Department to the specific enumeration of the names of officers and men who won distinction by meritorious service during the siege, as reported by General Smith, and I heartily indorse his commendations.

"Satisfied that the enemy disappeared from Vicksburg under the mortifying conviction that it was impregnable to his attack, *I resolved to strike a blow before he had time to organize and mature a new scheme of assault.*


"The enemy held Baton Rouge, the capital of Louisiana, forty-miles below the mouth of Red River, with a land force of about 3,500 men, in conjunction with four or five gunboats and some transports. It was a matter of great necessity to us that the navigation of Red River should be opened as high as Vicksburg. Supplies much needed existed there, hard to be obtained from any other quarter, and strong military reasons demanded that we should hold the Mississippi at two points, to facilitate communications and cooperation between my district and the Trans-Mississippi Department. The capture of Baton Rouge and the forces of the enemy at that point would open the Mississippi, secure the navigation of Red River, then in a state of blockade, and also render easier the recapture of New Orleans. To this

end I gave orders to General Breckinridge to move upon Baton Rouge with a force of 5,000 men picked from the troops at Vicksburg, and added to his command the whole effective force of General Ruggles, then at Camp Moore, making a total force of 6,000 men. To insure the success of the plan I ordered the 'Arkansas' to cooperate with the land forces by a simultaneous attack from the river. All damages sustained by the 'Arkansas' from the fleets of the enemy had been repaired, and when she left the wharf at Vicksburg for Baton Rouge she was deemed to be as formidable in attack or defense as when she defied a fleet of forty vessels of war, many of them ironclads. With such effective means I deemed the taking of Baton Rouge and the destruction or capture of the enemy on land and water the reasonable result of the expedition.

"By epidemic disease the land force under Major-General Breckinridge was reduced to less than 3,000 effective men within the period of ten days after he reached Camp Moore. The 'Arkansas,' after arriving within a short distance of Baton Rouge in ample time for joint action at the appointed hour of attack, suddenly became unmanageable from a failure in her machinery and engine, which all the efforts of her engineers could not repair. The gallant Breckinridge, advised by telegram every hour of her progress toward Baton Rouge and counting on her cooperation, attacked the enemy with his whole effective force (then reduced to about 2,500 men), drove him from all his positions, and forced him to seek protection under the cover of his gunboats.

"I regret to state that the labors of General Breckinridge in a distant field of operations have thus far prevented him from making to me a report of his action, but enough has transpired to enable me to assure the Department that the battle of Baton Rouge illustrated the valor of our troops and the skill and intrepidity of their commander. His report will be forwarded so soon as it is received.

"It will be thus manifest to the Department that an enterprise so hopeful in its promise met with partial failure only from causes which were not only beyond my control, but out of the reach of ordinary foresight. I could not anticipate the sudden illness of 3,000 picked men, and the failure of the 'Arkansas' at the critical hour appointed to her for added honors was a joyful



LEVEE AT VICKSBURG.

surprise to the startled fleet of the enemy and a wonder to all who had witnessed her glory at Vicksburg.

“Advised of the result of the expedition, I immediately ordered the occupation of Port Hudson, a point selected for its eligibility for defense and for its capacity for offensive annoyance of the enemy-established batteries—manned them with experienced gunners and guarded them by an adequate supporting force, holding Baton Rouge in the meanwhile in menace. The effect of these operations was the evacuation of Baton Rouge by the enemy and his disappearance from the Mississippi between the capital of Louisiana and Vicksburg. The results sought by the movement against Baton Rouge have been to a great extent attained. We hold two points on the Mississippi, more than two hundred miles, unmolested by the enemy and closed to him. The navigation of the Mississippi River from the mouth of Red River to Vicksburg was at once opened and still remains open to our commerce, giving us also the important advantage of water connection by Red River of the East with the West. Indispensable supplies have been and continue to be drawn from this source. The desired facilities for communication and cooperation between this district and the Trans-Mississippi Department have been established. The recapture of New Orleans has been made easier to our army.

“I think it due to the truth of history to correct the error industriously spread by the official reports of the enemy touching the destruction of the ‘Arkansas.’ She was no trophy won by the ‘Essex,’ nor did she receive injury at Baton Rouge from the hands of any of her adversaries. Lieutenant Stevens, her gallant commander, finding her unmanageable, moored her to the shore. On the cautious approach of the enemy, who kept at a respectful distance, he landed his crew, cut her from her moorings, fired her with his own hands, and turned her adrift down the river. With every gun shotted, our flag floating from her bow, and not a man on board, the ‘Arkansas’ bore down upon the enemy and gave him battle. The guns were discharged as the flames reached them, and when her last shot was fired the explosion of her magazine ended the brief but glorious career of the ‘Arkansas.’ ‘It was beautiful,’ said Lieutenant Stevens, while the tears stood in his eyes, ‘to see her, when abandoned by commander and crew and dedicated to sacrifice, fighting the bat-

tle on her own hook.' I trust that the official report of Commodore Lynch will do justice to the courage, constancy, and resolution of the officers and men who were the last crew of the 'Arkansas.'

"I deem it eminently proper to say to the Department that neither the spirit which resolved to dispute at Vicksburg the jurisdiction of the Mississippi River nor the energy which successfully executed that resolution was local in its character. Nor was it a spirit bounded by State lines or circumscribed by State pride. It was a broad catholic spirit, wide as our country, and unlimited as the independence which we struggle to establish. The power which baffled the enemy resided in the breasts of the soldiers of seven States, marshaled behind the ramparts of Vicksburg. Mississippians were there, but there, too, also were the men of Kentucky, of Tennessee, of Alabama, of Arkansas, of Louisiana, and of Missouri, as ready to defend the emporium of Mississippi as to strike down the foe at their own hearthstones.

"I incorporate with my report a schedule of the forces under my command at Vicksburg as a proper contribution to the archives of the Confederacy.

"General Helm: Fourth Kentucky Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Hynes; Fifth Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel Hunt; Thirty-first Alabama Volunteers, Colonel Edwards; Fourth Alabama Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Snodgrass; Thirty-first Mississippi Volunteers, Colonel Orr; Hudson's Battery, First Lieutenant Sweeney.

"General J. S. Bowen: First Missouri Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Riley; Tenth Arkansas Volunteers, Colonel A. R. Witt; Ninth Arkansas Volunteers, Colonel Dunlop; Sixth Mississippi Volunteers, Colonel Lowry; Second Confederate Battalion, [James C. Malone]; Watson Battery, Captain Bursley.

"General Preston: Third Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel Thompson; Sixth Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel Lewis; Seventh Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel Crossland; Thirty-fifth Alabama Volunteers, Colonel Robertson; Cobb's Battery, Lieutenant Gracey.

"Col. W. S. Statham: Fifth Mississippi Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Farrell; Twenty-second Mississippi Volunteers, Captain Hughes; Nineteenth Tennessee Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Moore; Twentieth Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel Smith;

Twenty-eighth Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel Brown; Forty-fifth Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel Searcy; McClung's Battery, Captain McClung.

"General M. L. Smith: Company of sappers and miners, Captain Wintter; Twenty-sixth Louisiana Volunteers, Colonel De Clouet; Twenty-eighth Louisiana Volunteers, Colonel Thomas; Sixth Mississippi Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour; Twenty-seventh Louisiana Volunteers, Colonel Marks; Third Mississippi Volunteers, Colonel Mellon; Seventeenth Louisiana Volunteers, Colonel Richardson; Fourth Louisiana Volunteers, Colonel Allen; Company I, Thirty-ninth Mississippi Volunteers, Captain Randel; First Mississippi Light Artillery, Colonel Withers; regiment heavy artillery, Colonel Jackson; Eighth Louisiana Battalion, W. E. Pinkney; First Louisiana Battalion, Major Clinch; Twenty-eighth Mississippi Cavalry, Colonel Starke; Battalion Zouaves, Major Dupeire; cavalry escort, Lieutenant Bradley.

"To the members of my staff, Majors Kimmel and Stith, assistant adjutant-generals; to Major Joseph D. Balfour, inspector; to Surgeon Choppin, medical director; Surgeon Bryan, medical inspector; to Lieutenants Sulivane and Shoemaker, my aides; to Lieutenant-Colonel Lomax, assistant adjutant and inspector-general; Lieut.-Col. J. P. Major, acting engineer; Capts. A. H. Cross and Thyssens, engineers; to Col. Fred. Tate, and to Majors Uriel Wright and Welchler, volunteer aides, I return my thanks for the ready and efficient services rendered by them in their respective departments.

"I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"EARL VAN DORN,

"Major-General."

"GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 51.

"WAR DEPT., ADJT. AND INSP. GEN.'S OFFICE,

"RICHMOND, VA., July 22, 1862.

"The successful defense of Vicksburg against the mortar fleet of the enemy by Major-General Van Dorn and the officers and men under his command entitles them to the gratitude of the country, the thanks of the Government, and the admiration of the Army. By their gallantry and good conduct they have not only saved the city intrusted to them, but they have shown that

bombardments of cities, if bravely resisted, achieve nothing for the enemy, and only serve to unveil his malice and the hypocrisy of his pretended wish to restore the Union. The world now sees that his mission is one of destruction, not restoration.

"Lieutenant Brown and the officers and crew of the Confederate steamer 'Arkansas,' by their heroic attack upon the Federal fleet before Vicksburg, equaled the highest recorded examples of courage and skill. They prove that the Navy, when it regains its proper element, will be one of the chief bulwarks of national defense, and that it is entitled to a high place in the confidence and affection of the country.

"By command of the Secretary of War:


"S. COOPER,

"Adjutant and Inspector General."

On the opposite side of the river, the enemy was exerting his best skill and ingenuity to circumvent the designs of General Van Dorn, who, on the other hand, was zealously working night and day to defeat the plans of the enemy. The daily papers were thoughtlessly publishing the movements of troops; there was constant communication with the enemy, and Federal commanders had been ordered by the United States Government to offer every inducement to Southern planters to furnish cotton.* At the same time General Van Dorn was planning to move troops to the west of Baton Rouge, and with the aid of the ram "Arkansas" to recapture New Orleans. His plans were supposed to be as secret as possible, hence were unknown to the press or the soldiers (who planned and fought more campaigns from their sanctums and camps than both armies). This being a most im-

* August 2, 1862, General Halleck wrote to General Grant to "See that all possible facilities are afforded for getting out cotton. It is deemed important to get as much as we can into market. I see it stated in the newspapers that General Sherman has forbidden the payment of gold for cotton, while General Butler advises the payment of gold, in order to induce planters to bring it to market."

Again, General Grant said: "The Government wanted to get out all the cotton possible from the South and directed me to give every facility towards that end. Pay in gold was authorized, and stations on the Mississippi River and on the railroads in our possession had to be designated where cotton would be received. This opened to the enemy not only the means of communication, but was demoralizing to the troops." (P. 399, Vol. I. of his Memoirs.)



COTTON BOAT ON THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER.



portant movement, and by the counsel and suggestions of his superior officers, he issued what is known as order No. 9, in these terms, expecting patriotic citizens to uphold the same, and to cooperate with him in his effort to save them from invasion, and protect their persons and property from the enemy, "having, as he stated, "no desire to accumulate power, but for their best interest was the order issued."

"GENERAL ORDERS, No. 9.

"HDQRS. DEPT. OF SOUTH MISS. AND E. LA.,

"VICKSBURG, MISS., July 4, 1862.*

"The General Commanding having announced in General Orders, No. 1, his intention to defend the Department to the last extremity, or in view of the exigencies of the Country, hereby declares Martial Law in the following counties: As there seems to be some misapprehension in regard to the meaning and effect of Martial Law, the General Commanding deems it proper to state that it has been well defined to be 'the will of the Military Commander, but the extent of the action that may be had under it cannot be definitely announced, depending, as it does, upon the emergency of calling for such action. It is not intended to interfere with the courts, either civil or criminal, except so far as they may come in conflict with military orders.

"That 'private interest must be subservient to the public good,' is an old and respected maxim, and the loyal and intelligent will yield a willing obedience to the military mandates based thereon. The General Commanding confidently calls upon all officers, both civil and military, as also the citizens generally, to cooperate with and sustain him in all things necessary for the defense of the Country.

"Disloyalty must and will not be countenanced. The credit of the Government must be sustained. The seeds of dissension and disaffection shall not be sown among the troops. Speculation and extortion upon soldiers and citizens will not be tolerated, and to these ends the General Commanding orders:

"(I.) Any person who shall trade or attempt to trade with the enemy under any pretense whatsoever, or who shall give any signal to, or in any manner hold communication with the Enemy

* One year from this date Vicksburg surrendered, July 4, 1863.

for the purpose of giving information concerning the Confederate forces, or shall pass into his Camps, or through his lines without a passport from the proper authority, shall suffer death.

"(II.) Any person who shall refuse to receive Confederate money, or shall do or say or write anything calculated to depreciate the same, shall be subject to fine and imprisonment, or confiscation of property, either or both, as the nature of the case may indicate.

"(III.) The publication of any article in the newspapers in reference to the movements of the troops is prohibited, and if the editor or proprietor of any newspaper published in any of the counties hereinbefore designated shall publish any editorial article, or copy into his paper any article, or paragraph calculated to impair confidence in any of the Commanding Officers whom the President may see fit to place over the troops, such editor or proprietor shall be subject to fine and imprisonment, and the publication of the paper shall be thereafter suspended.

"(IV.) The asking of exorbitant prices for goods or the commodities of life, such as would indicate a want of confidence in Confederate money, or the bartering of or offering to barter goods at 'low prices' for the commodities of life, is prohibited, and any person so offending shall be subject to fine and imprisonment, or confiscation of property, either or both, as the nature of the case may indicate.

"(V.) Provost Marshals will be appointed for each of the counties in which none have been appointed, and the appointments heretofore made are confirmed until further orders.

"(VI.) Colonel Fred Tate, Provost Marshal General of the Department, is charged with the execution of the above order, and the local Provost Marshals will report to him weekly all proceedings had before them.

"By order of Major-General Earl Van Dorn,

"M. M. KIMMEL,

*"Major and Assistant Adjutant-General."**

* (Martial law.)

Corinth, Miss., March 30, 1862.

By order of General A. S. Johnston martial law was established at Jackson and Grenada, Miss., and environs for a circuit of five miles and suitable persons were appointed to act as provost marshals.

Martial law was also declared at Memphis and a provost marshal appointed by General Ruggles to enforce the order.

In this connection read what General W. T. Sherman writes to Admiral Porter under date of Feb. 4, 1863:

“BEFORE VICKSBURG, Feb. 4, 1863.

“GEN. W. T. SHERMAN TO ADMIRAL DAVID D. PORTER:

“DEAR SIR:—I thank you most heartily for your kind and considerate letter, Feb. 3, received this day, and more obliged than you can understand, as it covers many points I had neglected to guard against. Before Vicksburg, my mind was more intent on the enemy intrenched behind those hills than on the spies and intriguers in my own camp and ‘at home.’

“The spirit of anarchy seems deep at work at the North, more alarming than the batteries that shell at us from the opposite shore. I am going to have the correspondent of the *New York Herald* tried by a court-martial as a spy, not that I want the fellow shot, but because I want to establish the principle that such people cannot attend our armies, in violation of orders, and defy us, publishing their garbled statements and defaming officers who are doing their best. You of the Navy can control all who sail under your flag, whilst we are almost compelled to carry along in our midst a class of men who on Government transports usurp the best state-rooms and accommodations of the boats, pick up the drop conversations of officers, and report their limited and tainted observations as the history of events they neither see nor comprehend. This should not be, and must not be. We cannot prosper in military operations if we submit to it, and, as some one must begin the attack, I must assume the ungracious task. I shall always account myself fortunate to be near the officers of the old Navy, and would be most happy if I could think it possible the Navy and the Army of our country could ever again enjoy the high tone of honor and honesty that characterized them in the days of our youth.”

The defeat at Elkhorn, Arkansas,—not a defeat as was said, but simply a failure to drive the enemy out of the State and thereby relieve Missouri of his presence,—had been condoned, and for a time General Van Dorn’s star was in the ascendant. The ram “Arkansas” came out of Yazoo River and routed the Union fleet that lay in front of Vicksburg, bombarding the city at will, and the situation seemed bright and hopeful until order No. 9 was issued. At once a storm, a whirlwind, of obloquy

burst upon his head that would have crushed a man of less determination. The press assailed him as a "military tyrant," and applied every harsh epithet in their vocabulary; but finding they could not successfully assail his military reputation nor crush his spirit by that means, they resorted to ingenious and malicious assaults upon his personal and private character. Then, and then only, was his soul wounded to the quick. Then he bowed his head in sorrow, requested the President, who was his constant friend, to relieve him of the command and to assign him to another field. And, thus, Earl Van Dorn was driven from his native State, for which he was ready to give his life, his love, his heart's best devotion.

General Van Dorn was soon placed in command of cavalry forces and General Pemberton assigned to the command at Vicksburg. (After the fall of Vicksburg, some of General Van Dorn's critics were heard to say, that, "had Van Dorn remained in command, Grant's transports would never have passed their guns, nor would his army have landed as it did on the east side of the river on its way to besiege Vicksburg. General Pemberton was also so well abused that he, too, asked to be relieved after the dire happenings, and to be reduced to the ranks as a private.)

In the Appendix telegrams and orders and reports will show how industriously General Van Dorn had labored for the defense of this city, and how zealously he studied its welfare and safety, and how eagerly his presence and command were afterward sought when General Grant had crossed the river. The only fortifications erected south of Vicksburg were by his orders, knowing this to be the only vulnerable point by which General Grant could approach and besiege that stronghold. His energies were therefore directed to the southern approaches. Port Hudson had been fortified by his orders, and heavy artillery placed to command the river. That point guarded the mouth of Red River, from whence abundant supplies of beef cattle and provisions came to the army from Texas and other places. Several assaults were made on this armed fort and failed, but it held its ground until Vicksburg fell. The canal that General Grant attempted below the city proved a failure, and as General Van Dorn had warned the people his objective point was south of the city, having found all other points impracticable to a siege. General



FORT VAN DORN.

Grant's report of his campaign around this city will be read with interest by those who lived near and are familiar with the river, the roads, and country around this section.

In connection with General Van Dorn's foresight as to the plans of General Grant, this statement comes from his aide-de-camp, Colonel Sulivane. This officer left Maryland and enlisted as a private in the 16th Mississippi Regiment, and was promoted for gallantry in action, until at the close of hostilities his commission only needed the signature of the President to make him a Brigadier-General.

"As Aide-de-Camp, I had to perform any duties to which I might be assigned, and was always at the beck and call of the commanding general.

"During the month of July, 1862, the first siege of Vicksburg, my sole occupation was, as ordered by General Van Dorn, to make myself thoroughly familiar with the country around Vicksburg, its woods, hills, bayous, roads, etc., and especially toward Big Black River, and beyond; and I spent the whole month in solitary rides of exploration, in view of an attack by the United States Army. Repeatedly General Van Dorn said to me, 'They can never seriously menace Vicksburg, certainly can never take it, but by landing a heavy force to the south of the city, either above or below the Big Black. If above, I must meet them before they make good their footing,—if below, I must meet them at the Big Black. And I desire to know every foot of the country. If they are ever allowed to pass the Big Black with a heavy force, Vicksburg must fall.' Just one year afterwards, when the General was in his grave, his military prescience was vindicated. I often commented on it during the second siege of Vicksburg to my fellow officers of the Army in North Virginia, and I steadily said to them (after General Grant's occupation of Raymond), 'Vicksburg will fall.'"

General Johnston also states in his report to the President that he "had told General Pemberton that the time to strike the enemy with the best hope of saving Vicksburg was when he was landing near Bruinsburg"—that "if Grant's army landed on the east side of the river the safety of Mississippi depended upon beating it back; if Grant crossed to unite his whole force against him. These instructions were neglected and time was given Grant to gain a foothold in the State."

To be misunderstood and misjudged by those we love is the curse and bitterness of life, and if God could suffer we would crucify Him every day.

All of General Van Dorn's zeal, activity and military ability were centered in the struggle to defend Vicksburg to the last extremity,—centered, as it proved, in an egg from whence issued hissing serpents instead of a dove of peace and cooperation.

"Modern fame lodgeth in a hut, a slight and temporary dwelling;
Lay not up the treasures of thy soul within so damp a chamber
For the moth of detraction shall fret thy robe, and drop its eggs upon thy
motive,"

Every seed he had planted for its defense blossomed now into a poisonous fruit of sorrow and sadness that followed him to if it did not put him into his grave. He was too unselfish and generous to friend and foe and possessed of too many enviable qualities to pass through the world without detractors,—and to a sensitive man detraction kills quicker than the poison of asps,—and "they delivered him to the chief priests to be scourged."

"Love, the fairest of all fair things
That ever to man descended,
Grows rank with nettles and poisonous stings
Unless it is watched and tended.

"On the river of life as I float along,
I see with the spirit's sight
That many a nauseous seed of wrong
Has root in a seed of right."

Chance is the lord of destiny, "Reputation a bubble that bursts in an hour, and life but the toss of a coin; those who float in the sunshine know little of the shadow; while the sun shines the bubble sparkles and eludes; when the shadow comes the sparkle vanishes and all is gone. Man may do his best and is alone responsible for his doing; if he wins he gets applause, if he loses, by no fault of his own, he is condemned."

Who were more condemned and vilified in their lifetime than Abraham Lincoln, Washington, Grant, and even the immortal Lee did not escape. Stonewall Jackson sent despatches that show that he, too, was disappointed, and wounded, and asked to be allowed to resign and resume his duties at the University,—as this correspondence proves:



"WATER-MILLIONS."

"STONEWALL JACKSON'S WAY."

GEN. JACKSON'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

"HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,

"January 31st, 1862.

"HON. J. P. BENJAMIN, SECRETARY OF WAR:

"SIR:—Your order requiring me to direct General Loring to return with his command to Winchester immediately has been received and promptly complied with. With such interference in my command I cannot expect to be of much service in the field, and accordingly respectfully request to be ordered to report for duty to the Superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington, as has been done in the case of other professors. Should this application not be granted, I respectfully request that the President will accept my resignation from the army.

"I am, sir, very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"T. J. JACKSON,

"Major-General P. A. C. S."

HIS LETTER TO GOVERNOR LETCHER—THE ROMNEY EXPEDITION.

"WINCHESTER, January 31st, 1862.

"GOVERNOR:—This morning I received an order from the Secretary of War to order General Loring and his command to fall back from Romney to this place immediately. The order was promptly complied with, but as the order was given without consulting me, and is abandoning to the enemy what has cost much preparation, expense and exposure to secure, and is in direct conflict with my military plans, and implies a want of confidence in my capacity to judge when General Loring's troops should fall back, and is an attempt to control military operations in detail from the Secretary's desk at a distance, I have for the reasons set forth in the accompanying paper requested to be ordered back to the Institute, and if this is denied me, then to have my resignation accepted. I ask as a special favor that you will have me ordered back to the Institute.

"As a single order like that of the Secretary's may destroy the entire fruits of a campaign, I cannot reasonably expect, if my operations are thus to be interfered with, to be of much service in the field. A sense of duty brought me into the field, and has thus far kept me. It now appears to be my duty to return to the In-

stitute, and I hope that you will leave no stone unturned to get me there. If I have ever acquired through the blessing of Providence any influence over troops, this undoing of my work by the Secretary may greatly diminish that influence.

"I regard the recent expedition as a great success. Before our troops left home on the 1st instant there was not, so far as I have been able to ascertain, a single loyal man in Morgan County who could remain at home in safety. In four days that county was entirely evacuated by the enemy. Romney and the most valuable portion of Hampshire County was recovered without firing a gun, and before we had ever entered the county.

"I desire to say nothing against the Secretary of War. I take it for granted that he has done what he believed to be best, but I regard such a policy as ruinous.

"Very truly, your friend,

"T. J. JACKSON.

"*His Excellency John Letcher, Governor of Virginia.*"

To read the records of the Civil War on either side will mantle the cheek with a blush for the treason, invective, false representations of commanding officers and their motives, and the archives of the nation are blackened and besmirched by them to a degree of disgrace and dishonor that should be blotted out with the sins of the penitent sinner!

By reference to the Records, it will be seen by the multitudes of telegrams and papers addressed to and relative to General Van Dorn from General J. E. Johnston, General Bragg, and the President, how greatly his services were in demand, and how confidently they depended upon him for the execution of the most difficult orders. Knowing his dash and celerity of movement, the enemy also was kept on the lookout for his troops, and many telegrams from General Grant and others are to "look out for Van Dorn's cavalry." At the time of his last campaign he was preparing for the important movement to enter Nashville and combine his forces with General Bragg's to drive the enemy from Tennessee and Kentucky. When General Grant was below Vicksburg, encamped at a landing on the Mississippi River, an old man was taken prisoner and his friends went to beg him off, and to take him clothing and money. General Grant was so much afraid of a surprise by cavalry, that upon hearing the rumor from


this party of General Van Dorn's death, which occurred May 7th, his battle at Port Gibson having occurred the 1st of May, 1863, he would allow no one to enter the camp for any purpose, doubled his pickets, and stated that the rumor of General Van Dorn's death was but a ruse to put him off his guard that Van Dorn might repeat the surprise of Holly Springs and cut off his base of supplies by getting in his rear.

RELATIVE TO MARTIAL LAW.

"I did not see the order from General Bragg to General Van Dorn to which you refer, but it was my understanding at the time that it was at the former General's suggestion that General Van Dorn proclaimed martial law in order to be able to censor the press, the immediate and pressing necessity for this being the absolute need to keep secret the projected descent on Baton Rouge, La. General Williams, U. S. A., was lying at Baton Rouge with between 4,000 and 5,000 men, and General Van Dorn formed a plan to send General Breckinridge with about the same number of Confederate troops down the railroad to Tangipahoe, thence to march on Baton Rouge about eighty miles distant, and arrive there on a fixed day in August, 1862, to meet the ram 'Arkansas,' which General Van Dorn was to have there also on the same day. General Breckinridge was to attack, drive to the river bank and kill or capture Williams' entire force, while the 'Arkansas' was to engage the United States' war vessels and prevent their giving any assistance to their infantry on shore. There was but one U. S. ironclad, the 'Essex,' there, and she was incomparable to the 'Arkansas' either in guns or armor, the Confederate ironclad carrying ten, and the U. S. ironclad carrying but two guns. It was confidently expected that the 'Arkansas' would sink, disable, or drive away the 'Essex' and her wooden consorts, whereupon General Williams' army, if beaten by Breckinridge, would have no choice but to surrender or be driven to the Mississippi. General B. was to telegraph his success to General Van Dorn from Tangipahoe, whereupon the latter General would immediately join him with 5,000 more troops and march down the levee to New Orleans (where General Butler was lying with from 3,000 to 5,000 U. S. troops), escorted by the 'Arkansas,' and on arriving there the Baton Rouge pro-

gram was to be repeated; unless General Butler should escape to Fort Jackson and the remnant of the U. S. fleet do the same without battle. In any event we would have regained New Orleans and the railroads centering there, and guarded by the 'Arkansas' have proceeded to fortify below the city to secure it. I never knew a simpler or more feasible project, and you know from history how near it came to fruition and what defeated it. General Breckinridge did his part of the work and drove Williams' forces to the bank of the river. The 'Arkansas,' also, was true to time and had reached a point but six or eight miles from Baton Rouge on the morning of the battle, and would have been there in an hour, when its main shaft snapped in two. Of course, it was impossible to repair it, and just then the 'Essex,' having seen her smoke above the bend and steamed up to see what it was, the commander of the 'Arkansas' and crew could do nothing but leave in his small boats and burn up the vessel to prevent her falling into the enemy's hands, which he did. The history of the war, and especially the career of General Van Dorn, would have been radically changed but for that broken shaft. 'The conqueror of New Orleans,' amidst the frantic plaudits of the Confederacy, would (as soon as New Orleans was fortified, say in two months) have repeated this operation at Memphis and St. Louis, and by ascending the Ohio to Louisville and Cincinnati have compelled the whole U. S. Army in Tennessee to fall back to that river, thus freeing Tennessee and Kentucky.

"It was on the night after the battle of Baton Rouge that General Van Dorn, having to his astonishment received no message from General Breckinridge, sent me and others to that General's camp. It had been the habit of the Jackson papers to publish every movement of troops, though repeatedly remonstrated with; and it was all important to get General Breckinridge and the 'Arkansas' to Baton Rouge before the enemy knew of the movement; otherwise Butler's army at New Orleans would have joined Williams and fortified, and together they could have set General B. at defiance. The Jackson papers would have informed the public of this movement down the river, and General Butler's intelligence would immediately have disclosed to him the whole project. And you now see how important it was to declare martial law if only for a few weeks, until the foregoing enterprise was an accomplished fact.



THE OFFICERS' CORNER MOUND, E. NATIONAL CEMETERY, VICKSBURG.

"And now to return to my trip to Baton Rouge: General Breckinridge was to have attacked on August 5th (as he did), and General Van Dorn confidently looked all day of the 6th for a telegram announcing the capture of Williams' army and the destruction or flight of his fleet. Through the entire day he chafed like an impatient lion until I left his house at supper time to go to my own. About midnight I was awakened by Milton (his body servant) to say that the General wished to see me at once. Hastening to his house, I found him alone, and he informed me that Breckinridge had fought a successful battle but the 'Arkansas' had failed to appear and therefore would not follow up his victory, as the U. S. fleet repelled him from the river bank. That Breckinridge had lost heavily in officers; that he (Van Dorn) had ordered Colonels Lomax and Dillon of our staff to go immediately to Baton Rouge and order Breckinridge to renew his attack as the 'Arkansas' would surely appear, something having delayed her arrival. That he did not wish to lose a day or an hour, and wished me to go also, and no matter what the other gentlemen did I was to press right on to Breckinridge's camp and deliver my orders, and offer my services to the General to lead the storming column into Baton Rouge. That within an hour a special train would be in readiness to carry us and our horses to Tangipahoe. I at once expressed my perfect willingness to go, but called his attention to the fact that at the moment I was unprovided with a horse, not having bought one since the raising of the siege of Vicksburg the week before. 'I have thought of that,' replied he, 'and have directed Milton to put "San Antonio" on the train for you.' (This horse was the beautiful thoroughbred animal presented to General Van Dorn by the city of San Antonio, a splendid horse and ever a favorite with his owner). 'But, General,' remonstrated I, 'this is a very valuable animal, and I may very likely get him killed or maimed, for you may be very certain that as I shall not spare myself I shall not spare "San Antonio."' I have never forgotten the military pride that flashed from his bright blue eyes as he rejoined, 'And you, sir, may feel very certain that when I risk *you* to go I do not mind risking "San Antonio."' And suiting the action to the word he turned to the sideboard on which stood a decanter of wine and some glasses, and added, 'Come, let us take a parting drink together; "the paths of glory lead but

to the grave;"—and cordially parting I hastened on my way. The sequel of it was that we reached Tangipahoe about seven o'clock next morning, and finding that Dillon and Lomax were going to rest their horses until ten, I and 'San Antonio' took a hasty breakfast and got off at eight, rode all day and got into General Breckinridge's camp at just eight that evening, having made what they called eighty-four miles,—but I thought it eighty,—in exactly twelve hours. At the time it was thought a remarkable ride. The other gentlemen did not reach there until noon the next day, too late, for the battle had then been over. But General B. had by that time heard of the destruction of the 'Arkansas,' knew it would be useless to attack without her, and so very properly decided to disobey orders, which I agreed with him would not have been given had General Van Dorn known of the above fact. And so we all came leisurely back together, General B. sending forward a courier to telegraph to General Van Dorn."

"I add a word in reference to the proclamation of martial law:

"As you are doubtless aware, it was the policy of the Confederate Government (in all the earlier stages of the war especially) to attempt to force France and England, particularly the latter, to recognize our Confederacy, by a cotton famine. In pursuance of this policy all department commanders in the cotton states were expressly ordered to use the utmost vigilance to prevent the exportation of any cotton, excepting of course what the Government itself exported in order to buy ships, arms, ammunition, etc., abroad.

"General Van Dorn, when he went to Mississippi, found a brisk trade going on with New Orleans and Memphis in this commodity, and do what he could, with our extensive frontier from the Tennessee line down the river and around by the Gulf to the Alabama line, he could not prevent it. He caught some parties, who immediately got out writs of habeas corpus; and in short he was powerless to use the courts effectively to prevent this contraband trade. Determined to stop it, he declared martial law, for, in addition to the trade, he found that under cover of it, United States spies discovered, as soon as our own soldiers, every movement of our troops, and their positions, and he was engaged in making preparations for the movement on Baton Rouge under General Breckinridge, and through it the recovery of the Mis-

Mississippi River including New Orleans; and this design must of necessity have succeeded but for the accident to the ironclad ram 'Arkansas,' just above Baton Rouge, on the very day that the victorious Breckinridge had jammed the whole of Butler's army (excepting a thousand or fifteen hundred men in New Orleans, to resist our 5,000), in a panic-stricken, disorganized, and cowering mass, down to the river bank at Baton Rouge, under the protection of their wooden fleet, which was to have been destroyed by the terrible armament of the ironclad 'Arkansas.'

"These were General Van Dorn's reasons. He then at once put a stop to the whole cotton trade and did actually surprise Butler's army at Baton Rouge. So effectively was it stopped, that General B. F. Butler's brother came within our lines under flag of truce, *ostensibly* about an exchange of prisoners (and we sent two officers to New Orleans on the same business, where they dined with General Butler), but *really* to intimate to General Van Dorn that he and another party (a name was given which is not now remembered) were engaged in this cotton speculation; that they were willing to give General Van Dorn: (1) immense prices for all cotton he would sell them; (2) to give him large sums of money to wink at their trade, and (3) to pay in quinine, salt, medical stores, clothing, or anything he (General Van Dorn) might select. In fact, he intimated that the name of the partner given us was fictitious, and that his brother, the General, was really the partner in the business. It is unnecessary to say that General Van Dorn refused the three offers peremptorily. He informed me of this at the time. President Davis disapproved the martial law order and that was the end of it."

GRANT'S INTERESTING STATEMENT OF HIS OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF
AND BELOW VICKSBURG.

"On the 24th (of April, 1863) my headquarters were with the advance at Perkins' Plantation. Reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whether there was high land on the east shore of the river where we might land above Grand Gulf. There was none practicable. Accordingly the troops were set in motion for Hard Times, twenty-two miles farther down the river and nearly opposite Grand Gulf. The loss of two steamers and six barges reduced our transportation so that only 10,000 men could be

moved by water. Some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those less severely injured. All the troops, therefore, except what could be transported in one trip, had to march. The road lay west of Lake St. Joseph. Three large bayous had to be crossed. They were rapidly bridged in the same manner as those previously encountered.

"On the 27th McClernand's corps was all at Hard Times, and McPherson was following closely. I had determined to make the attempt to effect a landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible. Accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, McClernand was directed to embark all the troops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry. About 10,000 men were so embarked. The plan was to have the navy silence the guns at Grand Gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy and carry the works by storm. The following order was issued:

" 'PERKINS' PLANTATION, LA.,

" 'April 27, 1863.

" 'MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. MCCLERNAND, Commanding 13th A. C.:

" 'Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as there is transportation for. Have put aboard the artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning.

" 'All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send to a point opposite Grand Gulf, where you see, by special orders of this date, General McPherson is ordered to send one division.

" 'The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all the batteries commanding the river. Your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing down the river. Once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. The first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves

until such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a forward movement.

“ ‘Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced.

“ ‘It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past Grand Gulf and land at Rodney. In case this should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start with this view. Or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. In this case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to below Grand Gulf, reembark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. There will be required, then, three signals: one, to indicate that the transports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the transports can run by with the troops on board.

“ ‘Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to run the blockade.

“ ‘If not already directed, require your men to keep three days’ rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences.

“ ‘U. S. GRANT,
“ ‘*Major-General.*’

“At eight o’clock A. M., 29th, Porter made the attack with his entire strength present, eight gunboats. For nearly five and a half hours the attack was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy. All this time McClernand’s 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the stream ready to attempt a landing if signaled. I occupied a tug from which I could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within range of the enemy’s guns; but a small tug, without armament, was calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being assailed themselves. About half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeing their efforts were entirely unavailing. The enemy ceased firing as soon as we withdrew. I immediately signaled the Admiral and went aboard his ship. The navy lost in this engage-

ment eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. A large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side and exploded between decks where the men were working their guns. The sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eyes as I boarded the ship was sickening.

"Grand Gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot of it. It is as defensible upon its front as Vicksburg and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack. I therefore requested Porter to run the batteries with his fleet that night, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would be wanted below.

"There is a long tongue of land from the Louisiana side extending towards Grand Gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three miles above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point from about the same distance below. The land was so low and wet that it would not have been practicable to march an army across but for a levee. I had had this explored before, as well as the east bank below, to ascertain if there was a possible point of debarkation north of Rodney. It was found that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon.

"Porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in the plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports. I had intended to make this request but he anticipated me. At dusk when concealed from the view of the enemy at Grand Gulf, McClernand landed his command on the west bank. The navy and transports ran the batteries successfully. The troops marched across the point of land under cover of night, unobserved. By the time it was light the enemy saw our whole fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving down the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, with National troops.

"When the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected that we would have to go to Rodney, about nine miles below, to find a landing; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that a good landing would be found at Bruinsburg, a few miles above Rodney, from which point there was a good road leading to Port Gibson some twelve miles in the interior. The information was found correct, and our landing was effected without opposition.

" Sherman had not left his position above Vicksburg yet. On the morning of the 27th I ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps up the Yazoo and threatening an attack on Haines' Bluff.

" My object was to compel Pemberton to keep as much force about Vicksburg as I could, until I could secure a good footing on high land east of the river. The move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about Vicksburg and doubts about our real design. Sherman moved the day of our attack on Grand Gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which Porter had left above Vicksburg.

He debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at Haines' Bluff. The move was made without a single casualty in either branch of the service. On the first of May (1863) Sherman received orders from me (sent from Hard Times the evening of the 29th of April) to withdraw from the front of Haines' Bluff and follow McPherson with two divisions as fast as he could.

" I had established a depot of supplies at Perkins' plantation. Now that all our gunboats were before Grand Gulf it was possible that the enemy might fit out boats in the Big Black with improvised armament and attempt to destroy these supplies. McPherson was at Hard Times with a portion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of his command. The night of the 29th I directed him to arm one of the transports with artillery and send it up to Perkins' plantation as a guard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved there and put in position.

" The embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at De Shroon's (Disheroons), Louisiana, six miles above Bruinsburg, Mississippi. Early on the morning of 30th of April McClermand's corps and one division of McPherson's corps were speedily landed.

" When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equaled since. Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. I was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. But I was

on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from the month of December previous, to this time, that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object.

"I had with me the 13th corps, General McClernand commanding, and two brigades of Logan's division of the 17th corps, General McPherson commanding—in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the campaign with. These were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade of Logan's division and Crocker's division of the 17th corps. On the 7th of May I was further reinforced by Sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. My total force was then about thirty-three thousand men.

"The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Haines' Bluff and Jackson with a force of nearly sixty thousand men. Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicksburg and is connected with it by a railroad. My first problem was to capture Grand Gulf to use as a base.

Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. The bottom at that point is higher than most of the low land in the valley of the Mississippi, and a good road leads to the bluff. It was natural to expect the garrison from Grand Gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, our reaching this solid base. Bayou Pierre enters the Mississippi just above Bruinsburg, and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at the time, in order to intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson, the nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. This more than doubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back of Bruinsburg. No time was to be lost in securing this foothold. Our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river at one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and one division of the 17th was effected during the day, April 30th, and early evening. McClernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days' rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. The bluffs were reached an hour before sunset and McClernand was pushed on, hoping to reach Port Gibson and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre before the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an enemy is always difficult. Port Gibson, too, is the starting point of roads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg and Jackson.

"McClernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of Port Gibson at Thompson's plantation. There was some fir-



MINT BAYOU NEAR VICKSBURG.

ing during the night, but nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. The enemy had taken a strong natural position with most of the Grand Gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under General Bowen, *His hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under Loring could reach him from Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to render much assistance south of Port Gibson. Two brigades of McPherson's corps followed McClernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battle-field whenever the 13th corps could be got out of the way.

"The country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from one ridge to another. Where there are no clearings the sides of the hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. This makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one.

"Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port Gibson divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two at the widest point. These roads unite just outside the town. This made it necessary for McClernand to divide his force. It was not only divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above described. One flank could not reinforce the other except by marching back to the junction of the roads. McClernand put the divisions of Hovey, Carr and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch and Osterhaus on the left. I was on the field by ten A. M., and inspected both flanks in person. On the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least not repulsing our advance. On the left, however, Osterhaus was not faring so well. He had been repulsed with some loss. As soon as the road could be cleared of McClernand's troops I ordered up McPherson, who was close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of Logan's division. This was about noon. I ordered him to send one brigade (General John E. Smith's was selected) to support Osterhaus and to move to the left and flank the enemy out of his position. This movement carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge,

* 4,500 men.

and, when Smith's troops were seen well through the ravine, Osterhaus was directed to renew his front attack. It was successful and unattended by heavy loss. The enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left followed before sunset. While the movement to our left was going on frequent requests for reinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed, came from McClernand, who was with his right flank. I had been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had. We followed up our victory until night overtook us about two miles from Port Gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for the night.

"We started next morning for Port Gibson as soon as it was light enough to see the road. We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned. The troops were set to work as once to construct a bridge across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre. At this time the water was high and the current rapid. What might be called a raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely. Colonel J. H. Wilson, a member of my staff, planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water and working as hard as any one engaged. Officers and men generally joined in this work. When it was finished the army crossed and marched eight miles beyond to the North Fork that day. One brigade of Logan's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge. Two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the North Fork to repair the bridge there. The enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere. Before leaving Port Gibson we were reinforced by Crocker's division, McPherson's corps, which had crossed the Mississippi at Bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days' rations. McPherson still had one division west of the Mississippi River, guarding the road from Milliken's Bend to the river below until Sherman's command should relieve it. . . .

"When the movement from Bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon train. The train still west of the Mississippi

was carried around with proper escort, by a circuitous route from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times, seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the battle of Port Gibson. My own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what I had on was with this train. General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburg, which I borrowed with a saddle tree without upholstering further than stirrups. I had no other for nearly a week.

"It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. Provisions could be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. I directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. Quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. In it could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plow-harness, straw collars, rope lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation either for use or pleasure. The making out of provision returns was stopped for the time. No formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured when the time could be spared to observe them.

"It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of the complete success of Colonel Grierson, who was making a raid through Central Mississippi. . . .

"General Pemberton's report on the surrender of Vicksburg, etc., states that "I have been thus circumstantial in reciting the incidents connected with the celebrated raid that I might clearly demonstrate the great deficiency, I may almost say absence, of cavalry in my department and the absolute impossibility of protecting my communications, depots, and even my most vital positions, without it; and, further, to show that consequent upon this want of cavalry I was compelled to employ infantry, and thus weaken our forces in that arm at other points."

General Pemberton also says, August 2, 1863, "I wrote to General Johnston on March 25, urgently requesting that the division of cavalry under Major-General Van Dorn, which had been

sent to the Army of Tennessee for special and temporary purposes, might be returned to me."

(From the *Mobile Register*.)

"If General Pemberton had had Van Dorn and his splendid division of cavalry at hand, Grant and his vandals would never have polluted the soil of Mississippi. Van Dorn and his gallant fellows would have sabered and ridden them down faster than Grant could have put them ashore. This, however, was not permitted, General Pemberton was not allowed to judge of his own necessities, and Van Dorn's cavalry remained with Bragg, while Mississippi was being overrun by Grierson and his marauders."

March, 12, 1863.—TO SECRETARY OF WAR.

"General J. E. Johnston asks if General Van Dorn's cavalry cannot return. His forces too weak to meet Grant's."

January 22, 1863.—This paper is signed by General Sterling Price and General Van Dorn.

"In a conversation two days ago between Generals Pemberton and General Van Dorn and myself, the following statement was made by General Pemberton, viz.: That 100,000 men could not have taken Vicksburg, and that since the attack was abandoned by the enemy he had strengthened his works of defense very much; that he could spare General Bragg 8,000 men, but would not make the proposition for fear of accidents."

FEDERAL TELEGRAMS.

February 13, 1863.

Van Dorn is moving as far as Florence.

February 14, 1863.

Van Dorn is passing north.

February 16, 1863.

Van Dorn is crossing the Tennessee.

February 22, 1863.

Van Dorn has crossed the river and is now with Forrest and Wheeler at Columbia.

May 11, 1863.

Van Dorn reported killed by citizen.

June 2, 1863.

General Rosecrans reports two of Van Dorn's brigades sent to Johnston in Mississippi.

June 10, 1863.

Van Dorn's force, under Jackson, reached Jackson (Miss.) last Friday.

June 12, 1863.

Van Dorn's old command at Bolton Depot.

June 17, 1863.

Van Dorn's old command, 19,000 strong, under Wheeler and Morgan, crossing to unite with troops coming from Jackson.

CHAPTER IX.

CORINTH.

“ For that day
Saw many a Trojan slain, and many a Greek
Stretched side by side upon the bloody field.”

DESTINY has two ways of dealing with us, one by granting our prayers and the other by refusing them,—our safety lying alone in leaving all to the will of God. Is there one who doubts that He rules the nations, stills the tempests, numbers the stars and takes notice of a sparrow that falls? Is there one who doubts that had our wishes been granted in the struggle between the States, that only warfare and confusion would have resulted instead of the continued combined power which the country now wields among the nations of the earth? When man fails in his purposes, no matter what combinations, or labor, or zeal, he may exercise, it is called “ providence,” “ ill luck,” so that to invariably succeed he must first provide himself with good luck against chance or accident, and defy the will of the higher power that governs our affairs and orders His divine schemes for the good of the world. Accident plays a large part in the affairs of men, as the most successful among them admit, and few commanders of battles, or men of state, have escaped being led through accident or chance to victory or defeat.

For the sake of truth, and in justice to the commanding officers, as well as to correct stupendous errors constantly made regarding the bloody assault upon Corinth and its outposts, October 3d, 4th and 5th, 1862, as well as for the sake of comparison, and to give the opportunity to glean facts connected with that battle, the official reports of General Van Dorn, General Price, General Rosecrans, and General Grant are here reproduced at length.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF CORINTH OCT. 3, 4, 1862.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF WEST TENNESSEE,

"HOLLY SPRINGS, MISS., October 20, 1862.

"GENERAL:—I have the honor to make the following report of the battle of Corinth:

"Having established batteries at Port Hudson, secured the mouth of Red River and the navigation of the Mississippi River to Vicksburg, I turned my special attention to affairs in the northern portion of my district.

"On August 30 I received a despatch from General Bragg, informing me that he was about to march into Kentucky and would leave to General Price and myself the enemy in West Tennessee.

"On September 4 I received a communication from General Price, in which was inclosed a copy of the despatch from General Bragg, above named, making an offer to cooperate with me. At this time General Breckinridge was operating on the Mississippi River between Baton Rouge and Port Hudson with all the available force I had for the field; therefore I could not accept General Price's proposition. Upon the return, however, of General Breckinridge I immediately addressed General Price, giving him my views in full in regard to the campaign in West Tennessee, and stating that I was then ready to join him with all my troops.

"In the meantime orders were received by him from General Bragg to follow Rosecrans across the Tennessee River into Middle Tennessee, whither it was then supposed he had gone. Upon the receipt of this intelligence I felt at once that all my hopes of accomplishing anything in West Tennessee with my small force were marred. I nevertheless moved up to Davis's Mill, a few miles from Grand Junction, Tennessee, with the intention of defending my district to the best of my ability, and to make a demonstration in favor of General Price, to which latter end also I marched my whole command on September 20 to within 7 miles of Bolivar, driving three brigades of the enemy back to that place and forcing the return to Corinth of one division (Ross's) which had been sent there to strengthen Grant's army.

"General Price, in obedience to his orders, marched in the direction of Iuka to cross the Tennessee, but was not long in discovering that Rosecrans had not crossed that stream. This officer, in connection with Grant, attacked him on September 19, and

compelled him to fall back toward Baldwyn, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.

"On the 25th day of the same month I received a despatch by courier from General Price, stating that he was at Baldwyn and was then ready to join me with his forces in an attack on Corinth, as had been previously suggested by me.

"We met at Ripley on September 28, according to agreement, and marched the next morning toward Pocahontas, which place we reached on October 1.

"From all the information I could obtain the following was the situation of the Federal army at that time: Sherman at Memphis with about 6,000 men; Hurlbut (afterward Ord) at Bolivar with about 8,000; Grant's headquarters at Jackson with about 3,000; Rosecrans at Corinth with about 15,000, together with the following outposts, viz.: Rienzi, 2,500; Burnsville, Jacinto, and luka about 6,000; at important bridges and on garrison duty about 2,000 or 3,000, making in the aggregate about 42,000 men in West Tennessee. Memphis, Jackson, Bolivar and Corinth were fortified, the works mounting siege guns; the outposts slightly fortified, having fieldpieces. Memphis, Bolivar, and Corinth are on the arc of a circle, the chord of which from Memphis to Corinth makes an angle with the due east about 15 degrees south. Bolivar is about equidistant from Memphis and Corinth, somewhat nearer the latter, and is at the intersection of the Hatchie River and the Mississippi Central and Ohio Railroad. Corinth is the strongest but the most salient point.

"Surveying the whole field of operations before me calmly and dispassionately, the conclusion forced itself irresistibly upon my mind that the taking of Corinth was a condition precedent to the accomplishment of anything of importance in West Tennessee. To take Memphis would be to destroy an immense amount of property without an adequate military advantage, even admitting that it could be held without heavy guns against the enemy's gun and mortar boats. The line of fortifications around Bolivar is intersected by the Hatchie River, rendering it impossible to take the place by quick assault, and reinforcements could be thrown in from Jackson by railroad, and situated as it is in the reentrant angle of the three fortified places, an advance upon it would expose both my flanks and rear to an attack from the forces at Memphis and Corinth. It was clear to my mind that if a success-

ful attack could be made upon Corinth from the west and north-west, the forces there driven back on the Tennessee and cut off, Bolivar and Jackson would easily fall, and then, upon the arrival of the exchanged prisoners of war, West Tennessee would soon be in our possession and communication with General Bragg effected through Middle Tennessee. The attack on Corinth was a military necessity, requiring prompt and vigorous action. It was being strengthened daily under that astute soldier General Rosecrans. Convalescents were returning to fill his ranks, new levies were arriving to increase his brigades, and fortifications were being constructed at new points, and it was very evident that unless a sudden and vigorous blow could be struck there at once no hope could be entertained of driving the enemy from a base of operations so convenient that in the event of misfortune to Bragg in Kentucky the whole valley of the Mississippi would be lost to us before winter. To have waited for the arrival, arming, clothing, and organization of the exchanged prisoners would have been to wait for the enemy to strengthen themselves more than we could possibly do.

“With these reflections and after mature deliberation I determined to attempt Corinth. I had a reasonable hope of success. Field returns at Ripley showed my strength to be about 22,000 men. Rosecrans at Corinth had about 15,000, with about 8,000 additional men at outposts from 12 to 15 miles distant. I might surprise him and carry the place before these troops could be brought in. I therefore marched toward Pocahontas, threatening Bolivar; then turned suddenly across the Hatchie and Tusculum and attacked Corinth without hesitation, and did surprise that place before the outpost garrisons were called in. It was necessary that this blow should be sudden and decisive, and if unsuccessful that I should withdraw rapidly from the position between the two armies of Ord and Rosecrans. The troops were in fine spirits and the whole army of West Tennessee seemed eager to emulate the Armies of the Potomac and of Kentucky. No army ever marched to battle with prouder steps, more hopeful countenances, or with more courage than marched the Army of West Tennessee out of Ripley on the morning of September 30, on its way to Corinth.

“Fully alive to the responsibility of my position as commander of the army, and after mature and deliberate reflection, the march

was ordered. The ground was well known to me and required no study to determine where to make the attack. The bridge over the Hatchie was soon reconstructed and the army crossed at 4 A. M. on October 2. Adams' brigade of cavalry was left here to guard this approach to our rear and to protect the train, which was parked between the Hatchie and Tuscumbia. Colonel Hawkins' regiment of infantry and Captain Dawson's battery of artillery were also left on the Bone Yard road, in easy supporting distance of the bridge. The army bivouacked at Chewalla after the driving in of some pickets from that vicinity by Armstrong's and Jackson's cavalry. This point is about 10 miles from Corinth.

"At daybreak on the 3d the march was resumed, the precaution having been taken to cut the railroad between Corinth and Jackson, which was done by a squadron of Armstrong's cavalry. Lovell's division in front kept the road on the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Price, after marching on the same road about 5 miles, turned to the left, crossing the railroad, and formed line of battle in front of the outer line of intrenchments and about 3 miles from Corinth. Lovell formed line of battle, after some heavy skirmishing—having to construct a passage across the dry bed of Indian Creek for his artillery under fire—on the right and in front of the same line of intrenchments.

"The following was the first order of battle: The three brigades of Lovell's division—Villepigue's, Bowen's and Rust's—in line, with reserves in rear of each; Jackson's cavalry brigade on the right *en échelon*, the left flank of the division on the Charleston Railroad; Price's corps on the left, with the right flank resting on the same road; Maury's division on the right, with Moore's and Phifer's brigades in line, Cabell's in reserve; Hébert's division on the left, with Gates' and Martin's brigades in line, Colbert's in reserve; Armstrong's cavalry brigade on the extreme left somewhat detached and out of view. Hébert's left was masked behind a timbered ridge, with orders not to bring it into action until the last moment. This was done in hopes of inducing the enemy to weaken his right by reinforcing his center and left—where the attack was first to be made—that his right might be forced.

"At 10 o'clock all skirmishers were driven into the intrenchments and the two armies were in line of battle, confronting each

other in force. A belt of fallen timber, or abatis, about 400 yards in width, extended along the whole line of intrenchments. This was to be crossed.

"The attack was commenced on the right by Lovell's division and extended gradually to the left, and by 1.30 o'clock the whole line of outer works was carried, several pieces of artillery being taken. The enemy made several ineffectual efforts to hold their ground, forming line of battle at advantageous points and resisting obstinately our advance to the second line of detached works.

"I had been in hopes that one day's operations would end the contest and decide who should be the victors on this bloody field, but a 10 miles' march over a parched country, on dusty roads, without water, getting into line of battle in forests with undergrowth, and the more than equal activity and determined courage displayed by the enemy, commanded by one of the ablest generals of the United States Army, who threw all possible obstacles in our way that an active mind could suggest, prolonged the battle until I saw with regret the sun sink behind the horizon as the last shot of our sharpshooters followed the retreating foe into their innermost lines. One hour more of daylight and victory would have soothed our grief for the loss of the gallant dead who sleep on that lost but not dishonored field. The army slept on their arms within 600 yards of Corinth, victorious so far.

"During the night three batteries were ordered to take position on the ridge overlooking the town from the west, just where the hills dip into the flat extending into the railroad depot, with instructions to open on the town at 4 A. M. Hébert, on the left, was ordered to mask part of his division on his left; to put Cabell's brigade *en échelon* on the left also, Cabell's brigade being detached from Maury's division for this purpose; to move Armstrong's cavalry brigade across the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and if possible to get some of his artillery in position across the road. In this order of battle he was directed to attack at daybreak with his whole force, swinging his left flank in towards Corinth and advance down the Purdy Ridge. Lovell—on the extreme right, with two of his brigades in line of battle and one in reserve, with Jackson's cavalry on the extreme right on College Hill, his left flank resting on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad—was ordered to await in this order or to feel his way along slowly with his sharpshooters until Hébert was heavily engaged with the ene-

my on the left. He was then to move rapidly to the assault and force his right inward across the low grounds southwest of town. The center, under Maury, was to move at the same time quickly to the front and directly at Corinth. Jackson was directed to burn the railroad bridge over the Tennessee during the night.

"Daylight came and there was no attack on the left. A staff officer was sent to Hébert to inquire the cause. That officer could not be found. Another messenger was sent and a third; and about 7 o'clock General Hébert came to my headquarters and reported sick. General Price then put Brigadier-General Green in command of the left wing, and it was 8 o'clock before the proper dispositions for the attack at this point were made. In the meantime the troops of Maury's left became engaged with the enemy's sharpshooters and the battle was brought on and extended along the whole center and left wing, and I regretted to observe that my whole plan of attack was by this unfortunate delay disarranged. One brigade after another went gallantly into the action, and pushing forward through direct and cross fire over every obstacle, reached Corinth and planted their colors on the last stronghold of the enemy. A hand-to-hand contest was being enacted in the very yard of General Rosecrank's headquarters and in the streets of the town. The heavy guns were silenced and all seemed about to be ended, when a heavy fire from fresh troops from Iuka, Burnsville, and Rienzi, that had succeeded in reaching Corinth in time, poured into our thinned ranks. Exhausted from loss of sleep, wearied from hard marching and fighting, companies and regiments without officers, our troops—let no one censure them—gave way. The day was lost.

"Lovell's division was at this time advancing pursuant to orders, and was on the point of assaulting the works when he received my orders to throw one of his brigades (Villepigue's) rapidly to the center to cover the broken ranks thrown back from Corinth and to prevent a sortie. He then moved his whole division to the left and was soon afterward ordered to move slowly back and take position on Indian Creek and prevent the enemy from turning our flank. The center and left were withdrawn on the same road on which they approached, and being somewhat in confusion on account of the loss of officers, fatigue, thirst, want of sleep, thinned ranks, and the nature of the ground, Villepigue's brigade was brought in opportunely and covered the rear

to Chewalla. Lovell came in rear of the whole army, and all bivouacked again at Chewalla. No enemy disturbed the sleep of the weary troops.

During the night I had a bridge constructed over the Tuscumbia and sent Armstrong's and Jackson's cavalry with a battery of artillery to seize and hold Rienzi until the army came up, intending to march to and hold that point; but after consultation with General Price, who represented his troops to be somewhat disorganized, it was deemed advisable to return by the same route we came and fall back toward Ripley and Oxford.

"Anticipating that the Bolivar force would move out and dispute my passage across the Hatchie Bridge, I pushed rapidly on to that point in hopes of reaching and securing the bridge before their arrival, but I soon learned by couriers from Colonel Wirt Adams that I would be too late. I nevertheless pushed on with the intention of engaging the enemy until I could get my train and reserve artillery unparked and on the Bone Yard road to the crossing at Crum's Mill. This road branches off south from the State Line road about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of Tuscumbia Bridge, running south or up the Hatchie. No contest of long duration could be made here, as it was evident that the army of Corinth would soon make its appearance on our right flank and rear. The trains and reserve artillery were therefore immediately ordered on the Bone Yard road, and orders were sent to Armstrong and Jackson to change their direction and cover the front and flank of the trains until they crossed the Hatchie, and then to cover them in front until they were on the Ripley road. The enemy were then engaged beyond the Hatchie Bridge by small fragments of Maury's division as they could be hastened up, and were kept in check sufficiently long to get everything off. General Ord commanded the forces of the enemy and succeeded in getting into position before any number of our travel-worn troops could get into line of battle. It is not surprising, therefore, that they were driven back across the bridge; but they maintained their positions on the hills overlooking it under their gallant leader, General Price, until orders were sent to fall back and take up their line of march on the Bone Yard road in rear of the whole train.

"At one time, fearing that the enemy, superior in numbers to the whole force I had in advance of the train, would drive us back, I ordered General Lovell to leave one brigade to guard the

rear at the Tuscumbia Bridge and to push forward with the other two to the front. This order was quickly executed, and very soon the splendid brigades of Rust and Villepigue made their appearance close at hand. The army corps of General Price was withdrawn and Villepigue filed in and took position as rear guard to the army against Ord's forces. Rust was ordered forward to report to General Price, who was directed to cross the Hatchie at Crum's Mill and take position to cover the crossing of the trains and artillery. Bowen was left at Tuscumbia Bridge as rear guard against the advance of Rosecrans from Corinth, with orders to defend that bridge until the trains were unparked and on the road, then to cross the bridge and burn it and to join Villepigue at the junction of the roads. In the execution of this order, and while in position near the bridge, the head of the Corinth army made its appearance and engaged him, but was repulsed with heavy loss and in a manner that reflected great credit on General Bowen and his brigade. The army was not again molested on its retreat to Ripley nor on its march to this place.

"The following was found to be our loss in the several conflicts with the enemy and on the march to and from Corinth, viz.: killed, 594; wounded, 2,162; prisoners and missing, 2,102. One piece of artillery was driven in the night by mistake into the enemy's lines and captured. Four pieces were taken at the Hatchie Bridge, the horses being shot. Nine wagons were upset and abandoned by teamsters on the night march to Crum's Mill. Some baggage was thrown out of the wagons, not amounting to any serious loss. Two pieces of artillery were captured from the enemy at Corinth by General Lovell's division, one of which was brought off. Five pieces were also taken by General Price's corps, two of which were brought off, thus making a loss to us of only two pieces.

"The enemy's loss in killed and wounded, by their own accounts, was over 3,000. We took over 300 prisoners. Most of the prisoners taken from us were the stragglers from the army on the retreat.

"The retreat from Corinth was not a rout, as it has been industriously represented to be by the enemy, and by the cowardly deserters from the army. The division of General Lovell formed line of battle facing the rear on several occasions when it was reported the army was near, but not a gun was fired after the army

retired from the Hatchie and Tuscumbia Bridges, nor did the enemy follow, except at a respectful distance.

"Although many officers and soldiers who distinguished themselves in the battle of Corinth and in the affair at Hatchie Bridge came under my personal observation, I will not mention them to the exclusion of others who may have been equally deserving but who did not fall under my own eye. I have deemed it best to call on the different commanders to furnish me a special report and a list of the names of the officers and soldiers of their respective commands who deserve special mention. These lists and special reports I will take pleasure in forwarding, together with one of my own, when completed, and I respectfully request that they may be appended as part of my report.

"I cannot refrain, however, from mentioning here the conspicuous gallantry of a noble Texan, whose deeds at Corinth are the constant theme of both friends and foes. As long as courage, manliness, fortitude, patriotism, and honor exist the name of *Rogers* will be revered and honored among men. He fell in the front of battle, and died beneath the colors of his regiment, in the very center of the enemy's stronghold. He sleeps, and glory is his sentinel.

"The attempt at Corinth has failed, and in consequence I am condemned and have been superseded in my command. In my zeal for my country I may have ventured too far with inadequate means, and I bow to the opinion of the people whom I serve. Yet I feel that if the spirits of the gallant dead who now lie beneath the batteries of Corinth see and judge the motives of men, they do not rebuke me, for there is no sting in my conscience, nor does retrospection admonish me of error or of a reckless disregard of their valued lives.

"Very respectfully, sir, I am, your obedient servant,

"EARL VAN DORN,

"Major-General."

GENERAL PRICE'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF CORINTH AND THE OPERATIONS OF HIS ARMY BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 27 AND OCTOBER 5, 1862.

"MAJOR:—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this army connected with the several engagements at Corinth and Davis' Bridge of the 3d, 4th and 5th instant.

" Having arranged with Major-General Van Dorn to unite my forces with his for active operations, I joined him at Ripley on the 27th ultimo. My force at this time consisted of 10,498 effective infantry, 2,437 effective cavalry, 928 artillerymen, and 44 guns, including two 24-pounder howitzers and four rifled pieces of 33 $\frac{3}{8}$ caliber. The infantry was divided into two divisions, commanded by Brig.-Gens. Maury and Hébert. Maury's division consisted of three brigades, commanded by Brig.-General Moore and Acting Brig.-Generals Cabell and Phiher. Hébert's division consisted of four brigades, commanded by Brig.-General Green and Colonels Martin, Gates and Colbert. The cavalry, except such companies as were on detached service, was under command of Acting Brig.-Gen. Armstrong. The artillery was apportioned as follows: With Maury's division, Hoxton's battery (Lt. Tobin commanding), Bledsoe's battery, McNally's battery (Lieut. Moore commanding), Bryan's battery, Lucas' battery and Sengstak's battery. Hoxton's and Sengstak's batteries were held as reserves, under command of Lieut. Burnet, acting chief of artillery, of the division. With Hébert's division were Wade's, Landis', Guibor's, Dawson's and King's. The cavalry force under General Armstrong reported to the major-general commanding the combined forces and afterwards acted under orders direct from him.

" On the morning of the 30th ultimo we took up the line of march in the direction of Pocahontas, which place we reached on the 1st instant, and from which we moved upon the enemy at Corinth, bivouacking on the night of the 2d instant at a point nearly opposite to Chewella, having left one regiment of infantry and a section of artillery with the wagon train as a guard.

" At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 3d instant we resumed the march, my command moving on the main Pocahontas and Corinth road in rear of General Lovell's. At a point about 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the enemy's outer line of fortifications my command made a detour to the left, with instructions to occupy the ground between the Memphis and Charleston and Mobile and Ohio Railroads. This done, my line—Maury commanding the right and Hébert the left, with Cabell's and Colbert's brigades in reserve—fronted the enemy's works in a southeasterly direction, the right resting upon the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. While these

dispositions were making, General Lovell engaged the enemy upon our right.

"All being now ready for the attack my line was ordered forward at about 10 A. M. Almost simultaneously with the movement the opposed armies became engaged in desperate conflict along the whole extent of my line. My command had scarcely cleared the position of its first formation when, entering an abatis of more than 300 yards, it became unmasked before a position naturally exceeding formidable and rendered trebly so by the extent of felled timber through which it must be approached and the most approved and scientifically constructed intrenchments, bristling with artillery of large caliber and supported by heavy lines of infantry. My troops charged the enemy's position with the most determined courage, exposed to a murderous fire of musketry and artillery. Without faltering they pressed forward over every obstacle, and with shouts and cheers carried in less than twenty minutes the entire line of works, the enemy having fled, leaving in our hands many prisoners and two pieces of artillery, one a 4-inch Parrott gun, the other a 24-pounder howitzer.

"Our loss in this attack was comparatively small. This is attributable to the impetuosity with which the charge was made and the works carried.

"It becomes my painful duty in this connection to revert to the distinguished services of two gallant officers who fell in this engagement—Col. John D. Martin, commanding a brigade of Mississippians, and Lieut. Samuel Farrington, of Wade's (Missouri) battery. Col. Martin fell mortally wounded while leading the charge against an angle in the enemy's works exposed to the fire of enfilading batteries. The gallant bearing of this officer upon more than one bloody field had won for him a place in the heart of every Mississippian and the admiration and confidence of his superior officers. Lieut. Farrington was struck and instantly killed by a shot from a rifled gun while bringing one of the guns of his battery into position. This gallant soldier and courteous and chivalric gentleman, forgetful of personal interest and mindful of the necessities of the service only, resigned a lieutenant-colonelcy in the service of his State for a lieutenancy in the Confederate service, and gave up his life a glorious sacrifice upon the altar of his country's honor in the seventh of the battles in which he has been conspicuous for cool, determined, and effective

bravery. Though young, his country mourns no more valiant defender, his command no abler commander, his friends no worthier recipient of their affection.

"The outer works being in our possession my troops moved forward in pursuit of the retreating enemy until within one mile of Corinth, where the enemy was encountered in position and in force. The necessary disposition being made, my whole line again moved forward to the attack at about 3 P. M. Here the fighting was of unparalleled fierceness along the whole extent of my line. The position of the enemy along the entire length of his lines was covered by fencing, heavy timber, or thick underbrush, while portions of my troops advanced through open fields, exposed to a deadly fire of batteries operating over the enemy's line of infantry. Here, as in the assault upon the outer works, we had little artillery in action, it being impossible to procure such positions for my batteries as would enable them to cooperate effectively with the infantry. After continuous and most desperate fighting along the whole extent of my line of nearly two hours' duration, the enemy, notwithstanding his lines had been trebled by reinforcements, was driven from his positions and forced to take refuge in his innermost works in and around the town. The troops of my command, having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the heavy fighting through the day, were withheld from immediate pursuit, and the delay in procuring the necessary supplies of ammunition forced us to close the fight for the day. My troops were withdrawn for cover and laid on their arms during the night in the position from which the enemy had been driven.

"About 4 o'clock on the morning of the 4th three batteries of my command were placed in position and opened fire upon the town, under the immediate orders of the major-general commanding. About daylight orders were received to advance my whole line. In the execution of this order a delay was occasioned by the illness of Brig.-General Hébert, commanding a division. He was necessarily relieved from duty. The command devolved upon Brig.-General Green, who moved forward as soon as he could make the necessary disposition of his troops.

"It was after 9 o'clock when my line became generally and furiously engaged with the enemy in his innermost and most formidable works, from which his infantry and artillery could jointly operate against my troops. Here, as in the previous actions, my

artillery could not be effectively brought into action and but few of the guns were engaged. The fighting by my command was almost entirely confined to the infantry. My men pressed forward upon the enemy, and with heavy loss succeeded in getting into his works, having driven him from them, capturing more than forty pieces of artillery and forcing him to take refuge in the houses of the town and in every place that would afford protection from our galling fire. He was followed and driven from house to house with great slaughter. In the town were batteries in mask, supported by heavy reserves, behind which the retreating enemy took shelter, and which opened upon our troops a most destructive fire at short range. My men held their positions most gallantly, returning the fire of the enemy with great spirit until portions of them exhausted their ammunition and were compelled to retire. This necessitated the withdrawal of the whole line, which was done under a withering fire. The attack was not resumed and we fell back to our supply train, the men being almost exhausted from exertion and want of food and water. General Villepigue's brigade moved over to our assistance but did not become engaged, as the enemy was too badly cut up to follow us. We fell back, in order to obtain water, some 6 miles from Corinth, where we bivouacked for the night, bringing off all of our artillery and arms save one rifled piece, which had been inadvertently driven into the enemy's line while going into battery before daylight in the morning and had been left. We brought off also the two guns captured at the outer line of fortifications on the 3d.

"It is impossible for me to do justice to the courage of my troops in these engagements, nor can I discriminate between officers or commands where all behaved so nobly. This is the less necessary, as the operations of my command were under the immediate observation of the major-general commanding.

"For minute details of the actions, and particularly of the artillery, of the 3d and 4th instant, as well as for instances of personal and distinguished gallantry, I beg leave to refer the major-general commanding to the reports of the commanding officers, herewith inclosed.

"On the morning of the 5th instant we resumed the march in the direction of Pocahontas, my command moving by divisions, Maury's in front, each in rear of its ordnance and supply train, except Moore's brigade, which constituted the advance guard.

After crossing the Tuscumbia Moore's brigade was hurried forward to protect Davis' Bridge across the Hatchie, which was threatened by an advance of the enemy. It being found that the enemy was in force, the remainder of Maury's division was ordered forward, and finally I was ordered to move up the whole of my command. Moore's brigade, with a section of the Saint Louis Battery and Sengstak's battery, were thrown across the Hatchie, but the enemy having possession of the heights commanding the crossing, as well as the position in which these troops were placed, and it being found that he was in very heavy force, it was deemed advisable to cross the Hatchie by another road, and these troops were withdrawn after serious loss to the east side of the Hatchie, where, being joined by Cabell's and Phifer's brigades, and, assisted by the batteries of McNally, Hogg, Landis and Tobin, they effectually checked the advance of the enemy. Green's division, which had been delayed by passing the wagon train that had been parked near the Tuscumbia, arriving on the ground, was formed in line of battle, but the enemy making no further effort to advance the whole of my command were moved off by another route, General Lovell's command being in our rear. This was our last engagement with the enemy.

"In this engagement we lost four guns, occasioned by the killing of horses. Our whole wagon train came off without molestation or loss, except a few wagons that were broken down and had to be abandoned.

The history of this war contains no bloodier page perhaps than that which will record this fiercely contested battle. The strongest expressions fall short of my admiration of the gallant conduct of the officers and men under my command. Words cannot add luster to the fame they have acquired through deeds of noble daring which, living through future time, will shed about every man, officer, and soldier who stood to his arms through this struggle a halo of glory as imperishable as it is brilliant. They have won to their sisters and daughters the distinguished honor, set before them by a general of their love and admiration upon the event of an impending battle upon the same field, of the proud exclamation, 'My brother, father, was at the great battle of Corinth.'

"The bloodiest record of this battle is to come. The long list of the gallant dead upon this field will carry sorrow to the hearth-

stone of many a noble champion of our cause, as it does to the hearts of those who are to avenge them. A nation mourns their loss while it cherishes the story of their glorious death, pointing out to their associate officers in this mighty struggle for liberty the pathway to victory and honor. They will live ever in the hearts of the admiring people of the Government for the establishment of which they have given their lives.

"Of the officers killed were Colonels Rogers, Second Texas Infantry, who fell in the heart of the town of eleven wounds; Johnson, Twentieth Arkansas, and Daly, of the Eighteenth Arkansas; Lieutenant-Colonels Maupin, First Missouri Calvary (dismounted), and Leigh, Forty-Third Mississippi; Majors Vaughn, Sixth Missouri Infantry; Dowdell, Twenty-First Arkansas, and McDonald, Fortieth Mississippi.

"Many of my ablest and most gallant field officers are wounded, several mortally. Of this number are Colonels Erwin, Sixth Missouri Infantry; MacFarlane, Fourth Missouri Infantry; Pritchard, Third Missouri Infantry; Moore, Forty-Third Mississippi and McLain, Thirty-Seventh Mississippi; Lieutenant-Colonels Pixlee, Sixteenth Arkansas; Hedgpeth, Sixth Missouri Infantry; Terral, Seventh Mississippi Battalion; Lanier, Forty-Second Alabama; Hobson, Third Arkansas Cavalry; Matheny, Twenty-First Arkansas; Campbell, Fortieth Mississippi, and Boone, Fifteenth Arkansas Infantry; Majors Senteny, Second Missouri Infantry; Kirn, Thirty-Eighth Mississippi; Slaton, Thirty-Seventh Alabama; Timmins, Second Texas; Jones, Twenty-First Arkansas; Russell, Third Louisiana; Yates, Thirty-Sixth Mississippi; and McQuiddy, Third Missouri Cavalry.

"For other casualties in officers and men I beg leave to refer to lists inclosed.

"I cannot close this report without recognizing the eminent services and valuable assistance of Brig.-Generals Maury, Hébert (whose services I regret to have lost on the morning of the 4th by reason of his illness), and Green, commanding division. I bear willing testimony to the admirable coolness, undaunted courage, and military skill of these officers in disposing their respective commands and in executing their orders. Through them I transmit to Brig.-General Moore and acting Brig.-Generals Cabell, Phifer, Gates and Colbert my high appreciation of their efficient services on the field. Their skill in maneuvering their troops and

promptness and gallantry in leading them through the most desperate conflicts elicit my highest admiration; and of my troops as a body I can say no juster or more complimentary words than that they have sustained and deepened and widened their reputation for exalted patriotism and determined valor.

"To my personal staff I return my thanks for their promptness to the delivery of my orders and their gallant bearing on the field.

"All of which is respectfully submitted.

"STERLING PRICE,

"Major-General.

"M. M. KIMMEL,

"Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of West Tennessee."

GENERAL ROSECRANSE'S ACCOUNT OF BATTLE OF CORINTH IN 1863.

"The battle of Corinth, Miss., which is often confounded in public memory with our advance under Halleck, from Pittsburg Landing in April and May, 1862, was fought on the 3d and 4th of October, of that year, between the combined forces of Major-Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price of the Confederacy, and the Union divisions of Brigadier-Generals David S. Stanley, Charles S. Hamilton, Thomas A. Davies, and Thomas J. McKean, under myself as commander of the Third Division of the District of West Tennessee.

"In the early days of the summer, McClellan's campaign on the peninsula of the James ended in failure, and was followed by the aggressive movements of Lee, his victory of the Second Bull Run, the invasion of Maryland, and his defeat at Antietam.

"While McClellan was advancing on Richmond, General Halleck, moving by steady steps upon Bragg, and Beauregard, intrenched at Corinth, Mississippi, saw the latter place evacuated the last of May. Soon after, learning that Bragg with a large portion of his forces had gone northeasterly through Alabama, intending from Chattanooga to pass northward, through the mountainous regions of Tennessee and Kentucky, and plant the Confederate flag on the banks of the Ohio, General Halleck ordered General D. C. Buell with the 'Army of the Ohio' (a part of which was afterwards designated 'of the Cumberland') to Middle Tennessee to counteract this movement. Halleck shortly after was called to Washington to discharge the duties of General-in-Chief. He left

the District of West Tennessee and the territory held in Northern Mississippi under the command of General Grant. In August, by Halleck's orders, General Grant sent Palmer's and Jeff C. Davis's divisions across the Tennessee to join Buell, who was moving northerly through Middle Tennessee, to meet Bragg, then rapidly entering Kentucky. These divisions arrived in time to garrison Nashville while Buell followed Bragg into Kentucky.

"Many readers of this will remember the almost breathless anxiety with which, in the early days of September, the friends of the Union, after the disaster of the 'Second Bull Run,' watched the advance of Lee into Maryland, of Bragg into Kentucky, and the hurrying of the Army of the Potomac northward from Washington, to get between Lee and Washington, Baltimore and Philadelphia. Who remembers not the fearful suspense lest McClellan should not be in time to head off Lee; lest Buell should not arrive in time to prevent Bragg from taking Louisville or assaulting Cincinnati? To swell the mighty flood of anxieties which filled the popular heart, the Union forces in West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi were suddenly startled by the movements of General Sterling Price, who, with fifteen thousand to twenty thousand men, during July and August, had been on the Mobile and Ohio railway near Guntown and Baldwin, Miss.

"Under the idea that I was to reinforce Buell, General Price moved up to Iuka about the 12th of September, intending to follow me; and as he reported, 'Finding that General Rosecrans had not crossed the Tennessee River, concluded to withdraw from Iuka toward my old encampment.' His 'withdrawal' was after the hot battle of Iuka on the 19th of September, two days after the battle of Antietam which caused Lee's 'withdrawal' from Maryland.

"During the month of August General Price had been conferring with General Van Dorn, commanding all the Confederate troops in Mississippi except Price's, to form a combined movement to expel the Union forces from Northern Mississippi and Western Tennessee, and to plant their flags on the banks of the Lower Ohio, while Bragg was to do the like on that river in Kentucky. General Earl Van Dorn, an able and enterprising commander, after disposing his forces to hold the Mississippi from Grand Gulf up toward Memphis, late in September, with Lovell's division, a little over 8,000 men, came up to Ripley, Mississippi,

where, on the 28th of September he was joined by General Price, with Hébert's and Maury's divisions, numbering 13,863 effective infantry, artillery, and cavalry.

"This concentration, following the precipitate 'withdrawal' of Price from Iuka, portended mischief to the Union forces in West Tennessee, numbering some forty to fifty thousand effectives, scattered over the district, occupying the vicinity of the Memphis and Charleston railway from Iuka to Memphis, a stretch of about a hundred and fifteen miles, and interior positions on the Ohio and Mississippi from Paducah to Columbus, and at Jackson, Bethel, and other places on the Mississippi Central and Mobile and Ohio railways.

"The military features of West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi will be readily comprehended by the reader who will examine a map of that region and notice : (1) That the Memphis and Charleston railway runs not far from the dividing line between the States, with a southerly bend from Memphis eastward toward Corinth, whence it extends eastwardly through Iuka, crosses Bear River and follows the Tuscumbia Valley on the south side of that east and west reach of the Tennessee, to Decatur. Thence the road crosses to the north side of this river and unites with the Nashville and Chattanooga road at Stevenson *en route* for Chattanooga. (2) That the Mobile and Ohio railway, from Columbus on the Mississippi, runs considerably east of south, passes through Jackson, Bethel, Corinth, Tupelo, Baldwyn, and thence to Mobile. (3) That the Mississippi Central, leaving the Mobile and Ohio at Jackson, runs nearly south, passing by Bolivar, Grand Junction, Holly Springs, Grenada, etc., to Jackson, Mississippi. Now all this region of West Tennessee and the adjoining counties of Mississippi, although here and there dotted with clearings, farms, settlements, and little villages, is heavily wooded. Its surface consists of low, rolling oak ridges of diluvial clays with intervening crooked drainages traversing narrow bushy and sometimes swampy bottoms. The streams are sluggish and not easily fordable, on account of their miry beds and steep, muddy clay banks. Water in dry seasons is never abundant, and in many places only reached by bore-wells of one hundred to three hundred feet in depth, whence it is hoisted by rope and pulley carrying water-buckets of galvanized iron pipes from four to six inches in diameter, and four to five feet long, with valves at the lower end.

These matters are of controlling importance in moving and handling troops in that region. Men and animals need hard ground to move on, and must have drinking-water.

"The strategic importance of Corinth, ninety-three miles east of Memphis, where the Mobile and Ohio crosses the Memphis and Charleston, results from its control of movements either way over these railways, and the fact that it is not far from Hamburg, Eastport, and Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee River, to which good freight steamers can ascend at the lowest stages of water. Corinth is mainly on low, flat ground, along the Mobile and Ohio railway, and flanked by low, rolling ridges, covered, except the cleared patches, with oaks and undergrowth for miles in all directions. With few and rare clearings, outside of those made by the Confederate troops in obtaining fuel during their wintering in 1861--1862, the country around Corinth, in all directions, was densely wooded.

"While General Halleck was advancing on Corinth, the Confederates had extended a line of defensive light works from the Memphis and Charleston road on the west, about two and a half miles from the town, all the way round by the north and east to the same railway east. When the Union forces took possession General Halleck ordered a defensive line to be constructed about a mile and a half from the town, extending from the Memphis and Charleston railway on the west around southerly to cover the Union front in that direction. After the departure of General Buell's command toward Chattanooga this work was continued, although we had no forces adequate to man it, and it was too far away to afford protection to our stores at Corinth. During August I used to go over from Camp Clear Creek to General Grant's headquarters, and after the usual greetings would ask: 'How are you getting along with the line?' He would say: 'Well, pretty slowly, but they are doing good work.' I said to him: 'General, the line isn't worth much to us, because it is too long. We cannot occupy it.' He answered, 'What would you do?' I said, 'I would have made the depots outside of the town north of the Memphis and Charleston road between the town and the brick church, and inclosed them by field works, running tracks in. Now, as the depot houses are at the crossroads, the best thing we can do is to run a line of light works round in the neighborhood of the college up on the knoll.' So, one day, after dining with

General Grant, he proposed that we go up together and take Colonel Prime with us, and he gave orders to commence a line of breastworks that would include the college grounds. This was before the battle of Iuka. After Iuka I was ordered to command the district, and General Grant moved his headquarters to Jackson, Tenn. Pursuant to this order, on the 26th of September, I repaired to Corinth, where I found the only defensive works available consisted of the open batteries Robinett, Williams, Phillips, Tannarth, and Lothrop, established by Colonel Prime on the College Hill line. I immediately ordered them to be connected by breastworks, and the front to the west and north to be covered by such an *abatis* as the remaining timber on the ground could furnish. I employed colored engineer troops organized into squads of twenty-five each, headed by a man detailed from the line or quartermaster's department, and commanded by Captain Gaw, a competent engineer. I also ordered an extension of the line of redoubts to cover the north front of the town, one of which, Battery Powell, was nearly completed before the stirring events of the attack. No rifle-pits were constructed between Powell and the central part covering the northwest front of the town which was perfectly open northeast and southeast, with nothing but the distant old Confederate works between it and the country.

"To add to these embarrassments in preparing the place to resist a sudden attack, Grant, the general commanding, had retired fifty-eight miles north to Jackson, Tenn., on the Mobile and Ohio railway, with all the knowledge of the surrounding country acquired during the four months in which his headquarters were at Corinth, and I, the new commander, could not find even the vestige of a map of the surrounding country to guide me in these defensive preparations.

"During the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th of September, the breastworks were completed joining the lunettes from College Hill on the left. A thin *abatis* made from the scattering trees, which had been left standing along the west and north fronts, covered the line between Robinett and the Mobile and Ohio; thence to Battery Powell the line was mostly open and without rifle-pits.

"To meet emergencies Hamilton's and Stanley's divisions, which had been watching to the south and southwest from near Jacinto to Rienzi, were closed in toward Corinth to within short call.

"On the 28th I telegraphed General Grant at Columbus, Kentucky, confirmation of my report of Price's movement to Ripley, and that I should move Stanley's division to Rienzi, and thence to Kossuth, unless he had other views. Two days later I again telegraphed General Grant that there were no signs of the enemy at Hatchie Crossing, and that my reason for proposing to put Stanley at or near Kossuth was that he would cover nearly all the Hatchie crossing, as far as Pocahontas, except against heavy forces, and that Hamilton would then move at least one brigade from Rienzi. I asked that a sharp lookout be kept in the direction of Bolivar. October 1st, I telegraphed General Grant we were satisfied there was no enemy for three miles beyond Hatchie; also that prisoners reported Breckinridge had gone to Kentucky with three Kentucky regiments, leaving his division under the command of General Rust. The combined forces under Van Dorn and Price were reported to be encamped on the Pocahontas road, and to number forty thousand. [In fact about 22,000.]

"Amid the numberless rumors and uncertainties besetting me at Corinth during the five days between the 26th, when I assumed command, and the 1st of October, how gratifying would have been knowledge of the following facts, taken from General Van Dorn's report, dated Holly Springs, October 20, 1862:

"Surveying the whole field of operations before me, . . . the conclusion forced itself irresistibly upon my mind that the taking of Corinth was a condition precedent to the accomplishment of anything of importance in West Tennessee. To take Memphis would be to destroy an immense amount of property without any adequate military advantage, even admitting that it could be held without heavy guns against the enemy's gun and mortar boats. The line of fortifications around Bolivar is intersected by the Hatchie River, rendering it impossible to take the place by quick assault. . . . It was clear to my mind that if a successful attack could be made upon Corinth from the west and northwest, the forces there driven back on the Tennessee and cut off, Bolivar and Jackson would easily fall, and then, upon the arrival of the exchanged prisoners of war, West Tennessee would soon be in our possession, and communications with General Bragg effected through Middle Tennessee. . . .

"I determined to attempt Corinth. I had a reasonable hope of success. Field returns at Ripley showed my strength to be

about twenty-two thousand men. Rosecrans at Corinth had about fifteen thousand, with about eight thousand additional men at outposts, from twelve to fifteen miles distant. I might surprise him and carry the place before these troops could be brought in. . . . It was necessary that this blow should be sudden and decisive. . . .

"The troops were in fine spirits, and the whole army of West Tennessee seemed eager to emulate the armies of the Potomac and of Kentucky. No army ever marched to battle with prouder steps, more hopeful countenances, or with more courage than marched the Army of West Tennessee out of Ripley, on the morning of September 29, on its way to Corinth."

"But of all this I knew nothing. With only McKean's and Davies's divisions, not ten thousand men, at Corinth on the 26th of September, by the 1st of October I had gradually drawn in pretty closely Stanley's and Hamilton's divisions. They had been kept watching to the south and southwest of Corinth.

"Our forces when concentrated would make about sixteen thousand effective infantry and artillery for defense, with twenty-five hundred cavalry for outposts and reconnoitering.

"On October 2d, while Van Dorn was at Pocahontas, General Hurlbut telegraphed the information, from an intelligent Union man of Grand Junction, that 'Price, Van Dorn, and Villepigue were at Pocahontas, and the talk was that they would attack Bolivar.' Evidence thick and fast arriving, showed that the enemy was moving, but whether on Corinth, Bolivar, or passing between they would strike and capture Jackson, was not yet clear to any of us. I knew that the enemy intended a strong movement, and I thought they must have the impression that our defensive works at Corinth would be pretty formidable. I doubted if they would venture to bring their force against our command behind defensive works. I therefore said, The enemy may threaten us, and strike across our line entirely, get on the road between us and Jackson and advance upon that place, the capture of which would compel us to get out of our lines; or he may come in by the road from Tupelo so as to interpose his force between us and Danville. But all the time I inclined to the belief that it would not be for his interest to do that. I thought that perhaps he would cross the Memphis and Charleston road and, going over to the Mobile and Ohio road, force us to move out and fight him in the open country.

"October 2d, I sent out a cavalry detachment to reconnoiter in the direction of Pocahontas. They found the enemy's infantry coming close in, and that night some of our detachment were surprised. Some of their horses were captured, and a few of the men. The escaped reported to me that the enemy was there in force. This was still consistent with the theory that the enemy wished to cross the Memphis and Charleston road, go north of us, strike the Mobile and Ohio road and maneuver us out of our position.

"To be prepared for whatever they might do I sent Oliver's brigade of McKean's division out to Chewella, ten miles northwest. On the morning of the 3d the enemy's advance came to Chewella and Oliver's brigade fell back fighting. I sent out orders to the brigade commander to make a stiff resistance, and, to see what effect it would have, still thinking that the attack was likely to be a mask for their movement for the north, I ordered Stanley to move in close toward town near the center line of works called the 'Halleck line' and to wait for further developments.

"An order dated 1.30 A. M. October 3d, had set all the troops in motion. The impression that the enemy *might* find it better to strike a weaker point on our line and compel us to get out of our works to fight him, or if he should attempt Corinth that he would do it if possible by the north and east, where the immediate vicinage was open and the place without defenses of any kind, governed these preliminary dispositions of my troops. The controlling idea was to prevent surprise, to test by adequate resistance any attacking force, and finding it formidable, to receive it behind that inner line which had been preparing from College Hill round by Robinett.

"To meet all probable contingencies, nine o'clock on the morning of the 3d found my troops disposed as follows: Hamilton's division, about three thousand seven hundred strong, on the Purdy Road north of the town, to meet any attempt from the north; Davies's division, three thousand two hundred and four strong, between the Memphis and Charleston and Mobile and Ohio railways, northwest of the town; McKean's division, five thousand three hundred and fifteen strong, to the left of Davies's and in rear of the old Halleck line of batteries; and Stanley's division, three thousand five hundred strong, mainly in reserve on the extreme left, looking toward the Kossuth road.

" Thus in front of those wooded western approaches, the Union troops on the morning of October 3d waited for what might happen, wholly ignorant of what Van Dorn was doing at Chewalla, ten miles away through thick forests. Of this General Van Dorn says:

" At daybreak on the 3d the march was resumed. . . . Lovell's division, in front, kept the road on the south side of the Memphis and Charleston railroad. Price, after marching on the same road about five miles, turned to the left, crossing the railroad, and formed line of battle in front of the outer line of intrenchments and about three miles from Corinth.'

" These were the old Confederate works, which I had no idea of using except as a cover for a heavy skirmish line, to compel the enemy to develop his force, and to show whether he was making a demonstration to cover a movement of his force round to the north of Corinth. This work was well and gallantly accomplished by Davies's division during the morning, aided by McArthur with his brigade, and by Crocker, who moved up toward what the Confederate commander deemed the main stand of the Union forces for the defense of Corinth, and upon which they moved, with three brigades of Lovell's division,—Villepigue's, Bowen's, and Rust's,—in line with reserves in rear of each; Jackson's cavalry on the right *en échelon*, the left flank on the Charleston railroad. Price's corps of two divisions was on the left of Lovell.

" Thus the Confederate general proceeded, until ' at ten o'clock the Union skirmishers were driven into these old intrenchments, and a part of the opposing forces were in line of battle confronting each other. There was a belt of fallen timber about four hundred yards wide between them, which must be crossed by the Confederate forces before they could drive this stubborn testing force of Davies's, sent by me to compel the enemy to show his hand. VanDorn describes the movement: ' The attack was commenced on the right by Lovell's division and gradually extended to the left, and by 1.30 P. M. the whole line of outer works was carried, several pieces [two] of artillery being taken."

" Finding the resistance made by Oliver's little command on the Chewalla road early in the morning was not stiff enough to demonstrate the enemy's object, I had ordered McArthur's brigade from McKean's division to go to Oliver's assistance. It was done

with a will. McArthur's Scotch blood got up, and the enemy being in fighting force, he fought him with the stubborn ferocity of an action on the main line of battle, instead of the resistance of a developing force.

"The same remark applies to the fighting of Davies's division, and as they were pushed and called for reinforcements, orders were sent to fall back slowly and stubbornly. The Confederates, elated at securing these old outworks, pushed in toward our main line, in front of which the fighting in the afternoon was so hot that McKean was ordered to send further help over to the fighting troops and Stanley to send 'a brigade through the woods by the shortest cut' to help Davies, whose division covered itself with glory, having Brigadier-General Hackleman killed, Brigadier-General Oglesby desperately wounded, with nearly twenty-five per cent. of its strength put out of the fight. Watching with intense interest every event of the movement which would throw light on the enemy's intentions, soon after midday I decided that it was a main attack of the enemy. Hamilton's division had been sent up the railroad as far as the old Confederate works in the morning, and formed the right of our line. At one o'clock his division was still there, watching against attack from the north. When the enemy prepared to make the attack on our first real line of battle, word was sent up to Hamilton to advise us if any Confederate force had gotten through, on the Mobile and Ohio road. At three o'clock when the fighting began and became very heavy, Stanley was ordered to move up from his position and succor McKean's and Davies's divisions, that had been doing heavy fighting. When the enemy had displaced those two divisions, Colonel Ducat, acting chief of staff, was sent with an order to General Hamilton to file by fours to the left, and march down until the head of his column was opposite the right of Davies's. He was ordered then to face his brigades to the west-southwest, and to move down in a south-westerly direction. The enemy's left did not much overpass our right, and but few of his troops were on the line of the old Confederate works. Hamilton's movement, the brigades advancing *en échelon*, would enable the right of Buford's brigade, which far outlapped the enemy's left, to pass towards the enemy's rear with little or no opposition, while the other brigade could press back the enemy's left, and by its simple advance would drive them in, and attack their rear.

“Hamilton told Colonel Ducat that he wanted a more positive and definite order before he made the attack. Ducat explained the condition of the battle and urged an immediate movement, but was obliged to return to me for an order fitted to the situation. While Ducat was returning he was fired on by the enemy's skirmishers who had reached open ground over the railway between Hamilton and Corinth. Two orderlies sent on the same errand afterwards were killed on the way. I sent Colonel Ducat back with further explanations of the most explicit kind, and a little sketch to show what was to be done. Upon the receipt of these Hamilton put his division in motion, and by sunset had reached a point opposite the enemy's left, and after moving down a short distance Sullivan's brigade facing to the west, crossed the narrow flats flanking the railway, and went over into the thickets where they had a fierce fight with the enemy's left and created great commotion. Buford's brigade had started in too far to the west and had to rectify its position; so that the only effect produced by Hamilton's division was to bring a terrific scare on the enemy and a sharp fight with one brigade. Had the movement been executed promptly after three o'clock, we should have crushed the enemy's right and rear. Hamilton's excuse that he could not understand the order shows that even in the rush of battle it may be necessary to put orders in writing, or to have subordinate commanders who instinctively know or are anxious to seek the key of the battle and hasten to its roar.

“At nightfall of the 3d it was evident that, unless the enemy should withdraw, he was where I wished him to be—between the two railroad lines and to the south of them—for the inevitable contest of the morrow. Van Dorn says:

“I had been in hopes that one day's operations would end the contest and decide who should be the victors on this bloody field. But a ten mile's march over a parched country on dusty roads without water, getting into line of battle in forests with undergrowth, and the more than equal activity and determined courage displayed by the enemy, commanded by one of the ablest generals of the United States army, who threw all possible obstacles in our way that an active mind could suggest, prolonged the battle until I saw with regret the sun sink behind the horizon as the last shot of our sharpshooters followed the retreating foe into their innermost lines. One hour more of daylight and victory

would have soothed our grief for the loss of the gallant dead who sleep on that lost but not dishonored field. The army slept on its arms within six hundred yards of Corinth, victorious so far.'

"Alas, how uncertain are our best conclusions! General Van Dorn, in his subsequent report as above, bewails the lack of one hour of daylight at the close of October 3, 1862. I bewailed that lack of daylight, which would have brought Hamilton's fresh and gallant division on the Confederate left and rear. That hour of daylight was not to be had; and while the regretful Confederate general lay down in his bivouac, I assembled my four division commanders, McKean, Davies, Stanley, and Hamilton, at my headquarters and arranged the dispositions for the fight of the next day. McKean's division was to hold the left, the chief point being College Hill, keeping his troops well under cover. Stanley was to support the line near the middle of which was Battery Robinett, a little three-gun redan with a ditch five feet deep. Davies was to extend from Stanley's right northeasterly across the flat to Battery Powell, a similar redan on the ridge east of the Purdy road. Hamilton was to be on Davies's right with a brigade, and the rest in reserve on the common east of the low ridge and out of sight from the west. As the troops had been on the move since the night of October 2d, and fighting all the third, which was so excessively hot that we were obliged to send water around in wagons, it became my duty to visit their lines and see that the weary troops were surely in position. This I did and returned to my tent at three o'clock in the morning after having seen everything accomplished and the new line in order. It was about a mile in extent and close to the edge of the north side of the town. By the time I laid down it was four o'clock. At half-past four the enemy opened with a six-gun battery. I had no time for breakfast. The troops got very little. They had not been allowed to build fires during the night, and were too tired to intrench.

"The morning opened clear and grew to be hot; it must have been ninety-four degrees in the shade. Our people soon replied to the enemy's battery, which then quit firing. I visited the lines and gave orders to our skirmishers to fall back the moment it was seen that the enemy was developing a line of battle. About eight o'clock his left crossed the Mobile and Ohio railroad and got into position behind a spur of table land to reach which they had moved by the flank for about half a mile. When they be-

gan to advance in line of battle they were not over three hundred yards distant.

"I told McKean on the left to be very watchful of his front lest the enemy should get in on his left, and directed General Stanley to hold the reserve of his command ready to help either north of the town or aid McKean if required. I visited Battery Robnett and directed the chief of artillery, Colonel Lothrop, to see to the reserve artillery, some batteries of which were parked in the public square of the town. I then visited the line of Davies's division in nearly open ground, with a few logs, here and there, for breastworks, while on his extreme right Sweeny's brigade had no cover save a slight ridge, on the southwest slope of which, near the crest, the men were lying down. Riding along this line, I observed the Confederate forces emerging from the woods west of the railroad and crossing the open ground toward the Purdy road. Our troops lying on the ground could see the flags of the enemy and the glint of the sunlight on their bayonets. It was about nine o'clock in the morning. The air was still and hot. The sun shone fiercely down. General Van Dorn says in substance:

"The Confederate preparations for the morning were that Hébert on the left should mask part of his division, Cabell's brigade *en échelon* on the left, it having been detached from Maury's division for that purpose; Armstrong's cavalry brigade to be across the Mobile and Ohio road, and if possible to get some of his artillery in position across the road, swing his left flank, and follow down the Purdy Ridge. On the right Lovell, with two brigades in line of battle and one in reserve, with Jackson's cavalry to the right, was ordered to await the attack on his left, feeling his way with sharpshooters until Hébert was heavily engaged with the enemy. Maury was to move at the same time quickly to the front directly at Corinth; Jackson to burn the railroad bridge over the Tuscumbia during the night.'

"General Van Dorn's attack on the left was to have been earlier, but for the accident of Hébert's sickness, which prevented. The Confederates, from behind a spur of the Purdy Ridge, advanced splendidly to the attack. The unfavorable line occupied by Davies's division made the resistance on that front inadequate. The troops gave way; the enemy pursued; but the firing from the batteries on the Union side crossing from our right soon thinned

their ranks. Their front line was broken, and the heads of their columns melted away. Some of the enemy's scattered line made their way into the edge of the town; a few got into the reserve artillery, which led to the impression that they had captured forty pieces of artillery; but they were soon driven out by Stanley's reserve, and fled, taking nothing away. By one o'clock the enemy had returned across the railway into the edge of woods whence they had come.

"While going to order Hamilton's division into action on the enemy's left, I saw the L-shaped porch of a large cottage packed full of Confederates. I ordered Lieutenant Immell, whom Loomis had sent with two field-pieces, to give them grape and canister. After one round, only the dead and dying were left on the porch. On reaching Hamilton's division I ordered him to send Sullivan's brigade forward. It moved in line of battle in open ground a little to the left of Battery Powell. Before its splendid advance the scattered enemy, which had withdrawn, was endeavoring to form a line of battle, but on the appearance of these new troops gave way and went back into the woods, from which they never again advanced.

"Meanwhile there had been terrific fighting at Battery Robinett. The roar of artillery and musketry for two or three hours was incessant. Clouds of smoke filled the air and obscured the sun. I witnessed the first charge of the enemy there before I went over to Hamilton. The first repulse I did not see because the contestants were clouded in smoke. It was an assault in column. There were three or four assaulting columns of regiments, probably a hundred yards apart. The enemy's left hand column had tried to make its way down into the low ground to the right of Robinett, but did not make much progress. The other two assaulting columns fared better because they were on the ridge where the fallen timber was scarcer. I ordered the Twenty-seventh Ohio and Eleventh Missouri to kneel in rear of the right of Robinett, so as to get out of range of the enemy's fire, and the moment he had exhausted himself to charge with the bayonet. The third assault was made just as I was seeing Sullivan into the fight. I saw them come upon the ridge and Battery Robinett belching its fire at them. After the charge had failed I saw the Twenty-seventh Ohio and the Eleventh Missouri chasing them with bayonets.

"The head of the enemy's main column reached within a few feet of Battery Robinett, and Colonel Rogers, who was leading it, colors in hand, dismounted, planted a flagstaff on the bank of the ditch, and fell there, shot by one of our drummer-boys, who, with a pistol, was helping to defend Robinett. I was told he was the fifth standard-bearer who had fallen in that last desperate charge. It was about as good fighting on the part of the Confederates as I ever saw. The columns were plowed through and through by our shot, but steadily closed up and moved solidly till forced back.

"Just after this last assault, for the first time I heard the word 'ranch.' Passing over the field on our left, among the dead and dying, I saw leaning against the root of a tree a wounded lieutenant of an Arkansas regiment who had been shot through the foot. I offered him some water. He said, 'I thank you, General; one of your men just gave me some water.' I said, 'Whose troops are you?' He replied, 'Cabell's.' I said, 'It was pretty hot fighting here.' He answered, 'Yes, General, you licked us good, *but we gave you the best we had in the ranch.*'

"Before the enemy's first assault on Robinett, I inspected the woods towards our left where I knew Lovell's division to be. I said to Colonel Mower, afterwards commander of the Seventeenth Army Corps, and familiarly known as 'Fighting Joe Mower': 'Colonel, take the men now on the skirmish line, and find out what Lovell is doing.' He replied, 'Very well, General.' As he was turning away I added, 'Feel them but don't get into their fingers.' He answered significantly: '*I'll feel them!*' Before I left my position Mower had entered the woods, and soon I heard a tremendous blast of musketry in that direction. His skirmishers fell back into the fallen timber and the adjutant reported to me. 'General, I think the enemy have got Colonel Mower; I think he is killed.' Five hours later when we captured the enemy's field hospitals, we found that Colonel Mower had been shot in the back of the neck and taken prisoner. Expressing my joy at his safety, he showed that he knew he had been unjustly reported to me the day before to be intoxicated, by saying: 'Yes, General, but if they had reported me for being "shot in the neck," to-day instead of yesterday, it would have been correct.'

"About two o'clock we found that the enemy did not intend

to make another attack. Falling sick from exhaustion I sought the shade of a tree, from which point I saw three bursts of smoke and said to my staff, 'They have blown up some ammunition wagons, and are going to retreat. We must push them.' I was all the more certain of this, because, having failed, a good commander like Van Dorn would use the utmost despatch in putting the woods and forests between him and his pursuing foe, as well as to escape the dangers to him which might arise from troops coming from Bolivar.

"Even at this distant time memory lingers on the numerous incidents of distinguished bravery displayed by officers and men who fought splendidly on the first day, when we did not know what the enemy was going to do. Staff as well as line officers distinguished themselves while in action. The first day my presence was required on the main line, and the fighting in front of that did not so much come under my eye, but the second day I was everywhere on the line of battle. Temple Clark of my staff was shot through the breast. My sabretache strap was cut by a bullet, and my gloves were stained with the blood of a staff officer wounded at my side. An alarm spread that I was killed, but was soon stopped by my appearance on the field.

"Satisfied that the enemy was retreating, I ordered Sullivan's command to push the enemy with a heavy skirmish line, and to keep constantly feeling them. I rode along the lines of the commands, told them that, having been moving and fighting for three days and two nights, I knew they required rest, but that they could not rest longer than was absolutely necessary. I directed them to proceed to their camps, provide five days' rations, take some needed rest, and be ready early next morning for the pursuit.

"So ended the battle of Corinth.

"General McPherson, sent from Jackson with five good regiments to help us, arrived and bivouacked in the public square a little before sunset. I intended to make the pursuit immediate and vigorous, but the darkness of the night and the roughness of the country, covered with woods and thickets, made any movement by night impracticable and by day slow and difficult. General McPherson's brigade of fresh troops with a battery was ordered to start at daylight and follow the enemy over the Chewalla road; Stanley's and Davies's divisions to support him.

"McArthur, with all of McKean's division except Crocker's brigade, and with a good battery and a battalion of cavalry, took the route south of the railroad toward Pocahontas; McKean followed on this route with the rest of his division and Ingersoll's cavalry; Hamilton followed McKean with his entire force.

"The enemy took the road to Davis's Bridge on the Hatchie, by way of Pocahontas. Fortunately General Hurlbut, finding that he was not going to be attacked at Bolivar, had been looking in our direction with a view of succoring us and met the enemy at that point. General Ord, arriving there from Jackson, assumed command and drove back the head of the enemy's column. This was a critical time for the Confederate forces; but the reader will note that a retreating force, knowing where it has to go and having to look for nothing except an attack on its rear, always moves with more freedom than a pursuing force. This is especially so where the country is covered with woods and thickets, and the roads narrow. Advancing forces always have to feel their way for fear of being ambushed.

"The speed made by our forces, from Corinth, during the 5th, was not to my liking, but with such a commander as McPherson in the advance, I could not doubt that it was all that was possible. On the 6th better progress was made. From Jonesborough, on October 7th, I telegraphed General Grant:

" 'Do not, I entreat you, call Hurlbut back; let him send away his wounded. It surely is easier to move the sick and wounded than to remove both. I propose to push the enemy, so that we need but the most trifling guards behind us. Our advance is beyond Ruckersville. Hamilton will seize the Hatchie crossing on the Ripley road to-night. A very intelligent, honest young Irishman, an ambulance driver, deserted from the rebels, says that they wished to go together to railroad near Tupelo, where they will meet the nine thousand exchanged prisoners, but he says they are much scattered and demoralized. They have much artillery.'

"From the same place, at midnight, after learning from the front that McPherson was in Ripley, I telegraphed General Grant as follows:

"GENERAL:—Yours 8.30 P. M. received. Our troops occupy Ripley. I most deeply dissent from your views as to the manner of pursuing. We have defeated, routed, and demoralized the

army which holds the Lower Mississippi Valley. We have the two railroads leading down toward the Gulf through the most productive parts of the State, into which we can now pursue them with safety. The effect of our return to old position will be to pen them up in the only corn county they have west of Alabama, including the Tuscumbia Valley, and to permit them to recruit their forces, advance and occupy their old ground, reducing us to the occupation of a defensive position, barren and worthless, with a long front, over which they can harass us until bad weather prevents an effectual advance except on the railroads, when time, fortifications, and rolling stock will again render them superior to us. Our force, including what you have with Hurlbut, will garrison Corinth and Jackson, and enable us to push them. Our advance will cover even Holly Springs, which would be ours when we want it. All that is needful is to continue pursuing and whip them. We have whipped, and should now push them to the wall and capture all the rolling stock of their railroads. Bragg's army alone, west of the Alabama River, and occupying Mobile, could repair the damage we have it in our power to do them. If, after considering these matters, you still consider the order for my return to Corinth expedient, I will obey it and abandon the chief fruits of a victory, but I beseech you, bend everything to push them while they are broken and hungry, weary and ill-supplied. Draw everything possible from Memphis to help move on Holly Springs, and let us concentrate. Appeal to the governors of the States to rush down some twenty or thirty new regiments to hold our rear, and we can make a triumph of our start.'

"As it was, General Grant telegraphed to General Halleck at 9 A. M. the next day, October 8th:

"'Rosecrans has followed rebels to Ripley. Troops from Bolivar will occupy Grand Junction to-morrow, with re-inforcements rapidly sent on from the new levies. I can take everything on the Mississippi Central road. I ordered Rosecrans back last night, but he was so averse to returning that I have directed him to remain still until you can be heard from.'

"Again on the same day, October 8th, General Grant telegraphed to General Halleck:

"'Before telegraphing you this morning for reinforcements to follow up our victories I ordered General Rosecrans to return.

He showed such reluctance that I consented to allow him to remain until you could be heard from if further reinforcements could be had. On reflection I deem it idle to pursue further without more preparation, and have for the third time ordered his return.'

"This was early in October. The weather was cool, and the roads in prime order. The country along the Mississippi Central to Grenada, and especially below that place, was a corn country—a rich farming country and the corn ripe. If Grant had not stopped us, we could have gone to Vicksburg. My judgment was to go on, and with the help suggested we could have done so. The enemy were retreating under the pressure of a victorious force and experiencing all the weakening effects of such an army whose means of supplies and munitions are always difficult to keep in order. We had Sherman at Memphis with two divisions, and we had Hurlbut at Bolivar with one division, and John A. Logan at Jackson with six regiments. With these there was nothing to save Mississippi from our grasp. We were about six days' march from Vicksburg, and Grant could have put his force through to it with my column as the center one of pursuit. Confederate officers told me afterwards that they never were so scared in their lives as they were after the defeat before Corinth.

"We have thus given the facts of the fight at Corinth, the immediate pursuit, the causes of the return, and as well the differing views of the Federal commanders in regard to the situation. Let the judgments of the future be formed upon the words of impartial history.

"In a general order announcing the results of the battle to my command I stated that we killed and buried 1,423 officers and men of the enemy, including some of their most distinguished officers. Their wounded at the usual rate would exceed 5,000. We took 2,268 prisoners, among whom were 137 field-officers, captains, and subalterns. [The official Confederate reports make their loss 505 killed, 2,150 wounded, 2,183 missing—EDITOR.] We captured 3,300 stand of small arms, fourteen stand of colors, two pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of equipments. We pursued his retreating column forty miles with all arms, and with cavalry sixty miles, and were ready to follow him to Vicksburg, had we received the orders.

"Our loss was 355 killed, 1,841 wounded, 324 captured or missing.

"In closing his report Van Dorn said:

"A hand-to-hand contest was being enacted in the very yard of General Rosecrank's headquarters and in the streets of the town. The heavy guns were silenced, and all seemed to be about ended when a heavy fire from fresh troops from Iuka, Burnsville, and Rienzi, who had succeeded in reaching Corinth, poured into our thinned ranks. Exhausted from loss of sleep, wearied from hard marching and fighting, companies and regiments without officers, our troops—let no one censure them—gave way. The day was lost. . . . The attempt at Corinth has failed, and in consequence I am condemned and have been superseded in my command. In my zeal for my country I may have ventured too far without adequate means, and I bow to the opinion of the people whom I serve. Yet I feel that if the spirits of the gallant dead, who now lie beneath the batteries of Corinth, see and judge the motives of men, they do not rebuke me, for there is no sting in my conscience, nor does retrospection admonish me of error or of a reckless disregard of their valued lives."

"And General Price says in his report:

"The history of this war contains no bloodier page, perhaps, than that which will record this fiercely contested battle. The strongest expressions fall short of my admiration of the gallant conduct of the officers and men under my command. Words cannot add luster to the fame they have acquired through deeds of noble daring which, living through future time, will shed about every man, officer, and soldier who stood to his arms through this struggle, a halo of glory as imperishable as it is brilliant. They have won to their sisters and daughters the distinguished honor, set before them by a general of their love and admiration upon the event of an impending battle upon the same field, of the proud exclamation, "My brother, father, was at the great battle of Corinth."

GENERAL GRANT ON CORINTH.

"On the 19th of September, 1862, General Geo. H. Thomas was ordered east to reinforce Buell. This threw the army at my command still more on the defensive. The Memphis and Charleston railroad was abandoned, except at Corinth, and small forces were

left at Chewalla and Grand Junction. Soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and Bolivar became our most advanced position on the Mississippi Central railroad. Our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were sent out to watch the movements of the enemy. We were in a country where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us and friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress.

"On the 22d Bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of Grand Junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and artillery. I reinforced Bolivar, and went to Jackson in person to superintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might be made upon. The troops from Corinth were brought up in time to repel the threatened movement without a battle. Our cavalry followed the enemy south of Davis' Mills in Mississippi.

"On the 30th I found that Van Dorn was apparently endeavoring to strike the Mississippi River above Memphis. At the same time other points within my command were so threatened that it was impossible to concentrate a force to drive him away. There was at this juncture a large Union force at Helena, Arkansas, which, had it been within my command, I could have ordered across the river to attack and break up the Mississippi Central railroad far to the south. This would not only have called Van Dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of a large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids on the enemy's line of supplies. Geographical lines between the commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were too rigidly adhered to.

"Van Dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above Memphis, as had apparently been his intention. He was simply covering a deeper design; one much more important to his cause. By the 1st of October (1862) it was fully apparent that Corinth was to be attacked with great force and determination, and that Van Dorn, Lovell, Price, Villepigue and Rust had joined their strength for this purpose. There was some skirmishing outside of Corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d. The rebels massed in the northwest angle of the Memphis and Charleston and the Mobile and Ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at Corinth and all possible reinforcements. Any fresh troops for us must come by a circuitous route.

"On the night of the 3d accordingly, I ordered General McPherson, who was at Jackson, to join Rosecrans at Corinth, with reinforcements picked up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. Hurlbut had been ordered from Bolivar to march for the same destination; and as Van Dorn was coming upon Corinth from the northwest some of his men fell in with the advance of Hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of the 3d. On the 4th Van Dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to capture Rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. In that case the enemy himself could have occupied the defenses of Corinth and held at bay all the Union troops that arrived. In fact he could have taken the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about Corinth to hold them. *He came near success*, some of his troops penetrating the National lines at least once, but the works that were built after Halleck's departure enabled Rosecrans to hold his position until the troops of both McPherson and Hurlbut approached towards the rebel front and rear. The enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter; all their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed. The loss on our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with Van Dorn's. McPherson came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of Rosecrans just after the repulse. His approach, as well as that of Hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. General Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. He did not do so, and I repeated the order after the battle. In the first order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued.

"General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th, and being senior took command of his troops. This force encountered the head of Van Dorn's retreating column just as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge some ten miles out from Corinth. The bottom land here was swampy and bad for the operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. Ord attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in

a panic. Many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off the bridge in their hurried retreat. Ord followed and met the main force. He was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher up the stream. Ord was wounded in this engagement and the command devolved on Hurlbut.

"Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th, and then took the wrong road. Moving in the enemy's country he traveled with a wagon train to carry provisions and munitions of war. His march was therefore towards his supplies. Two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly been. Even when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the route taken by the enemy, he would have come upon Van Dorn in a swamp with a stream in front and Ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading north and towards Chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy had moved to get to the Hatchie, he was as far from battle as when he started. Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such force as Van Dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he might have been in great peril.

"I now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past, and after Rosecrans reached Jonesboro, I ordered him to return. He kept on to Ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther. I thereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to the general-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired, 'Why not pursue?' Upon this I ordered Rosecrans back. Had he gone much farther he would have met a greater force than Van Dorn had at Corinth, and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the probabilities are he would have lost his army.

"The battle of Corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1,812 wounded and 232 missing. The enemy lost many more. Rosecrans reported 1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners. We fought behind breastworks, which accounts in some degree for the disparity. Among the killed on our side was General Hackelman. General Oglesby was badly, it was for some time supposed mortally wounded. I received a congratulatory letter from the President, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses.

"The battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not so complete as I had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as I now think was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at Corinth. Since the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the North. The battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving reinforcements I suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement against Vicksburg. . . .

"At the close of the operations just described my force in round numbers was 48,500. Of these 4,800 were in Kentucky and Illinois, 7,000 in Memphis, 19,200 from Mound City south, and 17,500 at Corinth. General McClelland had been authorized from Washington to go north and organize troops to be used in opening the Mississippi. These new levies with other reinforcements now began to come in."

Prior to the attack on Corinth there was much correspondence between the President, Generals Bragg, Van Dorn and Price, showing how entirely agreed they were upon the assault, and how urgent the demand for it, as necessary to reach West Tennessee, and combining with General Bragg to drive the enemy from Tennessee and Kentucky. Corinth commanding several railroads and its armed outposts threatening General Pemberton's forces and Vicksburg. (See Appendix.)

CONTEMPORANEOUS NEWSPAPER ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF
CORINTH—FULL PARTICULARS.

OCTOBER 11, 1862.

EDITOR'S APPEAL:—Truth, justice and the holy cause of independence for which we struggle demand that some corrective should be given to the stupendous and mischievous errors, rife in the country and the press, touching the late battle of Corinth, and the conduct of the retreat of our army from that memorable field. It is enough to chill the valor and patriotism of the soldier to find

his most skilful and his bravest deeds set down to the account of a blundering and stupid inefficiency, and bruited by the press over every hearthstone in the land.

I fear that the lamented and immortal Albert Sydney Johnston is not to be the only general sacrificed by croakers who hate the smell of gunpowder! It may be true, as he said, "that the people are right in demanding *success* as the only test of merit," but our fathers acted on a different idea, or else George Washington could not long have remained Commander-in-Chief of the army of the Revolution. Indeed, no general of that day could have escaped banishment. The Conway cabal did *not* triumph over the good sense of our ancestors, and we may hope that the factions of our day may not without resistance blur the fame of officers whose military achievements deserve the nation's gratitude.

Of the battle of Corinth, history will say it was only not a victory. In all the elements of military science—conception, plan of attack and execution of design—it reflects the highest credit on the general who commanded the forces, and it covered with glory the subordinate generals, officers and men engaged in the terrific struggle. On the close of the contest on the night of the first day (Friday), General Van Dorn received the congratulations of every general officer under his command; and, in the hearts of his men, lying prostrate, parched by thirst, and weary from excess of valor, there was but one feeling—pride that they served under a commander who had taught them, that day, his capacity to command and guide the currents of a wide-spread battle-field.

Price, on the left and center, and Lovell, on the right, each received on the field, amid the terrible contest, written congratulatory orders, for their skill and prowess in carrying, against superior forces, the intrenchments of the enemy; not forgetting the noble men they led.

At the close of the fight on Friday, Villepigue, Bowen and Rust, under Lovell—Maury, Cabell, Phipper, Hébert, Green, Gates, Martin, Moore, Irwin, and all others under Price—received the universal meed of applause, so grateful to the soldier's heart, when it follows heroic deeds.

Two hours of daylight on Friday would have made us masters of Corinth. The place was saved by the extraordinary exertions

of Rosecrans, who, working with indefatigable labor until day-break, brought reinforcements of eight thousand men—not, as the “very intelligent gentleman who enlightens the Mississippian declares, from Cairo and Columbus, by the oversight of our general in not cutting the railroad”—but from Jacinto, Rienzi, Iuka and Kosuth.

This force was concentrated at daylight upon the strong central fortifications of the town, before which the center and left of our army lay, and where our gallant and noble soldiers threw themselves with the early dawn into these formidable works. They were too few to hold the places their valor had won. These were the forces under the gallant Price. On the right, Lovell's division having taken the exterior line of intrenchments, and after hard fighting captured a fort, found his wing confronted by the last strongholds which guarded the town on the west. His troops, not having been once repulsed in their victorious march, were in the act of storming these last works when he received orders to retire and form the rear guard to protect and cover the retreat.

General Van Dorn had cut off all reinforcements from Bolivar, by so maneuvering as to menace that point, and by cutting the railroad between it and Corinth.

Rosecrans, on Friday night, expected to lose Corinth. He started his train in retreat toward Farmington, and burnt some of his military stores. He has deservedly won a right to promotion by the toil, skill and energy of his defense.

As to the casualties of the fight, we have every reason to conclude that in the killed and wounded, and prisoners taken on the field, the loss of the enemy was greater than our own. The stragglers of our army, worn out by the excessive heat and burning thirst of a two days' struggle, after rapid marches, may swell their list of prisoners.

We captured at Corinth three pieces of artillery, and lost one piece by a mistake of the driver, who ran it into town.

THE RETREAT

Was conducted in a masterly manner, as its results proclaim. A baggage train, six or seven miles in length, was brought off in safety. The small loss of ten or twelve wagons was occasioned

by the silly panic of the drivers. There were but two contests on the retreat. The first occurred at Davis's bridge on the Hatchie River, near Pocahontas, where the forces of Hurlbut's division, from Bolivar—afterwards reinforced by Ross's division, from the same point—disputed the passage of the Hatchie. The contest was short and bloody. Morris's brigade was in the advance, a portion of his force—about five hundred in number—crossing the bridge. A part of Phifer's and a portion of Campbell's brigades were pushed up in support, making altogether about 1,000 men engaged on our side. At that point the noble, high-toned, gallant soldier and gentleman, Major Balfour, on Van Dorn's staff, fell mortally wounded, in the effort to rally our men, pressed and overpowered by really superior numbers. The enemy succeeded in gaining the bridge, but withdrew after a short contest, on the approach of Hébert's division, commanded by General Green. During this combat at the Hatchie bridge, the forces of Rosecrans, from Corinth, attacked our rear guard, six miles distant, at the bridge across the Tuscumbia.

Bowen's brigade at this latter point repulsed the enemy with great slaughter, and that was the last contest on the retreat. Van Dorn retired Price's division up the Hatchie to Krum's mill, preceded by his immense train of baggage, unmolested; repaired a bridge at that point, which had been burnt by General Armstrong that morning—crossed and camped. Lovell's division followed the same route, unmolested—and in this order our entire army has marched to that point. "The very intelligent gentleman" of the *Mississippian* puts down as *one* of the *two* "causes of our reverses," the burning of a bridge across Cypress creek, ten miles from Corinth—at which point the enemy held a commanding position, where our men had to run down the creek and cross over a mill dam, etc. There was no bridge burnt or injured, on our entire route, from Corinth to near Pocahontas, on the Hatchie—that bridge was not burnt—its passage was disputed by the enemy in position—but the contest cost them dearly. They lost upwards of one hundred killed, and between four and five hundred wounded, among whom were Generals Ord and Veitch—while our loss was in prisoners between four and five hundred, and about forty or sixty killed and wounded. At Tuscumbia the bridge was perfect—Price's division had crossed it—and Lovell's division was approaching it. The enemy were not in position

there—but were sent howling back before they reached it. Bowen destroyed it after he crossed.

I have spoken in warm but merited praise of all the officers and men engaged in the bloody field of Corinth. There is a class of soldiers of whom I have not spoken—a large class—would it had been smaller!—a class, in numbers, sufficient to form a brigade—a class of stragglers, who were *not* at Corinth on either of the long to be remembered days of Friday and Saturday—who deserted our advancing columns—who learned the currents of the fight only by those cannonades whose *distant* thunder made the firm earth reel and tremble under their feet—whose coward footsteps turned away from the fields of carnage, and whose lying tongues spread a panic on every mile of their ignominious flight. It is a pity to find their caitiff stories of blundering generals and terrible disasters stiffened into type.

Whatever may be the sum of hurtful and erroneous criticism heaped upon some of the generals who fought at Corinth, by those ignorant of their action on the field, it ought to be a solace to officers thus defamed to know that they are cherished by the soldiers they led, in so much that even retreat could not stifle their cheers of admiration.

Rosecrans is, of course, inferior to the military critics who denounce the action of Van Dorn; but it is safe to say that he would not readily undergo again the toil by which he saved Corinth.

As to Lovell, so bitterly and undeservedly assailed—his cool courage, self-possession and skill in handling his force attracted the admiration of the army.

I see that in the list of the meritorious I have failed to mention General Armstrong and Colonel Jackson, who commanded our cavalry. Each of those gallant officers greatly distinguished themselves by their admirable use of their respective forces in protecting the flanks of our line. Indeed, without exception, the conduct of all our officers, of every grade, was worthy of all praise. And Adams, in his vigilance in watching the enemy advancing from Bolivar to the Hatchie bridge, commanded the thanks of the Commanding General."

The brunt of the failure to take Corinth, after the fiercely fought contest, loss of life and great suffering, fell upon the

hapless head of General Van Dorn, and the ready-made abuse of the press on account of the martial law order at Vicksburg received new impetus by this unfortunate, unavoidable and sanguinary struggle. And so severe, so unmerited, and so vicious were the charges spread broadcast by stragglers from the fight on the day of battle, that he requested and was granted a court of inquiry, the details of which involve so many historic events, and so completely vindicate that officer from each and every charge, that the proceedings are here given in full. General Van Dorn addressed the court saying in eloquent terms:

“Gentlemen of the Court, these extended remarks are not meant alone for your ears. In this tribunal I know that my character is safe; but the accusations against me will take an enduring form by becoming part of the archives of the nation, and the jealousy with which a soldier guards his reputation prompts me to place by their side an antidote to the poison they contain.”

PROCEEDINGS.

Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry convened at Abbeville, Mississippi, by virtue of the following order:

[EXTRACT.]

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI & EAST LOUISIANA,
Jackson, Miss., Nov. 7th, 1862.

Special Orders, No. 24.]

At the request of Major-General Earl Van Dorn, P. A. C. S., a Court of Inquiry will convene at Holly Springs, or wherever the Army of Operations may be, on Monday, the 10th of November, 1862, at 8 o'clock A. M., or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, for the investigation of certain allegations, made by Brigadier-General John S. Bowen against Major-General Earl Van Dorn, relative to the advance of his forces on Corinth, on or about the 3d, 4th and 5th of October, 1862, and of all points connected with the movement upon and the retirement before Corinth. The Court will sit without reference to hours.

DETAIL FOR THE COURT.

Major-General Sterling Price, P. A. C. S.
 Brigadier-General Lloyd Tilghman, P. A. C. S.
 Brigadier-General Dabney H. Maury, P. A. C. S.
 Captain L. B. Marris, 38th Miss. Reg., is appointed Recorder
 of Court.

By order of Lieutenant-General Pemberton,
 R. W. MEMMINGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI & EAST LOUISIANA,
Jackson, Miss., Nov. 11th, 1862.

[EXTRACT.]

Special Orders, No. 25.]

VII. Captain Harris detailed as Recorder of Court of Inquiry, by virtue of Special Orders No. 24, paragraph XIV, current series, is hereby relieved from duty as member of the Court, and Capt. E. H. Cummins, A. A. G., is substituted in his stead.

By order, Lt.-Gen. Pemberton,
 (Signed) R. W. MEMMINGER, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE WEST,
Abbeville, Miss., Saturday, Nov. 15th, 1862—10 o'clock, A. M.

Court met pursuant to the above order.

Present.—Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price commanding Army of the West, Brig.-Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, commanding 1st Division, Lovell's Corps, Brig.-Gen. Dabney H. Maury, commanding 1st Division, Army of the West, Capt. E. H. Cummins, Asst. Insp.-General, Recorder.

Major-General Earl Van Dorn was also present.

The Recorder read the order convening the Court.

The Court was then duly sworn by the Recorder, and the Recorder was duly sworn by the Presiding Officer of the Court.

Gen. Van Dorn then addressed the Court as follows:—

Gentlemen of the Court:—Before you proceed to the investigation of the charges preferred against me by Brig.-Gen. Bowen,

I desire to call your attention to these facts—that I have been a soldier for nearly a quarter of a century—that this is the first time I have been called upon to defend myself, against allegations of any kind; though my career has been an eventful one—that I have accumulated nothing of the world's wealth—having devoted my whole time and energies to the service of my country; and that *therefore* my reputation is all that belongs to me, without which life to me were as valueless as the crisp and faded leaf of autumn.

As a personal favor to me, I ask that the investigation on which you are about to enter shall be thorough and complete. I invoke the fullest scrutiny, on your part, into my conduct, as the only adequate means of securing my exoneration from charges which nearly touch a soldier's reputation.

I am not guilty of one of them. I ask no sympathy, but I do ask at your hands a patient, full, and searching investigation.

(Signed)

EARL VAN DORN,
Major-General.

Major Wright was then introduced by Gen. Van Dorn as his adviser.

Witnesses:—Maj.-Gen. STERLING PRICE.

Brig.-Gen. JNO. B. VILLEPIGUE.

“ “ RUST.

“ “ JNO. S. BOWEN.

“ “ D. H. MAURY.

“ “ M. E. GREEN.

Col. ROBERTSON, 35th Ala.

Col. LOWRY, 6th Miss.

Lt.-Col: H. CLAY TAYLOR, Price's Staff.

Capt. L. H. KENNEDY, 1st Mo.

Lt. L. P. HUTCHINSON, 1st Mo.

And Citizens of Water Valley, names unknown.

The charges were read aloud by the Recorder of the Court.

General Bowen was requested to indicate the special points upon which he desired to examine each witness, and declined for the following reasons:

“I respectfully ask the Court will excuse me from being present, or assisting in conducting the examination, as I deem

it clearly the duty of the Recorder, or Judge Advocate, to have entire charge of the prosecution. If I can aid him in curtailing the proceedings by stating what the several witnesses are supposed to be able to testify to, and the Court desire it, I can either impart the information while under examination, or in conference with the Recorder; but to act as an assistant to him, during the proceedings, would be exceedingly unpleasant, and I trust they will consider it unnecessary.

“JOHN S. BOWEN.”

CHARGE FIRST—NEGLECT OF DUTY.

Specification 1st.—In this, that Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn, commanding the troops of the Confederate States, Provisional Army, in the District of Mississippi, and East Louisiana, including the force known as the Army of the West, did concentrate the greater portion of said force, and undertake an important expedition against the enemy at Corinth, Miss., where they, the enemy, were strongly fortified and in formidable numbers, fully prepared for a stubborn resistance, without due consideration or forethought; and did utterly fail and neglect to discharge his duties as a General commanding an Army, in the following particulars, viz.:

1st. By failing to provide himself with a proper map of the approaches and plan of the work to be attacked.

2d. By eschewing entirely the services of an Engineer officer and failing to reconnoiter the position before the attack.

3d. By marching his troops to the attack with an insufficient supply of Commissary stores to maintain them, depending entirely upon captures from the enemy to enable the occupation of the place, if taken.

4th. By marching the troops in a hastily and disorderly manner, hurling them upon the enemy with an apparent attempt to take a command by surprise, whose “outposts had been engaged with his (Gen. Van Dorn’s) advance for thirty-six hours before attack.” All this at or near the towns of Ripley and Corinth, Miss., on or about the 1st to the 3d of October, A. D. 1862.

Specification 2d.—In this, that Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn, after the troops of his command had driven the enemy from their exterior line of intrenchments at Corinth, Miss., October 3d, 1862, did fail and neglect to perform his duty as a General com-

manding an Army, by delaying the attack upon their inner works until the next morning, thereby affording them ample time to receive reinforcements,—of which advantage they fully availed themselves.

Specification 3d.—In this, that Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn did fail and neglect, as a General commanding, by suffering the enemy to receive large reinforcements on the nights of October the 3d and 4th, at Corinth, Miss., without his knowledge, when he, the aforesaid Gen. Van Dorn, was present inside of their works, with a victorious army, and in hearing of the noise made by their wagons and artillery carriages; and did further neglect to ascertain the strength and location of the enemy, and their intrenchments, which he ordered to be taken by assault in the morning.

CHARGE SECOND—CRUEL AND IMPROPER TREATMENT OF OFFICERS
AND SOLDIERS UNDER HIS COMMAND.

Specification 1st.—In this, that Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn, commanding the aforesaid Army in the expedition against Corinth, and on his retreat from the same, did cause long, tedious and circuitous marches to be made, and either through ignorance of the route, or neglect, repeatedly march and countermarch over the same road, and did have a large command moving to and fro, without any apparent reason, while the men were footsore, wearied and starving. This on the retreat between Corinth and Holly Springs, Miss., on or about October 6th, 7th and 8th, 1862.

Specification 2d.—In this, that Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn, commanding, as aforesaid, did allow one or more trains of cars freighted with wounded soldiers from the battle-field, at and near Corinth, Miss., to be detained without any necessity, at Water Valley, Miss., during one or more entire nights—said wounded soldiers having been herded in said cars at Holly Springs, without blankets or nourishment; and many with undressed wounds. No surgeon, officer, nurse or attendant with them, thus causing an incredible amount of useless suffering, and creating disaffection among the troops.

Respectfully submitted,
(Signed) JNO. S. BOWEN,
Brig.-Gen. C. S. P. A.

Brig.-Gen. ALBERT RUST was duly sworn:

Question by Recorder.—State all that you know bearing on the first specification of the first charge.

Answer.—I do not know whether Gen. Van Dorn was or was not provided with a map or chart. None was exhibited to me. I do not know that Gen. Van Dorn marched without availing himself of the services of an Engineer and without making proper reconnaissance. Gen. Van Dorn told me subsequent to the repulse that he had sent a person inside of the works of the enemy; but that the information received from that source was insufficient, or unsatisfactory—that the person had not performed his duty satisfactorily, and had not given the requisite and correct information. My impression received from the conversation with Gen. Van Dorn was that he found this information to be incorrect after making the attack. I started with a sufficient supply of Commissary stores, in case the attack had been successful—all that prudence required. I had provisions when I returned to Holly Springs, remaining of those supplied for the expedition. I turned over *four thousand* rations of bread stuffs, by order of Gen. Lovell, to Gen. Price at the Hatchie, on the way to Corinth. On account of the impossibility of cooking three days' rations as ordered, in consequence of being detained until midnight, by troops in advance of me, which I was ordered to follow, my troops would have suffered, on the night of the 2d, had I not been able to supply myself on the spot, from a man living in the neighborhood. This was eight miles this side of Corinth.

I do not know how other troops marched—mine marched in perfect order, and in no haste—more haste would have been more agreeable and less fatiguing to the troops.

I don't know whether Gen. Van Dorn expected to surprise them or not. I did not, from the fact of the skirmishing which had taken place the day before.

Question by Recorder.—Are you aware of any want of consideration and forethought, and failure, and neglect to perform his duty as commanding General in any of the particulars specified in specification first?

Answer.—The attack having been determined upon, I do not—except I thought I ought to have had rations on the occasion previously referred to, as my troops would have had nothing, had I not been able to purchase provisions; which was an accident.

Question by Recorder.—Do you think there was a want of foresight, or due consideration, in making the attack?

Answer.—I learned on the 2d, at the Tuscumbia bridge, while halting for the repair of the bridge, from Gen. Lovell for the first time, that it was designed to make the attack. I expressed myself strongly against it. I declared it was impossible to succeed in the attack. Gen. Lovell said if we could not succeed we had better lay down our arms and go home. I adhered to my opinion. I did not communicate my opinion, except to Col. Hobson, of Gen. Price's command, to whom I characterized the attempt as madness. No person of my command knew or suspected my opinion. I heard Gen. Van Dorn at Davis' Mills, speak of maneuvering the enemy out of Corinth, and that I supposed to be his purpose.

Question by Recorder.—State what you know of the facts bearing on the second specification?

Answer.—If there were no insurmountable impediments, I think without doubt, it would have been better to have continued the attack the same evening, considering the facilities the enemy had of receiving reinforcements, and their proximity to them. There was some difficulty in my own command in regard to ammunition, but considerably before night our cartridge boxes were replenished, and we could have advanced. I do not know whether the enemy availed themselves of the opportunity of reinforcing, or not; I presume they did.

Question by Recorder.—State what you know of the facts bearing on the third specification?

Answer.—I do not know what Gen. Van Dorn knew in regard to the enemy's receiving reinforcements—never having heard him say. He may, or may not have been in hearing of the noise of their wagons and artillery carriages. I was not, though within the intrenchments. I was furnished with no plan or chart of the defenses the enemy had constructed, and was not informed orally of their position and character.

Question by Recorder.—State what you know of the facts bearing on the first specification, second charge?

Answer.—I do not recollect a single occasion on which the command was countermarched or passed to and fro over the same road, on the return from Corinth to Holly Springs. The enemy having thrown himself across the direct route, at the Hatchie, and

having successfully disputed our passage at that point, a portion of the command necessarily countermarched a short distance to the Bone Yard road, by way of which the whole command crossed the Hatchie, at a point some six or eight miles above that occupied by the enemy. Having failed to drive the enemy from his position on the direct route, the one taken to Holly Springs was necessarily circuitous. It may have been made more so after getting to Ripley, from the fact that the enemy were expected, and believed, to be threatening our rear and both flanks. A large portion of the army was supposed not to be in a condition to make a fight.

Question by Recorder.—State what you know in relation to the men being footsore, wearied and starving.

Answer.—I suspect they were all very tired, and some of them footsore; I do not think any of them were starving. My troops were put to some inconvenience, as before stated, by the mis-carriage of the wagons and the absence of cooking utensils; having nothing to cook in, we bought potatoes and roasted them. I did not consider it a hard retreat. I heard no extraordinary complaint. I suffered much more with my command in Virginia, when there was less excuse for it.

Question by Recorder.—State all you know relative to the second specification.

Answer.—I reached Holly Springs on the night of the 10th. I was notified I could get subsistence from the Post Commissary. A large portion of the few cooking utensils with which the command was provided being left yet behind, I intended myself to have the rations cooked by the citizens, and ordered details from each regiment to go to the houses of citizens, who had agreed to cook for them, and ordered my Brigade Commissary, Maj. Marshall, to hurry the issuing of the rations. It was a wet and cold evening. He (Marshall) in a little while reported to me that the men were not suffering much, and preferred not to draw the rations that evening, and accordingly it was not done. They have not been without rations from that time to this so far as I know, and I try to keep myself advised of their condition in that respect.

Question by Recorder.—State what you know relative to the third specification, second charge.

Answer.—I know nothing at all about that.

CROSS EXAMINATION.

Question by Defendant.—In the skirmishing the day before the attack in Corinth, was our infantry engaged with the enemy's pickets?

Answer.—When near Chewalla, and as I afterwards ascertained, to a small encampment of the enemy and some trivial defenses to the left of the road, his presence was announced, and I was ordered to form my brigade, it being in front in line of battle, and to throw out skirmishers, which I did as speedily as possible. While putting my skirmishers in position a few shots were fired from the front, to which my men were not permitted to respond. Having formed my men I advanced rapidly, passing through and over their camp and breastworks without encountering or seeing any of them. The cavalry was in front, and I am not aware that the enemy saw our infantry. There was a ridge between where I formed my men and the encampment of the enemy,—making one invisible to the other.

Question by Defendant.—Where did your command encamp that night? did you advance beyond Chewalla?

Answer.—I encamped on the road to the right, and a little in advance of Chewalla, my left resting on the road and extending at right angles to it in line of battle through the woods.

Question by Defendant.—At what time did our infantry engage the enemy? *id est*, What day and how far from Corinth?

Answer.—My brigade engaged it in the morning of the 3d, about 11 o'clock, about 2 miles from Corinth. I do not think there had been any engagement of the infantry until then.

Question by Defendant.—Did you have an independent command, or were you acting under the orders of Maj.-Gen. Lovell?

Answer.—I was acting under orders of Maj.-Gen. Lovell.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether Maj.-Gen. Lovell received from Maj.-Gen. Van Dorn at Chewalla, on our advance, a map of Corinth, its defenses, and approaches?

Answer.—I do not. I think I saw a map in his hand; I am pretty sure I did. I don't know where he got it.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether Gen. Van Dorn, before he left Ripley, after the junction with Gen. Price, had in his possession a Federal map of Corinth and its approaches, taken from the enemy at Iuka?

Answer.—No. I do not know it.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether in advancing upon Corinth and retreating from that place, Gen. Van Dorn had competent guides with him?

Answer.—I do not know.

Question by Defendant.—When did the engagement with the enemy cease on the first day of the attack at Corinth?

Answer.—The firing continued until late in the evening, nearly night; the firing continued on the left long after it ceased on the right.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know what was the condition of the men at that time, from thirst and fatigue, and the march of the day?

Answer.—I can't tell. I saw none of Gen. Price's command. On the right the men were in first-rate fighting condition. From time to time mounted men were sent with their canteens for water, and they had not been engaged on the right as they had been on the left. Our engagement had been brief comparatively.

Question by Defendant.—Do you think it would have been advisable to commence an attack on the town of Corinth and inner intrenchments after dark?

Answer.—The moon was very bright, and if the men on the left were as anxious to attack as those on the right, I would have attacked that night before the enemy could have received reinforcements. I think the enemy were whipped that night, all who were there—and I would have attacked with more hope of success, before the enemy had received reinforcements, than after they were there.

Question by Defendant.—At Tuscumbia bridge you thought the attack on Corinth must necessarily be unsuccessful. Did you not change your opinion at the end of the first day's fight?

Answer.—I still had misgivings, doubts, and fears; my opinion was changed. We had come much nearer achieving success than I had hoped for. My opinion was changed because I had stated to Gen. Lovell that I believed it impossible to take it. I had in my conversation with Col. Hobson, characterized the attempt as madness. I believed at the end of the first day's fight that the place was nearly taken.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know of any obstacle between

the position you occupied on the night of the 3d, and the town and innermost intrenchments of Corinth?

Answer.—On the morning of the 4th, after marching a mile or so, we came to two forts and parapets which I supposed were the last between us and the town; in front of this were abatis, about two hundred yards wide—it was thin and not much obstruction—not more formidable than that we had passed over the day before.

Question by Defendant.—Do you think it would have been practicable, from the position our army was in on the night of the 3d, to have prevented large reinforcements from coming into Corinth, from the east or southeast?

Answer.—Only by driving the enemy then in Corinth out of the place, and occupying it ourselves.

Question by Defendant.—What has been your experience, or reading, in regard to attacks made at night, with troops not veteran soldiers?

Answer.—Extremely hazardous and only advisable under extraordinary circumstances, which I think existed on this occasion, as I stated before.

Question by Defendant.—Will you state in brief, why at Tusculumbia, you thought the attack on Corinth must necessarily fail?

Answer.—In the first place I believed the enemy had or could have more men there than we could assault with, such were their facilities for concentrating, and I knew that the defenses constructed by Gen. Beauregard were somewhat formidable, and had intelligence which I credited that they were very much strengthened by the enemy.

Question by Defendant.—Were you cognizant of the strength of the enemy? Did you know before you went to Corinth whether the enemy had twenty or forty thousand men? If so, in what way did you get the information?

Answer.—Gen. Lovell told me they only had twelve thousand; attaching no importance to this, and giving the enemy character for ordinary prudence and sagacity, I could not believe that they would attempt to hold Corinth, Bolivar, Jackson and Rienzi, and perhaps other places with forces which aggregated, would not be twice or thrice as large as our own, particularly as they seemed to give us credit for having a great many more men than we really had, and I thought it practicable to mass a majority of these troops at any one of these points within 36 hours. I had no positive in-

formation of the facts. These were only opinions, and reasons which influenced my mind in coming to these conclusions.

Question by Defendant.—You say you were ignorant at the Tuscumbia, that our army was marching on Corinth. Had the enemy better means of information as to the design of Gen. Van Dorn, as to the point he would attack? Whether it would be Bolivar or Corinth?

Answer.—I have no means of knowing what the sources of the enemy's information are, with regard to Gen. Van Dorn's movement, or the movements of his army.

Question by Defendant.—Did you suppose we were marching to attack the enemy at any point; if so, what?

Answer.—I did not. I recollected the remark that Gen. Van Dorn made about maneuvering the enemy out of his fortifications, and supposed that this might be his object. I contented myself with executing orders as well as I could.

Question by Defendant.—Had you any idea of what that maneuvering must be, to have the effect of getting the enemy out of Corinth?

Answer.—No. My own idea was that the enemy might be maneuvered out by getting in his rear, by cutting off his supplies, or threatening to do so, or occupying his own base.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) When did you arrive at the camp on the Hatchie? (2d.) When did you get orders to cook three days rations? (2d.) When did you turn over rations to Gen. Price's command? (4th.) Would it have been possible to cook any rations during the night?

Answer.—(1st.) My command arrived there very late at night. The place at which I was ordered to camp was a mile or two to the right of Bowen, in the bottom or swamp. The forest and foliage were so very dense that the darkness made it impossible to get the train straightened out and in place.

(2d.) I suppose about 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

(3d.) I left them in the swamp and woods at this place which I described, having been ordered to leave them where I camped, and notified Gen. Maury that I had left them, and where he would find them.

(4th.) It was possible. I did cook one day's rations for my command. It was impossible on account of the inadequate supply of cooking utensils in the command to cook the three day's rations

by the time we were ordered to march in the morning. The best officers commanding regiments declared it was utterly impossible, and I agreed with them. That night the men were much fatigued. On the day previous being encamped north of Ripley four miles, I was ordered to have my command at the road from Ripley to Ruckerville at 8 o'clock, and to fall in the rear of Gen. Hébert's command. I did so, but was detained there until nearly 5 o'clock by the troops in front of me. I received an order that night, if I had not passed Gen. Hébert to camp with him or at the same place. On reaching his headquarters he informed me that there was not nearly enough water there for his own command. I procured a guide, who took me through the fields and woods a mile and a half or two miles to a branch which supplied me with water. It was very late before my men could rest or sleep. For the same reasons the same thing happened the next day, and hence it was that my men were tired when they got to the Hatchie.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether or not the miscarriage of the wagons, on our return to Holly Springs, was a fault of General Van Dorn? Or if they were not immediately ordered on the right road as soon as the fact was reported to him?

Answer.—I presume they were. I do not know that it was his fault. The fault may have been with those under him. I don't know whose fault it was.

Question by the Court.—If there had been neglect of the wounded would you not have known it?

Answer.—In my command, yes.

Question by the Court.—Since the result at Corinth, have you a clearly defined idea of the enemy's force during the fight?

Answer.—I have ideas and opinions, but no knowledge.

Brig.-Gen. JOHN S. BOWEN, being duly sworn, says:

Question by Recorder.—State all the circumstances in your knowledge bearing on the 1st specification of the 1st charge.

Answer.—I was present with the Army of the West, and the troops of the District of the Mississippi, in command of a Brigade of Lovell's Division, when they formed a junction at or near Ripley, Mississippi; from which point the combined army marched on Corinth. I knew nothing of the intended attack upon Corinth until our arrival at Davis' Bridge, on the Hatchie River. I was officially notified of it there by Major-General Lovell, and went a

short time afterwards with him to Mr. Davis' house, where we met General Van Dorn. General Van Dorn was employed, at this time, making a sketch himself, of the country lying between Davis' Bridge and Corinth. He was consulting with a citizen guide in regard to the roads. General Lovell ordered me, in General Van Dorn's presence, to repair the bridge at the crossing of the Tuscumbia River, and I was shown the map that General Van Dorn was working upon, in order to explain to me the roads leading to the Tuscumbia. The map was a crude sketch, on a sheet of letter paper, drawn to no particular scale, and such as I deemed utterly unsuitable for the ordinary movements of an army, and so expressed myself to General Lovell on leaving the office, asking if there was any other information, than this map, on this subject of our advance. The party sent to the Tuscumbia bridge to repair it met a picket of the enemy at that point, five miles from our camp, where we had been lying for eight hours, and on a road where we had no picket or scout. A slight skirmish, in which three of the enemy were reported wounded, preceded the rebuilding of the bridge. When I was officially notified that the enemy were driven back, and the bridge commenced, I repaired immediately to General Lovell's headquarters, and from thence to General Van Dorn's, taking with me the written reports of Colonel Riley, who was commanding at Tuscumbia Bridge. In a conversation with Generals Van Dorn and Lovell, on the subject of those bridges, General Lovell guaranteed that the bridge over the Hatchie would be rebuilt by the morning, and I expressed equal confidence that Colonel Riley's work would be finished by the same time. General Van Dorn then inquired of one of his staff officers concerning another bridge over the Hatchie, which was under charge of some engineer officer for construction. His staff officer said there was difficulty about procuring tools, and General Van Dorn expressed himself very hastily in regard to the worthlessness of engineer officers, and stating that he should rely upon them for nothing more. He also expressed satisfaction that the bridges were finished, and we could cross both rivers without their assistance. The march on Corinth was taken up early next morning, General Lovell's Division having first turned over, by order of General Van Dorn, twelve thousand of their rations, to General Price's army, leaving an insufficient supply in General Lovell's Division to subsist them for five days. I don't know the amount

of subsistence which was on hand in General Price's army. I asked General Lovell to remonstrate against the march until rations could come up. The troops continued their march from Davis' Bridge, through Chewalla to Corinth. Lovell's Division was constantly driving before them pickets and outposts of the enemy. The march, though not long, was nevertheless tedious to the troops, from the fact that they were continually being deployed in line of battle. There was scarcely time allowed them, in camp, to prepare rations, and in Lovell's Division the attack was made on the morning of the 3d, when the men had not more than one half day's rations in their haversacks, and their supply train too far in the rear to reach them in time to prepare more.

Question by Recorder.—State all that you know relative to the second specification of the first charge.

Answer.—The outworks were carried at Corinth by assault, in front of Lovell's Division, between twelve and two o'clock. The Division was then formed in line, awaiting orders. The dead of my Brigade were collected and buried. The wounded were carried beyond Cypress Creek. The captured muskets and other arms, taken across Cypress Creek. The piece of artillery taken possession of was fitted up for action. One regiment of my brigade occupied a camp about three quarters of a mile inside of the enemy's entrenchments. I applied to General Lovell to move on to their support with my Brigade. He ordered me to recall one regiment back to the Brigade. About an hour afterwards we made a circuitous detour to the right. This was about four o'clock, and waited in line of battle. After moving about one hour, I finally communicated with General Lovell, and ascertained that he was convinced that three redoubts, and a line of encampments in their rear, had been abandoned by the enemy several hours before. We moved on to the encampments, arrived there about one hour and a half before sundown, and received orders to bivouac for the night. The order to me was given about sunset. During the night, I could hear, from a point a little in advance of my bivouac, rumblings of wagons or artillery carriages, or both. It was surmised by most of us, at that part of the line, that the enemy were evacuating the town. In the morning we found a large and formidable force in our front, showing, that whether they had had an accession of troops in the town, or not, their left wing, at least, had been materially

strengthened. No orders were given to me, notifying me, or the troops of Lovell's Division, of these reinforcements; no preparation seemed to have been made, to ascertain their character or extent.

Question by Recorder.—State all that you know relative to the 3d specification of the first charge.

Answer.—On the night of the 3d, between eleven and twelve o'clock, General Lovell summoned Generals Villepigue, Rust and myself to his headquarters for orders. He showed us a crude sketch of the works supposed to be in front of us, also in front of General Price's wing. He could not tell us whether the enemy were being reinforced or not. Major M. M. Kimmel, of General Van Dorn's staff, who was also present, expressed his ignorance of the same fact to me. The works that were indicated for us to take in the morning were alleged to be one or two redoubts, with three guns each. The probabilities were expressed as being in favor of there being but one of these works. My Brigade was detailed as the storming party, but I was to await orders, on arriving in sight of the works, before attempting to take it by storm. In the morning we arrived in line of battle, I on the right, Villepigue on the left, and Rust in reserve. Arriving in sight of a large redoubt, with a garrison flag flying, I halted my command, Villepigue doing the same. After three messages to General Lovell, stating our position, and urging his presence, I determined to ascertain by the time he arrived something definite in regard to the work in front of us. Satisfied that the information of the night before was not correct, I ordered up the Watson battery of my Brigade, and opened with spherical case on the fort. It was responded to by eight or ten heavy guns from the front, and as many from either flank from two other forts which I had not before seen. I should think there were about twenty-four pieces of heavy artillery instead of three. After losing about fifty-five men, killed and wounded, in the Brigade from the shells, I withdrew one hundred yards in the rear to get cover for the men, still waiting for General Lovell. The enemy became emboldened by our apparent apathy, and sallied out in front of Villepigue's Brigade, who repulsed them. We waited at this point until about twelve o'clock, when a retreat was ordered, and I deployed one of my regiments as skirmishers to cover Rust and myself, Villepigue having been detached and sent to the left. General Lovell ar-

rived on our line of battle between ten and eleven o'clock, having been immediately in the rear up to that time. He gave me no order to advance, but one of his staff inquired of me the practicability of taking the work by storm. I expressed my opinion that the opportunity had been lost, but considered it a questionable enterprise under any circumstances. He then asked me, suppose General Lovell orders you to take it. I replied my Brigade will march up and be killed.

Question by Recorder.—State what want of consideration and forethought was, in your opinion, displayed in the attack upon Corinth beyond the particulars in the specification of the first charge.

Answer.—I will state that I was in command of Breckinridge's Division, at Jackson, when the first movement north was spoken of by General Van Dorn. I was called in by him, General Van Dorn, to notify me of a contemplated movement, and to get the Division in readiness. During the conversation, General Lovell being present also, I endeavored to elicit from them what was the point to be attacked. General Van Dorn replied, in substance, that he intended to maneuver the enemy out of Memphis, Jackson, Bolivar and Corinth. The impression produced on my mind by him was that we were to force the enemy to leave these entrenchments and fight them in the open field. Again, after we had moved up in the vicinity of Davis' Mill, near La Grange, on the Central railroad the enemy having moved down upon us, and were pursued back towards Bolivar by General Lovell's Division, under command of General Van Dorn in person, the enemy eluding us and escaping into Bolivar, I asked General Van Dorn if he intended to attack Bolivar. He replied to me that he would not sacrifice his men against the fortifications. These two remarks led me to the conclusion that up to the time of the junction with General Price, no attack was contemplated against Corinth.

At four o'clock and thirty minutes P. M., the Court adjourned to meet at nine o'clock A. M., on the 16th inst.

10 o'clock A. M., Sunday, Nov. 17th, 1862.

The Court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present—Maj-Gen. Sterling Price, Brig.-Gen. D. H. Maury, and Capt. E. H. Cummins, Recorder.

It being Sunday, the Court adjourned to meet at nine o'clock A. M., on Monday the 17th instant.

10 o'clock A. M., Monday, Nov. 17th, 1862.

The Court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present—Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price, Brig.-Ben. Lloyd Tilghman, Brig.-Gen. D. H. Maury, Capt. E. H. Cummins, Recorder, Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn.

Reading the proceedings of yesterday was waived by the Court. General Bowen resumed his testimony.

Question by Recorder.—State all the facts in your knowledge pertinent to the first specification of the second charge.

Answer.—The retirement from Corinth took place about two o'clock on the 4th, General Price being in the advance, General Rust covering the rear. The march was directed to Chewalla, the enemy not pursuing us that afternoon. The men on the morning of the 5th were in excellent condition, my Brigade, especially, seeming to feel complimented that they were detailed as the rear guard. There was no demoralization or breakdown; they were entirely recuperated. The march of the 5th was necessarily tedious—a tedious one on account of the length of the train, and the battle which was fought at Hatchie, impeding our entire movement. The enemy's advance overtook the rear guard, and were repulsed in two skirmishes. The second skirmish, about sundown, seemed to check their advance and stop pursuit for the night. The march of the 6th was without any special incident, except that we had orders on arriving in camp that we would remain there several days. This camp was about seven miles north of Ripley, the object being to afford the troops rest and time to recuperate. The morning of the 7th, at three o'clock, I was ordered out with my Brigade, and marched together with Rust and Villepigue under General Lovell's command, about three miles north of our camp. At this point General Lovell told me that it was a stampede, and turned the command back.

Question by the Court.—What was the impression made upon your mind by the remark of General Lovell?

Answer.—That the alarm was a false one—that the enemy were not advancing on our position—that the movement to repel, or check them, was therefore useless.

Question by Recorder.—Continue your statement in reference to the first specification of the second charge.

Answer.—After countermarching we moved to within about four miles of Ripley, where Lovell's Division was drawn up in

line of battle, General Rust on the right, myself in the center, General Villepigue on the left. General Lovell left us at this point, and went in the direction of Ripley, to report to General Van Dorn. On his return to the command, about three hours afterwards, the Brigade commanders were together in the center discussing their position. I had asked General Rust to assume command, and was seconded by General Villepigue, the officers having first discovered that the position was untenable, capable of being turned on the right and left. A few seconds after General Lovell's return, report reached us from Colonel Jackson, commanding cavalry between us and the enemy, that they were advancing on all three of the roads. We were drawn up in line of battle across the center road; our left and right did not touch either of the others—country was open and comparatively level. General Lovell then ordered us to resume our march in the direction of Ripley, in continuation of our retreat. As the Brigades filed out on the road, we were ordered to push the men up, as the enemy were advancing from Rienzi to Ripley, and would cut us off. Passing four miles beyond Ripley, the troops were bivouacked, having made a march of about eighteen miles in nineteen hours—the men being without rations, considerably worn out, and showing signs of demoralization. The wagons, with provisions, came into camp about nine o'clock that night, having been marched and counter-marched sixteen miles, and finding themselves where they were first ordered to in the morning. About eleven o'clock my Brigade was turned out under arms. I detailed one regiment, with a small battalion, to go towards Ripley, where it was deployed as skirmishers, covering the bivouac of the command. The whole command moved at once next morning, my Brigade in rear, leaving camp about two o'clock. We marched thence to Hickory Flat, about eighteen or twenty miles by the road we took. The march was about ten hours in duration, and no material delays. My Brigade remained under arms, at Hickory Flat, until ten o'clock that night, having been forty-three hours on duty, with two hours intermission, and without rations. I had applied to General Lovell three times during the afternoon to be relieved. He admitted the justness of my claim, and finally gave me permission to apply directly to General Van Dorn, who immediately relieved me, and gave the order about seven o'clock, and I reached camp

about ten o'clock as above stated. General Price's command was immediately in front of us during the afternoon of the 8th. I saw them march over the same road three times—first moving west; thence they took a road to the south, and returning took the same road to the west. General Lovell ordered my wagon train, when in bivouac four miles south of Ripley, to proceed across the Tallahatchie, at New Albany, and go from thence to Hickory Flat. There was no such route in existence. The train traveled upwards of sixty miles, and reached me three days afterwards at Holly Springs, having twice crossed the Tallahatchie, my men being compelled to subsist on parched corn and potatoes during its absence, with the exception of a few barrels of flour borrowed from General Rust, and a half day's beef rations, which was purchased and issued by my acting commissary.

Question by Recorder.—State all the facts in your knowledge bearing on the second specification of the second charge.

Answer.—Lovell's Division arrived at Holly Springs on the 10th. I proceeded in advance to procure rations and select an encampment—was notified by General Lovell, on my arrival, that the post commissary had orders to issue to my men. Having no wagons I could draw nothing that night. The train came up, however, before the morning of the 11th, having with it one or two days' rations left from a former issue. From the morning of the 11th to the 13th, my commissary repeatedly applied for rations, reporting his failure to get them to me. I renewed my application to General Lovell, and endeavored to borrow rations from Generals Rust and Villepigue. Finding they had none, General Rust and myself went, in person, through the neighborhood, and succeeded in buying a hundred or two bushels of potatoes. My Brigade received no bread rations until the morning of the 16th. We then got sufficient corn meal to issue six or eight ounces to the man. I know nothing as to when Rust and Villepigue got theirs, but I know they had none on the morning of the 14th.

Question by Recorder.—State all the facts in your knowledge bearing on the third specification of the second charge.

Answer.—I know nothing relative to this specification.

CROSS EXAMINED.

Question by Defendant.—You say the sketch made by General Van Dorn, at Davis' house, was shown to you to explain the roads

leading to Tuscumbia. Did you find any difficulty in reaching the Tuscumbia, although the sketch was on letter paper, and drawn to no particular scale?

Answer.—No, not the slightest; but the distance between the Hatchie and the Tuscumbia, at that point, is only five miles. There were two roads, both very plain. Colonel Riley, whom I sent out to build the bridge, found the road without seeing the map.

Question by Defendant.—What force was sent to the Tuscumbia to secure the building of the bridge?

Answer.—About two hundred and eighty men. They were picked men, and good ones. The detail was for two hundred. I sent 1st Missouri regiment entire.

Question by Defendant.—Are you aware of the fact that General Armstrong, with his cavalry, was ordered by General Van Dorn to Chewalla the same night that you encamped at Davis' Bridge?

Answer.—No, I heard that he was somewhere in that direction, but do not remember the location.

Question by Defendant.—Was not our cavalry in front of Lovell's Division (our infantry advance) until within a short distance of the exterior works of Corinth?

Answer.—Yes. Jackson's cavalry was continually in front skirmishing with the enemy, especially between Chewalla and Corinth.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Do you know whether or not any provision was made by defendant for bringing forward supplies from Holly Springs to supply the necessities of the army?

(2d.) When did your Brigade reach Davis' Bridge?

(3d.) When did you get orders to cook three days' rations?

(4th.) How long were we going to Corinth?

(5th.) How far from Tuscumbia to Corinth?

Answer.—Orders were issued at Davis' Mill to send back wagons for rations to Holly Springs. The order was not complied with at all in my Brigade, and I think not in the other two of Lovell's Division, our transportation being too limited to spare any wagons. These facts were reported, and nothing further said about rations.

(3d.) On the 30th of September, as well as I can remember, about ten or eleven o'clock A. M.

(3d.) I got the orders to cook three days' rations an hour or

two after my arrival. We only cooked two days' rations, having but one day's salt meat.

(4th.) We encamped one night on the Chewalla, and made the attack next morning.

(5th.) From Tuscumbia to Corinth is from twelve to fifteen miles.

Question by Defendant.—Explain why the attack was made on Corinth with a half day's rations?

Answer.—We had two days' rations when we left Davis' Mills. We were a day and a half in marching from Davis' Mill to Corinth.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Did you get orders from any one to send empty wagons back from Ripley to Holly Springs? (2d.) Did you turn over rations to General Price's command? If so, out of whose wagons were they taken, and how much?

Answer.—(1st.) I got orders to send back empty wagons from General Lovell, but had none to send. (2d.) I turned over four thousand pounds of flour and a sack of salt to General Price's command, taken out of the different regimental wagons of my Brigade.

Question by the Court.—What became of the wagons emptied by the issue of rations to the troops, on the march from Davis' Mill to Davis' Bridge, and also of those emptied by issue to General Price's command?

Answer.—There were no wagons emptied by the issue. I had not transportation enough for a commissary train, and had to divide the fifteen days' rations issued immediately among regiments. They were transported mixed in with the lighter baggage of the command, and in some of the regiments two days' rations were cooked and packed by the men when we started from Davis' Mill near La Grange. About two or three wagons were broken down on the march, and all of them overloaded when we started. My command had been reduced prior to the march, to the minimum allowance under General Bragg's order, and had been increased subsequently by the assignment of seven hundred and twenty-five conscripts to three of the regiments.

Question by Defendant.—Do you mean to be understood as saying that there was no firing in the division to which you belonged, on Friday, the first day of the attack on Corinth, after two o'clock P. M.?

Answer.—There was firing by the First Missouri regiment of my Brigade, which was engaged with the enemy over half a mile in front of us. There was no firing by the remaining troops of my Brigade, or those of Rust's, or Villepigue, in my sight. I could see nearly all of their regiments. The Second Texas regiment, in General Moore's Brigade, in Price's army, was engaged at the same time with the First Missouri immediately in our front.

Question by Defendant.—In your official report of the action of your Brigade at Corinth, does not this passage occur: "The First Missouri regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Riley commanding, proceeded onward, drove the enemy from one of their encampments nearly a mile inside their works, holding the same *under fire* until the second line of battle was formed, toward sunset." Is that correct?

Answer.—It is.

Question by Defendant.—You say that about five o'clock General Lovell made a circuitous detour to the right. Was not that detour made by him for the purpose of attacking a work advantageously which was on your front? and was not that work carried by Moore's Brigade?

Answer.—The detour was made for the purpose of taking the work but not the same one that was attacked by General Moore's Brigade, Moore's Brigade and the work attached being considerably to the left of Lovell's Division, after the detour spoken of.

Question by Defendant.—You say that a little before sundown, on Friday, the Division of General Lovell advanced and occupied the line of encampments of the enemy behind three redoubts which had been abandoned by the enemy? Do you know what had transpired in General Price's corps, on your left, between the hours of two o'clock P. M. and dark of that day?

Answer.—I know nothing of what transpired in General Price's corps, except in the Second Texas regiment of Moore's Brigade.

Question by Defendant.—You state that on the morning of the 4th you found a large force in your front—afterwards that you marched to the front in line of battle, until you came in sight of the work. When did the force leave your front?

Answer.—If so recorded in my testimony it was a mistake. The force was at the fortifications alluded to subsequently in my testimony.

Question by Defendant.—Were your pickets on the night of the

third in advance of your lines, far from the enemy's pickets? How would you propose to find the strength and position of the enemy on that night?

Answer.—I should think so from the fact that they were not disturbed during the night. Had I been in command I would have pushed a line of skirmishers up to the works of the enemy, supporting them with a reserve. It was a moonlight night.

Question by Defendant.—How could the enemy have been prevented, on Friday night, from reinforcing Corinth from the east and south?

Answer.—By attacking and driving them out of Corinth on Friday afternoon.

Question by Defendant.—Do you mean to say that you would have made a night attack on Friday?

Answer.—Not necessarily. I believe that the place could have been carried during the afternoon, and by eight o'clock P. M.

Question by Defendant.—In what way?

Answer.—The enemy's center was broken near the railroad. I saw it retiring in confusion, pursued simply by a line of skirmishers. If the whole of Lovell's Division had moved directly forward we could have entered pell-mell with them into town.

Question by Defendant.—When the enemy broke, as you say, and fled, why was the attack on the right not made? Is it usual for troops to wait for orders under such circumstances?

Answer.—I should think not, but the different Brigades were halted by General Lovell. Two of my regiments had to be called back—rather one regiment and a battalion, the officers having considered that they had full authority to pursue, and that they were being supported.

Question by Defendant.—That opportunity lost, could preparations be made to take the place by assault before dark?

Answer.—If the line had formed within an hour, and the advance made directly upon the center, I think the place would have fallen.

Question by Defendant.—Was there continuous fire on the center and left of our forces until nearly dark?

Answer.—Yes, continuous random firing, the enemy having rallied reformed at that point, as I believe, at the time, to cover their retreat.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know anything of the condi-

tion of things on our left; or the opposition made by the enemy in that quarter?

Answer.—I do not.

Question by Defendant.—You say that you saw the center of the enemy break; what was the amount of the force of the enemy's center?

Answer.—About five regiments which I saw. They were running in confusion, and passing helter skelter through a train of wagons, one or two of which were broken down, and the quartermaster of the train was shot by one of the skirmishers of our command, who failed to hear the order calling them in. I captured a team of mules from this train, and used it to bring off the "Lady Richardson," parrot gun captured.

Question by Defendant.—How far off were you from the inner entrenchments at this time?

Answer.—There was a line of redoubts with an abatis immediately to our right, and a little to the front. I think there were no guns in position in any of these redoubts at this time. The inner line to the right, where my Brigade was drawn up on the second morning, was to the right and front about one and a half miles. The works immediately in front I never saw.

Question by Defendant.—Whose were the troops that broke the center?

Answer.—General Lovell's, with the right of General Price's. I think it was Moore's Brigade.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Did you hear any heavy firing on the left, some distance off, after this? (2d.) Do you know what the force of the enemy was, at this time, in your front, or on your right and front?

Answer.—(1st.) I think I heard some artillery firing about that time to the left. (2d.) I do not know, except the five or six regiments which were flying from us. I cannot tell whether they were supported or not, the recalled regiments not having pushed the pursuit far enough to ascertain.

Question by Defendant.—If you had advanced in pursuit of the enemy at this point, and been checked, and a column had deployed on your right, what would have been the consequence? (2d.) Do you know that there was no force of the enemy on your right?

Answer.—I was fully satisfied at the time that the entire left of the enemy was falling back, their whole movement indicating it.

Question by Defendant.—What do you consider was the force of the enemy in Corinth at the time the attack was made?

Answer.—I should think there were about fifteen thousand men; it is only a conjecture on my part.

Question by Defendant.—How far to the left of Corinth did the enemy's line of battle extend?

Answer.—I had no means of ascertaining, and don't know.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether or not the force you saw the next morning in the entrenchments, were there at this time?

Answer.—I am not positive; it is only surmise that they were not.

Question by Defendant.—Did you suppose that with a force of fifteen thousand men the enemy's center would consist of only five regiments?

Answer.—I did not see the whole of the enemy's center. In speaking of five regiments, I alluded to those immediately in front of my own Brigade.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Do you know whether the sketch in possession of General Lovell was intended to represent anything more than the locality of the works and not the number of guns? (2d.) Where is that sketch?

Answer.—The sketch in possession of General Lovell was a very rough one, and very much defaced, and only intended to show the supposed location of the works. I do not know where it is. It remained in his possession.

Question by Defendant.—The first specification of the first charge states that the enemy was strongly fortified, and in formidable numbers, fully prepared for a stubborn resistance, and that the attack was made without due consideration or forethought. As you state, Corinth might have been taken in the evening of the 3d; did you, at this time, change your opinion?

Answer.—I have not changed my opinion. It appeared to me that provision should have been made, and a distinct understanding in case our impetuous attack on the advance works was successful, in what manner it was to be followed up.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know that no such orders were given by General Van Dorn?

Answer.—I do not, but am satisfied that the mode in which the attempt was followed up, was not the result of proper reflection.

Question by Defendant.—Do you mean here to say the mode of the attack was followed up in the Division or Brigade to which you belonged, or to the whole army?

Answer.—In the Division to which I belonged, General Lovell appeared to me to be very undecided, and seemed to be waiting orders.

[Court cleared by request of General Maury, and determined to confine the questions and testimony more closely to the subject.]

Question by Defendant.—Was your Brigade put on duty as rear guard by order of General Lovell, or Van Dorn? and who kept them there forty-three hours?

Answer.—They were first put on duty with Lovell's whole division and subsequently detached by General Lovell. He refused three times to relieve me, and I subsequently appealed to General Van Dorn, who then relieved me.

Question by Defendant.—Did General Van Dorn go from Ripley to Hickory Flat, on the road taken by your division, or on that taken by General Price?

Answer.—On the road taken by General Price.

Question by Defendant.—Did you hear anything of orders having been given by me for your division to encamp between Orizava and Hickory Flat?

Answer.—The orders received from General Lovell were to go via New Albany to Hickory Flat, and that he had orders from General Van Dorn to camp about twelve miles from their position near Ripley. I think Orizava is the point he intended to reach; though I did not know it by that name.

Question by Defendant.—What part of this march do you consider as reflecting upon General Van Dorn's treatment of officers and soldiers?

Answer.—The useless delay of Lovell's division in front of Ripley when we were all without rations. The marching and counter marching of the trains through Ripley, by which they were delayed so long, that many of the men in the division failed to procure rations that night. I am unable to say from whom these orders emanated. The subsequent suffering of my Brigade resulted from want of knowledge of the route by General Lovell.

Question by Defendant.—Were you in a position to know the reasons for the movements of the trains, or even of your division? Do you not think that General Van Dorn may have had sources of

information that would cause the changes you refer to in regard to the trains?

Answer.—(1st.) I was in a position to know. The cavalry, I would state, who were covering our left and rear, reported directly to the Division.

(2d.) I think not.

Question by Defendant.—Did you hear when you were near Ripley that the enemy had appeared to the east of Ripley, and that their advance was then about seven miles off?

Answer.—I did. Heard it from General Van Dorn's headquarters, first about four o'clock in the evening, and when the column was about three miles from Ripley. I had heard a rumor before that but did not credit it.

Question by Defendant.—You state that on the first occasion of going out from the camp seven miles north of Ripley, that General Lovell said it was a stampede. Afterwards three miles north of Ripley, you formed line of battle again; and received word from Colonel Jackson that the enemy were advancing on all the roads, was this the same day?

Answer.—It was.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Were any rations due your men when you arrived at Holly Springs?

(2d.) When was the first issued you according to your returns?

(3d.) When did you first draw rations after reaching Holly Springs?

(4th.) Did you get all the parts of the rations at any time before this, except bread or flour?

(5th.) What were the means at the disposal of General Van Dorn for getting rations?

Answer.—(1st.) About three or four days.

(2d.) I cannot remember, about the 12th according to back returns on the 10th. My requisition was made on the 12th. The former rations expired on the 10th.

(3d and 4th.) The first bread rations were issued on the 15th or 16th. The men had beef, and the small rations.

(5th.) He had a railroad for their transportation. I had bought quantities of flour, sufficient for twelve regiments, at Davis' mills, for ten days. The railroad connection was complete at Davis' mills, when we arrived at Holly Springs. If the mill had been run to its full capacity and the flour brought down, I think

it would have been sufficient for the command for a day or two; at least local mills in the neighborhood could have furnished corn meal.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know that they could? Do you know whether or not any effort was made to get meal from the neighboring mills?

Answer.—Yes. Lumpkin's mill could have furnished it, and others, if they had been set to work prior to our arrival. An effort was made by the whole Commissary Department on our arrival, but the supply was not adequate, and two or three days coming in.

Question by Defendant.—Did you get any rations for your command from the Commissary Department, on the road from Corinth to Holly Springs—if so, how much?

Answer.—I borrowed six beeves and eleven barrels of flour from General Rust. I got none from the Commissary, but he offered to issue me beef at Hickory Flat.

Question by Defendant.—Do you remember anything of a train of provisions having arrived at Ripley from Holly Springs?

Answer.—No; but they may have arrived, and my Commissary received some provisions.

Question by Defendant.—Did you see General Van Dorn often, on the march from Davis' mill to Corinth, and from Corinth to Holly Springs—if so, did you see him at any time intoxicated, or otherwise not in a condition to discharge the duties of a commanding General?

Answer.—I saw General Van Dorn repeatedly on the march to Corinth, and two or three times during the retreat. He was perfectly sober, and was, so far as I could judge, active and energetic in discharging his duties as commanding officer.

CROSS EXAMINATION FINISHED.

Question by the Court.—How far from the forks of the Rocky Ford road, and Tippah Crossing road, on the Rocky Ford road, did General Price's command proceed?

Answer.—I do not know that they proceeded over two miles.

Question by the Court.—Did the troops on any two consecutive days from the 5th to the 9th inclusive, make what could be called a long march?

Answer.—Yes.

Question by the Court.—State the length of the march on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th days?

Answer.—On the 4th to Chewalla eight miles; on the 5th eighteen or twenty; on the 6th eight miles; on the 7th Lovell's Division marched about twenty-two miles; on the 8th twenty miles; and on the 9th about ten or twelve miles, not over.

Question by the Court.—At the camp south of Ripley, when you left at one o'clock in the morning, had your men supped the night before?

Answer.—They had.

Question by Defendant.—Had they breakfasted the same morning?

Answer.—They had not.

The Court adjourned at four o'clock P. M., to meet again Tuesday, 18th November, at nine o'clock.

Tuesday, November 18th, 1862.

The Court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present—Maj.-Gen. S. Price, P. A. C. S., Maj.-Gen. D. H. Maury, P. A. C. S., Brig.-Gen. L. Tilghman, P. A. C. S., Capt. E. Cummins, P. A. C. S.

Brigadier-General M. E. GREENE sworn.

Question by Recorder.—Were your supplies of commissary stores insufficient when you marched to the attack of Corinth?

Answer.—We were never out of supplies. Sometimes we were not as well supplied as we desired to be. There was some complaint among the men that they did not get enough.

Question by Recorder.—Were your troops marched in a hasty and disorderly manner?

Answer.—They were marched fast. I think generally in pretty good order.

Question by Recorder.—Was it obvious to your mind that the attack should have been continued Friday evening, or that success was prevented by waiting until next morning?

Answer.—My opinion at the time was that so far as my Brigade was concerned I could have gone into the town. There was nothing in the way. This was half an hour before sunset.

Question by Recorder.—Could General Van Dorn have pre-

vented the enemy from reinforcing himself during the succeeding night?

Answer.—I do not see how he could have prevented it, unless by the cavalry.

Question by Recorder.—Could you tell by the noise of the wagons and artillery carriages, whether the enemy was reinforcing or evacuating?

Answer.—I could not. I did not think they were evacuating. What made me doubt they were evacuating, was the chopping of timber. There was a difference of opinion among the officers with whom I discussed the matter. I also doubted they were evacuating, because I heard the cars coming in twice, and a shout on their arrival.

Question by Recorder.—Are you aware of any circuitous or unnecessary marching on the return from Corinth? Were any of your troops starving?

Answer.—The route, I believe, was circuitous. There was no counter-marching but once that I remember. I do not, of course, refer to the counter-marching at Hatchie Bridge, which I consider to have been necessary. None of my troops were starving; they were hard run for bread, and had it not been for potatoes, we would have been badly off.

Question by Recorder.—Did your troops, after reaching Lumpkin's mill, suffer by reason of the non-issue of breadstuffs?

Answer.—I don't think there was any suffering. I think there was some scarcity, but with the potatoes there was no suffering.

CROSS EXAMINED BY DEFENDANT.

Question by Defendant.—Did you see the defenses immediately around the town of Corinth in the evening of the 3d? If so, were they manned? and did they mount guns?

Answer.—On my right I did not see them; immediately in my front I saw no obstacle; on the left I saw fortifications and guns mounted, and they were manned. But on going in, in the morning, there were fortifications immediately before me; whether they were there in the evening, or built in the night, I do not know.

Question by Defense.—Do you remember having received rations at Ripley on the return from Corinth?

Answer.—Yes, I received some there.

Question by Defense.—State the character of the fortifications assailed by your command on the morning of the 4th.

Answer.—On the 3d I commanded only my Brigade. On the 4th I commanded a Division. The fortifications in front of my Brigade were not very heavy, nor very strongly manned; those in front of the 1st and 4th Brigades were very strong and heavily manned. There seemed to be two or three ranks of infantry behind—the artillery very thick; I did not count them; there were about, some said, seventy-five pieces. These fortifications had been much improved during the night.

Question of Defense.—Did you see General Van Dorn often on the march to Corinth, and on the return to Holly Springs? If so, did you, at any time, see him intoxicated, or in any way incapacitated for the discharge of his duties as commanding General?

Answer.—I did not see him very often, but when I did see him, I never saw him incapacitated in any way. During the time referred to, I saw General Van Dorn at least twice—once going into battle, and the second time when the retreat was ordered. On both these occasions he appeared as he always does. I never have seen General Van Dorn at all out of the way, at any time.

DR. T. D. WOOTEN being duly sworn, deposes as follows:

Question by Recorder.—Have you any knowledge of the facts alleged in the *third* specification, *second* charge? If so, state the facts.

Answer.—I have no knowledge of any of the facts alleged in the specifications.

Major-General STERLING PRICE being duly sworn, deposes as follows:

Question by Recorder.—Did General Van Dorn have in his possession, or make use of maps of the roads and localities about Corinth?

Answer.—He had in his possession one of the best maps I have ever seen made by any Engineer Officer. I gave it to him myself at Ripley before we went to Corinth; which map was taken from a Federal Engineer officer captured at Iuka.

Question by Recorder.—Did General Van Dorn avail himself of your engineer corps?

Answer.—I think he did. I think they were called upon and superintended the construction of the bridge near Pocahontas. My impression is they were ordered to report to General Van Dorn.

Question by Recorder.—Were your engineers acquainted with the localities about Corinth?

Answer.—Somewhat. I think so. One of them was in the service of General Beauregard at Corinth, in constructing roads, and must necessarily have been acquainted with the country.

Question by Recorder.—Was your supply of commissary stores insufficient when you marched to the attack?

Answer.—Yes, and I so informed General Van Dorn. General Van Dorn replied to me that he would spare me some rations on the way to Corinth, which he did. He also informed me that he would send to Holly Springs for an additional supply of rations, which he thought would reach Corinth nearly as soon as the army. He, at the same time, called upon me for all the wagons I could spare from my command, with a suitable officer to take charge of the train on that service. I think I turned over about fifty wagons from my command, and the officer, as directed. I further heard General Van Dorn give instructions to one of his officers to hire, for the same purpose, all the wagons that could be procured in the country. We met one train of those wagons, as I was informed, near the Hatchie Bridge, on the day after the last day's fight at Corinth, Sunday. When we reached Ripley, on the retreat, General Van Dorn informed me that there were forty wagons loaded with provisions at that place, and that he had given instructions to turn over half the provisions to my command, and the other half to General Lovell. I immediately sent my commissary to receive the rations turned over to my command, which he received. My army corps was about two-thirds of the whole army.

Question by Recorder.—Were your troops marched in a hasty or disorderly manner when going to Corinth?

Answer.—I thought not too much so. I am sure they were not marched in a disorderly manner, and I am sure not too rapidly, under the circumstances. I think there was no suffering among my troops on that account, notwithstanding they had been marched rapidly to and from Iuka. I did not think even under these circumstances that the march was too hasty.

Question by Recorder.—Was it obvious to your mind that the

attack should have been continued Friday afternoon, or that success was prevented by waiting until next morning?

Answer.—It was not obvious to my mind that the attack should have been continued on Friday afternoon. In attacking the outer fortifications, after a brisk march of eight miles that morning, my command had to charge through felled timber near a quarter of a mile in distance, in extremely warm weather; and after carrying those fortifications they pursued the enemy some half mile rapidly, and in following closely after my army, I came to many soldiers who had fallen with sunstroke and exhaustion. I halted my command, and had those exhausted soldiers cared for, and rested the army perhaps an hour. When General Van Dorn himself came up, we then continued the pursuit, and soon engaged the enemy. The battle continued until near sundown, the greater portion of which time the firing was terrific. My impression is that General Van Dorn consulted me after the firing had ceased, for we were together a great deal and consulted frequently during the battle. I know that it was my opinion that it would have been better to have continued the pursuit into the town on that night if General Lovell was ready to support me, but as that fact was not known it was prudent to delay the attack on the town until the succeeding morning. My army was then ordered to bivouac in their then position.

Question by Recorder.—Could General Van Dorn have prevented the enemy reinforcing that night?

Answer.—I think not.

Question by Recorder.—Could you tell by the noise of the wagons and artillery carriages whether the enemy was reinforcing or evacuating Corinth?

Answer.—I had a conversation with General Van Dorn on the subject that night, or early next morning, who was nearer the enemy that night than I was myself, and I think I learned from him that he had heard the noise of wheels of wagons, etc., during the night, and that it was his impression that they were evacuating Corinth. I do not think I heard this noise of the wagons myself.

Question by Recorder.—Are you aware of any circuitous or unnecessary marching on the retreat from Corinth?

Answer.—I do not know that there was any unnecessary, circuitous or any counter-marching of consequence in my command.

Question by Recorder.—Were any of your men starving at this time?

Answer.—I think not. Their rations had become perhaps scarcer than they would have been on account of the return of some of the provision wagons that had reached the neighborhood of Hatchie Bridge, and had heard that the enemy were between them and our army. In a word, I would say that I believe every necessary provision had been made to supply the men with rations, and I believe I know as much about it as anybody except General Van Dorn. I had heard his orders given, and thought them sufficient.

Question by Recorder.—Did your troops, after reaching Lumpkin's mill, suffer by reason of the non-issue of breadstuffs?

Answer.—I am not aware that they did.

Question by Recorder.—Have you any knowledge of the facts alleged in the third specification of the second charge?

Answer.—I know nothing about it, nor did I hear of it until I saw it in that specification.

Question by Defendant.—Did the troops in your command charge the enemy, and push forward at every opportunity as gallantly as our troops have ever done within your observation; or was any opportunity lost for gaining ground up to the halt and cessation of firing at sundown?

Answer.—The gallantry displayed by my troops on that occasion has never been surpassed in my observation, if it has been equaled, and they pushed forward with great eagerness, and encountered the enemy wherever he was found. No opportunity was lost for gaining ground I think until sundown, when the order was given to halt and bivouac for the night.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether or not the cessation of firing was by General Van Dorn's order, or by the circumstances of the battle, the enemy having retired within his inner entrenchments?

Answer.—It was not by General Van Dorn's order to me, but by the retiring of the enemy, and the late hour of the day.

Question by Defendant.—If it had been determined upon to attack the entrenchments of Corinth that evening, would the necessary preparations to do so have been taken until after dark?

Answer.—I should think so. It would have been necessary to

have brought General Lovell up in supporting distance, and some of my Brigades which were stationed along the railroad far to the left. It would have been necessary to have reformed the line before charging the inner works, which I think would have occupied more time than we would have had daylight.

Question by Defendant.—After taking the exterior works of the enemy, and resting your troops as stated by you, do you remember at what hour when your dispositions for renewing the attack were made your whole *line became engaged*; state also the character and length of that conflict?

Answer.—I do not recollect the hour of the day. I paid but little attention to that, but I should think it was between two and three o'clock probably, and that the engagement must have lasted between two and three hours, sometimes with terrific firing along nearly the whole length of my line.

Question by Defendant.—If two hours more of daylight had been given us what do you think would have been the result of the contest?

Answer.—That I cannot tell. My impression is, that with a cordial support from General Lovell's command we would have carried their works and held them.

Question by Defendant.—If you saw General Van Dorn on the battle-field of Corinth on the 3d and 4th of October, and on the 5th at the Hatchie, state what was his condition as to sobriety, or fitness to discharge his duties as commanding General. State also his condition as to sobriety and capacity in moving on Corinth and returning from it.

Answer.—I was with General Van Dorn a great deal, both in the advance upon, and returning from Corinth, and during the battle, and I have never seen him, either then or at any other time when I thought he was at all intoxicated; and will state farther, that he conducted himself during the entire engagement with coolness and determination; and I recollect no difference of opinion between us in the management of the fight; the only difference of opinion was in the movement upon Corinth, before receiving the reinforcements from Jackson.

Question by Defendant.—When did you first become acquainted with General Van Dorn? how long have you served with him? do you know him to be an intemperate man within the time?

Answer.—I first became acquainted with General Van Dorn a

few days before the battle of Elkhorn, about the 1st of March, 1862; and as I stated before, I don't think I have ever seen him at all intoxicated. I have served with him the greater portion of the time since I made his acquaintance.

Major-General D. H. MAURY, duly sworn, commanding 1st Division, Army of the West.

Question by Recorder.—Did General Van Dorn have a map or maps in his possession on the march to Corinth? was it a proper map for military purposes?

Answer.—I saw at Ripley in General Van Dorn's possession, two maps, I think of the region of country embracing Corinth, and the roads and approaches and watercourses, which had reference to our military operations, proposed and present; one of these maps was the most minute and detailed map I have ever seen. It was prepared by Federal officers, and I understand it was taken from the enemy at Iuka. The other map was a carefully and neatly prepared manuscript map, which I understand was prepared by the Engineer officers of General Price's command, and had reference to the same region of country; these are all the maps of which I have any knowledge, and I saw them at Ripley, previous to our advance on Corinth, in his possession.

Question by Recorder.—Where did you encamp when you came with the Army of the West to Corinth, last spring? Did General Van Dorn then have an opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with the ground on which the attack was made?

Answer.—General Van Dorn's headquarters were first established between the Charleston and Memphis Railroad and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, north of the Charleston and Memphis Railroad, and west of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and within two hundred paces of where he made his headquarters late in the evening of Friday, October 3d. His headquarters were there I think about a week, and during that time General Van Dorn was much occupied in making himself acquainted with the locality and with the approaches and defenses of Corinth. The road by which I went to Corinth on the morning of the 4th, with a portion of my troops, was laid out and cut out in April last, under the personal superintendence of General Van Dorn.

Question by Recorder.—Were your troops marched in a hasty or disorderly manner, on the advance to Corinth?

Answer.—No. I think we marched about ten or twelve miles a day, and there was no more haste, and perhaps better order than was usual in my Division in marches.

Question by Recorder.—Was it obvious to your mind that the attack should have been continued Friday afternoon, or that success was prevented by waiting until next morning?

Answer.—I did not think the attack should have been continued any longer than it was Friday afternoon, nor did I think that success was prevented by waiting until next morning.

Question by Recorder.—Could General Van Dorn have prevented the enemy reinforcing himself the night of the 3d?

Answer.—So far as I understood his resources for so doing, I don't think he could.

Question by Recorder.—Could you tell by the noise of the wagons and artillery carriages whether the enemy was reinforcing or evacuating?

Answer.—No, I could not. I heard a confused rumbling of wheels in Corinth during the large portion of the night.

Question by Recorder.—Do you know that the enemy reinforced at all?

Answer.—I do not.

Question by Recorder.—Are you aware of any circuitous or unnecessary marching on the return from Corinth?

Answer.—No, except after we left Ripley and bivouacked on a creek four miles from there. I was ordered to move my Division back towards Ripley, to support General Lovell's corps, as I understood, which was reported to be threatened by an attack of the enemy. The head of the Division had advanced about two miles I think, not more certainly, when I received orders to return to the place where we had been bivouacking. I had no means of determining whether the move was necessary or unnecessary. I received orders and obeyed them; and again the night we crossed the Tippah, the Division, and I believe General Price's Corps made a much longer march than usual, in consequence, as I understood at the time, of a bridge having been burned on our direct route the night before. That march was about sixteen or eighteen miles I think, and we made it on the evening of the 9th of October.

Question by Recorder.—Were your men starving at any time during the retreat?

Answer.—No; there was more irregularity in the issue of supplies than at ordinary times. If the subordinate officers had attended to their duty, respecting issues of supplies and cooking, there was no reason why the men should be suffering for supplies, for we had access to our supply train, on the 6th, the day before we passed through Ripley in retreat, and I understand in camp that evening that sufficient supplies were drawn by the troops; I refer in all this to my own Division.

Question by Recorder.—Did your troops after reaching Lumkin's mill suffer by reason of the non-issue of breadstuffs?

Answer.—I don't think they suffered when they first arrived there; I remember reports being made to me that breadstuffs were not at hand, but I think that a sufficient quantity of sweet potatoes was secured by the Commissary to meet their immediate wants, and in the course of the day the breadstuffs were issued as usual.

Question by Recorder.—Have you any knowledge of the alleged facts in the third specification of the second charge?

Answer.—None. I do not recollect to have heard of anything of the kind, until I heard that charges and specifications had been preferred against General Van Dorn on account of it. I know nothing of the charge or specification.

Question by Defendant.—Your Division was immediately in front of the town of Corinth; how far during the night of the 3d were your pickets from the enemy's line of sharpshooters?

Answer.—Within gunshot I understood, probably not a hundred paces apart.

Question by Defendant.—In what way could a reconnaissance of the interior defenses of Corinth have been made on the night of the 3d?

Answer.—It was not possible to make one.

Question by Defendant.—Can you explain the marching and countermarching of General Price's corps near Hickory Flat, about where the Rocky Ford road leaves the Holly Springs road?

Answer.—General Price's army corps moved off to the left on the Rocky Ford road from the Holly Springs road in order to encamp upon good water, about three-fourths of a mile, perhaps a mile, moved back next day to get on the Holly Springs road. On the day we marched off the road my Division did not march more than five miles altogether.

Question by Defendant.—State what was the condition of General Van Dorn on the battle-fields of the 3d, 4th and 5th, as to sobriety? state your opportunities of judging and also how long you have known General Van Dorn, and what were his habits as to sobriety since you have known him?

Answer.—General Van Dorn was entirely free from any perceptible influence of liquor during the whole of the 3d, 4th and 5th. I saw him repeatedly during all of those days; I was constantly with him, that is near him and in communication with him from daylight on the morning of the 3d, until daylight on the morning of the 4th, and saw him several times and was with him a good deal on the 5th. I think I first made his acquaintance in Monterey, in September, 1846. Early in February last I joined his military family as Chief of his Staff and continued in constant association with him in that capacity until June, when he left this Army in Pineville to go to Vicksburg, and I feel sure that he is not unduly addicted to the use of liquor.

The Court adjourned at 4 o'clock P. M., to meet at nine o'clock on the 19th.

Wednesday, 10 o'clock, Nov. 19th, 1862.

The Court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present—Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price, Maj.-Gen. D. H. Maury, Brig.-Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, Capt. E. H. Cummins, Recorder.

Major-General Earl Van Dorn.

Colonel Robertson, commanding 35th Alabama Regiment, having been summoned as a witness for the defense, was reported absent on furlough of thirty days, by the Adjutant of his Regiment.

Lieutenant L. B. HUTCHINSON, 1st Missouri Regiment, was duly sworn.

Question by Recorder.—Do you know that any wounded soldiers were detained one or more nights at Water Valley?

Answer.—I do.

Question by Recorder.—Can you state when this occurred?

Answer.—The Saturday night after we arrived at Holly Springs.

Question by Recorder.—Where is Water Valley?

Answer.—Somewhere between Oxford and Coffeeville.

Question by Recorder.—Were these soldiers from the battlefield at or near Corinth?

Answer.—Those I conversed with said they were.

Question by Recorder.—How many trains were there?

Answer.—One that I saw.

Question by Recorder.—Were their wounds undressed?

Answer.—I am not certain, but think they were.

Question by Recorder.—Were they crowded in the cars, that is were they uncomfortably crowded?

Answer.—I think not.

Question by Recorder.—Were they without blankets?

Answer.—Most of them were.

Question by Recorder.—And without nourishment?

Answer.—They complained that they had nothing to eat.

Question by Recorder.—Did they state how long since they had food nourishment?

Answer.—They said they had nothing since they left the hospital. I don't know when that was.

Question by Recorder.—Were they not in charge of an officer?

Answer.—Captain Kennedy and myself looked for an officer and could find none.

Question by Recorder.—Of whom did you inquire for an officer?

Answer.—We inquired of the wounded men themselves, and one or two railroad men, who replied that they knew of no one being in charge.

Question by Recorder.—Was there any nurse or any other attendant with them, or a surgeon?

Answer.—None that we could find.

Question by Recorder.—Did you ascertain who ordered them in the cars? Did you inquire?

Answer.—I did not ascertain. Something was said about their having been put aboard at Holly Spring.

CROSS EXAMINATION.

Questions by Defendant.—(1.) How came you to be at Water Valley?

(2.) Do you know by whose orders the wounded were sent to the cars?

(3.) Where was General Van Dorn when the wounded left Holly Springs?

(4.) Do you know that no one was in charge of the wounded soldiers referred to?

(5.) By whose orders did they continue on the route next day?

Answers.—(1.) I was on my way to Coffeeville with my brother, who was sick, taking him to Coffeeville under orders from General Bowen.

(2.) No, I do not.

(3.) I do not know.

(4.) Only from what I heard from them and other men.

(5.) I do not know. I only know the train passed Coffeeville the next morning.

Questions by Defendant.—(1.) How many cars were there?

(2.) Did you go through all of them to find an officer?

(3.) What time of night was it that you hunted or inquired for an officer?

(4.) Were persons asleep in the cars at that time?

Answers.—(1.) I do not know how many cars were in the train.

(2.) No, I did not go through all; I went through about five.

(3.) Some time between ten and eleven o'clock.

(4.) I saw no one asleep.

Question by Defendant.—Did you inquire of the *conductor* of the train whether there was an officer in charge of the wounded?

Answer.—I could not find the conductor.

Question by Defendant.—At what hour did the train start from Holly Springs?

Answer.—I do not know; it was ahead of us, and we started at eight in the evening.

Question by the Court.—Did you examine the wounds to see if they were dressed or not?

Answer.—I examined one man's wound (he was wounded in both legs), that had not been dressed.

General Rust was recalled for the prosecution.

Question by Recorder.—State any additional particulars bearing on, or corroborative of, your evidence.

Answer.—I wish my testimony in regard to the wounded to refer to their condition up to the time of their leaving Holly

Springs, having heard and knowing nothing of their treatment after leaving Holly Springs. With regard to the subsistence with which I was supplied on the retreat at Mr. Cooper's, the second camping place this side of Ripley, I was applied to by the Commissary of General Villepigue, first for rations or subsistence. I replied, I would divide so long as I could do so without disfurnishing my two troops. Whereupon the Commissary loaned General Villepigue nine head of beef cattle, ten sacks of meal, three barrels of flour, and thirty-one pounds of salt. At the same place loaned to General Bowen eleven barrels of flour, one hundred pounds of salt, and calling upon my Commissary for information upon these points, he exhibited the receipts for those articles.

Colonel ROBERT LOURY, 6th Mississippi, sworn.

Question by Recorder.—Were your supplies of commissary stores insufficient when you marched to Corinth, or on the retreat?

Answer.—Yes, they were insufficient. On our arrival at Corinth at the close of the first day's fight, our commissary stores were exhausted, and on the retreat we had a very limited supply, and a portion of the time we were without any. I remember that at one time beef was given to me without any bread or salt, and I did not kill it; after consultation with my men I drove it on.

Question by Recorder.—On your march to Corinth were your troops marched in a hasty or disorderly manner?

Answer.—No; they were marched as troops would generally be. There was no disorder in our Division.

Question by Recorder.—Are you aware of any circuitous or unnecessary marching on the return from Corinth?

Answer.—I think there was some unnecessary marching. We went considerably out of the way on this side of Ripley. My brother, who was with me, and who was acquainted with the country, called my attention to the fact that several miles might have been saved. I do not remember any other instance.

Question by Recorder.—After encamping near Holly Springs, did your troops suffer by reason of the non-issue of breadstuffs?

Answer.—After getting encamped at Cold Water, a few miles from Holly Springs, we were without rations, I think for two days. We then had for one day, I think, bread, and the next meat. I do not remember which we got first, but we did not have both together. During this time I sent out my wagons and purchased

some forty or fifty bushels of potatoes, which the officers purchased themselves. I think afterwards this was done again, and the men were thus subsisted. I made several appeals to the General commanding my Brigade. I may be incorrect as to the time. There may be some slight inaccuracy, but very little.

Question by Recorder.—Do you know that any wounded soldiers were detained one or more nights at Water Valley?

Answer.—I do not.

CROSS EXAMINED.

Question by Defendant.—You say at the close of the first day's fight at Corinth, your commissary stores gave out. Where were the commissary stores at that time? Were you ordered at Davis' Bridge to cook rations for three days?

Answers.—(1.) I am not able to say.

(2.) That is my recollection.

Question by Defendant.—How many days' rations did your regiment have when you started from Ripley?

Answer.—I do not recollect.

Question by Defendant.—Why did your troops have no provisions when the attack was made on Corinth?

Answer.—We had rations until the close of the first day's fight. I am not prepared to say.

Question by Defendant.—You say on the retreat that some miles might have been saved. Do you know why the Brigade or Division to which you belong was marched on the road you did take?

Answer.—I do not know the reason; we were ordered on that road.

Captain L. H. KENNEDY, First Missouri regiment, was duly sworn.

Question by Recorder.—Do you know that any wounded soldiers were detained one or more nights at Water Valley?

Answer.—Yes.

Question by Recorder.—When and how long were they detained?

Answer.—A day or two after the arrival of the army at Holly Springs; they were detained from about ten o'clock at night un-

til about eight o'clock next morning, at which time we passed Coffeetown.

Question by Recorder.—Were their wounds undressed?

Answer.—I cannot say.

Question by Recorder.—Were they without blankets?

Answer.—Many of them were.

Question by Recorder.—Were they crowded on the cars?

Answer.—They were crowded, but not uncomfortably crowded.

Question by Recorder.—Were they without food or nourishment?

Answer.—Several of them informed me that they were without provisions.

Question by Recorder.—Where were they going?

Answer.—They did not know. I endeavored to ascertain that fact, but no one could tell me.

Question by Recorder.—Was there no surgeon, officer, nurse, or attendant with them?

Answer.—They so stated to me; the wounded men so stated.

Question by Recorder.—Do you know by whose order they were placed upon the train?

Answer.—I do not.

Question by Recorder.—Do you know why they were detained, or by whose order?

Answer.—I was informed by the wounded men that the conductor refused to go any farther that night.

Question by Recorder.—Did you inquire of the conductor why he did not go on?

Answer.—I did not; I went to look for him but could not find him.

The testimony for the prosecution closed.

TESTIMONY FOR THE DEFENSE.

Major-General STERLING PRICE called.

Question by Defendant.—(1.) If Corinth had been carried do you think that the present base of operations of the enemy would be theirs or ours?

(2.) Would the fall of Corinth have tended to the result of freeing West Tennessee from the occupation of the enemy?

Answer.—(1.) I do not entertain a doubt but that it would have been ours.

(2.) I think it would for the time being.

Question by Defendant.—Assuming that General Bragg, with a force inferior to the enemy in his front, should be compelled to fall back into Tennessee, the west part of which being then in the occupation of the enemy, with a garrison at Nashville (small), in Middle Tennessee, if Corinth had been carried do you think the situation of affairs would have enabled the armies of General Bragg and this to have united or cooperated in such a way as to have held the State of Tennessee at least for several months?

Answer.—I think it more than likely that it would have enabled us to have held Tennessee.

Question by Defendant.—Pointing to the present base of operations of the enemy, with the Mississippi River to Memphis, the Tennessee River to Florence, the Railroad to Corinth, the Railroad to Grand Junction, and the Railroad from Memphis to Corinth and Florence, and the advantage of such a base to them, do you think the advantages that would have been given to our cause by the taking of Corinth warranted more than the usual hazard of battle?

Answer.—Yes, I think it warranted more than the usual hazard of battle, yet I was of the opinion that the hazard would have been much less to have delayed the attack a few days, and to have received the reinforcements which I supposed to be then being fitted out at Jackson.

Question by Defendant.—Was there, when we formed our junction at Ripley, any certainty as to *when* the returned prisoners would be ready to take the field? I allude to those then being fitted at Jackson.

Answer.—I do not know that there was any certainty as to the precise time they would reach us, but I understand from General Van Dorn that he ordered that the troops should be forwarded as rapidly as they could be organized into regiments, and I know that arms had been furnished them, hence I could not see any good reason for much delay.

Question by Defendant.—What number of returned prisoners did this army receive, and when were they received, and when were they ready for the field?

Answer.—I do not know exactly; I think between 7,000 and

8,000. I know that I had furnished over 8,000 arms for them myself, or that my ordnance officer so reported to me. I think it was the impression of General Van Dorn at the time, that with Waul's Legion, together with the returned prisoners, he would receive between 12,000 and 15,000. I do not know, but I think the army found them at Holly Springs on our return from Corinth. I do not know when they were organized, but in an emergency I should have considered them ready for the field when they got guns in their hands. I presume they were organized into regiments before they got to Holly Springs. I do not know what were their means of transportation.

Question by Defendant.—In favoring the policy of delay for a time before making the attack on Corinth, did you suppose the enemy would be less reinforced or strengthened in the interval than we?

Answer.—I was of that opinion.

Question by Defendant.—Did you hear from any source that the enemy were strengthening their works, or that they were getting accessions to their ranks?

Answer.—I learned from scouts that they had been a short time previous strengthening their works, and that they had been sending off their old and drilled troops and receiving new levies in their stead. The receiving of new troops and sending off the old ones, I did not believe after my march upon Iuka, but that the scouts had been deceived by the frequent movements of their troops from point to point in the vicinity of Corinth.

Question by Defendant.—When you heard of the doubtful position of Bragg in Kentucky, or rather the uncertainty of his being able to hold Kentucky on account of the great numbers of the enemy in his front, were you impressed with the importance of this army doing something immediately to aid him?

Answer.—I thought it important that we should, as soon as we could with safety to our army, move forward through West Tennessee and reinforce General Bragg, and that we should be watchful that the enemy were not reinforced by the command of Rosecrans.

Question by Defendant.—Was the attack on Corinth a subject of correspondence between yourself and General Van Dorn before we met at Ripley? If so, how long before?

Answer.—It was a subject of correspondence between us some

several weeks before our junction at Ripley. I do not recollect the precise length of time.

Question by Defendant.—Was the army (as far as you saw them) in fine spirits on the evening of the 3d October at Corinth?

Answer.—Yes.

Question by Defendant.—If Corinth had been carried, and in consequence West Tennessee freed, would not the efforts of the enemy to dislodge our army have prolonged the contest until late in the season, when military movements are difficult?

Answer.—I have no doubt of it.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know of any opposition among the officers of your corps to attack Corinth?

Answer.—None had expressed themselves opposed to it to me.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know of any neglect on the part of General Van Dorn to perform the duties devolving upon him as commander of the army in the expedition to Corinth, and on the retreat?

Answer.—I do not. I think he displayed great energy and activity.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether or not General Bragg had been deceived as to the strength of the enemy in West Tennessee, or that he had calculated upon this army joining him in Kentucky, or of cooperating with him from West Tennessee?

Answer.—Judging from his telegraphic despatches and letters which I have received from him, he must have been greatly deceived as regards the strength of the enemy in North Mississippi and West Tennessee, and that he expected a movement of my troops earlier than my movement on Iuka. One of his telegraphic despatches stated that Rosecrans had arrived at Nashville with a large portion of his forces, and was in a council of war on a few evenings prior to his sending the despatch, and that despatch I received at Iuka about the time I was fighting Rosecrans and the whole of his army, I think not less than twenty-eight thousand strong.

Question by Defendant.—Did the troops under your command carry the interior works of Corinth on the morning of the 4th, and enter the town of Corinth?

Answer.—They did.

Major-General D. H. MAURY for the defense.

Question by Defendant.—Were you chief of Staff of General Van Dorn during the whole time that the Army of the West under his command was at Corinth, before its evacuation by General Beauregard? If so, will you state your opinion as to General Van Dorn's knowledge of the country around Corinth topographically?

Answer.—I was chief of his Staff during the whole of that time, and General Van Dorn was occupied from the time he first came to Corinth in April until he left it about the first of June. A great deal in making himself acquainted by personal reconnaissance, and by maps, and by interrogating guides and scouts, and the people who lived in the vicinity, with all of the surroundings of Corinth, bearing upon its military defense or attack, and topography. My belief is and was, that he was as well informed about the topography of Corinth and its vicinity, as any other one officer who was there. I frequently saw him making maps, and accompanied him in reconnaissances. He made many reconnaissances upon which my other duties did not permit me to accompany him.

Question by Defendant.—Did the troops of your command carry the interior works of Corinth and enter the town of Corinth on the 4th October last?

Answer.—General Moore took his brigade right into the main part of the town of Corinth, capturing a battery of Light Artillery near where he crossed the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, taking possession of the Tishamingo Hotel, and the buildings about the railroad depot, and a part of his brigade including the Second Texas regiment led by Colonel Rogers entered the innermost works of Corinth, in which Colonel Rogers and many other officers of the Division were left killed or wounded. Phifer's and Cabell's Brigades entered the town farther to the left than Moore's did, and passed into the innermost works of Corinth, capturing them and driving the enemy from their guns. Many of the officers were left dead and wounded on these works. Colonels Johnson and Daily of Arkansas were among them.

Question by Defendant.—You have known General Van Dorn you have said since the army was in the city of Monterey, in Mexico, in 1846; do you know or have you ever heard of anything in the character of General Van Dorn to warrant the sup-

position or belief that he would be cruel or inhuman in his treatment to the soldiers under his command?

Answer.—On the contrary; I do not believe from all I have heard of General Van Dorn or known of him, that he could be capable of cruelty or inhumanity, or intentional injustice to any one.

Major EDWARD DILLEN, Chief Commissary of the Army of West Tennessee, commanded by General Van Dorn, was duly sworn.

Question by Defendant.—What supplies were carried by the troops from Davis' mills, near Grand Junction, when they marched to Ripley *en route* to Corinth?

Answer.—Fifteen days' supplies were taken from Davis' mills.

Question by Defendant.—What dispositions were made at Ripley to supply the army with rations after the fifteen days' rations should be exhausted?

Answer.—On the 28th September, I think the day before we left Ripley, General Van Dorn directed me to order 400,000 rations of breadstuffs and salt, and 92,000 rations of salt meat, to be forwarded from Holly Springs immediately, there being already a sufficient quantity, say 1,000 head of beef cattle, within reach of the army. On the morning that we left Ripley, a number of wagons, I think seventy-four or seventy-five, were sent to Holly Springs to transport these rations, provided the Commissary at Holly Springs did not send them by hired wagons, which he was directed to do, when he received the order to forward these rations, and those other wagons were sent in order to prevent the possibility of failure.

Question by Defendant.—Can you state when the rations of the two corps of the army should have been exhausted?

Answer.—The rations of General Lovell's army corps should have been exhausted on the 9th October. Those of General Price's army corps on the 3d or 4th October (the 4th I think), exclusive of the rations that had been sent for.

Question by Defendant.—When the time arrived was the army resupplied with rations, and if so, to what period?

Answer.—When the army arrived at Tuscumbia bridge on its retreat from Corinth, some of the Brigades of General Price's army corps drew from a train which we met there, for two days'

rations. On the 7th and 8th October, three days' rations of breadstuffs and of salt and beef were issued to the whole army, except General Bowen's command, which was already rationed to include the 9th. He did not call for any. The rations were there. He could have had them if he needed them. This was at Ripley.

Question by Defendant.—If Corinth had been carried how long would it have taken to bring up rations from the depot on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad?

Answer.—About three days.

Question by Defendant.—Would the rations from Holly Springs have arrived in time to supply the army at Corinth until the rations from the depot could be brought up?

Answer.—Yes, I think they would. I think that the trains we met at Ripley on the 8th would have been in Corinth on the 5th or 6th October had they not been turned back through fear of the enemy then advancing towards Davis' bridge.

Question by Defendant.—Will you state what orders were given to supply the army with subsistence upon its arrival at Holly Springs after the repulse at Corinth?

Answer.—While at Ripley on our return from Corinth, the Commissary at Jackson was directed to send 100,000 rations to Oxford and 100,000 to Holly Springs, a portion of the latter were at Holly Springs when the army arrived there; and 50,000 rations were at Oxford several days before the army arrived at Holly Springs, but did not reach Holly Springs for several days in consequence of want of railroad transportation.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know why these arrangements in regard to breadstuffs failed for a few days?

Answer.—I don't think there was any failure, that is, I think the army was supplied with rations after arriving at Holly Springs, and from 24th September to 15th October, nearly 100,000 rations more were issued by me, than they were entitled to for this time. I mean transferred in bulk to Brigade Commissaries.

Question by Defendant.—Can you exhibit returns to show this?

Answer.—I can exhibit returns and receipts of Brigade Commissaries.

Question by Defendant.—Upon your arrival at Holly Springs what arrangements were made in the neighborhood for supplying

the army with breadstuffs, and were those arrangements made by my orders?

Answer.—I was directed by General Van Dorn to employ every mill in the neighborhood and make every exertion to procure fifteen days' rations for the army as quickly as possible. For a few days, I was only able to get enough to supply the daily consumption of the army, and in the course of a week or ten days to get three or four days in advance, but the milling capacity in that neighborhood was insufficient to do more than this.

Question by Defendant.—Did General Van Dorn upon his return to Holly Springs use all his authority in attempting to get up from the depots below, rations for the troops of his command?

Answer.—He did, and did supply the daily consumption of the army; but arrangements to accumulate a stock were broken into by General Pemberton, who took command in the meanwhile, and made his own arrangements, which were sufficient.

Question by Defendant.—Did you attempt to make a reconnaissance of the enemy's position at Corinth on the night of the 3d October last, by my orders? if so, how far did you go until you met with the enemy's line of sharpshooters?

Answer.—I did. I went within forty or fifty yards of the enemy's sharpshooters, near enough to see three of them distinctly. These men were about one hundred yards in front of General Moore's pickets, and near enough to Corinth for me to hear distinctly commands given by the enemy in the town, and to hear the rattling of wagons, the sound of axes, and the hum of voices about the town.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether or not General Van Dorn was acquainted with the country in the vicinity of Corinth?

Answer.—Yes. I believe he was very familiar with it. The spot on which he slept on Friday night, October 3d, was within fifty yards of where he had his headquarters when he went to Corinth last spring with the Army of the West, and I have ridden with him on several occasions to reconnoiter that country.

The Court adjourned at 4:30 P. M., to meet at nine o'clock A. M., on the 20th inst.

Thursday, November 20th, 1862.

The Court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present—Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price, P. A. C. S., Maj.-Gen. D. H. Maury, P. A. C. S., Brig.-Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, P. A. C. S., Capt. E. H. Cummins, Recorder, and Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn.

The reading of the proceedings was waived by the court.

Lieutenant THOMAS F. TOBIN, of Hoxton's battery, was duly sworn.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Were you engaged in the battle of Corinth? (2d.) If so, in what capacity, and in what division and corps?

Answer.—I was. I was commanding a battery in the artillery reserve of General Maury's division, commanded by Major Burnett, in General Price's corps.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Were you taken prisoner by the enemy? (2d.) If so, state on what day and hour, and (3d.) where were you taken? (4th.) Where were you ordered to report? (5th.) By whom, and (6th.) to whom?

Answer.—(1st.) I was. (2d.) On Saturday, October 4th, about four o'clock in the morning. (3d.) On the road that leads between Fort Williams and Fort Robinett. (4th.) I was ordered by General Stanley to report at some landing on the Tennessee River. I think it was Hamburg landing—to General Rosecrans, at sunset that evening.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) How far from Corinth was the point at which you were taken prisoner, and (2d.) under what circumstances were you taken?

Answer.—(1st.) Not over three-fourths of a mile from the depot. (2d.) I was ordered by Major Burnett to follow him on the straight road, which I did. As I came across our line of infantry to the crest of the hill, I halted my battery, and with my bugler advanced about thirty yards, when I was taken by a company, I suppose, of sharps, which were in advance of the enemy's line, as well as I could judge.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) After you were taken prisoner, state, if you know, if any portion of our army carried the interior works around Corinth? (2d.) and what troops, if you knew them? and also (3d.) state whether they entered the town, and (4th.) how far into it they penetrated?

Answer.—(1st.) Yes. (2d.) General Maury's division—nearly all of it I think, and the first brigade of General Greene's division, commanded by Colonel Gates, carried everything before them; and (3d.) came into Corinth driving the enemy across the high bridge over the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and beyond General Polk's old headquarters, which was outside of the town. The artillery of the enemy went out as far as General Price's old headquarters. Our troops (4th.) penetrated to the Corinth House and the Tishemingo House, and to the square in front of General Bragg's old headquarters, and into the yard of General Rosecrans' headquarters.

Question by Defendant.—State, if you know, and give the source of your knowledge when the enemy were first apprised of the fact that our army was moving on Corinth?

Answer.—I know nothing of my own knowledge—only from hearsay.

Question by Defendant.—State any fact in your knowledge tending to show that the enemy anticipated a defeat on the morning of the 4th?

Answer.—I judge that they expected a defeat from their having sent all their wagons to the rear, some of which did not get back until Wednesday. They had no ordnance whatever, except what they had in the limbers and caissons of their pieces; so I was told; and from this fact I was ordered to report at the Tennessee River.

Question by Defendant.—What was the force of the enemy as near as you could judge, at Corinth on the morning on the 4th, while you were a prisoner there?

Answer.—As near as I could judge not over twenty thousand men.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether the enemy had been working on, or putting up any new fortifications just previous to the attack on Corinth?

Answer.—Yes they had, for Forts Williams and Robinett were not complete.

Question by Recorder.—Was it within or beyond the abatis you were taken?

Answer.—On the edge of the abatis.

Dr. MONTROSE A. PALLAN, Medical Director of the Army of

West Tennessee, commanded by Major-General Earl Van Dorn, duly sworn.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Were you medical director of the Army of West Tennessee at the battle of Corinth; (2d.) and were you near the person of General Van Dorn during the operations against Corinth? (3d.) If so, state if General Van Dorn showed by his directions and orders, in regard to the wounded, any disregard of their comforts and negligence of their safety and welfare?

Answer.—(1st.) I was. (2d.) I was near. (3d.) General Van Dorn always manifested the greatest desire to promote the safety and welfare of our wounded, and gave me all the necessary orders to promote their welfare, and all facilities to give them all the comforts practicable. His orders were that the wounded and sick be cared for, and instructed me to use all the appliances within my power.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Were you left at or near Hatchie Bridge by order of General Van Dorn, when the army retreated from Corinth, to look after the comfort and welfare of our wounded left there?

Answer.—I was, with instructions to use every endeavor in my power to have these men well cared for, and other surgeons had been detailed to remain and assist, who did so; and the wounded men received every proper and possible attention.

Question by Defendant.—What orders had you in regard to sending the wounded from Holly Springs to hospitals below on the railroads?

Answer.—The orders were to move the wounded and sick as rapidly and comfortably as possible to Holly Springs, thence to the various hospitals in the rear, on the railroad, and to obtain from Colonel Orr, commanding at Holly Springs, such facilities as the town afforded, consisting of bedding, mattresses, subsistence, stimulants, and to obtain medical attendance, and nurses to be sent to such hospitals as I might select.

Major M. M. KIMMEL, A. A. General Army of West Tennessee, commanded by Major-General Van Dorn, duly sworn.

Question by Defense.—Are you chief of staff at General Van Dorn's headquarters; if so, do you know whether or not the attack

on Corinth was a subject that had engaged the consideration and thought of General Van Dorn before he left Jackson, Mississippi?

Answer.—I am the senior A. A. General on General Van Dorn's staff. I know that the attack on Corinth was a subject thought about and spoken of by General Van Dorn frequently, as long ago as August last, particularly after receiving communications from Generals Bragg and Price upon this subject. The letter from General Bragg, which first intimated that he (General Van Dorn) was to go into the field, was received in August.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether or not General Van Dorn had furnished himself with maps of the approaches to Corinth before the attack was made?

Answer.—Yes. I knew that he had maps, and that the maps were frequently examined by him in my presence.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether or not General Van Dorn knew anything of the defense of Corinth before the attack?

Answer.—Besides the knowledge acquired last spring by General Van Dorn of the works on the northwest side of the town, I know that reports were made by individuals of the works on the south side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and in front of our right when we attacked.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Do you know whether or not General Van Dorn had made himself acquainted with the roads from Tuscumbia bridge, or Chewalla to Holly Springs, *via* Ripley and Hickory Flat; also by Bone Yard and Rienzi? (2d.) If so, were orders given by him to General Lovell to move his division from Ripley to Hickory Flat, *via* Orizava? (3d.) And was the corps of General Price directed by him to take the direct road to the same point; and (4th.) were there other roads on which Adams' cavalry were ordered to move?

Answer.—(1st.) I think so, most thoroughly, as well as they could be known without going over the ground himself. (2d.) Yes. (3d.) Yes. (4th.) Yes.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Were you continuously near the person of General Van Dorn from the time the army left Ripley until it returned to Holly Springs? (2d.) Do you know whether or not any order was given by General Van Dorn to any portion of the army to counter-march, which order was the result of the ignorance of the roads, and neglect of giving timely orders?

Answer.—(1st.) I was continually near the person of General Van Dorn during the whole time. (2d.) No such order was given.

Question by Defendant.—Were you absent from General Van Dorn any length of time from the time the army left Davis' Mills until it reached Corinth, to Holly Springs? If not, do you know whether or not General Van Dorn was, at any time, intoxicated?

Answer.—I was not absent from General Van Dorn any length of time, except once, and that was about three hours, and I did not know of his taking a drink of liquor but once during the whole time, and that he was in no manner under the influence of liquor.

Colonel J. T. WARD, Volunteer Aid to General Van Dorn's staff, duly sworn.

Question by Defendant.—Please state to the Court how long you have known General Van Dorn, and under what circumstances, and at what places you have been with him.

Answer.—I have known General Van Dorn since January, 1857. He was commanding officer of the military posts in Texas, and in Indian Territory. I was sutler. I was also with him in an expedition north of Red River. He had a fight at the Wichita Village with the Indians. I saw General Van Dorn daily, from '57 to '61; since then from April, '61, to July, '61; from August, '62, until the present time.

Question by Defendant.—Will you please state whether or not General Van Dorn was addicted to drinking, or if he was, or was ever considered a drunkard during that time?

Answer.—No, he never was. From July, 1857, to December, 1890, I never saw General Van Dorn take a drink, not even a drink of wine. Since that time I have seen him take one or two drinks, but never saw him drunk, or never knew of his being drunk.

Question by Defendant.—(1st.) Did you move with the army on Corinth? (2d.) Were you frequently in the presence of General Van Dorn on that expedition? (3d.) Did you see him on the battle-field of Corinth? (4th.) If so, state whether he was intoxicated, or in any degree under the influence of liquor?

Answer.—I moved with the army on Corinth; was with Gen-

eral Van Dorn all the time of his move on Corinth; was with him on the battle-field, except when absent carrying orders, and know that he was not drunk, nor under the influence of liquor, either on the move to Corinth or on the battle-field, or on the retreat from Corinth.

JAMES P. MAJOR, Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery, acting Chief of Artillery on General Van Dorn's staff, sworn.

Question by Defendant.—State how long you have known General Van Dorn, and under what circumstances, and at what places you have been with him?

Answer.—I have known him since the spring of '57. I have known him intimately, and served with him in the old U. S. Army, in the same regiment, and on detached duty was immediately connected with him for over a year, as his Adjutant. At the breaking out of this war, I was again assigned to his command in Texas, and was with him about three months, during which time he captured the Federal forces in Texas, and on the coast of Texas. After the battle of Elk Horn, I again came under his command, and have been connected with him ever since; have known him intimately from '57 to '61. I knew him on the frontier of Texas, and in the Indian country. Since that time in various portions of the Confederacy, principally in the Valley of the Mississippi and Western Texas.

Question by Defendant.—Was General Van Dorn addicted to drinking? Was he, or was he considered a drunkard during this time?

Answer.—He was not addicted to drinking; on the contrary he was one of the most temperate men I ever saw. In my whole intercourse with him in Texas, I never saw him take a drink at all, and I have been with him in such places, at such times, and under such circumstances, that if ever a man would take a drink that would be about the time.

Question by Defendant.—Did you move with the army on Corinth; were you frequently in the presence of General Van Dorn on that expedition?

Answer.—I did move with the army, and was frequently in his presence.

Question by Defendant.—Did you see him on the battle-field of Corinth?

Answer.—I did.

Question by Defendant.—Was he intoxicated or in any degree under the influence of liquor?

Answer.—He was not.

Brigadier-General LLOYD TILGHMAN, commanding 1st Division of General Lovell's Army Corps, was duly sworn.

Question by Defendant.—Can you state with any accuracy the period at which the returned prisoners were exchanged, their number and when received in our army; also your means of knowledge?

Answer.—As the officer placed in command by the Secretary of War, of exchanged prisoners, and entrusted with the reorganization of all such as were to arrive at Vicksburg, more especially those captured at Forts Henry, Donelson, Madrid Bend and Island No. 10, I proceeded to organize the same at Jackson on their arrival there early in September. There were reported to have arrived at Vicksburg by Commissioner Watts, over 15,000, about 3,000 of whom were immediately sent to General Bragg and the army of Western Virginia. A number were discharged on surgeon's certificates, and about 8,000 aggregate organized into regiments, battalions and companies, in accordance with special instructions from General Bragg. About 22d September, I was authorized to announce as finally exchanged about 2,000. On the 7th October, I was authorized to announce the exchange of all delivered up to that date at Vicksburg, or registered for exchange at Vicksburg as final and complete. A part of the 2,000 exchanged on 22d September were sent to near Ponchatoula, by order of General Van Dorn. About one regiment, about —, was also sent to Port Hudson. Though I was urged frequently by Generals Van Dorn and Price to send forward the troops allotted to their several commands on the plea of the urgency of the case, I was forbidden to do so by my orders until the exchange was ratified. So soon as the announcement was made of the ratification of the exchange, no time was lost night or day in equipping and sending forward as fast as railroad transportation could be obtained, every available man of the exchanged prisoners, together with two field batteries from Vicksburg, assigned to this command. The last of the troops referred to did not reach Holly Springs until about 14th October. The whole number of troops

sent to Holly Springs was about 7,800 aggregate, well equipped in every respect, save transportation, which they were entirely without.

Question by Defendant.—Waiting for the wagons and teams intended for this command on the way up from Jackson, and to purchase in the vicinity enough transportation for this command, when could it have been put in the field?

Answer.—With every effort of Major Mims, and other quartermasters, including my own division quartermaster, by sending agents far and wide to procure wagons, mules and horses, leaving nothing undone that active and intelligent agents could perform, I have not now half the amount of transportation deemed necessary, with the use of all proper economy of baggage and equipage to supply the wants of that portion of the returned prisoners under my command (which embraces about five-sevenths of all sent to Holly Springs) in any movement independent of the aid of railroad transportation.

And the Court adjourned to meet Friday, November 21st, 1862.

Friday, November 21st, 1862.

The Court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present—Maj-Gen. Sterling Price, P. A. C. S., Maj-Gen. D. H. Maury, P. A. C. S., Brig-Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, P. A. C. S., Capt. E. H. Cummins, P. A. C. S., Recorder, and Maj-Gen. Earl Van Dorn, P. A. C. S.

Brigadier-General M. E. GREEN appeared before the Court, and offered the following explanation, which was accepted:

Explanation by General M. E. Green.

I wish to explain an apparent discrepancy in my evidence, having said that I saw no works in front of my position on the evening of the 3d October, but that on going in on the morning of the 4th, I found fortifications existing in my front. I wish it understood that I did not on the morning of the 4th advance over the ground which had been in front of me on the evening of the 3d. General Phifer's Brigade, of Maury's Division, had been extended to the left over my position of Friday evening, and I had been moved farther to the left, and nearer to the railroad. The

position I occupied on Thursday morning was not in sight when I rode forward on Friday evening.

Dr. J. W. C. SMITH, Surgeon, P. A. C. S., was duly sworn.

Question by Defendant.—Were you Surgeon of the post at Holly Springs when the army returned to that place from Corinth on the 9th and 10th October last; if so, do you know anything in regard to the conveyance of the wounded on the cars to hospitals below?

Answer.—I was. I did superintend shipping most if not all of them.

Question by Defendant.—Can you state whether or not the wounded were properly provided? whether an officer and attendant were sent with them?

Answer.—I know that the wounded men were put aboard the cars, and the most dangerously wounded were put upon mattresses, and in some instances I could not get mattresses. On every occasion I endeavored to have at least one day's cooked rations sent with the men, and I sent also a sufficient number of assistants to look after them. I also sent either a surgeon or an assistant surgeon with the first four or five trains that left Holly Springs after the wounded came in. These men were delivered to hospitals below, and the medical officers reported back to me that they had discharged their duty.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know whether or not the cars with the wounded stopped all night at Water Valley? and if so, why they stopped?

Answer.—It was reported to me by a medical officer whom I sent in charge of the wounded, that one train was stopped for the purpose of preparing warm rations for the men, as they did not relish cold rations. The doctor's name was De Roach; he is now at Canton. I think no other train was reported to me as having stopped there at night by any medical officer. Mr. Frost, the Superintendent of the railroad, told me that the regular freight train left at one o'clock, and that when there were wounded on board, the train would go directly through to its destination. I made the proper inquiries. I would not have allowed a train that had left Holly Springs to have remained at Water Valley all night if I had known it.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know if all proper arrange-

ments were made to have the wounded sent to hospitals as comfortable as possible?

Answer.—I did everything, and I believe everything was done that could have been done. General Van Dorn told me to call upon him for everything I needed, and afforded me every assistance in his power. In addition to which he telegraphed to General Ruggles to make preparation for them in his District, in case they could not be taken care of nearer on this side of it.

Question by Defendant.—Do you know of any neglect on the part of General Van Dorn to have the wounded properly attended to, or of any report ever having been made to him that they had not been?

Answer.—I do not.

Question by Defendant.—If cars with wounded men improperly stopped at Water Valley, could it have been prevented by General Van Dorn?

Answer.—I think not; because the Superintendent of the railroad claims to be governed by General Lee's orders prohibiting military interference with the management of the railroads, in regard to running the road, and so expressed himself to me on several occasions. Once when I endeavored to get him to bring a load of sick over as far as Oxford off schedule time.

Question by Defendant.—What has been General Van Dorn's usual attention to the sick and wounded in this Department?

Answer.—His attention has been prompt and kind so far as I know; more so than any other military officer under whom I have ever served.

Question by Recorder.—Were any of the wounded men sent off to the hospitals below, with their wounds undressed?

Answer.—I suppose there were. We had not a sufficient number of medical officers to attend the whole of them. We attended to most of the cases, and as fast as we could.

Question by Recorder.—Were they improperly crowded or herded in the cars?

Answer.—Not that I know of. We had to put them pretty close, but not so as to be injurious in any way that I know of. I think it not unlikely that at every station below, the stragglers crowded in, and by the time they got some distance below, they may have been pretty well crowded. There are a great many stragglers besieging every railroad depot.

The following order was received by the Court:

[EXTRACT.]

HEADQRS. DEPT. MISS. AND E. LOUISIANA,
JACKSON, MISS., Nov. 18th, 1862.

Special Orders, No. 32.

* * * * *

IV. The Court of Inquiry now sitting at Abbeville, Miss., in the case of Major-General Earl Van Dorn, P. A. C. S., will in addition to their present duties, express an opinion upon the facts as elicited, and will further investigate any charge of drunkenness against that officer.

By order of Lt.-Gen. Pemberton,

J. R. WADDY,

A. A. Gen.

Maj.-Gen. Price, through Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn.

And the Court adjourned at two o'clock P. M., to meet again on Saturday morning, Nov. 22d.

9 o'clock A. M., Saturday, Nov. 22, 1862.

The Court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present—Maj.-Gen. Sterling Price, Maj.-Gen. D. H. Maury, Brig.-Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, Capt. E. H. Cummins, Recorder, Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn.

Maj.-Gen. VAN DORN submitted the address herewith forwarded:

Gentlemen of the Court: Stripped of all technicalities the accusations against me are:

First.—That I ought not to have attacked Corinth at all.

Second.—That I made the attack without consideration or forethought on a plan crude and undigested.

Third.—That military blunders were committed by me in the management of the fight on the first day (Friday), and that I failed to make proper disposition during the night of Friday, by which the battle was lost.

Fourth.—That I moved my army on Corinth with deficient subsistence supplies relying on capturing what was needed from the enemy.

Fifth.—That I was cruel and inhuman to the officers and men of my command by ordering senseless circuitous marches and counter-marches, and by subjecting them to starvation.

Sixth.—That I was negligent of my wounded, and by my neglect subjected them to incredible and unnecessary suffering.

If these accusations are well founded they must deeply touch my character as a soldier and a man. If they be true, I am neither fit for society or command. If they are established by the evidence before you, I ought to be stripped of every badge of military authority or honor my country ever conferred upon me (which I have worn with the thrill of gratitude, love of country inspired), and banished out of the circle of a civilized and Christian humanity. Upon issues so big with importance to all that I hold dear, I trust the Court will not regard some comment, on my part, either untimely or improper.

First.—Was it wrong to attack Corinth at all? This question cannot be determined without a careful consideration of the situation, the accepted word to signify the relative position and forces of the enemy, and of our own.

At the time I determined to move on Corinth the enemy held the city of Memphis fortified by works, and within the protection of gunboats; Bolivar strongly fortified on both banks of the Hatchie River, Jackson fortified, and Corinth strengthened by more elaborate works and defenses than existed at either of the positions mentioned. The forces of the enemy distributed at these points approximately amounted in the aggregate to forty-two thousand, as follows: At Memphis six thousand, at Bolivar eight thousand, at Jackson three thousand, at Corinth fifteen thousand, at the outposts, Burnsville, Rienzi, Jacinto, Iuka and Bethel, eight thousand; at important bridges and on garrison duty, two or three thousand. Western Tennessee was occupied by the enemy with railroad connections to Columbus, Ky., and the Mississippi River, from Helena to Cairo, and they held Nashville, garrisoned by a small force, in Middle Tennessee. At Helena, also fortified, the Federal force amounted to ——— thousands, with the facility of river transportation. The new levies under the call for six hundred thousand additional troops, had long been made, and were rapidly being organized, while many thousand of them had already taken the field. The main body of our army, which evacuated Corinth, was in Kentucky under General Bragg, before greatly superior forces of the enemy, with at least no certainty of maintaining its position. Eastern Tennessee was free from Federal dominion. General Price, with a

force of ——— thousand, occupied the lines of the Ohio and Mobile Railroad at Baldwin, while my command at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and at Abbeville, was guarding the Mississippi River and the lines of the Mississippi Central Railroad leading to the capital of the State. The successful defense of Vicksburg against a naval force, however formidable, has shown that a combined land and naval attack was necessary to the reduction of the place, and the enemy was exerting extraordinary energy to be prepared for such result. To prevent it, the expulsion of the enemy from Western Tennessee became a military necessity. More than this, in view of the immense preparations being made by the Federal Government to overwhelm us in the spring, or during the autumn, should the stage of the waters and the season be propitious, it was an obvious defensive policy to push the enemy across the Ohio River, occupy Columbus, resume the jurisdiction of the Mississippi River by the occupation of Columbus, and instructed by the light of past events, fortify, permanently, the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. This policy carried our army, under General Bragg, to Kentucky. If General Bragg should succeed and maintain himself, it was clear that the columns of my command, united with that of General Price, should drive the enemy out of Tennessee, to accomplish the general design. If, on the contrary, he should be compelled to fall back, it was equally manifest that an effort should be made to aid him by crippling the Federal forces in Tennessee and placing ourselves in a position to secure a junction or cooperation with his retreating army. I ask how could these objects be accomplished while the enemy occupied Corinth. In the judgment of military men it is the key to the whole position; its stratagetic importance has been recognized by the enemy, as well as by ourselves. I could have taken Memphis, but I could not have held it against the naval force of the enemy in front, and his land forces in my rear, and on both flanks. No important military result would have attended the capture, and its total destruction by the enemy would have probably followed the attempt. The line of fortifications around Bolivar is intersected by the Hatchie River, rendering it impossible to take the places by quick assault, and reinforcements could be thrown in from Jackson by railroad, besides situated as it is in the reentrant angle of three fortified places an advance upon it would expose both my flanks and rear to an attack from the

forces at Corinth and Memphis. While Corinth was the strongest, it was the most salient point, and its capture was a condition precedent to the accomplishment of anything of importance in West Tennessee. The able and acute General who commanded at Corinth well understood the consequences which would have resulted from its fall. In his official order he says that the "stake for which he fought at Corinth was the fate of West Tennessee, and more remotely the fate of Federal arms in the Valley of the Mississippi." See this published order and report of General Rosecrans. A General no less distinguished gave me the concurrence of his judgment in support of my own upon the vital necessity of reducing Corinth. Major-General Price, before the junction of our forces at Ripley, in September, wrote me "that he was ready to cooperate with me in an attack upon Corinth," and here as a witness, in clear and emphatic words, and in many forms of expression, he has confirmed the propriety of the step he was willing to take. He testifies that so great was the importance of Corinth to us, that it "warranted more than the usual hazard of battle" to win it. He testifies that "had we taken Corinth, the present advantageous base of operations of the enemy, Memphis, Jackson, Bolivar, Lagrange, Grand Junction and Corinth would now be ours, not theirs." He adds: "I do not entertain a doubt of it."

He testifies that "he has not a doubt that if we had taken Corinth, and as a consequence thereof freed Western Tennessee, that the efforts of the enemy to dislodge our army would have prolonged the contest so late in the season as to render military movements difficult." He testifies that "in the event of General Bragg's army being compelled to fall back into Tennessee, the taking of Corinth by us would, in all likelihood, have enabled Bragg's army and this to have united or cooperated in such a way as to hold the State of Tennessee for several months." He volunteered to say in his evidence that "in the movements upon Corinth, and in the management of the fight at Corinth, amid all the consultations and conferences with me, which were frequent and many, there arose but one difference of opinion between us, and that was upon the question whether the attack should be delayed a few days until we should be reinforced by the returned prisoners, expected from Jackson. I introduced the testimony of General Price on the subject of the propriety of my advance on

Corinth, because he was an officer of experience and distinction; second, because from his position as commander of a separate army, left in the rear by General Bragg to guard important interests of this State, and to cooperate, as far as his limited resources would allow, in the general design which Bragg's movements was intended to accomplish, his mind must have often been painfully engaged in considering what action, on his part, might best contribute to the success of our arms; and last, because I knew the propriety of attacking Corinth was no new subject with him, but one that for a long time received his anxious consideration. Corinth, so hurtful to us while in the possession of the enemy, so advantageous to us if in our own, ought to have been attacked by me unless my repulse was an inevitable event.

This could be only because either the place was impregnable to assault, or because it was defended by an overwhelming force. My accuser, General Bowen, was not bold enough to affirm either proposition. He does not aver that the place was impregnable to assault. He does not charge that it was defended by overwhelming numbers. He charges only "that the place was strongly fortified," and that it was defended by a "formidable force." That it was not impregnable, he swears in his testimony, for he says on oath, that in spite of the "strength of the fortification" and the "formidable forces" of the enemy, the place could have been easily taken on Friday afternoon, with proper dispersion on my part during the battle.

That it was not impregnable is shown by the abundant proof in the cause that the exterior works were carried by my entire line, embracing both corps, and Price's corps carried the interior defenses, and penetrated into the heart of the town up to the square surrounding the headquarters of the commanding General of the enemy. General Rust, who, at Tuscumbia bridge, within fourteen miles of Corinth, pronounced that "success was impossible," and afterwards in stronger phrase declared the "attempt madness," with the candor of the soldier and the gentleman, testified before you that he was forced to change his opinion, and said on Friday afternoon, "I thought we had a first-rate chance to take the place." That the fortifications were not impregnable to assault is manifest from the nature of the works themselves, being penetrable by artillery, and requiring no scaling ladders to mount them.

Before proceeding to the second accusation, I wish to say a few words on the preliminary question, whether I should have waited for the arrival of the returned prisoners expected from Jackson before moving on Corinth?

General Price favored the policy of waiting for their arrival, and I at one time before our junction acquiesced in that idea, and wrote to him to that effect. Increase of force was mutually and greatly desired by us both. In reply, he writes to me from Baldwin: "Whether we wait for the returned prisoners or not, it is better that the junction of our forces should at once take place." Subsequent reflection and additional information received by me before our junction at Ripley on the 28th of September satisfied me that the blow on Corinth could not be struck too soon. From scouts in the service of the army, from my own cavalry pickets, as well from Federal papers, I learned that Rosecrans would be sent to the command of Corinth in place of Grant, who had gone North, and that the enemy were reinforcing Jackson and Bolivar from Columbus, and from my knowledge of the capacity and character of Rosecrans, I was convinced that Corinth would be strengthened by the change of its commander. Besides the uncertainty of Bragg's position became every day more manifest, and his retirement from Kentucky into Tennessee more probable. It became very obvious, also, that General Bragg was deceived in regard to the force of the enemy in Western Tennessee and in North Mississippi. In addition, my constant and unremitting efforts to have the returned prisoners forwarded to Holly Springs even were unavailing; and from information received from General Tilghman, charged with their equipment and organization, the difficulty of procuring full transportation for them, and the delays attendant upon the exchanges, I became satisfied that if I waited for their reception all opportunity of striking Corinth with a reasonable prospect of success would be lost. The junction of our armies at Ripley increased the force of these convictions. The fact of junction could not be long concealed from the enemy, and the knowledge of that fact would have stimulated the enemy to strengthen his defenses and augment his forces. His resources to reinforce were greatly superior to our own, and I am aware of no reason to suppose that he would not have used them. The testimony of General Tilghman establishes the correctness of my conclusion. The expectation entertained by us in September,

that the returned prisoners would be received by this army in a "few days" was a military illusion; "the few days" became an indefinite period. In greatly diminished numbers, it was not until the 14th of October that they came, and up to the present time, the 20th of November, after the most active and energetic exertions, they are not yet furnished with transportation for the field.

Second.—Was the attack on Corinth made without consideration or forethought on a plan crude and undigested?

It was supposed by my accuser that the attack on Corinth was a sudden thought of mine; that it was not only a new idea, but one antagonistic to purposes long entertained by me; that I was resolved "not to sacrifice soldiers by moving them against fortifications," and that in some unexplained way I had determined to maneuver the enemy out of the fortified places held by them in Mississippi and Tennessee. So strong was his conviction of my hostility to marching against fortifications, and the suddenness of determination to make Corinth an exception first communicated to him at Davis' bridge, on the Hatchie River, that he sees in everything the want of preparation, crudeness, and confusion which are apt concomitants of newly born purposes. Thus he supposes that I have failed to think of and provide subsistence, and calls upon his Division Commander to "remonstrate against the march," until the supposed deficiency shall be supplied. He concludes that in the hurry of action I have neglected to provide myself with correct maps drawn to a scale of the approaches to Corinth, and that I was seeking to supply the deficiency by crude sketches of my own, unfit for the ordinary use of the army. He imagines that I was ignorant of Corinth and its surroundings, and its defenses, and destitute of any maps showing the same. He finds that the army is marched on Corinth in "a hasty and disorderly manner." To his vision there is no concerted or systematic plan of attack, but troops were seemingly hurled against the defenses, as if to surprise a foe with whom I had been engaged, as he declares, "for thirty-six hours." He concludes, also, that in keeping with this hurry scurry mode of warfare, I had ignored all aid from engineers. It is some consolation to learn from my accuser that this irregular, spasmodic, and unscientific method of fighting found me on the night of the 3d of October in command of "a victorious army," inside of the works of a place, "strongly

fortified, supported by an enemy formidable in numbers, and fully prepared for a stubborn defense."—See 1st specification of 1st charge and the 3d specification of the 1st charge.

In spite of the utter hopelessness of surprising an enemy with whose outposts I had been engaged for thirty-six hours, we learn from my accuser that the enemy had failed to avail himself of this long notice, and had not called in his reinforcements, and required the further time of the night of the 3d and 4th of October to bring them in; which, he says, I allowed him by declining to make a night attack; of which advantage, he says, in his charge, but not in his testimony, the enemy fully availed himself.—See 2d specification of 1st charge.

The 1st charge and its specifications amount to a suicide in logic, and evince a total ignorance of my plan of attacking Corinth. It is not strange that Gen. Bowen should be ignorant of my purpose, and of the means by which I hoped to have executed it, for I had not deemed it necessary to inform him on either point. As a Brigade commander, I thought his duty was to obey orders, and I did not call him to counsel with me. Now this Court, in the light of the evidence before it, knows that the attack on Corinth had been the subject of anxious deliberation on my part, and on the part of Gen. Price; that I had made ample provisions for the subsistence of my army; that I had taken great pains while in Corinth, in April and May, to make myself acquainted with Corinth, its surroundings, its approaches, its defenses, and topography; that I was possessed of accurate maps drawn by competent engineers, Federal and Confederate, showing the same; that Gen. Price had sent me a scout, who, by his directions, had entered Corinth a short time previous to my attack of the place, to inform me of its defenses and forces; that our march was "not disorderly," but "in perfect order," and not too hasty; that the line of battle was formed and the attack made in accordance with the rule of military science, and at points with which I was made entirely familiar by previous service at Corinth, while the place was in our possession. It is charged by my accuser, that I failed to avail myself on Friday afternoon of an opportunity to send Gen. Lovell's division pell mell into Corinth, following what, he says, was the broken and retreating center of the enemy's lines. Without any knowledge of the condition of affairs on my center and left, and with a conjectural idea of the condition of the enemy's left, and with a

confessed ignorance of the force and position of the enemy's right—seeing, as he says, five regiments of the enemy retire towards their inner fortifications, in confusion; he suggests that Corinth might have been taken by throwing my right wing in pursuit of them! The proof shows that at that time, and for two or three hours afterwards, the center and left of my line, embracing Gen. Price's corps, which constituted two-thirds of my army, was engaged in a terrific contest with the enemy, who disputed every inch of ground till sunset, when they ended the contest by retiring into their interior defenses.

I do not doubt the gallantry of my accuser, but his criticisms as a Brigade Commander, confined in his knowledge to what appears before him, ignorant of the operations going on in two-thirds of the line of battle, and unapprized of the plan of operations of the General in command, reminds me of Cowper's fly on the dome of St. Paul, who, with a vision that extended only a few inches around him, was found discoursing on the architecture of the entire building.

It is said that I ought to have pursued the advantage gained by me in the afternoon of Friday, by a night attack. I did not fail to consider that matter; I was anxious to deny the enemy the possibility of reinforcements. I knew my antagonist; knew that he would avail himself of every resource in his power, but I could not prudently hazard a night attack. My troops were not veterans, though gallant as any commander ever led to battle. They were greatly exhausted by heat, by thirst, and by the fatigue which excess of valor created. The line of attack was a long one, and as it approached the interior defenses of the enemy, that line must necessarily become contracted; there would have been imminent danger of mistaking friend for foe, unless the utmost care was exercised in the advance. Besides, it was impossible for me to ascertain the precise position of the enemy, and that fact was strong against a night attack.

It is charged that I did not on the night of the 3d of October reconnoiter the position of the enemy. The fact is admitted by me, and the answer is as the evidence shows, including that of my accuser, that it was impossible. The experiment was tried. One of my staff officers, Major Dillon, was sent by me in that service, and he met the sharpshooters of the enemy in less than a hundred yards of my line. If the noise of the wagons and cannon had

clearly indicated reinforcements, rather than evacuation, there was no method by which I could have avoided the result.

The plan of the movement on Corinth was to take the place, not by siege or investment, but by *coup de main*. From all the sources of information accessible to a commander, I was satisfied that the force at Corinth and its outposts did not much exceed 20,000 men. Some of their outposts were at a distance from Corinth of 15 and 20 miles. The forces in Corinth did not exceed 12 or 15,000. By a sudden and rapid attack on the place, I expected to throw upon it a force superior to that of the enemy, and I hoped to carry the place before the reinforcements of the outposts could be drawn in. To this end I masked my attack on Corinth, by threatening Bolivar. My advance upon Bolivar had drawn the division of Ross from Corinth to that point. I marched suddenly from Ripley to Pocahontas equidistant between Bolivar and Corinth. My cavalry was thrown forward towards both points; I turned quickly towards Corinth, masking my infantry with my cavalry up to Indian Creek, within a short distance of the exterior works of Corinth, making it uncertain which place was the object of attack. I cut the railroad between Bolivar and Corinth, and no reinforcements came from Bolivar to the aid of Corinth. Further to cover my design, I worked all night on a bridge at Pocahontas, and left it unfinished. By the proof in the case, it is manifest that I fell upon Corinth defended by less than 15,000 men. The failure to carry the place in first day, and the reinforcements brought in by the toil and industry and working capacity of an able and indefatigable adversary, whom I had surprised, together with a failure to carry out my plan of attack on the morning of Saturday by one of those *contre-temps* against which no Providence can guard, lost the battle of Corinth. My official report explains the causes of its derangements, but as the charges and specifications do not touch the matter, I forbear to lay them before the Court.

It would be inexcusable in me before this tribunal to notice the remaining accusations made against me. The proof, unmistakably and beyond cavil, stamp them as untrue. My supplies were more than ample, there were no unnecessary marches or counter-marches, and the care of my wounded is affirmatively established beyond the power of refutation.

Outside of the specific charges made by my accuser, I have been enabled by this investigation to stamp with infamy the defamatory

attack made upon my character, as a soldier and a gentleman, throughout the length and breadth of this land, by clandestine and cowardly falsehoods, sent on electric currents to the President at Richmond, and by wholesale and loud-mouthed calumny, scattered over my native State. I have been proclaimed an habitual drunkard, addicted to intemperance—intoxicated on the battle-field of Corinth. You, Gen. Price and Gen. Maury, members of this Court, know and have testified to the intense falsehood of that accusation. Other charges, incapable in their nature of investigation by this Court, nearly touching my character as a man, originating among the people of my native State, have had the same widespread circulation. Born of malice and falsehood, they can escape refutation only by escaping investigation.*

Gentlemen of the Court, I am a Mississippian by birth; the ashes of my parents repose in her soil; it has been my pride to serve her. Called to an administrative department on her territory against my will, because not fitted by previous experience to discharge the duties of such position—I have taxed every energy of my nature to guard and protect her interests. I remember with what fondness, after long absence, I gazed upon the sky which canopied the spot where I had first seen the light of day. My hopes and my aspirations have been blended with her prosperity and her glory. To aid in advancing both has been my study since I was clothed with authority on her soil. I have spent many an anxious night and travail of mind to discover how best I might beat back the invader from her limits. I struck for her as I would strike for wife or child. I have always been ready to shed my blood for the State, yet in the midst of my struggles for Mississippi my name has been blighted by her people.

This letter relates an interesting scene at the close of this Court of Inquiry from an eminent attorney of the New Orleans bar, and ex-State Senator of Louisiana, Hon. Thos. S. McCay.

*“ Jesus stooped down and wrote upon the ground, then lifted up Himself and said, ‘ He that is without sin cast the first stone.’ Again He wrote, and when He arose He was left alone,—their consciences convicted them and they went out one by one.”

“CAMP NEAR ABBEVILLE, MISS., November 23, 1862.

“MY DEAR FRIEND:

“I have intended to write you, but almost constant occupation and the very meager facilities for correspondence, such as no ink, pen, paper, desk, etc., provided. Though silent, my thoughts are often in Port Gibson.

“I snatch one moment to give you I know great joy and gladness, and then must postpone general subjects of interest for more time and convenience.

“The gallant Gen. Earl Van Dorn, my warm personal friend, has passed triumphantly through an ordeal lasting some ten days, which he was called upon to encounter. You may probably be informed that Brig.-Gen. John S. Bowen, shielding himself from the popular clamor of the *profanum vulgus*, and instigated by the malice of Satan, preferred a series of charges as long as the moral law against Earl. They embraced his military, moral, and social character, and had they been sustained, he should have been stripped of the honors which his country had so generously bestowed and sent among his fellows as one like them, but not of them; as one regardless of the sick and wounded in defense of our cause, and as utterly insensible of sobriety in manhood or the claims of virtue in humanity.

“The Court was composed of that old hero, Sterling Price, Major-General and President of the Court; Major-General Dabney H. Maury, and Brigadier-General L. Tilghman. This tribunal was selected by Lieutenant-General Pemberton.

“After a patient and thorough examination of all the evidence, the Court has just rendered the judgment. Clamor and defamation are silenced, military science, moral and social character have been exalted, and my friend has been triumphantly acquitted after, as I declare in my professional capacity, as searching and complete an investigation as was ever given a cause.

“The Court declare: ‘We, the Court, do unanimously find that the charges preferred by Brigadier-General John S. Bowen against Major-General Earl Van Dorn are not only not proved, but that they are disproved.’ ‘We, the Court, do further find that the charge of drunkenness against Major-General Earl Van Dorn is not only not proved, but is disproved by the testimony of Majors-General Price and Maury, who were in constant conference with him in the recent attack upon Corinth.’”

"This decision pronounces the attack on Corinth as a masterly military effort unsurpassed by any of the war, and attributes its failure wholly to causes which could not have been anticipated or prevented by General Van Dorn.

"A most touching incident occurred while the written defense of Earl Van Dorn was being read. I cannot describe it here as it should be painted. Old General Price, whom all call 'Pap' from his fatherly appearance and kind countenance and bearing, arrested the speaker by weeping like a child. Simultaneously and in obedience to that absolute sympathy which binds and cements all true souls, the three Judges, prosecutor, and audience were in tears—every man present wept, save one, and that was Earl Van Dorn, who sat with firm brow and dauntless eye as only triumphant integrity and conscious right could do under the circumstances. To him it was not a matter of tears, but as one of principle, existence, life, *honor*, emphatically 'to be or not to be.'

"You have it all—my friend is exalted and stands higher in the estimation of military men and good men than ever, though malice has tried its best.

"When I commenced I only expected to write a line—I write on my lap. Regards to friends. . . .

"Yours,

"THOMAS S. McCAY,
Attorney at Law, New Orleans, La.

CHAPTER X.

HOLLY SPRINGS.

AFTER the battle of Corinth, Gen. Van Dorn joined Gen. Pemberton at Grenada, Miss. Gen. Grant united his scattered forces in Tennessee, making a base of supplies at Holly Springs, Miss., and was making all preparation to march against Vicksburg. At this crisis, in the late fall of 1862, while the Southern troops were encamped in the vicinity of Grenada under command of Gen. Pemberton, and Gen. Grant was leisurely making progress towards Vicksburg by a flank movement on Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, constructing roads and bridges, Gen. Van Dorn, commanding the cavalry division, represented to Gen. Pemberton that within a week his position would be stormed by superior forces under Grant, and there were but two courses to pursue, one to fall back on Jackson, or by a bold stroke to capture Holly Springs and destroy their supplies. He said, that to fall back would place his army in no better condition for defense. Gen. Loring and Gen. Tilghman approved the proposition and Gen. Pemberton assented to it, provided Gen. Van Dorn would command the assault. To this Gen. Van Dorn readily assented, if permitted to select his men. The night previous to the expedition he spent in company with Gen. Walthall, afterwards Senator from Mississippi, and Gen. Van Dorn related his plan to him. A brother of Gen. Walthall asked to be allowed to accompany the expedition, and after a little hesitation the request was granted, and he proved eminently useful; and within two days with sword in hand he rode through the streets of Holly Springs, his native village, in the presence of his sister and sweetheart, who cheered him as he passed—which seemed the culmination of the young soldier's ambition. The account here quoted is from the journal of one of Gen. Van Dorn's staff officers, and will add interest to the history of the capture of Holly Springs:

"We rode out of Grenada 2,000 strong, all cavalry, in broad daylight, towards the Alabama line, traveled with rapidity until night, made four hours' rest, rose before daybreak, and pushed on to Pontotoc, just in time (they thought) to entrap, kill, and capture a force of 500 United States troops who had passed through eastward an hour before. Gen. Van Dorn was urged by Col. Jack Wharton and others to pursue them, but he refused, detached a company to picket, then to obstruct as far as possible their return to Coffeeville (whence they had started), and then hastened himself on to Holly Springs, and here we arrived, as near as we dared approach, about 10 o'clock P. M. Our scouts reported all quiet up to 500 yards of Holly Springs. The young officer had gone into Holly Springs. For three hours the roads were reconnoitered right, left, and rear of us, and as near as we could to the front of us, with orders to arrest every man, woman, or child, friend or foe, so as to render any information of our presence impossible. By two o'clock we were on our way, moving at first rapidly and then came to a halt. There we sat on our horses for half an hour, when a commander of troops, I know not who, galloped down from Holly Springs and told Gen. Van Dorn (I by his side) that the only outlying picket of Holly Springs had been captured without a gun being fired, and he had nothing to do but to ride straight into the enemy's camp.

"I have passed through at least ten pitched battles and over a hundred skirmishes, but this day—with one exception—was the proudest and happiest day of my life."

[It will be seen from this statement that in this expedition there were but 2,000 men. The Federal reports place the number at from 5,000 to 10,000.]

GENERAL VAN DORN'S BRIEF REPORT OF THE CAPTURE OF HOLLY SPRINGS, BRIEF BUT TO THE POINT.*

"I surprised the enemy at this place at daylight this morning; burnt up all the quartermaster stores, cotton, etc. An immense

* A paragraph in a recent issue of the *Washington Post* contained a statement, inadvertently penned, to the effect that Gen. W. H. Jackson, of Tennessee, the noted breeder of fine racehorses, captured Holly Springs and destroyed thousands of dollars' worth of Gen. Grant's stores. "That was a mistake," said an ex-Confederate general at the Metropolitan. "The credit of the capture of Holly

amount burnt up, many trains. Took a great many arms and about 1,500 prisoners.

"I presume the value of stores would amount to a million and a half of dollars. I move on to Davis' Mills at once. Morgan attacked Jackson day before yesterday. Yankees say he was repulsed. They are sending reinforcements there.

"I will communicate with him.

"EARL VAN DORN,
"Major-General.

"Holly Springs, Dec. 20, 1862.

"To Lieut.-Gen. Pemberton."

The following incidents connected with the capture of Holly Springs are narrated by Dr. J. G. Deuprée and W. R. Stevenson, of Texas, who were among the picked men selected for this daring expedition against Holly Springs, and are graphically described. Dr. Deuprée says:

"The narrative opens by describing the military situation as it was about the middle of December, 1862—Grant with his main body at Oxford and his outposts at Coffeeville; Pemberton south of the Yalobusha, with front and flanks covered by Van Dorn's cavalry, numbering about 2,500 troopers. The story tells how Van Dorn moved east from Grenada on the night of December 17, ostensibly to capture or destroy Col. Dickey's 1,000 raiders operating on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad above and below Tupelo; how Van Dorn, when about to encounter Dickey, so maneuvered as to pass through Pontotoc in the direction of New Albany, and allow Dickey to follow him if he chose, or if he preferred, after noting the direction of Van Dorn's march, to go and report to Grant at Oxford that he had seen Van Dorn at the head of his cavalry moving north, apparently bent on going into Tennessee to join Forrest at Bolivar or Jackson. As the story goes, Dickey chose the latter alternative. The narrative shows the tactics of Van Dorn in keeping the enemy always behind him, never giving him an opportunity to get ahead and interfere with the advance or give warning of his approach. It also reveals how well Van Dorn concealed from the enemy his objective point. Holly Springs belongs to Gen. Earl Van Dorn, whose tragic and untimely death was so deeply deplored. He was one of the most gallant soldiers that ever donned the gray."

as long as possible, and then moved so rapidly that hostile scouts or videttes could not report his coming long enough in advance to be of any service to Col. Murphy, in command at Holly Springs.

"After telling many amusing and instructive incidents of the march and how Van Dorn's troopers halted about 10 o'clock on the night of December 19 within five miles of town, dismounted in grim silence, and without fires stood ready at any moment to remount, the story continues thus:

"Before daylight an order was quietly passed along to mount and form fours. It chanced to be the day for the First Mississippi Cavalry to be the advance of McCullough's brigade. Lieut. S. B. Day, of Company G (Noxubee Cavalry), was in command of the advance guard, and the front four were Bob White, Groves Dantzler, D. W. Deuprée and J. G. Deuprée. The order was at once given to move forward on two roads at a gallop, to capture the pickets or pursue them so closely that no alarm could precede us. The wisdom of the order was appreciated by all, and it was obeyed with alacrity. The First Mississippi were to enter town from the northeast, charge through infantry without halting to fight or receive surrenders, but at once to attack the cavalry when discovered. The Second Missouri were to dismount at the edge of town, charge on foot and capture or disperse any infantry encountered. The Texas brigade were to approach from the east, coming in by the railroad depot, and thus prevent any reinforcements from surprising us in that direction. A detachment of Texans also were to go south and watch the Abbeville road. Jackson's brigade were to approach from the north, preventing possible reinforcements from Bolivar, as well as watching the road coming from Memphis on the west.

"As we neared the town we increased our speed. Pinson's First Mississippi rode through in a sweeping gallop, ignoring the infantry, many of whom, awakened and startled by the charge, ran out of their tents in night attire and fired into our column, wounding nearly every horse in the advance guard and several of the men. As we approached the fair grounds the Second Illinois Cavalry, under Col. Neill and Maj. Mudd, were in line, answering roll call, preparing to go out and look for Van Dorn, as they had heard he was coming. Brave and courageous, under gallant officers, they bodily charged upon us with drawn sabers.

I cannot undertake to recount all that occurred in the melee, but mention only some incidents that came under my own observation. Little Jere Beasley, a lad of fifteen summers, was about to be cut down by a stalwart Federal, when Lieut. Day shot the daring rider with an arm uplifted ready to strike the deadly blow. Our Maj. Wheeler had his thumb cut off in a saber duel with a Federal officer. Adjutant Lawrence Yates was struck in the forehead, the blood gushing from the long, deep wound and flooding his face and neck. My own horse had been shot twice as we came through the infantry, and now received the third and fatal bullet right between the eyes, and fell lifeless to the ground. I simply made breastworks of the dead animal, until I could catch the horse of the Federal with whom I had been engaged, and who had been shot by me or some other Confederate. Mounting the Federal charger, I was soon with my regiment chasing the routed enemy. Pistols in the hands of Mississippians had proved superior to sabers wielded by the hardy sons of Illinois. Many thrilling deeds done by Federals and Confederates must remain forever unknown. But it may be said that the First Mississippi met in the Second Illinois foemen worthy of their steel, for nerve was required to make as well as to receive that impetuous charge. Though few of our men were killed, yet many were wounded, most of them but slightly. As victors we arranged to have the wounded cared for and to send our disabled south by way of the east.'

"Here this valuable paper gives many interesting details of the entry of the other Confederate commands, of the surrender of the Federal infantry, of the destruction of the vast stores of every kind accumulated for Grant's great army, and of the excitement and confusion necessarily incident to the occasion. The scene was described as 'wild and exciting, Federals running, Confederates pursuing and yelling, negroes and abolitionists begging for mercy, tents and houses burning, torches flaming, guns popping, sabers clanking, women in dreaming robes, clapping their hands with joy and shouting encouragement to the raiders, a mass of frantic human beings, presenting in the early morning hour a picture which words would not pretend to portray.'

"Van Dorn always kept his pursuers at a respectful distance and beat off all who attempted to intercept him, and finally returned to Grenada. The paper concludes as follows:

““ We had accomplished one of the most daring and successful raids of the war. In consequence of losing so important a post as Holly Springs, Col. Murphy was dismissed from the service in a stinging order by Gen. Grant, to take effect on December 20, the day of his capture. The destruction of the stores in Holly Springs was an irreparable loss to Grant. His army was thus suddenly deprived of sustenance. The Mississippi Central terminated at Jackson, Tenn., and Forrest from this point had completely destroyed the Mobile & Ohio Railroad to Columbus, Ky. With the fear inspired by the dashing Van Dorn and the reckless Forrest, Grant saw that he could not maintain a railroad in working order. Hence deeming his position untenable, he fell back to reopen communication with Memphis. He would not undertake to subsist his army on the country with Pemberton in his front and the dare-devil cavalry on flank and in his rear. He wisely determined to abandon this line altogether and to move his army down the Mississippi River from Memphis to Vicksburg.

““ Sherman, in the meantime, ignorant of what had happened at Holly Springs and of Grant's retreat, had proceeded to carry out his part of the prearranged program and had landed his forces on the bank of the Yazoo, attacking S. D. Lee at Chickasaw Bayou. It is claimed that Sherman might not have failed so completely if Grant could have pushed on and held Pemberton's forces in his front, thus preventing timely reinforcement of Lee.

““ In conclusion, I may join with Comrade Barron, of the Third Texas, in the statement that from the beginning of this raid into Holly Springs I was under the command of Van Dorn till his untimely death at Spring Hill, Tenn. Speaking from memory, and after an experience of four years in the Confederate cavalry under various leaders, including the intrepid Armstrong, the “Game-Cock” Chalmers, the cautious “Red” Jackson, and that all-round successful soldier, Stephen D. Lee, I must express the deliberate opinion that a more chivalrous soldier did not draw battle-blade in either army than Earl Van Dorn; and as a cavalry commander I do not believe he had a superior on the continent of America.’”

Mr. Stevenson's version is also given, as follows:

“I was a member of Company F, of the Third Texas Cavalry, Ross' Brigade, and after the battle at Corinth we fell back to

Holly Springs, thence to Lumpkin's Mill, where we were reinforced. We then fell back below Grenada, and one evening, during a brisk rain, we received orders to cook three days' rations, and be ready to move at a moment's warning. A short time after night the bugle sounded 'saddle up.' We mounted without knowing where we were going. We moved through Grenada and turned in a northeasterly direction, and between midnight and day the rain ceased, the clouds cleared away, the stars were bright, and by daylight there was considerable frost on the ground. We passed on up through Pontotoc and several other small towns. When within twenty or twenty-five miles of Holly Springs we halted, fed our horses, and drew a little tough beef, our rations being nearly exhausted. Gen. Van Dorn sent word around to 'the boys' to make out the best they could, as by the next morning he would have plenty for them. A little after dark we mounted and moved out toward Holly Springs. A scout was sent ahead to capture the Yankee pickets, which was done by our scouts getting between them and the town. We were marched up near town, and waited a short time until day dawned, when we charged the town. When we passed in, seeing Gen. Van Dorn on a little rise, seated on his fine black mare, holding his hat above his head, I thought him as fine a general as I had ever seen. As we dashed down one of the main streets, by a two-story residence on the right, there were on the little front portico up-stairs two ladies, mother and daughter doubtless, in their night dresses, both jumping up and down and clapping their hands, one of them crying at the top of her voice: 'I told the Yankees our boys would come in here and catch them. I told them so!' Both seemed to be as happy as mortals could possibly be. We captured everything but a few Yankees that jumped on their horses without waiting to dress, bare-backed, and most of them bare-headed. We got all the provisions we wanted, and plenty of guns, six-shooters, clothing, and horses. We burned large supplies for Grant's army. I understood that Mrs. Grant was in the town, and that Gen. Van Dorn put a guard around the house she occupied until we left. He paroled about 2,700 prisoners, and we then proceeded up the main lines of railroads, tearing them up and burning most of the bridges nearly up to Bolivar, Tenn. We had a hard engagement at Davis' Mill, the enemy being in a blockhouse. We also had a severe engagement

at Middleburg, Tenn., the enemy being in a large brick house, and we having no artillery with which to dislodge them. We then turned south and made our way back. Gen. Grant thought to cut us off at Ripley with his cavalry, but we beat them. While we were resting and taking a scant dinner, they attacked Col. Dudley Gaines' regiment, which was on picket, and he had a light engagement until we had time to move out. We then made our way back to the main army at Grenada. The raid was a complete success, and, I understood, prevented Grant from taking Vicksburg until the next year, which he did by way of the river."

Gen. Grant, in his *Memoirs*, Vol. I., pp. 431--435, says:

"Pemberton's force in my front was the main part of the garrison of Vicksburg, as the force with me was the defense of the territory held by us in West Tennessee and Kentucky. I hoped to hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rear and into Vicksburg. The further north the enemy could be held the better.

"It was understood, however, between Gen. Sherman and myself that our movements were to be cooperative; if Pemberton could not be held away from Vicksburg I was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected to abandon the railroad north of the Yallabusha. With that point as a secondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the Yazoo until communications could be opened with the Mississippi was contemplated.

"It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman and his command, that if the enemy should fall back I would follow him even to the gates of Vicksburg. I intended in such an event to hold the road to Grenada, on the Yallabusha, and cut loose from here, expecting to establish a new base of supplies on the Yazoo, or at Vicksburg itself, with Grenada to fall back upon in case of failure. It should be remembered that at the time I speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies. A halt was called at Oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, to bring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions to the front.

"On the 18th of December I received orders from Washington to divide my command into four army corps, with Gen. McClernand to command one of them and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operate down the Mississippi.

This interfered with my plans, but probably resulted in my ultimately taking the command in person. McClernand was at that time in Springfield, Ill. The order was obeyed without any delay. Despatches were sent him the same day in conformity.

"On the 20th Gen. Van Dorn appeared at Holly Springs, my secondary base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men commanded by Col. Murphy, of the Eighth Wisconsin Regiment, and destroyed all our munitions of war, food, and forage. The capture was a disgraceful one to the officer commanding, but not to the troops under him. At the same time Forrest got on our line of railroad between Jackson, Tenn., and Columbus, Ky., doing much damage to it. This cut me off from all communication with the North for more than a week, and it was more than two weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtained in the regular way. This demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy's country. I determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign into the interior with Columbus as a base, and returned to La Grange and Grand Junction, destroying the road to my front and repairing the road to Memphis, making the Mississippi River the line over which to draw supplies. Pemberton was falling back at the same time.

"The moment I received the news of Van Dorn's success I sent the cavalry at the front back to drive him from the country. He had start enough to move north, destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack several small garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad. All these he found warned of his coming and prepared to receive him. Van Dorn did not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at Holly Springs, which was larger than all the others attacked by him put together. Murphy was also warned of Van Dorn's approach, but made no preparations to meet him. He did not even notify his command. . . .

"The surrender of Holly Springs was most reprehensible and showed either the disloyalty of Col. Murphy or gross cowardice.

"Our loss of supplies was great at Holly Springs, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from the country and by the lesson taught.

"The news of the capture of Holly Springs and the destruction of our supplies caused much rejoicing among the people

remaining in Oxford. They came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, to ask what I was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat. I told them that I was not disturbed; that I had already sent troops and wagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteen miles on each side of the road. Countenances soon changed, and so did the inquiry. The next was, 'What are we to do?' My response was that we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own Northern resources while visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enough to destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected that men, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty. I advised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist in eating up what we left."

Gen. Grant further states that:

"Vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first high ground coming close to the river below Memphis. From there a railroad runs east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of the Southern States. A railroad also starts from the opposite side of the river, extending west as far as Shreveport, La. Vicksburg was the only channel, at the time of the events of which this chapter treats, connecting the parts of the Confederacy divided by the Mississippi. So long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation of the river was prevented. Hence its importance. Points on the river between Vicksburg and Port Hudson were held as dependencies; but their fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place.

"The campaign against Vicksburg commenced on the 2d of November (1862), as indicated in a despatch to the general-in-chief in the following words: 'I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction, with three divisions from Corinth and two from Bolivar.. Will leave here (Jackson, Tenn,) tomorrow, and take command in person. If found practicable, I will go to Holly Springs, and maybe Grenada, completing railroad and telegraph as I go.'

* * * * *

"Holly Springs I selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war, all of which at that time came by rail from Columbus, Ky., except the few stores collected about La Grange and Grand Junction. . . . On the 15th of November, while I

was still at Holly Springs, I sent word to Sherman to meet me at Columbus. We were about forty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was for me to take the rail to Columbus, and Sherman a steamer for the same place. At that meeting, besides talking over my general plans, I gave him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down the Mississippi Central Railroad, if he could. Sherman, who was always prompt, was up by the 29th to Cottage Hill, ten miles north of Oxford. He brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only four regiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery, and a small detachment of cavalry. . . . Pemberton's force in my front was the main part of the garrison of Vicksburg, as the force with me was the defense of the territory held by us in West Tennessee and Kentucky. I hoped to hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rear and into Vicksburg. The further north the enemy could be held the better. . . . It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman and his command, that if the enemy should fall back I would follow him even to the gates of Vicksburg."

From this account it will be seen what an important movement was on foot by Gen. Grant, who was commanding in person, when he was turned back from his design to capture Vicksburg, that point being the key to the State of Mississippi and the Mississippi River, and how disastrously he was defeated in his scheme to go to the "gates of Vicksburg," by this route, by the capture of Holly Springs (the base of his supplies), by Gen. Van Dorn.

After the evacuation of this region of country by Generals Grant and Sherman, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was made the superior officer to Bragg and Pemberton, and Gen. Van Dorn was given command of all the cavalry in North Mississippi and Tennessee, and was ordered to proceed to make a campaign into Tennessee.

AN INTERESTING INCIDENT.

"ABBEVILLE, MISS., Nov. 29, 1862.

"To Gen. Waul, 'Waul Legion,' Rocky Ford, Miss.

"GENERAL:

"A few kind-hearted and patriotic little schoolgirls of my native town, Port Gibson, have sent me a hundred pairs of fine

woolen socks, knit by their own hands, to be distributed to the Texas soldiers of my command. Please accept them for your Legion, and give them to those most in need.

"You will observe that these little angels identify me with Texas. They are right. I am a Texan, a Mississippian no longer, except in my love for the pure-hearted children of her soil who have not yet learned to make the name and fame of one of her sons the butt of malignant archery. Bless them, they belong to no State, neither are they cosmopolitan; they are of heaven.

"Respects to your good wife, and, believe me, very sincerely and respectfully your friend and obedient servant,

"EARL VAN DORN,
"Major-General."

To which Gen. Waul replied:

"HEADQUARTERS WAUL'S TEXAS LEGION,
"GRENADA, MISS., December 12, 1862.

"MAJ. GEN. EARL VAN DORN.

"MY DEAR SIR:

"The most timely gift of one hundred pairs of socks, knit by the little girls of your native town, have been received, and in compliance with your wishes distributed to the privates, now needy, in the Legion. The value of the present is greatly enhanced by the circumstances under which they have been received.

"It was peculiarly fit and proper that you should be the organ, from these pure and patriotic children, to Texans, for, sir, we have marked and claimed you for our own through the different grades of your deserved and honorable promotion, and we have gloried in the advancement of the gallant soldier who wielded the keenest blade upon our Western border, and has ever been esteemed the mirror of gallant deeds and honorable conduct.

"The Legion was raised and each man enlisted by orders of the Secretary of War, expressly for your command. The rapidity with which the ranks were filled, and the character of men recruited, was a compliment worthy of you.

"After crossing the Mississippi at Vicksburg, the ever enduring monument of your skill and valor, we found that rumor with her thousand tongues was busy with your reputation, in a manner

well calculated to weaken the confidence of the soldiers in this command. Need I say the evil reports fell upon unwilling ears, and although sufficient to awake observation, time and contact have confirmed our appreciation of your merits as a soldier and a gentleman.

"I feel proud in saying that there is not an officer in the Legion who would not glory to win his spurs under your leadership, not a man who would not go willingly wherever you direct, knowing it could only be on the path of duty and honor.

"Will you say to the youthful maidens of Port Gibson, we hope that the history of the Legion may be referred to hereafter by them with the pleasant recollection that they had added to its comfort, and by their sympathy had awakened fond recollections of their own firesides and the angels in their distant homes.

"May no disappointment ever canker their young hearts, or make what is now the abode of purity and trust a receptacle for that spirit that believeth evil and slakes its thirst by evil speaking.

"May the freshness of their young hearts never wither and the same confidence they repose in others be returned to them a thousand-fold.

"May the love that trusteth all never fail, and their future be as happy as their present is guileless.

"I am most respectfully your friend,

"T. N. WAUL,
"Col. Commanding Legion."

CHAPTER XI.

VISIT HOME.

IN the latter part of December, 1862, not very long after the battle of Corinth and the capture of Holly Springs, and prior to going into West Tennessee to take command of a large body of cavalry to which he had been assigned, Gen. Van Dorn took a short leave of absence to visit his family in Alabama, about thirty miles north of Mobile. After the many hardships and narrow escapes he had made with his life from cannon balls, shells, and *pens* (a weapon more deadly than either), this brief reunion with his wife and children was a privilege and pleasure well appreciated, and which proved his last meeting with them on earth.

While at the beautiful new home of his wife's mother, his artistic taste and skill were called into play in directing the laying off the grounds into flower beds, walks, and driveways. The hospitable people of the neighborhood were enthusiastic in their reception of him, and took pride in entertaining the General with fêtes and evening parties. After a few days he tore himself from his family to resume his duties and perils, and after his departure his little daughter, who had followed him around the grounds in his work, with her hands filled with small stakes, found her father's footprints in the shifting white sand, and drove around each one the little stakes, thinking in her infantile mind to thus preserve the sweet memory of his visit—a touching tribute of affection. In her happiness at seeing her father again after so long a separation she expressed it in these lines: "My dear Papa gave us an agreeable surprise by coming when we least expected him; he awakened me with a kiss, and you may well imagine my joy and delight. He staid with us a few days only. Cousin Clement was with him. We spent a pleasant evening at Mrs. Calvert's together, and Papa was pleased that we had so many charming neighbors. Buddie (the son Earl, Jr.) can read

now and write his name, and the other day wrote his name in a letter to Papa." To which Mrs. Van Dorn adds a postscript: "Were you not surprised to hear that Earl had paid me a visit? It was a delightful surprise, I assure you. He came in immediately after his expedition into West Tennessee, where, I supposed, he was up to the time of his arrival here. He said that he would never stay away so long again. If I had expected his coming I should have notified you by telegram. I have read the proceedings of that Court of Inquiry, and everything was disproved, and all the slanders the people of his State had circulated were repudiated, and by those who were with him and knew him best. His vindication was perfect. His friends in the army stood by him, while the people of his native State were his enemies. Does that not seem strange? It is not easy for any man to escape censure, and slander needs but little labor to assist its circulation. He has passed through a severe ordeal, but I knew all the time that *my* General was all right. Earl says that Earl Miller is very brave. . . . I have been knitting stockings for Olivia, and have some homespun material to make her a dress."

CHAPTER XII.

LAST DAYS.

"Soothsayers may menace and wives may dream dreams, but when the hour comes, Cæsar will go to the appointed spot where the daggers of his assassins await him."

GEN. JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON had become the Confederate leader in the West and the superior of Bragg and Pemberton. He sent for Gen. Van Dorn and recognized that his true place in the army, by reason of his experience and his temperament and training, was in the cavalry arm of the service. He was also a full major-general, and the cavalry brigadiers would not demur at coming under his command. Gen. Johnston placed him at the head of a large body of cavalry, with Generals Forrest, W. H. Jackson and Frank C. Armstrong under him. With this force Gen. Van Dorn entered upon an important campaign in Central Tennessee, on the flank of Gen. Rosecrans' army, in support of Gen. Bragg; and with this combination was moving on one of the most important expeditions of his life.

Early in March, 1863, he lay at Spring Hill, Tenn., skirmishing in the direction of Franklin, an outpost strongly fortified by the enemy. Rosecrans sent the brigades of Sheridan and Colonel Colburn against him, and in a sharp fight at Thompson Station, on the 5th of March, Colburn's brigade was routed and nearly all captured.

Early in April, rumors reached Gen. Van Dorn that the enemy was evacuating Franklin, and on the 10th he moved his whole command forward on a reconnaissance in force, but instead of evacuating the post it was found that the place had been strengthened in its position, and the impetuous Confederates were met in front with fortified batteries, while strong bodies of cavalry fell upon their flanks. Gen. Van Dorn then withdrew to Spring Hill. Meanwhile, Gen. Rosecrans and Gen. Bragg stood at arm's length watching each other, and Gen. Van Dorn's movements

were awaiting orders from Gen. Bragg to advance. His cavalry lay at this place two weeks. During this time he wrote many letters and wired many telegrams, some of which will be found in the Appendix.

A correspondent from the seat of war writes thus of the situation:

"The commander of the new organization is well known to the reading public. He was a cavalry officer in the old service, and his merits rapidly raised him until he became a brevet major in the old United States Army; Lee and Johnston were colonels in the same Second Cavalry in which Van Dorn was in Texas at the outbreak of the rebellion, and he was instrumental in bringing over to our cause many officers and soldiers of the old service, with whom he was very popular. His strategy and dash were at once called into requisition by the presence of several large garrisons of the enemy in Texas, which he had assigned himself the task of ejecting. Raising a small volunteer force, he led them, together with a portion of his old regular command, numbering in all less than 300, and menaced a garrison of Yankee regulars, numbering about 700. Approaching the position of the enemy, he displayed his scanty forces to the best advantage, maneuvered them vauntingly in sight of the garrison, and sent in a demand for its surrender. The enemy were greatly deceived in regard to our numbers, and after a short resistance, the 700 regular United States troops surrendered to Van Dorn's strategy—certainly not to his force.

"The next heard of him was in the brilliant affair of the capture of the 'Star of the West,' the vessel sent out to reinforce and provision Fort Sumter, which passed on to Texas. Van Dorn learning of her arrival, gathered his determined Texans on board a steamer, and put out for the 'Star of the West'—the commander of that vessel being unaware that Van Dorn was a rebel, and believing him to be in the old service.

"In the spring of 1863 he was the chief commander of the cavalry of Bragg's army, then at Tullahoma; he had as brigade commanders Armstrong, Jackson, Cosby, and Martin, and with about 8,000 men, was preparing to move across the Ohio. His command was bivouacked in the fertile region of Middle Tennessee. His headquarters were at Spring Hill, and almost daily he would engage the enemy with one of his brigades while the other

three were carefully drilled. His horses were in fine order and his men in better drill, discipline, and spirit than our cavalry had ever been. He was preparing to move on the most important enterprise of his life. I believe that in him we lost the greatest cavalry soldier of his time. His knowledge of roads and country was wonderful. He knew how to care for his men and horses. His own wants were few; his habits simple; he was energetic and enduring; he deferred everything to his military duty; he craved glory beyond everything—high glory; there was no stain of vainglory about anything he ever did or said. As the bravest are ever the greatest, so was he simple and kind, and gentle as a child."

GENERAL BRAGG'S REPORT OF THE ENGAGEMENT REFERRED TO IN
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 68.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,

"TULLAHOMA, TENN., March 31, 1863.

"The General Commanding announces with pride and gratification to the troops of his command two brilliant and successful affairs recently achieved by the forces of the cavalry of Maj.-Gen. Van Dorn.

"On the 5th inst. Maj.-Gen. Van Dorn made a gallant charge upon a large force of the enemy at Thompson's Station. He utterly routed him, killing and wounded a large number, capturing twelve hundred and twenty-one prisoners, including seventy-three commissioned officers, and many arms.

"On the 23d inst., Brig.-Gen. Forrest, with the troops of his command, daringly assailed the enemy at Brentwood, who could not withstand the vigor and energy of the attack and surrendered—captured. The results of his successful expedition were the capture of seven hundred and fifty privates and thirty-five commissioned officers, with all their arms, accouterments, ammunition, and sixteen wagons and teams. The troops here captured constituted the remainder of the brigade so successfully attacked by Maj.-Gen. Van Dorn on the 5th inst.

"The skilful manner in which these generals achieved their success exhibits clearly the judgment, discipline, and good conduct of the brave troops of their command.

"Such signal examples of duty the General Commanding takes pleasure in commending. They are worthy of imitation by all

commanders, and deserve the applause and gratitude of their comrades in arms and their country.

“By command of General Bragg.

“GEORGE WM. BRENT, *A. A. General.*

“Official.”

At Spring Hill, the headquarters of Gen. Van Dorn at this time, he and his staff occupied the house of a citizen of the town. His bodyguard encamped near, and the scene was one of rest to the troops, but one of unrest and waiting to the commanding general. During their stay at this place the officers made the acquaintance of members of the family in the house, and outside, and among them a number of ladies, who, like many ladies of the South and North at that period of peril and excitement, bestowed many kindnesses and attentions upon the soldiers of the armies. One of these ladies was a married woman, whose husband was quite prominent in the affairs of the place, and on account of his wife's attentions to the officers, and particularly to the commanding officer, professed to be jealous, and made this pretense a motive for the dark deed which was lurking in his breast. Gen. Van Dorn being an alert, fearless, and skilful commander, gave the enemy great cause for watchfulness, and to get rid of him and his gallant command was a factor in the affairs then pending.

On the 7th of May, 1863, as Gen. Van Dorn sat in his room at his desk, conferring with one of his staff, this man—this assassin—with evil design, but pretending friendliness, entered the room and asked the favor of a passport to go into Nashville, through the Confederate lines. The staff officer withdrew, and Gen. Van Dorn turned to his desk to write the passport, and before his full signature was signed to the paper, on some pretext the man passed to his rear, fired the fatal bullet in the back of his head, and walked out—mounted his horse; and, having prepared relays of horses and left the fences torn down through the country, he fled across the fields and into the enemy's lines, too swiftly for the bodyguard to mount and pursue him.

All was excitement and confusion, and in the midst of the clamor the assassin escaped, none too soon, for several thousand

cavalrymen were in hot pursuit. Had they caught him they would have torn him limbless. He remained under Federal protection until after the war, and years after the war, having secured a divorce from his wife (to give color to a cause for his crime), remarried his wife, whom he had degraded by a false pretense and motive for his deed. It is stated that the assassin went at once to Nashville to claim his reward, and it is a fact that his plantation on the banks of the Mississippi, which had been confiscated, was soon recovered, and he remained upon it until his death.

The dastardly crime, however, led to a series of tragedies in the family of the murderer, his daughter taking the black veil for life, and a son committed suicide after receiving a letter from the staff officers of Gen. Van Dorn, in reply to one he had written, asking if it were true that they had resolved to take the life of his father at sight, to which they replied that *they* were not assassins. The murderer lived in mortal terror of his life, his conscience making a coward of him, up to the time of his death. At one time a pistol ball passed through the pillow on which he was sleeping.

Various accounts of this tragedy have been published in many Southern and Northern papers which were greatly exaggerated and misrepresented, and greatly to the dishonor and defamation of Gen. Van Dorn, but the foregoing statement of facts has been authenticated by parties present all the while, and also by the lady herself, who asserts that Gen. Van Dorn never approached her by word or deed save in the most respectful manner.

And thus passed away the hero of a score or more of the nation's battles and martial strife. His life had been one fearless of danger, reckless, undaunted, and devoted; and he was a leader—a most valuable factor for the enemy to remove.

Like a thunderbolt from a clear sky, and while on the eve of one of the most daring expeditions of his career, these announcements came to the army and the devoted adherents of Earl Van Dorn:

"Telegram.

TULLAHOMA, Tenn., May 7, 1863.

"To

"GENERAL S. COOPER,

"Adjutant-General, Richmond, Va.

"SIR:—I have just received the painful intelligence of the

death of the distinguished Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn, which occurred this morning at Spring Hill.

“J. E. JOHNSON, *General*.”

By order of Gen. W. H. Jackson, the following eloquent announcement was given out in General Order No. 3:

(*Mobile Register*, May 3, 1863.)

“HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY CORPS,

“SPRING HILL, TENN., May 7, 1863.

“General Orders No. 3.

“It becomes the sad duty of the Brig.-General Commanding to announce to this corps the death of its late beloved and gallant commander, Maj.-Gen. Earl Van Dorn. He departed this life at 1 o'clock P. M. to-day. The sorrow with which his death is announced will be deeply felt by the country and by this corps; for to it his loss is an irreparable one. His career has been eventful—an educated soldier, he has served with distinction in the armies of his country for nearly a quarter of a century, with varied successes, at times shrouded and enveloped in the gloom of defeat—at others his career made resplendent with the most glorious victories; but in the midst of it all he has presented the same calm intrepid front; self-sustaining, self-reliant, he bared his breast to every shock with that true genuine nobleness and courage which he so eminently possessed. At the commencement of the present war he occupied a very high position in the army of the United States, which he had won for himself by his own valor and military skill, unaided by any influence from powerful friends. Upon the dismemberment of the Federal Union, he was amongst the first to resign his position, and espouse the cause of his native State, Mississippi, by whose authority he was placed in command of her forces second only to Jefferson Davis. Probably more interest has gathered around him than any other general officer on this Continent; for amidst the glory that his deeds had won for himself, a storm of obloquy and censure burst upon him at one time, and his friends trembled for his safety; but with his wonted calmness steadily and bravely he met his relentless enemies and hurled every charge triumphantly and proudly back upon them, making for himself a complete and magnificent vindication. It stands upon record. It is enrolled in the archives of the nation.

“Upon the battle-field he was the personification of courage

and chivalry. No knight of the olden time ever advanced to the contest more eagerly, and after the fury of the conflict had passed away, none was ever more generous and humane to the sufferers than he. As a commanding officer he was warmly beloved and highly respected; as a gentleman his social qualities were of the rarest order—for goodness of heart he had no equal.

“His deeds have rendered his name worthy to be enrolled by the side of the proudest in the Capital of the Confederacy, and long will be sacredly and proudly cherished in the hearts of his command.

“By order of Brig.-Gen. W. H. Jackson,

“GEO. MORMAN, *Capt. & A. A. General.*

“May 15, 1863.”

(Mobile Register.)

“May 7, 1863.”

DEATH OF GENERAL VAN DORN.

“The news this morning of the violent death of Gen. Van Dorn will be received with surprise and sorrow by the public. We have at this writing no particulars of the sad business, except that he was assassinated, and that the assassin had escaped.

“Gen. Van Dorn was every inch a soldier and just beginning to reap the reward of public confidence and praise. His loss will be severely felt in that branch of the service of which he was so complete a master.

An eyewitness writes:

“As we watched the immense procession of soldiers, the hearse drawn by six white horses, its gorgeous array of white and black plumes, that bore the grand casket in which the dead hero lay, we thought with sorrow of the handsome face still in death and the heart-broken wife thus cruelly widowed.”

After lying in state in Columbia, Tenn., the remains of Gen. Van Dorn were conveyed by members of his staff to the home of his wife in Alabama, and there deposited beneath the sighing pines of that State. The following lines from a staff officer will better describe the sorrowful rites attending the last scenes of the burial of Gen. Van Dorn. His little daughter was the chief

mourner visible at his bier, the wife being too much prostrated by grief to leave her room.

"I have the most vivid recollection of all the incidents attending the great military procession to his grave (the remains after lying in state in the court-house at Columbia, Tenn., for a day, having been temporarily deposited in the family vault of the Polks (Gen. Lucius Polk's first wife and mother of all his children having been one of the Donelson cousins), and my journey with a guard of honor to Col. Godbold's house, and the burial there under the sighing pines, about forty yards from the house, and the exquisite little Olivia, weeping and clinging to my hand as she walked to the grave as chief mourner—Mrs. Van Dorn remaining in her room. Poor little Olivia was the most charming child at twelve years of age I ever saw; it was only in the month of January preceding that I had gone to Mt. Vernon to hasten the General's return to the army in obedience to a telegram from Gen. Johnston, and had made the above remark to him, and his face at once glowed with tenderness as he rejoined that, 'for years she had always reminded him of some exquisite melody,' and recited some original lines addressed to his daughter:

"In the desert of my life is a fountain of bright water
That keeps one oasis of its sands ever green,
'Tis the sheen of an angel, 'tis the eye of my daughter
That gladdens my heart with its love-lighted beam."

The family burial spot at Port Gibson was at the time of Gen. Van Dorn's death in the lines of the enemy, and the remains could not be taken to that place, which would have been the proper one for their sepulture beside his father and mother. But many years after, the sacred remains were removed to his native place and laid there; and though no sculptured marble may arise to his memory, nor engraved stone record his deeds, yet the pages of history must embalm his memory. Marble will crumble and ail impressions upon stone crumble and fade away; but his *name* will stand upon the pages of American history while the nation remains a nation of heroes, and men who recognize with justice the treasured honor of the soldiers, whose *bodies* lie buried, but whose *names* will live forever.

The Northern and Southern press published so many false rumors regarding the circumstances that led to the death of Gen.

Van Dorn, that his staff officers gave out a reliable statement of the sad occurrence as they knew the facts to be. The assassin made many absurd statements to save himself from lynching; at one time being captured while at his plantation by scouts from the cavalry command of Gen. W. H. Jackson, who had to double the guard around the man to save his life from infuriated Texas troops. He was taken to the headquarters of Gen. Polk, and upon his false representations and other influences, obtained his release on a writ of habeas corpus.

“MOBILE, May 15, 1863.

“*Editors Advertiser and Register:*

“We, the undersigned, members of the late Gen. Van Dorn's staff, having seen with pain and regret the various rumors afloat in the public press, in relation to the circumstances attending that officer's death, deem it our duty to make a plain statement of the facts in the case.

“Gen. Van Dorn was shot in his own room, at Spring Hill, Tenn., by a citizen of the neighborhood. He was shot in the back of the head, while engaged in writing at his table, and entirely unconscious of any meditated hostility on the part of the man who had been left in the room with him apparently in friendly conversation, scarce fifteen minutes previously, by Maj. Kimmel. Neither Gen. Van Dorn nor ourselves were suspicious in the slightest degree of enmity in the mind of the assassin, or we would certainly not have left them alone together, nor would Gen. Van Dorn have been shot, as we found him five minutes later sitting in his chair, with his back towards his enemy.

“There had been friendly visits between them up to the very date of the unfortunate occurrence.

“Gen. Van Dorn had never seen the daughter of his murderer but once; while his acquaintance with the wife was such as to convince us, his staff officers, who had every opportunity of knowing, that there was no improper intimacy between them; and for our own part, we are led to believe that there were other and darker motives, from the fact that the assassin had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States Government, while in Nashville two weeks previously—as we are informed by refugees from that city—that he had remarked in Columbia, a short time before, ‘that he had lost his land and negroes in Arkansas, but he thought he would shortly do something which would get them

back'; and finally, that having beforehand torn down fences and prepared relays of horses, he made his escape across the country direct to the enemy's lines.

"Such is the simple history of the affair, and we trust that in bare justice to the memory of a gallant soldier, the papers that have given publicity to the false rumors above alluded to—rumors alike injurious to the living and to the dead—will give place in their columns to this vindication of his name.

"M. H. KIMMEL, *Maj. and A. A. G.*

"W. C. SCHAUMBURG, *A. A. G.*

"CLEMENT SULIVANE, *Aide-de-Camp.*

"R. SHOEMAKER, *Aide-de-Camp.*"

At the time of the death of Col. J. F. H. Claiborne, of Mississippi, he was engaged in writing a history of the State and its public men. He was a well-known author and journalist, and a distinguished citizen of the State, who was cotemporaneous with its greatest men as well as the most interesting periods of its history. No man was better equipped for the work than he, hence his loss is irreparable, and many important events and interesting scenes which he was preparing to perpetuate will be lost forever from the history of Mississippi. In a letter to a staff officer of Gen. Van Dorn, he said: "I am extremely anxious to write an elaborate memoir of the heroic service of Earl Van Dorn, because I had known him from his boyhood, and his father was one of my earliest personal and political friends. I wish to write the General's vindication as a soldier and as a man, and I am anxious to place him on the highest ground, and my vindication above criticism. His career in Mexico, in Texas, and in the first years of the Civil War, must all be set forth, and I will proceed with my task, which to me will be a labor of love. He was the most brilliant, high-toned man that this State ever gave birth to; he reflected luster on her escutcheon; he was basely traduced, and there is no labor that would give me more satisfaction than to rebuke his slanderers by the recapitulation of his noble deeds, and by a faithful portraiture of his many virtues and lofty attainments."

As a feeble substitute for Col. Claiborne's facile and trenchant pen, this sketch is given as a small part of the task he had in hand.

In 1899 the remains of General Van Dorn were removed from their neglected resting place in Alabama and reinterred in the cemetery at Port Gibson beside his parents. His wife and daughter had died, the place in Alabama had passed into stranger hands, and after an interment of thirty and more years the grave disclosed his soft light hair, and all the emblems of his rank—the belt, buckle, buttons, and epaulettes of his military clothing. In the beautiful cemetery at Port Gibson a simple pine board marks the spot where he lies, with the blue sky he loved so well spanning in one arch his grave and the home of his birth, and bears upon it the name of *Major-General Earl Van Dorn*. The earth is a noble sepulcher for one of America's soldiers—hero, warrior, patriot,—and in the hearts of his comrades is enshrined a memorial to his deeds, character, and memorable service.

Thus, in these pages, has passed in review the birth, family associations, education, military career, and the public and private character of an American soldier and citizen, who won his rank by his indomitable energy, patriotic devotion, and tender love for the land of his birth, and his zeal in defense of what he deemed his right, his inheritance, and his HONOR.

When a citizen is assailed and calumny takes the place of applause, and when the grave has closed over a brave man and rendered him defenseless, it becomes the sacred duty of the biographer to rescue his name and fame from injustice and ingratitude. Shakespeare says: "Men's evil manners live in brass; we write their virtues in water," and what is called fame or reputation is but a bubble to be exploded with a breath.

Telemachus said to Menelaus: "I ask thee not to soften aught in the sad history through tenderness to me, or kind regard, but tell me plainly all that thou dost know, and let me have the naked truth." The friendship of books never dies, but that of man perishes in life; therefore, let books be written and the truth be told that the motives and deeds of the actors that make history may be rightfully judged."

REMINISCENCES.

The appended eloquent and graphic reminiscences of facts and incidents connected with the campaigns and life of General

Van Dorn do him full justice and will be read with pleasure by surviving friends who knew him best and who appreciated his genial and social qualities through an eventful and perilous military career.

DASHING GENERAL VAN DORN.

THRILLING EPISODES IN THE CAREER OF A CONFEDERATE LEADER.

(From the *San Francisco Visitor*.)

"The bullet of the assassin which cut short the military career of General Van Dorn in the spring of 1863 undoubtedly changed the course of the minor, if not of the greater, events of the war in the West. Forrest's exploits from 1862 to 1865 showed that great service could be rendered the Confederacy by mounted men led by dashing commanders. Van Dorn had all of Forrest's personal courage and restless energy, and he had at the outset what Forrest won only by slow and painful effort—the confidence and approval of his superiors, and at the moment of his tragic death was at the head of a corps of cavalry in a field offering every advantage for brilliant results. Forrest was at the time a brigade commander under Van Dorn, and the death of the leader broke up the corps.

"Van Dorn entered the fight in 1861 with the prestige of a trained West Point soldier who had seen hard service, and, moreover, he was a cavalryman with a record. He had served in the border troubles in Mexico, and against the wild Apaches and Comanches, and his name was a familiar one in many a home in the Southwest, where the veterans of those wars recounted the deeds of their comrades into the receptive ears of the boys growing up to be warriors, too, when the time came. In the news from Cerro Gordo, Van Dorn had been gazetted a hero; so, too, at Cherubusco, Chapultepec, and the gates of Mexico he had come off with scars and brevets.

"When the Southern army was regularly organized Van Dorn's promotion was rapid, for he was under the eyes of men who knew his record, and, in fact, had served with him while he was making it. He entered the Confederate service as Colonel of Cavalry in March, 1861, and before the year closed was a

Major-General, commanding the Trans-Mississippi department. This last assignment was given him while he was in Virginia. He hastened to the field of action, which was along the Missouri and Arkansas border, with his plans laid for a campaign. He would attack St. Louis, break up the Union headquarters there, cross to Illinois, and erect powerful batteries, and so control the upper Mississippi channel and hold Missouri to the Confederacy.

"The people of the West who sided with the Confederacy took hope, for they looked upon the dashing and graceful, though small statured, Van Dorn as a young Napoleon and a savior.

"General Sterling Price was at the head of an army of Missourians, organized for State defense against the Federal Government, and lay at Springfield, in the southern part of the State. Van Dorn at once ordered all the Confederate forces in the Southwest to report to Price, and to his own headquarters at Pochontas, just across the border in Arkansas. Before the concentration of forces could be effected Price was driven out of Springfield and across the border by a strong Union force under General S. R. Curtis. Van Dorn then turned his attention to Curtis and pushed all the scattering detachments forward to Price's camp. Curtis had followed Price into Arkansas and held a strong position in the mountains. On the 4th of March, 1862, Van Dorn moved against Curtis with 16,000 men, divided into two columns. A force of 10,000 men, led by Generals Ben McCulloch and James McIntosh, was ordered to begin a direct attack, while Van Dorn and Price would make a detour and strike the Union army on the flank. This turning column was pushed out on the night of the 6th with secrecy and boldness worthy of a 'Stonewall' Jackson.

"The battle was joined on all sides on the afternoon of the 7th of March on the field known as Pea Ridge. The column under Van Dorn and Price carried everything before it, but nightfall put a stop to the movement, just when victory was within grasp. McCulloch and McIntosh had not done so well, however. Both of these leaders had fallen, and General Hébert, who took chief command when they fell, was a prisoner. On the morning of the 8th Van Dorn found that Curtis had taken up a new position, and that the main column of his own army was badly broken up by its experiences of the previous day. He renewed the battle without success.

“This took place a month before the battle of Shiloh, on the east side of the Mississippi, and at that very time General Halleck was sending troops down the country to attack Beauregard at Corinth. Van Dorn was ordered by his superiors to place his army within supporting distance of Beauregard. He answered the instructions by saying that he would ‘relieve Beauregard by giving battle to the enemy at New Madrid’ (on the Mississippi), or by marching ‘boldly and rapidly toward St. Louis.’ Either of these moves would have been a blow in the rear of Grant, who was struggling on toward Shiloh, and had they been made the history of the war in the Mississippi Valley would doubtless have been changed. But while on the march toward the Mississippi Van Dorn was suddenly ordered to take his command as quickly as possible to Memphis. He did so, but too late to save Beauregard at Shiloh, and his opportunity to strike a blow in Grant’s rear on the Upper Mississippi had passed.

“After the Confederates abandoned Corinth and the new commander, Bragg, had transferred the bulk of the forces to Chattanooga to invade Kentucky, in the summer of 1862, Van Dorn was placed in command of the district of Mississippi with orders to hold the defenses of the river. General Grant was at Jackson, Tenn., holding a force at Corinth under General Rosecrans. General Buell was in Kentucky heading off Bragg, and Grant was detaching heavily from his army to aid Buell. Van Dorn was correspondingly ordered to do something to menace Grant and prevent him from detaching against Bragg. After weighing all the circumstances he decided that an invasion of West Tennessee to the Kentucky border by the Confederates in Mississippi would fully accomplish what was expected of him. As a preliminary he would fall upon Corinth and dispose of that Union stronghold, so as to leave nothing important to threaten his rear while marching in West Tennessee. Under the belief that Rosecrans had been weakened by loss of detachments sent to Buell, he attacked the works around the town on October 3 and bivouacked that night within an easy rifle range of the citadel. ‘One hour of daylight,’ he said, would have given him victory. He ordered the attack renewed on the morning of the 4th, but owing to the sickness of General Hébert, one of his division leaders, the fighting was delayed until Rosecrans got his troops in hand at the threatened points and saved the day by a narrow

chance. Van Dorn retreated, and West Tennessee was safe for a time.

"Van Dorn fell into temporary disfavor on account of his failure at Corinth, but he had a friend at court who was no less a personage than Jefferson Davis himself. Davis had really brought about the Corinth affair by ordering that Van Dorn should control all the troops in Mississippi. But for that Van Dorn would have been less presumptuous. Neither failure nor loss of prestige, however, could dampen his ardor, and after the excitement over Bragg's invasion had subsided and General Grant had resumed the forward movement down the Mississippi overland, the long exposed line of Union communications in Northern Mississippi and West Tennessee invited such attacks as Van Dorn had theretofore planned but had not been able to carry out. The supply depot of Grant's land column was at Holly Springs, Miss., on the Mississippi Central.

"After Bragg's failure in the Kentucky invasion he had settled his army down at Murfresboro, in the central part of the State, to cover Chattanooga, Grant's threatening movement toward Vicksburg was so alarming in the eyes of the Richmond people that Bragg was called upon to send troops back to Mississippi. Feeling that he had enough to do at home to take care of the Army of the Cumberland that had hounded him out of Kentucky, and was still hot on the trail, he sent General Forrest to raid West Tennessee, and, if possible, defeat Grant's plans. Forrest did his work with his usual thoroughness, but did not strike below Jackson, Tenn., seventy miles north of Holly Springs. By one of those lucky strokes that often turn the tide in war, Van Dorn, acting on his own hook, made a swoop with a band of cavalry from Grenada, Miss., to Holly Springs, cut the telegraph by which Grant kept up his correspondence with Washington, and with his subordinates on the lines north of him, and for several days, with one enemy raiding in the rear and another hovering about its camps, the Army of the Tennessee was in a state of isolation as great as though steam roads and telegraphs had never been invented. Van Dorn also destroyed military stores valued at \$600,000 to \$1,000,000, and misled the troopers sent out by Grant to intercept him. So rapid were his movements that Grant's outlying scouts were beaten in the race to camp.

"Unquestionably Van Dorn's dash was a godsend to Forrest,

for it diverted attention from his movements in the direction where his danger was greatest. It was the first brilliant success to come to the Confederates out of Mississippi, and Van Dorn became the hero of the hour, past ill fortunes being forgotten."

General Fitzhugh Lee writes:

"I was assigned, when I graduated at West Point, to the famous Second Cavalry, U. S. Army, now the Fifth, then stationed in Texas.

Field Officers.	{ Albert Sidney Johnston was its Colonel.	
	Robert E. Lee,	Lieut.-Colonel.
	Wm. I. Hardee,	Senior Major.
	George H. Thomas,	Junior Major.
Brevet Major	Earl Van Dorn,	Troop A, Senior Captain.
	E. Kirby Smith,	" B, Captain.
	James Oaks,	" C, Captain.
	Innis Palmer,	" D, Captain.
	George Stoneham,	" E, Captain.
	Richard W. Johnson,	" F, Captain.
	Wm. R. Bradfute,	" G, Captain.
	Nathan G. Evans,	" H, Captain.
	Charles I. Whiting,	" K, Captain.

"It had a full complement of First and Second Lieutenants, and furnished more general officers from 1861 to 1865 than any other regiment in the army.

"In those days probably the two most distinguished officers, except the field officers, were Captain (Brevet Major) Van Dorn, and First Lieutenant John B. Hood, who at an early period greatly distinguished themselves in Indian warfare.

"I remember Van Dorn very distinctly at that period, though I was the second lieutenant of Captain Smith's troop, and not an officer of A Troop. He was thoroughly a soldier in all that constitutes a brave, conscientious officer. While a little below the medium height, his figure was strong and compact. He had a small waist and broad shoulders, and looked the gallant soldier that he was. Courteous, amiable, with a magnetic presence; agreeable manners, splendid head and handsome face, popular with officers and men, he was easily the most conspicuous officer of his grade.

"Shortly after I joined the regiment an expedition was organ-

ized to operate against the hostile Indians in Texas and on its borders. Six troops of the regiment were placed under Van Dorn's command. After a march from the Wichita Mountains of over 20 miles in a northerly course, a village of hostile Comanches were discovered at Small Creek, about fifteen miles south of old Fort Atkinson, near the Nescutunga, a tributary of the Arkansas River.

"The Indians occupied a strong defensive position, but after a sharp, bloody, and desperate engagement, in which no quarter was asked, they were utterly defeated, with a loss of fifty warriors killed, five wounded, and thirty-six captured. One hundred animals were captured, and their supplies and camp equipment were destroyed or appropriated to the use of the troops. The combat was in a thick jungle or brush-covered ravine, which was carried by an assault made with dismounted skirmishers, while mounted men commanded the outlets and occupied the crest of the hills above and below the ravine.

"One enlisted man was killed and one was mortally wounded. Captain Smith was severely and Lieutenant Lee was dangerously wounded. Eleven enlisted men were wounded.

"This was another brilliant victory over the Comanches, and made Captain (Brevet Major) Van Dorn one of the most conspicuous officers in the cavalry service. The party was a part of the same band which had been chastized at the Wichita village. Captain Van Dorn's opinion, as expressed early in the winter, concerning the whereabouts of the Indians, proved to be substantially correct. The battle was fought beyond the limits of the Department of Texas, and the officers and men by their good conduct and gallantry added another substantial success to the well-earned laurels of the regiment. The command was so crippled by the wounded and the prisoners that Captain Van Dorn was compelled to return to Otter Creek, where he arrived on the 30th of May, having completed a march of four hundred miles.

"The command was highly complimented in reports and general orders for conspicuous gallantry and a decisive victory."

(In this engagement General Lee was himself severely wounded.—EDITOR.)

"My Troop B accompanied the expedition, and I was selected by Van Dorn to be his adjutant.

"I, therefore, had an excellent opportunity to ascertain his

soldierly qualifications, his activity, courage, and power of endurance.

"In the war from 1861 to 1865 I never served with him.

"I write only about what I personally observed. General Twiggs, his department commander, at that time, in a general order, said:

"'It affords the general commanding the department much pleasure in this connection to recur again to the later valuable and important services of Brevet Major Earl Van Dorn, Second Cavalry. This officer, by his marked judgment, energy, and military ability, has gained two decisive victories over large bodies of Comanches in the recent campaigns in the Wichita country, showing conclusively that these qualities, if properly exercised, will insure success and set chance at defiance.'"

"FORT MEADE, SOUTH DAKOTA, August 27, 1901.

"My acquaintance with General Earl Van Dorn, then captain of the Second Cavalry, was that of a boy and soldier with his commanding officer. I was his orderly on many occasions, and can testify to his amiable qualities and generous character. He was beloved by his soldiers, and his characteristic bravery and dash was a theme of which they never tired. He was the most successful Indian fighter of his day. The following incident will give some idea of the estimation in which he was held by the people of Texas:

"'Several officers were *en route* to witness the inauguration of Sam Houston, as Governor of Texas, at Austin, in November, 1859, and at one of their camps were visited by a number of ranchmen of the neighborhood. It was a presidential year, and the conversation turned on the merits of the candidates for that high office, and when one of the officers asked the ranchmen to name their choice they replied in chorus, "*Major Earl Van Dorn.*" The settlers on the frontier appreciated his services and believed that no honor was too high or reward too great for him.'

"'E. M. HAYES,

'Colonel Thirteenth Cavalry, U. S.'

BY A STAFF OFFICER.

"Major-General Earl Van Dorn was a man of 5 feet 8 inches in height, gracefully and symmetrically formed, and with great

powers of endurance. As is remarked by Plutarch of the Dictator Sylla, 'his eyes were of a living blue, fierce and menacing when earnest, as in anger,' but capable of expressing the greatest tenderness. His hair was a light chestnut color, worn long and wavy, and for a man's hair was peculiarly beautiful. His complexion, where exposed to the sun, was of that dark red color that I have never seen in any other man but Gen. Robert E. Lee, as different as possible from the bright red of intemperance, and the dull brown of the olive hue, and more than anything else resembling the red of the Indian without its copper hue; the remarkable contrast of the complexion doubtless greatly heightened the color of the eyes, which appeared as bright and blue as the sky, and flashed like steel in the sunlight. His nose was straight, with wide firm set nostrils—what is usually known as the American nose. His teeth were beautiful and greatly heightened the effect of one of the most agreeable smiles I have ever seen; his mouth and chin were covered by a brown mustache and imperial which were considered of uncommon beauty. The *tout ensemble* of the man was that of a modest and refined gentleman, but in the heat of battle his appearance became so changed as almost to amount to transfiguration; his whole figure seemed to expand and dilate with the martial ardor of the high soul which glowed through every lineament. In such moments his voice, ordinarily as soft and gentle as a woman's, grew deep, harsh and imperious. His eyes flashed so brightly as to make their glance unpleasant to bear. The finest horseman in the Cavalry of the old United States Army, he sat his horse as firmly as if a part of him, and with the *gaudia certaminis* lighting up his face, his animated gesture, and fire of expression, he appeared the very impersonation of the Spirit of Battle—a born Child of War.

"I have known a few men as brave as General Van Dorn, and only a few, among the many who pretend to that quality, and indeed deservedly enjoy the reputation. It was a remark of his on one occasion in conversation, that 'in his opinion there were but very few men who were truly brave; that that man only was really brave who was brave everywhere and under all possible circumstances; as the ancients had it, 'on land and sea'; that he did not refer to those who had brutal courage like the wild animal, through want of reflection and insensibility to danger,—for that kind of courage he had great contempt, as could the ignorant

wretch only *know* his danger he would be frightened to death ;' and he then related this anecdote by way of illustration, with that freshness and enthusiasm of which only he was capable:—' In one of the first Napoleon's great battles, perhaps Leipsic, as a distinguished French regiment was composedly awaiting orders to advance, while hour after hour round shot and shell tore through their ranks, an old mustached grenadier, the veteran of twenty campaigns, observing a young recruit by his side, a fair-haired, blue-eyed boy, flinch from a shell which burst close by, with an expression of terror on his face, he turned on him fiercely with the exclamation, " By —— I believe you are afraid ! " Whereupon the young soldier replied haughtily, " Damn you, sir, had you been half as much frightened as I have been you would have run an hour ago ! " ' This,' remarked Gen. Van Dorn, ' illustrates the highest kind of courage,—the heroism of the soul, that superb pride which rises superior to the weakness of the flesh, and sustains its possessor everywhere against all possible terrors.' Gen. Van Dorn himself had, I verily believe, this species of courage, and whatever he may have *felt* I am convinced no amount of danger, either sudden or looked for, could under any circumstances have drawn from him the slightest exhibition of fear. I have seen many brave men on trying and critical occasions show symptoms of terror, such as nervousness, paleness, huskiness of voice, absorbed excitement ; so have I seen such men flinch from shot and shell, musket balls when passing unusually near, but I do not believe mortal man ever saw *in him* any indication of the slightest sense of danger, so self-sustaining was his pride. I am sure I never did, though as he had acquired in Mexico and the Indian wars a great reputation for courage, before I joined him in the late war, I, who am curious in such matters and rather given to speculation upon the motives and causes of action of men, made it my particular business to endeavor to find out by the exhibitions of it in him, in what true courage really consists. An anecdote is to a narrative as a lamp to a dark room, and the following may be mentioned as an instance which will throw light on my meaning. During the second action of Farmington, fought, if my memory serves me right, on the 8th of May, 1862, being one of those occasions on which Gen. Beauregard offered battle to Gen. Halleck some miles in front of the fortifications of Corinth, after pushing through Farmington in pursuit of Gen.

Pope's division (which by order of Halleck declined battle and fell back before us), seeing the enemy retire across an extended plain in our front upon the greater way of which was a slight crest behind which they disappeared, Gen. Van Dorn, followed of course by staff and bodyguard, galloped in front of the foremost line of battle to the summit of the crest. No enemy could be seen, but at the foot of a gentle declivity about 100 yards in our front was a thick wood. A fence ran immediately across our path, and here we stopped for the troops to come up. The first brigade that reached us, consisting (I think) of the 11th and 13th Louisiana Regiments, and another, were directed to clear the wood of any enemies that might be concealed in it, and at once sprang over the fence and proceeded still in line of battle towards the wood. But scarce had they advanced twenty yards, when a blaze of musketry from the edge of the wood disclosed the ambushed enemy, and shameful to relate, the great bulk of a brigade that had distinguished itself a month before at Shiloh for bravery, incontinently took to flight and left us a peculiar mark, mounted and uniformed as we were, for the enemy's bullets. A brave man might have been excused under the circumstances for quietly 'falling back,' and I fixed my eyes on the General. For a moment his eyes blazed with anger, and then turning half round on his horse he looked back to see where and how far back the main body of our troops was behind us. I, too, looked, and never have I seen war made so brilliant in aspect. From side to side of the vast plain almost as far as the eye could reach in the Confederate lines of battle—the bayonets glistening in the sunlight, the various banners fluttering in the breeze—came proudly on like wave after wave of the sea, while the air was filled with the crash of musketry, interrupted with strains of music that came floating from the rear. The nearest line of troops behind us was Gen. Patton Anderson's brigade, about 100 yards distant. At once I saw the General's determination was taken—he would not fly—a major-general in the face of the enemy! In a tranquil voice he directed his officers to hurry up the troops, and another to place a battery on the crest just off the right, and sat still! It is easy enough to write about, but it was a dread moment as the leaden tempest hurtled by, through, and amongst us, and we sitting as quietly as for a portrait! Of course we could not leave the General. It was but a few minutes in point

of time, hours in uncertainty. Several members of the staff and bodyguard were shot down, horse and man. Up galloped a four-gun battery, and rapidly taking position by our side added the roar of artillery to the sublimity of the scene.

“CLEMENT SULIVANE,
“*Aide-de-Camp.*”

ELOQUENT WORDS OF FATHER MAGEVNEY, IN WHICH HE PAYS A
TRIBUTE TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

The Masonic Temple at Baltimore, Md., has rarely contained a larger or more appreciative audience than assembled last night to hear the Rev. Hugh S. Magevney, S. J., lecture on the “Worth of Battle-field Memorials.”

Father Magevney was introduced by General Bradley T. Johnson, who briefly explained that the object of the lecture was to assist in liquidating the debt incurred by the Southern Historical Association in publishing a true account of the treatment of Northern prisoners by the South. He then presented Father Magevney. The lecturer began by saying he felt as though the Maryland society was his guardian angel, and he felt secure under the shadow of its protecting wing. Passing on then, he said that the battle-field was regarded in two lights; first, by the sentimentalists, who painted it with glowing colors as all glory, and, secondly, by the ascete, who painted it as all cruelty; both views are false. The battle-field is the playground of man's highest genius; the perfect soldier is immeasurably superior to the perfect civilian; the general embraces the statesman; there is no antagonism between the pen and the sword; the sword is the pen only more perfectly developed. Popular sentiment supports this view in its choice for rulers. How many of our presidents before the war were not soldiers? And since the war the presidential chair has been turned into a campstool, and none but a soldier need apply. [Prolonged applause.]

But the battle-field is also the scene of genius in its highest inspiration. It is the battle-field that brings into play all of a man's capabilities, his readiness to meet an emergency, his promptitude in meeting and warding off every stratagem of the enemy. The lecturer's beau ideal was Gen. Van Dorn. His calmness and coolness in all the terrible ordeal at Corinth have stamped Van

Dorn as one of the master minds among soldiers. But the battlefield also brings all the beautiful virtues of the soldier. The soldier is held responsible for the horrors of battle, but wars are bred in Senate chambers. War is the result of ill-used peace. Soldiers are not rude. Wellington, with the laurel of Waterloo wreathing his brow, said: "Nothing, except a battle lost; it more melancholy than a battle won." He, the lecturer, paid a noble tribute to Baltimore's women for the generosity displayed towards Lafayette's men; and a no less beautiful tribute was rendered the noble women of the South; in his heart every Confederate keeps the memory of their noble deeds as green as their own fair graves, as sweet as the magnolia that blooms thereon. What monument shall we erect to the memory of our fallen heroes? Not one of granite, for that crumbles, and their memory must never crumble; not marble, for that tarnishes, and their memory must stay free from blot and stain. Naught is worthy of their memory save the record of their hard-fought battles, as truth will hand that record down to history and posterity. There is no blot of shame on their escutcheon.

A MEMORIAL.

BY MARY EMILY DONELSON WILCOX.

(Daughter of Major Andrew Donelson, Secretary to President Jackson.)

There was general and unqualified rejoicing when Earl Van Dorn was selected to succeed General Twiggs as Commander of the Confederate troops garrisoning San Antonio and other neighboring army posts in Texas, for all believed that he, brave, tactful, patriotic, would overcome the sinister influences causing public sentiment to hesitate between Southern and Northern allegiance and rally to the support of the young Confederacy.

Some years before he had commanded expeditions against some insurgent Comanche Indians and, though encountering superior numbers and a desperate resistance, had gained decisive victories, displaying marvelous courage and skill. Lieut. Van Camp and others were killed and Lieuts. Hazen and Jones were severely wounded in one of these expeditions, which resulted in

almost complete extermination of the Comanches and their allies.

The citizens of San Antonio, quick to recognize valiant deeds and to honor those performing them, tendered Brevet-Major Van Dorn a public reception, and it was as the city's guest that he won that admiring regard never forfeited. Peculiar social and political conditions prevailed in San Antonio in 1860--61. A large army station mainly dependent on government patronage and deriving from it social and commercial prestige, interest and tradition bound it to the Union, then its large foreign population, —Mexican, French, German—its numerous Northern born residents who, owning no slaves, naturally opposed slavery, its isolation, non-identity with Southern customs, made any change undesirable and prevented any spontaneous patriotic outburst such as was noticeable in all other Southern cities.

Realizing the situation and conscious of his responsibility, Van Dorn, assuming command, exercised great prudence and discretion, was careful to antagonize no parties and vigilant to reconcile all interests. Cheerful and sanguine, his presence inspired confidence and hope, his supreme faith in the justice of the secession movement and his sincere belief in the ultimate success of the Confederacy proved contagious, and that Western Texas was so loyal to the Southern cause and contributed so generously, both in men and money, to its needs, was principally due to his wise, prudent, conservative course. Quoting General Washington, in the darkest hours of the struggle for independence, encouraged social amusements as being antidotes to despair and fear and stimulants to patriotic endeavor, he inaugurated a series of delightful entertainments, still pleasantly remembered.

In the decade preceding the Civil War many officers prominent on opposing sides in the ensuing conflict were stationed in San Antonio, and being genial, cultivated, and public-spirited, acquired much social influence. Among Federal officers most esteemed were General McDowell, Buell, Canby, Sumner, Captains Palmer and Jones, Lieutenants Hazen, Graham, Smith and others; among the Confederates were R. E. Lee, Joe Johnston, Sidney Johnston, Kirby Smith, Wilson, Van Dorn, Armstrong, McLean, Blair, and others, the frontier service of all of whom was an earnest of the remarkable careers awaiting them. Van Dorn, leaving San Antonio, for the scenes of active operations beyond

the Mississippi, took with him the good wishes of the entire community, all predicting for him a happy, successful and brilliant future.

Descending from a distinguished ancestry and combining the traits characteristic of his Holland, Scotch, Irish, English, progenitors, he inherited from the first prudence, discretion, wisdom, from the second honesty, loyalty and truthfulness; from the Irish wit, imagination, and a reckless love of pleasure and adventure, from the English courage, honor and contempt of death. Tall, erect, handsome, with light chestnut hair, bright flashing eye, cameo-like features, and a graceful, well-proportioned form, he had that winning charm of manner and personal magnetism so potent in love and friendship. An omnivorous reader familiar with classical and modern literature, an inimitable raconteur, with an inexhaustible fund of apropos quotations, he was a delightful fireside and table companion, as welcome in the politest society as in camps and bivouacs. During a long active eventful career he never lost a friend or justly made an enemy, and jealously guarded the legacies of his ancestors, left to his posterity and country a memory unstained by a suspicion of wrong-doing, enriched by high achievements and savory with honor, courage and virtue.

History furnishes examples of men, comely, quick-witted, high-spirited, warm-hearted, pleasure-loving, whom women especially admire and court, men like Alexander of Macedonia, Julius Cæsar, Henry of Navarre, who, pursuing sublime notable careers and fighting battles that culminate in fame, glory, power, wealth, also struggle all their lives against the seductive blandishments of intriguing women, and who, unless they flee like Joseph or turn like Saint Anthony from them, would become involved in scandals of the camp or garrisons. Van Dorn, flattered, petted, pursued, belonged to this class, yet no knight at King Arthur's Court had holier reverence for the sanctity of domestic ties, or keener appreciation of those graces that make woman the Angel of Home. Loving danger and adventure, eager for fame, in his element when in peace or war, the closing scene of his life should have been the battle-field, leading amid the flash and clash of arms, the flare of drums and trumpet, the shouts of soldiers, his troops to victory. Alas! fate decreed otherwise, though sparing him the pang of seeing the flag he so loyally upheld

lowered was a merciful escape. Shot by a pretended jealous husband, whose wife testified that General Van Dorn had never approached her save in the most respectful manner, and never addressed her with an improper word or look. He died at his desk after writing a passport for the assassin to enter the enemy's lines, at his own request. After being shot in the back of his head, with pen in hand, he never spoke, and died in a few hours, surrounded by those who loved him as brothers. His death scene was one worthy of a life spent in his country's service, a life glorified by sacrifice and devotion in company with a noble band whose deeds made the Southern Cross the symbol of faith and duty, of courage and honor,—no name is more worthy of reverent homage than that of Earl Van Dorn, Hero and Martyr, valiant champion of his Country's Rights.

Gen. Dabney H. Maury, in an address at Port Gibson, Miss., Decoration Day, May 1st, 1884, said, speaking of Gen. Earl Van Dorn :

"Here, too, was bred and born one whom it was my privilege to know and love for many years.

"We served together through two wars and in many battles.

"Never saw I such a soldier as he.

"Like DeSaix he was 'all for war and glory.' He joyed in the crash of battle and was unconquerable.

"Daring, alert, indefatigable, he was never depressed by disaster.

"And when his whole army thronged past him in disordered rout, his blue eye blazed with scorn for men who would not stand and fight.

"As a general of cavalry, Van Dorn had not his equal in the Confederate nor the Federal army.

"No heart was warmer or more tender than his; kind to all, he was generous to friend or foe.

"He loved danger and battle beyond all else—and could not understand a coward.

"He was ever true and good to me, and I pay tribute to him in his birthplace with sincere devotion to his memory; you do well indeed to honor and to decorate these graves.

GENERAL EARL VAN DORN, THE PRINCE RUPERT OF OUR CIVIL WAR,
THE BRAVEST OF THE BRAVE.

TUPELO, VICKSBURG AND CORINTH.

The following paper was prepared by Captain H. F. Starke, and read by him at the last monthly meeting of the Confederate Veterans' Association.

Captain Starke participated personally in many of the incidents described as a member of Van Dorn's command, and aside from the interest of the narrative the paper has a distinct historic value. It is a fitting tribute, moreover, to a gallant and gifted soldier.

"Texas furnished to the Confederacy her full quota of men and none excelled them in bravery and daring, and throughout the long struggle for liberty and independence they showed to the world that in courage they had no superiors. The state of their nativity or adoption was a great school of character. Here a choice seed of manhood had been planted, and even in its rudest and wildest types its population was a mixture of honor and chivalry. This peculiarity was well illustrated in the war. Wherever the rough sons of Texas fought, there was blood and glory, the terrible spasm of battle, the desperate achievement. Yet no soldier of the Confederacy was more generous to the enemy, more magnanimous to prisoners, and more fully alive to all the appeals of the cause for which they fought. They were the men in the army of Northern Virginia, upon whom General Lee relied for desperate enterprises, and whom he once designated in the strongest compliment he was capable of bestowing.

"General Johnston, of the army of the West, frequently said that he could always depend upon the men from Texas; in every dangerous and difficult enterprise, fighting with a fierce and apparently untamed courage, capable of the most sublime self-devotion, the soldiers of Texas yet carried a reputation for generosity, and in their tattered uniforms bore the true ornament of manhood, the rough diamond of chivalry. Their deeds alone, taken apart from the general story of the war, would fill volumes and be a complete testimony of the best manhood of the living age.

“ Chief among these men we find the incomparable and gallant Hood, the brave and indomitable McCullough, the chivalrous Ross, and the subject of this paper, the Prince Rupert of our Civil War, the bravest of the brave, the knightly Earl Van Dorn. He was not a native of Texas, but like many soldiers of the Lone Star State, he owed his lineage to Mississippi, and was born in 1820, in the town of Port Gibson. After receiving a liberal education, he graduated at West Point in 1842. He served in the Mexican war with credit, and at the battle of Cerro Gordo was breveted on the field for gallant and meritorious conduct, and in the battles of Contreras and Churubusco he fell wounded in the thickest of the fight, and upon the surrender of the City of Mexico he was again promoted, receiving the rank of major.

“ The State of Texas seceded from the Union the first of February, 1861, and soon after Van Dorn organized a company of about eighty men to operate against the enemy on the coast, and on April 20, he succeeded in capturing the Federal steamer ‘Star of the West’ in Galveston harbor. The ship was loaded with troops and stores, therefore there was great rejoicing throughout the country over its capture. Some of you are probably familiar with the story of the taking of the ‘Star of the West,’ but, being a participant, I may be able to give some facts concerning the capture that have never found their way into print.

“ On the night of April 20, which was extremely dark, we embarked on a ‘lighter’ which the Federals had used the day before in transporting troops, and approached the steamer, whose commander thought he was about to take on board his own men, but he reckoned wrong; for before he had time to offer resistance we had gained the decks and were in possession of the ship, and had driven the Federals below the hatches, ‘which we battered down,’ thus securing possession without the loss of blood. This success only whetted the appetite of our gallant leader for more exploits, whereupon he secured more volunteers and proceeded in our captured steamer to Seluria, where he arrived on April 24 and anchored in easy range of two Federal transports loaded with troops, about 600 in number. They obeyed our summons to surrender, whereupon we took their paroles, they agreeing not to take up arms again during the war.

“ These exploits gained for Van Dorn the rank of major-general, and much to our regret he was called from Texas and

assigned to duty in Virginia, where he greatly added to his fame as a tactician of the first order, and a gallant soldier. After his departure from Texas the regiment that I became associated with, the Sixth Texas Cavalry, was organized and took up its line of march for Arkansas and the Indian Nation. Afterwards we became a part of General Price's army in Missouri. After much fighting and many vicissitudes, we found ourselves at Elkhorn, Ark., confronting the united Federal armies, under the command of Sigel, Curtis and Fremont. Here Van Dorn joined us and took command, and the stubbornly fought and bloody battle of Elkhorn followed soon after. We undoubtedly gained a brilliant victory, but the fruits of the victory were lost. General Curtis, one of the Federal commanders, afterwards acknowledged that, owing to the superior tactics of Van Dorn, they were fairly defeated, and if it had not been for the lack of harmony between the Confederate generals, the forces would have been compelled to capitulate. From Elkhorn we retired to Van Buren, and soon after joined the army under Albert Sidney Johnston in Tennessee.

"In June, 1862, our honored commander was again taken from us, and transferred to the department of Louisiana, with headquarters at Vicksburg. Here he performed the most brilliant service of his entire military career, which was the first successful defense of that river stronghold. After the departure of Van Dorn for his new field, much fighting and many important military movements occurred in our department, but I will briefly pass over the movements of Beauregard, now in full command of the united armies of the West and Tennessee, and the bloody scenes that followed. His masterly retreat to Tupelo was regarded by the first military men of Europe as the greatest feat of strategy on record, considering the number and condition of his troops and the trifling loss attendant on such a movement, confronted by so large a force, there being 125,000 of the enemy against 35,000 Confederates. In September Van Dorn again joined the army of West Tennessee and took command, Beauregard having retired. The battles of Farmington, Iuka and Corinth followed in quick succession, but the heretofore unequalled bravery of our troops engaged on these bloody fields could not prevail against the overwhelming numbers of the army of the enemy, and notwithstanding the most stubborn resistance on

our part, we were compelled to steadily fall back, leaving West Tennessee and a large portion of Mississippi in possession of the invaders.

"If the true history of the attack on Corinth should be written, it would furnish a satisfactory excuse for the failure of Van Dorn in that memorable and desperately fought battle; our defeat must be attributed to the facts, that General Bragg saw fit to ignore the plans of Van Dorn, and to concentrate the army, for the purpose of engaging the enemy at Iuka. The result of that battle is well known; our force was reduced from 30,000 effective men to less than 17,000.

"But Van Dorn, with this small force, successfully stormed the works of this Gibraltar of Mississippi, defended by 35,000 men, composed of the flower of the entire Federal army, and commanded by their favorite general—'Grant.' I say successfully, because in the face of the strongest and most formidable works, protected by the most powerful field-guns then in use, and supported by 35,000 bayonets, Van Dorn, with less than 17,000 men succeeded in capturing the works and driving its defenders back into the town, with great slaughter, where they were forced to take refuge in the houses. But this success was gained by the loss of nearly one-half of our number in killed and wounded, which weakened our army to such an extent that the **largely re-**inforced enemy were enabled to repulse, and after a stubborn hand-to-hand fight drive us out of the fortifications. This battle ended the West Tennessee campaign, but did not end the brilliant exploits of Van Dorn.

"On December 19, 1862, with 2,000 cavalry volunteers, he made a detour around Grant's army, and struck its rear guard at Holly Springs, Miss. The enemy were taken completely by surprise, and we captured the town without the loss of a single man, we took nearly 2,000 prisoners and destroyed the immense collection of army stores found there. This movement was of the greatest importance to the Confederacy, as the destruction of Grant's supplies caused him to abandon his advance on Vicksburg and fall back to Memphis; it practically put an end to that season's campaign. The surprise of the Federals at Holly Springs caused some ludicrous scenes. A lady came to Van Dorn, and said: 'General, Colonel Murphy is concealed in my house,' and upon a search being made, the gallant Federal com-

mander was found under the lady's bed in his night clothes. The provost marshal was also taken in bed with his wife, and when discovered, he pulled the bed-clothes over his head, and cried out: 'I will surrender.' After the destruction of the vast accumulation of stores found there, the railroad was destroyed and a successful retreat accomplished. Van Dorn was engaged in many active and brilliant operations until May 7, 1863, when the life of this noble man was ended by the hand of an assassin. A renegade Tennessean, who had many times been befriended by Van Dorn, but regardless of the debts of gratitude that he owed his benefactor, he brutally murdered him. After the fatal shot was fired, Van Dorn never breathed. Thus ended the career of the gallant, noble and patriotic Earl Van Dorn, whose equal in many respects is not known, or recorded in history. Had he lived to the close of the war, there would be found gallant acts before unheard of. His loss to the Southern cause at that critical period was irreparable, and contributed largely to its collapse."

GENERAL VAN DORN AND GENERAL FORREST.

"In the last week of April, 1863, a clash occurred between these two celebrated Confederate cavalry commanders at Spring Hill, Tenn., interesting on account of their rank and celebrity, and so honorable to both, that I feel impelled to contribute it to these 'Reminiscences.'

"There must be premised as historical facts that Generals Van Dorn and Forrest were the antipodes of each other and of their respective classes—only brought into contact by that tremendous necessity that in time of civil commotion compresses men of all sorts together. Van Dorn was the son of generations of social culture, a West Point graduate, and one of the most distinguished officers of the old United States Army with all its class virtues, prejudices, and faults exemplified in his person. (These prejudices were especially illustrated by the singular fact so observed and bitterly resented by all their volunteer followers on either side that the old army officers were much more attached to one another, though a river of blood ran between, than they were to their officers and soldiers around them engaged in the same cause with themselves, subject to their orders, and daily exposed to the same perils. This class feeling was at the bottom of Gen. Grant's

magnanimity at Appomattox, and was signally exhibited by the 'fraternization' on that occasion, of which we have so many recorded instances.)

"Forrest was emphatically a son of the people, an untrained man, a keeper of a livery stable, and absolutely without antecedents. Both were intellectual, high-minded and heroically brave, and Jeffersonian in their political principles. When the unavoidable collision, postponed by Hamilton and Jefferson, came between their schools, and the aristocrat and the proletarian of the South, constrained by the danger to their common principles, rushed to arms, Van Dorn, the Mississippian, and Forrest, the Tennessean, drew their swords and linked their fortunes under the same flag. The one began the struggle high in rank, the other as captain of a cavalry company. Each obtained great distinction in the Confederate army, and died major-generals, the former in May, 1865, and the latter at his home in Memphis many years after the war. The one sustained a great reputation for skill and courage, gained on many bloody battle-fields prior to 1861, in the Mexican and Indian wars; the other won an equally high rank and a more extended reputation by innumerable deeds in arms during the four years of civil conflict. Both illustrated American character when living, and their respective careers form a part of American history now that they are dead.

"In January, 1863, the Confederate cavalry forces of North Mississippi and West Tennessee were organized into a corps nearly 4,000 strong, and the two divisions of Forrest and Jackson, commanded by Van Dorn, proceeded to Columbia, Tennessee, on Duck River, in February of that year. Shortly thereafter, they took part at Spring Hill, half way to Franklin, and in March fought a successful action against a portion of Gen. Grainger's United States forces sent out against them from the latter place, capturing an entire brigade (Coburn's Indiana). Various points of controversy had arisen between the two Confederate generals during their two months' association, both capable and ambitious, and distrustful of each other's *entente cordiale*, because probably of the general premises aforesaid. Also the one had recently been circumscribed in command by reason of his disaster at Corinth, and the other had risen to the second highest rank in the cavalry line by an uninterrupted succession of victorious exploits.

"Under these strained circumstances their relations had grown into a severely formal official intercourse, until about two weeks before the death of Gen. Van Dorn matters were brought to an issue by Gen. Van Dorn because of information, true or untrue, that had been brought to his ears, of Gen. Forrest's misrepresentation of certain military matters to the department commander at Tullahoma, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.

"One morning, as was my habit as a staff officer of Gen. Van Dorn, I went to his room in the house of Martin Chairs, at Spring Hill, Tenn. (the same room in which he was assassinated on the 7th of May a few weeks later), to get my orders for the day. Upon entering, I found the two Generals standing and engaged in an earnest discussion. So much occupied were they that my entrance was not observed, and I immediately retired. Shortly thereafter observing from the yard the departure of Gen. Forrest, I returned to the room, and Gen. Van Dorn, after inviting me to be seated, at once communicated to me what had just occurred between himself and Gen. Forrest, in about the following language: 'Well, I must say I have a higher opinion of Gen. Forrest than I have ever held before, and really I feel rebuked and ashamed of myself. After Forrest and I had despatched the business that brought him to see me this morning, and he was about to leave, I asked him to resume his seat as I wished some particular conversation with him. And then, without mincing matters, I called his attention to the reports I had heard, and accused him of misrepresentation at headquarters. This he warmly denied and expressed his conviction of my too great willingness to listen to stories to his discredit. One thing led to another, until at length I threw off all restraint, and directly expressing my belief in his treachery and falsehood, suggested that then and there was as good a time and place to settle our difficulties as any, and suiting the action to the word, I stepped to where my sword was hanging against the wall, snatched it down and turned to face him. Forrest (said Van Dorn with a smile) was really a sight to see. He had risen and advanced one step, his sword half drawn from its scabbard, and his face aflame with feeling. But even as I unsheathed my own sword and advanced to meet him, a wave of some kind seemed to pass over his countenance; he slowly returned his sword to its sheath, and steadily regarding me said, 'General Van Dorn, you know I'm not afraid of you,—



VAN DORN AND FORREST.

but I will not fight you,—and leave you to reconcile with yourself the gross wrong you have done me. It would never do for two officers of our rank to set such an example to the troops, and I remember, if you forget, what we both owe to the cause.” I never felt so ashamed of myself in my life,’ Gen. Van Dorn went on to say, ‘and recalled by Forrest’s manly attitude and words to our true position, I immediately replied that he was right, and apologized for having used any such expressions to him. And so we parted to be somewhat better friends, I believe, than we have been before. Whatever else he may be, the man is certainly no coward.’

“But this was not to be. Within two weeks of that day, Gen. Van Dorn fell by an assassin’s hand, and Gen. Forrest, his successor, awarded him a magnificent funeral, attended by all the pomp and circumstance and pageantry that marks the burial of the dead soldier.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

ANOTHER VERSION OF THE FORREST AFFAIR.

"The sketch of the mountain maiden who sat on the crupper of Gen. Forrest's horse, as guide to him in the final hours of his wonderful charge after Colonel Streight and his band of 1,600 bridge burners, does but give intensity to the overshadowing fame of the hero himself.

"General Earl Van Dorn was in Middle Tennessee. Forrest was operating there under him. Forrest had recently captured in Tennessee a large number of cavalry saddles and bridles from the United States. His own men were very badly equipped, and he allowed them to throw away their inferior saddles and bridles for the captured supply. Forrest reported to Van Dorn, and Van Dorn reported to Bragg, commander of the whole territory, at Chattanooga, the fact of the capture of the cavalry equipments from the United States. Bragg wanted horse equipments for Wheeler, and at once ordered Van Dorn to send to Chattanooga the supply Forrest had captured. Van Dorn called Forrest to his headquarters and repeated Bragg's order in person. Forrest nervously replied: 'I ain't got any to turn over.' 'General,' replied Gen. Van Dorn, 'your report to me was that you captured the equipments, and I forwarded your report, and your report was untrue, if you claim that you have not the saddles is true.' 'This war won't last always, General Van Dorn, and we can settle later on,' furiously responded Forrest. 'It is unnecessary to wait the termination of the war, General,' said Van Dorn, gently rising from his seat.

"Forrest silently strode the floor of the office and presently spoke. 'I reckon, General, we have both got as much as we want if we fight the Yankees,' he said. Van Dorn instantly seized his opportunity, saying in a calm and pleasant voice, 'I agree with you, General, and I am now going to start you on a ride that will

please you. A large mounted expedition has gone off into Alabama from the enemy's main body. Catch it, if you can, for it is in the rear of General Bragg, and he is anxious.'

"Forrest crossed the Tennessee about Mussels Shoals or in that vicinity. He reached Courtland, Ala., while a fight was going on between some of his men and the rear of Streight's column. There he ordered Captain W. S. Bankhead, a planter residing there, and who was a member of Roddy's staff, to take out into the mountains the broken-down men and horses, out of reach of danger from the enemy. He at once continued his pursuit of Streight.

"Forrest finally, with 350 men and a few guns, overtook Streight with his 1,100 men. Forrest sent forward a flag of truce with a demand for unconditional surrender. Meantime he moved his battery through a cut in an unfinished railroad. The battery went down into thick woods, then turned, changed horses in concealment and moved again through the cut in full view of Streight. This device was several times repeated, always with different horses.

"Streight replied to the demand that he was powerless in front of so much artillery and so large a force as Forrest must have to support it. He surrendered. After the act of surrender had been consummated the Northern commander asked Forrest where the balance of his force was. Forrest answered that he had brought just enough along with him!

"Before General Van Dorn could have heard of the splendid success of his subordinate's enterprise, he fell dead in his seat at his headquarters. A physician of the vicinity had shot him in the back without warning. This man had just received from Van Dorn a pass through the Confederate lines. He deliberately rode out of camp over into the enemy's lines.

"Van Dorn was a small man, fastidious in dress, elegant in his manners, a West Pointer, an Indian fighter of fame and a Confederate soldier of high rank and rare promise. He was a Mississippian.

"Forrest was an illiterate farm boy, who was reared in the northern part of Mississippi to large stature and robust manhood. At an early age he began a remarkably successful business career. When the war broke out he entered the ranks as a private, a man of fortune.

"Colonel Streight was put in Ludlow prison at Richmond. He was one of 200 captive officers who tunneled their way under the house and escaped for the time. Streight was recaptured in the suburbs of the city. Some of the party finally escaped capture. He was a very brave man, and wept bitterly when he found how Forrest had deceived him in Alabama."

"SHIELDSBORO, HANCOCK Co., MISS.,

"July 20, 1867.

"I have read your letter with melancholy interest. Every pang that you feel, when mourning the unjust persecution and the unhappy fate of General Van Dorn, finds a response in my heart. I admired and loved him, and the fiery furnace through which he passed, in the latter part of his career, only endeared him the more to me. I never saw the proceedings of the court of inquiry to which you refer, but my intimate knowledge of him, and the promptings of my own heart, satisfied me that he was innocent. A more honorable, lofty, generous and unsuspicious man never lived. His order in relation to the press was right, but inexpedient. As a general thing, the newspapers have interfered seriously with military operations, and have too often inspired the people with false confidence. In the hands of inexperienced men, for the most part, their course has been injudicious, and they have often demoralized the army by making war on our Generals. I shall never forgive their conduct to General Van Dorn.

"As a Mississippian I was proud of him, but I blush to think how he, the young hero of so many battles, was treated by his native State, at a period when she should have given him her most generous support. I confess I have lost my State pride, as well as my confidence in popular government, and it is no longer my boast that I am a native Mississippian, and have always been a Democrat.

"Mississippi, the first State to secede (the 2d), and but for whom the Union would not have been divided, has not proved equal to the crisis. Her sons, in other States, fight bravely, but at home the struggle has been to evade military duty. There has been no general rally of the people—no spirit such as Spain, Russia and Germany exhibited against invasion—none of the spirit of the Revolution—no more manhood than we see now among the Dutch of Pennsylvania. Desertion has become an

epidemic. Colonel Grierson traversed Mississippi without having a gun fired at him, and when General Grant marched from Grand Gulf to the capital there was no uprising of the people. In the presence of an army 400 men deserted from the 4th Miss. Cavalry; in the county whence I write, my son was the only person who responded to the call for conscripts and there are now here 300 deserters. Alas for Mississippi! I regret that General Van Dorn did not return the sword which he could no longer wear with pride! Preserve all his papers and when I find a safe way will send for them. I will place him where he deserves to stand—among the ablest, purest and most heroic men of his day, cut off by a murderer and a villain.

“ J. F. H. CLAIBORNE.

“ NATCHEZ, MISS., Aug. 22, 1875.

“ P. S.—Since writing I have found the highest testimonials to General Van Dorn's military talent, and gallantry from Generals Scott, Twiggs, President Davis, Joseph E. Johnston, Beauregard, Hardee, Robert E. Lee, George H. Thomas, etc. I shall have a series of sketches of distinguished officers, and his will be the most interesting of the group.

“ J. F. H. CLAIBORNE.”

EXTRACT FROM LETTER OF JEFFERSON DAVIS.

“ MISSISSIPPI CITY, Dec. 17, 1877.

“ The gallantry of Earl Van Dorn in the war with Mexico, when he was more frequently noticed in the official reports of the battles for gallantry in action I believe that any other officer in that army, attracted my attention and caused me to claim for him an additional brevet. He was associated with me in the organization of the army of the Mississippi, immediately after the secession of our State, and I was sincerely attached to him. Please accept my thanks for the sketch you have given me of his services, to which I would thank you to add any others which you may be able to recall. His action at Corinth was marked by his usual gallantry, and illustrated his military genius; to that you do not refer. I suppose because you considered it sufficiently known.”

LETTER FROM EX-GOVERNOR ROBT. LOWRY.

"JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, May 31, 1899.

"Until this morning I did not know the resting place of our late distinguished General Van Dorn. The people of Mississippi owe it to themselves to see that his remains are removed to a suitable cemetery and a shaft erected upon which there is an inscription commemorative of the services of one of our foremost Confederate Generals, a gifted military leader, and a true manly gentleman. The people of his native State, and the entire South, as well, should remember the 3d and 4th of October, 1862, when General Van Dorn made the gallant fight to recapture Corinth, one of the most important fortified places then in possession of the enemy. Nor should this, or succeeding generations of the South, forget that two movements had been planned for the capture of Vicksburg; one under General Sherman by river, and the other under General Grant to go through by land from Holly Springs, with that city as his base of supplies. General Van Dorn with a dash and brilliancy unsurpassed, in December, 1862, moved on Holly Springs, which he captured with its large garrison. He destroyed immense stores valued at nearly two million dollars, which had been collected thus to supply General Grant on his march through the State, and forced him to abandon his attack on that line. A brilliant and gifted officer was Major-General Van Dorn.

"ROBERT LOWRY."

LETTER FROM ONE OF GENERAL VAN DORN'S SCOUTS.

"MEMPHIS, TENN., November 10, 1899.

"I saw a few days ago that the remains of General Earl Van Dorn were reinterred at Port Gibson, his old home. I have tried several times since the war to learn where he was buried. I asked General Frank C. Armstrong several years ago and he was of the opinion that the General was buried at Selma, Alabama, and I was there during the summer but found no trace of his remains there. I was a private soldier in Ned Saunders' scouts. My company was his escort during the command of his cavalry career, and I was the first man who reached his headquarters outside of his escort, when he was shot, many of whom were in the room,

weeping as though he had been a brother, and with aid of members of his escort laid him down, and he only breathed once after we got him arranged, as we thought, comfortably. I, with over a hundred soldiers chased his assassin inside the Federal lines. I want it known, from one of his command, that his men worshipped him, and all that was necessary was for him to command, and his men would execute the most difficult undertakings. And we all felt when he died, that we had lost a commander whose services could not be equaled by any in the Confederacy, and I go farther—I do not think the world has ever produced such a cavalry commander as Earl Van Dorn, and I hope it will be my pleasure to lay a flower on his tomb before I too pass over the river. I wrote to the Secretary of State of Mississippi several years ago to try to find out if any of the General's family still lived, and for their address, but had no response. His death, together with Stonewall Jackson's, broke the backbone of the Confederacy. I would be glad to hear any particulars about the General's family. After the General died we served with General Frank Armstrong, as Saunders Battalion.

“Very respectfully,

“MARK W. SEARCY.”

MAJOR-GENERAL EARL VAN DORN.

(From a Port Gibson Paper.)

As the debris of war is disappearing before the approaches of returning peace, and as the smoke of the battle has evaporated, and joined the upper regions, it will not be improper that we should look around us and see who and what remains on this side of the scenes of belligerency. As reason resumes her wonted peace, and reflection gathers in the folds of its drapery to practical dimensions, we may be able to look into the past five years with impartial eyes and deal generously, even justly, with those whom malice, and envy, and thoughtlessness, and haste, have conspired to injure, if not to destroy.

One of the clergymen of Virginia said, sometime since, that the Confederacy died of a disease called “Congress and the Press.” We think he was largely right. We had less patriotism, and less practical sense in Congress, than ever was found in a

similar body, with such an imposing cognomen, and for such important purposes. The press was likewise. It slew more generals than the Federal army, and when it once fixed its pegs as to how far a public man should go, he got.

We have long intended to enter into an investigation of the charge against General Van Dorn, deeming it due to his former services, his native county, and to his many friends, but we learn that a distinguished gentleman is collecting material for a biography, and we shall content ourselves with such references to him and his services as time and circumstances may suggest. In the meantime, to show the high appreciation in which General Van Dorn was held at the time of his death, by officers of rank and distinction, and they don't catch at slanders as children do at bubbles, we publish the following order, issued by General Jackson, on the announcement of General Van Dorn's death. The order, in consequence of the want of newspapers, was never published, except in some of the Tennessee and one of the Mobile papers.

We have a copy of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, in the case of General Van Dorn, which we shall be glad to loan to any intelligent reader. He demanded an investigation into all charges, outside of the specifications, affecting his capacity or character. He was unanimously acquitted of all charges and specifications by the Court, composed of Generals Price, Maury and Tilghman. We shall refer to this again at a proper time.

“JACKSON, MISS., April 15, 1892.
(32 years after the war.)

“DEAR FRIEND:

“I should be glad to have a photograph of the distinguished Major-General Earl Van Dorn, for a History of Mississippi. It is our purpose to furnish the rising generations of Mississippians with a number of the pictures of the soldiers in order to familiarize the children of the State with the features of the most distinguished of the Mississippi soldiers.

“I knew General Van Dorn rather intimately during the early part of the war, and I need hardly add to you, who knew so well the high and honorable character of the man, and his many attractive and loveable traits of character, that won for him so many friends of all ranks in and out of the Army, that I esteemed

him most highly, as well as a friend in whom I reposed the utmost confidence, as well as a soldier who was destined to a distinguished position in the annals of the South, in the mightiest war of the ages. But alas, he died untimely, and too soon for the full fruition of his fame.

“WM. H. MCCARDLE,
(*“Journalist and Historian of Mississippi.”*)

A NARROW ESCAPE.

At Water Valley, Miss., on retreat from Abbeville to Grenada, Water Valley being between the two places, General Van Dorn and staff paused at the hotel for dinner. Lieutenant Brady with sixty-four veteran cavalry (formerly of the United States Army), halted on the hill overlooking the town. The Federals heard that Van Dorn was in the Valley, and if they would make a dash in the town they could capture him and his staff. Lieutenant Bradley with his bodyguard was on the hill; the main infantry force had gone on, and the two bodies were cut off. The Federal cavalry were seen coming and Van Dorn saw his danger, took his field-glasses to observe Brady's position, and after scanning the hill, turned with beaming, sparkling eyes to his staff and called out: “Gentlemen, Brady is going to come through!” He saw the cavalry forming, and with a swoop down the hill to the Valley in columns of fours, Colonel Brady swung his cavalry and scattered the Federals like chaff before the wind. Bloody sabers were sheathed, and Van Dorn and staff and the gallant band were safe.

VAN DORN, THE HERO OF MISSISSIPPI.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL DABNEY H. MAURY.

General Earl Van Dorn was, in the opinion of the writer, the most remarkable man the State of Mississippi has ever known. My acquaintance with him began in Monterey, in the fall of 1846. He was aide-de-camp then to General Persifer F. Smith, and was one of the most attractive young fellows in the army. He used to ride a beautiful bay Andalusian horse, and as he came galloping along the lines, with his yellow hair waving in

the wind and his bright face lighted with kindness and courage, we all loved to see him. His figure was lithe and graceful, his stature did not exceed five feet eight inches, but his clear blue eyes, his firm set mouth, with white strong teeth, his well-cut nose with expanding nostrils, gave assurance of a man whom men could trust and follow. No young officer came out of the Mexican war with a reputation more enviable than his. After the close of that war he resumed his duties and position in the infantry regiment of which he was a lieutenant. In 1854 the Second Cavalry was organized, and Van Dorn was promoted to be the major of the regiment. He conducted several of the most important and successful expeditions against the Comanches we have ever made, and in one of them was shot through the body, the point of the arrow just protruding through the skin. No surgeon was at hand. Van Dorn, reflecting that to withdraw the arrow would leave the barbed head in his body, thrust it on through, and left the surgeon little to do. When the States resumed their State sovereignty he took a bold and efficient part in securing to Texas, where he was serving, all of the war material within her borders. Early in the war he was ordered to join the army under General Joe Johnston at Manassas; whence soon after, in February, 1861, he was ordered to take command of the trans-Mississippi Department.

I was associated with him in this command as chief of his staff and saw him daily for many months. He had conceived the bold project of capturing St. Louis and transferring the war into Illinois, and was actively engaged in preparing for this enterprise when he was summoned by General Price to Boston Mountain, where the forces of Price and McCulloch lay in great need of a common superior—for these two generals could not cooperate because of questions of rank. Therefore, Van Dorn promptly responded to Price's summons, and in a few hours was in the saddle and on his way to Van Buren. I went with him, and one aide-de-camp and an orderly. Van Dorn rode a fine thoroughbred black mare he had brought from Virginia. I was mounted on a sorrel I had bought in Pocahontas a few hours before we set out. Except my sorrel mare, Van Dorn's black mare was the hardest trotter in the world, and as we trotted fifty-five miles every day for five or six days, we had a very unusual opportunity of learning all that a hard trotter can do to a man in a

long day's march. Had it not been that we slept every night in a feather bed that soothed our sore bones and served as a poultice to our galled saddle-pieces, we would have been permanently disabled for cavalry service forever.

Van Dorn had planned the battle of Elkhorn well; he had moved so rapidly from Boston Mountain, with the forces of Price and McCulloch combined, that he caught the enemy unprepared, and with his divisions so far separated that but for the inevitable indiscipline of troops so hastily thrown together he would have destroyed the whole Federal army. By the loss of thirty minutes in reaching Bentonville we lost the cutting off of Siegel with 7,000 men, who were hurrying to join the main body on Sugar Creek. But we pushed him hard all that day, and after he had closed upon the main body Van Dorn, leaving a small force to occupy the attention in front, threw his army, by a night march, quite around the Federal army and across their only road by which retreat to Missouri could be effected. He handled his forces well; always attacking, always pressing the enemy back. When he heard of the death in quick succession of the three principal commanders of his right wing—McCulloch, McIntosh and Hébert—and the consequent withdrawal from the attack of that whole wing, he only set his lips a little firmer; his blue eyes blazed brighter, and his nostrils looked wider, as he said, "Then we must press them the harder!" And he did, too, and he had everything moving finely by sundown, and all the enemy's line before us in full retreat at a run, and falling back into their wagon trains; when, by misapprehension on the part of the commander with our advanced troops, the pursuit was arrested, our forces withdrawn from the attack to go into bivouac, and the enemy was permitted to quietly reorganize his army and prepare for a combined attack upon us in the morning. During the night we found that most of our batteries and regiments had exhausted their ammunition, and the ordnance train, with all the reserve ammunition, had been sent away, fifteen miles back, on the road along which we had come, and the enemy lay between. There was nothing left for Van Dorn but to get his train on the road to Van Buren and his army off by the same route and to fight enough to secure them. This he did, and marched away unmolested.

Arrived at Van Buren, Van Dorn addressed himself to the

completion of the reorganization of his army, thenceforth known as the Army of the West, and it was there he gave an illustration of true magnanimity—very rarely known in ambitious men—by the offer he made to move with all his forces to reinforce General Sidney Johnston at Corinth. By this he surrendered the great independent command of the trans-Mississippi Department and all the plans he had formed for the sake of his views of the best interests of their common country, and became a subordinate commander of an army corps instead of the commander-in-chief of an army. He hoped to reach Johnston in time for the battle of Shiloh, and had he done so, would have given a very different result to that critical battle. But Shiloh had been fought and our army, under Beauregard, was occupying the works of Corinth when Van Dorn, with the Army of the West, 16,000 effectives, reached that point. We lay near Corinth more than six weeks and three times offered battle to Halleck, who, with 100,000 men, was cautiously advancing as if to attack us. Three times our army, 40,000 strong, marched out of its intrenchments and advanced to meet Halleck and give him battle, but every time he drew back and declined it. In every council Van Dorn's voice was for war. May 30th, 1862, Beauregard evacuated his works in a masterly manner, and marched south unmolested to Tupelo, when he halted the army and held it ready for battle. In June Van Dorn was ordered to go to Vicksburg, which was threatened with attack, and was in poor condition for defense. He evinced here great energy and ability. He repulsed the enemy's fleet, put the place in a good condition of defense, occupied Port Hudson, and there erected such works as enabled us for a year longer to control the Mississippi River and its tributaries so as to keep open free intercourse with the trans-Mississippi, whence large supplies for the armies on this side were drawn. He organized an expedition against Baton Rouge during this time, which but for the cholera, which swept off half of the force, and the untimely breaking down of the ram "Arkansas'" engine when almost within range of that town, would have been a brilliant and complete success.

After this Van Dorn urged General Price, who had been left at Tupelo with the Army of the West when Bragg moved to Chattanooga, to unite all their available forces in Mississippi, carry Corinth by assault, and sweep the enemy out of West Ten-

nessee. This, unfortunately, Price, under his instructions, could not then do. Our combined forces would then have exceeded 25,000 effectives, and there is no doubt as to the results of the movement. Later, after Breckenridge had been detached with 6,000 men and Price had lost about 4,000 on the Iuka expedition (mainly stragglers), the attempt on Corinth was made. Its works had been greatly strengthened and its garrison greatly increased. Van Dorn attacked with his usual vigor and dash. His left and center stormed the town, captured all the guns in their front and broke Rosecrans' centre. The division comprising our right wing remained inactive, so that the enemy, believing our right was merely making a feint, detached Stanley with 6,000 fresh men from his left and drove us out of the town.

Never was a general more disappointed than Van Dorn; but no man in all our army was so little shaken in his courage by the result as he was. I think his was the highest courage I have ever known. It rose above every disaster, and he never looked more gallant than when his broken army in utter disorder was streaming through the open woods which then environed Corinth and its formidable defenses. However much depression all of us showed and felt, he alone remained unconquered; and if he could have gotten his forces together would have tried it again. But seeing that was impossible, he brought Lovell's division, which not having assaulted was unbroken, to cover the rear and moved back to Chewalla, seven miles west of Corinth, encouraging officers and men to reform their broken organizations as we marched along. No sooner did he halt at Chewalla than he gave orders to move in the morning to attack the enemy at Rienzi. But the condition of two of his three divisions was such that the generals advised against attempting any new aggressive movement until we could reform and refit our commands. My division had marched from Chewalla to attack Corinth with 4,800 muskets the day but one before. We left in the approaches and the very central defenses of Corinth 2,000 officers and men killed or wounded; among them were many of my ablest field and company officers. The Missourians had lost almost as heavily; Lovell's division alone, not having attacked the works at all, came off with but a trifling loss. It was, therefore, decided to move down to Ripley by the route we had so lately come over in such brave array and with such high hopes. But before dawn

next morning Van Dorn had moved the cavalry and pioneers on the road to Rienzi, still resolved to capture that place, and march around immediately and attack Corinth from the opposite direction.

The plan was worthy of Charles XII., and might have been successful; and Van Dorn only abandoned it when convinced that he would inevitably lose his wagon train, and that the army would feel he was rash. A friend said to him finally: "Van Dorn, you are the only man I ever saw who loves danger for its own sake. When any daring enterprise is before you, you cannot adequately estimate the obstacles in your way." He replied: "While I do not admit the correctness of your criticism, I feel how wrong I shall be to imperil this army through my personal peculiarities, after what such a friend as you have told me they are, and I will countermand the orders and move at once on the road to Ripley." Few commanders have ever been so beset as Van Dorn was in the forks of the Hatchie, and very few could have extricated a beaten army as he did then. One with a force stated at 10,000 men headed him at the Hatchie bridge, while Rosecrans, with 20,000 men, was attacking his rear at the Tuscumbia bridge, only five miles off. The whole road between was occupied by a train of near four hundred wagons and a defeated army of about 11,000 muskets. But Van Dorn was never for a moment dismayed. He repulsed Ord and punished him severely. While he checked Rosecrans at the Tuscumbia until he could turn his train and army short to the left, and cross the Hatchie by the Boneyard road without the loss of a wagon.

By 10 P. M. his whole army and train were safely over the Hatchie, and with a full moon to light us on our way we briskly marched for Ripley, where we drew up in line of battle and awaited the enemy; but he not advancing we marched to Holly Springs. When in November Van Dorn checked Grant's advance, he then occupied the works on the Tallahatchie, which he held for a month—Grant's force was 60,000, Van Dorn's was 16,000. He then retired behind the Yallabusha to Grenada and awaited Grant's advance until Christmas eve, 1862, when leaving the army at Grenada, under Loring's command, he moved with 2,000 horse around Grant's army, swooped down upon Holly Springs, captured the garrison, destroyed three months' stores for 60,000 men and defeated Grant's whole campaign and com-

pelled him to abandon Mississippi. From that time Van Dorn resumed his proper *rôle* as a general of cavalry, in which he had no superior in either army. His extrication of his cavalry division from the bend of Duck River equaled his conduct in the forks of the Hatchie.

In the spring of 1863 he was the chief commander of the cavalry of Bragg's army, then at Tullahoma; he had as brigade commanders Armstrong, Jackson, Cosby and Martin, and with about 8,000 men, was preparing to move across the Ohio. His command was bivouacked in the fertile region of Middle Tennessee. His headquarters were at Spring Hill, and almost daily he would engage the enemy with one of his brigades while the other three were carefully drilled. His horses were in fine order and his men in better drill, discipline and spirit than our cavalry had ever been. He was assassinated just as he was about to move on the most important enterprise of his life. I believe that in him we lost the greatest cavalry soldier of his time. His knowledge of roads and country was wonderful. He knew how to care for his men and horses. His own wants were few; his habits simple; he was energetic and enduring; he deferred everything to his military duty; he craved glory beyond everything—high glory; there was no stain of vainglory about anything he ever did or said. As the bravest are ever the greatest, so was he simple and kind, and gentle as a child. I remember one evening on our ride across Arkansas we stopped at the hospitable house of an old gentleman (Dr. Williams) about one day's march this side of Van Buren. We were sitting on the portico—Van Dorn and I—when a little child came out to us; he called her to him, and soon had her confidence, and as she told him, in her childlike way, that she was an orphan, and spoke of her mother, lately dead, his eyes filled with tears, and I noticed that he slipped into her hand the only piece of gold he owned and asked her to get with it something to remember him by.

The preeminent quality of his military nature was that he was unconquerable. Whether defeated or victorious he always controlled his resources. As Napoleon said of De Saix, he was all for war and glory; and he had a just idea of glory. There was no self-seeking in him, and he would die for duty at any moment. His personal traits were very charming. His person was very handsome; his manners frank and simple; with his friends he

was genial and sometimes convivial; but never did I know him to postpone his duty for pleasure, or to pursue conviviality to a degree unbecoming a gentleman. Take him for all in all he was the most gallant soldier I have ever known.

A LETTER FROM COLONEL DILLON.

“General D. H. Maury, Chairman Executive Committee Southern Historical Society.

“DEAR GENERAL:—I take advantage of a few hours’ detention here to say, in reply to your inquiry of the 12th inst., that, while my memory is not fresh as to all the details of General Van Dorn’s operations between Columbia and Nashville, Tenn., in 1863, or as to the precise composition of his command at that time, yet I remember that it contained the brigades of Forrest, Jackson, Armstrong, Whitfield and Cosby, numbering, perhaps 7,000 effectives—cavalry and artillery; and I can no doubt give you with tolerable accuracy the main features of the transaction to which you refer.

“General Van Dorn arrived at Columbia early in February, 1863, and shortly thereafter (perhaps in March) took up his headquarters at Spring Hill, protecting the left of General Bragg’s army and operating against the Federal line of communication so effectively as to confine the enemy closely to their fortified positions at Nashville, Brentwood, Franklin, Triune and other points. Vexed at Van Dorn’s frequent attacks, and constantly increasing proximity to their line, the enemy repeatedly moved out in force from their strongholds, but could never be coaxed far enough from them to justify any vigorous attack till some time in May, when General Coburn came out of Franklin with about 5,000 men and was enticed to a point near Thompson’s Station, where, after a sharp engagement, he surrendered in time to prevent a simultaneous attack in front and rear—Forrest’s brigade having gotten behind him. On the day following Forrest was sent with his own and Armstrong’s brigade to attack Brentwood (believed to have been weakened in order to replace the captured garrison of Franklin), and succeeded in beating and capturing the force there (about 1,200), together with a large

number of horses and many arms of different kinds. Out of this affair came an altercation between Van Dorn and Forrest, which is worthy of note as characteristic of both.

"Forrest had reported his success to Van Dorn, who had in turn reported to Bragg; and he, being in need of just such things as Forrest had captured, directed Van Dorn to send them forthwith to him. This order of Bragg's was repeated by Van Dorn to Forrest, who replied that he did not have the captured property and could not comply with the order—I always supposed that Forrest's and Armstrong's men appropriated most of the captured property at the moment of capture. To this Van Dorn said: 'Either your report to me is incorrect, or your command is in possession of the property and you must produce and deliver it. Forrest replied indignantly that he was not in the habit of being talked to in that way and that the time would come when he would demand satisfaction. Van Dorn said, quietly: 'My rank shall be no barrier—you can have satisfaction at any time you desire.'

"Forrest passed his hand thoughtfully across his brow and replied, with a good deal of dignity and grace: 'I have been hasty, General, and am sorry for it. I do not fear that anybody will misunderstand me, but the truth is you and I have enough Yankees to fight without fighting each other, and I hope this matter will be forgotten. Van Dorn said: 'You are right, General, and I am sure no one would ever suspect you of not being ready for any kind of fight at any time. I certainly am willing to drop the matter, and can assure you that I have no feeling about it; but I must insist that my orders shall be obeyed as long as I am your commander. Let us drop the subject, however, as I have work for you to do.' The conversation then turned on the subject of a Federal raid which had just been reported to Van Dorn by scouts, and Forrest, being ordered to intercept it, left Van Dorn's presence (I think they never met again) to perform the most wonderful feat in the history of that remarkable war—I refer to the capture of Strait and his command.

"Very shortly after the departure of Forrest, General Granger, having reinforced Franklin, moved out with a force of about 10,000 infantry and a large body of cavalry and artillery, and Van Dorn retired before him, hoping to repeat the operation against Coburn; but finding Granger's force larger than it was

at first supposed, he determined to assume the defensive and take position behind Rutherford's Creek, a tributary of Duck River, with which it unites only a few miles below Columbia. Accordingly he formed his command on the left bank of the creek, which at that point is about four miles from the river at Columbia and for some distance is nearly parallel with the river, intending to receive Granger's attack there; but heavy rains having fallen on an already swollen river, it became past fording in a few hours, and Van Dorn deemed it imprudent, under the circumstances, to risk an engagement between the creek and swollen river, in which, if beaten, he would probably both lose his command and leave Columbia exposed. He therefore decided to turn up the river to a bridge twenty miles distant, cross, and return down the river by a forced march to cover Columbia before the enemy could cross, he (Van Dorn) having forty miles to move and they only four. This bold and dexterous movement was accomplished in spite of the fact that the enemy, seeing his position, pressed vigorously upon Van Dorn's right to force him into the fork; but finding that he had extricated himself and reached Columbia before any preparation could be made by them to cross, they retired immediately, seeming to fear that their absence from Franklin might tempt so daring and expeditious an opponent as Van Dorn to precede them to that point. Van Dorn at once resumed his position at Spring Hill, and his assassination followed very quickly. My recollection is that, during the few months of his brilliant career in Tennessee, he captured more men than he had in his own command. I may not be entirely accurate in all I have said, but substantially it is correct. If, however, you wish to be minute, you had better send this to General Forrest or General Jackson, either of whom can verify it or correct any inaccuracy of my memory if it be at fault. It is deeply to be regretted that the details of Van Dorn's plans and actions as a cavalry commander in Tennessee, or while covering Pemberton's retreat before Grant to Grenada, and in the signal affair at Holly Springs, fraught as the latter was with results more momentous than those involved in any action of its kind of which I ever knew or heard, should be lost to the history of cavalry; but I fear to trust my memory, and must confine myself to these brief outlines, hoping that some of those who followed him, whose memory is better than mine, may yet do justice to a cavalry whose feats, when

written out, must give him a place beside the greatest of those who in time past have ridden to victory or immortality.

“Yours truly,
“E. DILLON.

“MORGANTOWN, N. C., June 16th, 1877.”

CAPTURE OF THE “STAR OF THE WEST.”

CAPTAIN FARWELL'S NARRATIVE.

The first gun had been fired at Fort Sumter and rumors of imminent strife between the sections were rife, yet hope was general that matters political would be settled, and prayers for peace were momentarily sent up to the Throne of Grace. Vain was the hope, as the four years of horror and bloodshed, and the desolate, downtrodden graves in lonely battle-fields, the flower-grown mounds, and lofty monuments reared to the memory of those who wore the blue and the gray and gave up their lives for the section they loved best can testify.

The first gun fired by the Confederates was directed at the “Star of the West,” a United States transport sent to reinforce the Federal troops at Fort Sumter, and when captured carried at least one shothole received at that time.

The Confederate Government had been inaugurated, having its headquarters at Montgomery, Ala.

The United States troops were to be withdrawn from the Southern States, and the “Star of the West” was sent to transport the troops then in Texas under the command of General Twiggs.

General Twiggs resigned his command at precisely what point I am uncertain at this late date, but I think at San Antonio, and a grave mistake has been made when General Twiggs was accused of having been a traitor and having surrendered the troops and Government property for his own aggrandizement. The General was under the impression that the troops would embark from Indianola, and they marched to the seaboard without him.

On the 15th day of April, 1861, an officer of the newly established Government took passage on the steamship “Matagorda,” of the Morgan Line, at the town then known as Brashear City, *en route* for Texas. This officer was Colonel Earl Van Dorn,

and his purpose was to intercept the troops and capture the transport.

This was a bold move, which required daring, courage, and speed for its successful accomplishment. On their arrival at Galveston the following morning, by authority in him vested, Colonel Van Dorn took charge of the "Matagorda" and detained the ship while he perfected his arrangements and proceeded to muster men to accompany him. A portion of two companies of Galveston volunteered to join him, and the ship left at 8 P. M. for Indianola.

On arriving at Pass Cavallo early the next morning the Colonel found the steamship "Star of the West" lying outside the bar waiting to receive the United States troops, and he learned from the pilots that these troops were on the wharf at Indianola, expecting transportation on the steamship "Fashion"; the latter having been chartered by the United States Government to take them from Indianola to the "Star of the West," as, owing to its deep draft, it was impossible for the last named vessel to cross the bar.

BOARDING THE VESSEL.

Two or three miles above the pass was the village of Saluria, and on a wharf at this place Van Dorn decided to leave his men, until the return of the "Matagorda" from Indianola, at which place the steamer discharged some freight and proceeded to Lavaca.

At the latter port Van Dorn, in order to lose no time, released the "Matagorda" and assumed charge of the "General Rusk" (another of the Morgan Line steamers) and proceeded to Saluria to take on his volunteers, and, the shades of night having fallen, the ship crossed the bar. Running alongside of the "Star of the West," a request was made to the captain to throw a line, as the "General Rusk" had some troops for him.

Captain Howe, of the "Star of the West," asked why the "Fashion" did not go out with the troops. He was told that she would be out in the morning with the baggage and property, there not being sufficient water on the bar for her to cross with all on board at one time. The captain, being unsuspecting, ordered a line to be made fast from the "General Rusk" to the "Star of

the West." As soon as the line was fast Lieutenant Ned Malone, in charge of one of the Galveston companies, jumped on board; but the line at that time was by careless management slackened, and for a short time he stood alone.

"Captain Howe, seeing that this officer's uniform was not that of the United States, asked him what it all meant. Malone, becoming uneasy at the situation, told him that all would be shortly explained. At that moment the two ships came together again, and the Confederates began to pour on board.

The first man to reach Malone's side was a son of the Emerald Isle, Phil Dugan, who was the ensign of his company, and who carried the colors of his State, which he unfurled and shook to the breeze.

"What is that?" asked Captain Howe.

"Be jabers! It's the Lone Star of Texas on an Irish pipe," answered Phil Dugan, in the brogue characteristic of his countrymen.

The captain was placed under arrest. No resistance was made. Colonel Van Dorn assumed command of the ship at which the first gun had been fired by the Confederates and became their first prize, and the two ships proceeded to Galveston. The "Star of the West" was anchored off the bar about midday of the 18th, and about an hour later the "General Rusk" ran alongside our ship to transfer freight. Her commander, Leon Smith, was authorized to select a commander for the captured ship and navigate her to New Orleans, and I was the man he chose. I at first refused, saying that if the ship was recaptured by Federal cruisers in the Gulf that I would be hung to the yard-arm without trial. He asked two other men who refused, and then returned to me with a message from Van Dorn to the effect that if I did not go willingly I would be put on board at the point of the bayonet.

The crew of the captured ship had been engaged to work the vessel to New Orleans, and Captain Smith engaged an engineer, a Mr. Seymour, to go with me, who was to do duty only in case of refusal of the ship's engineers at any time.

DIFFICULTY WITH THE ENGINES.

We were conveyed on board the captured ship by the pilot-boat

"Dart," and on our arrival, about 9 P. M. on the evening of the same day, immediately sailed for this port. Nothing occurred to excite apprehension until near midnight of the 19th. We were off Timbaleur light, when Mr. Seymour informed me that the hose was attached to the hot water, or steam connection boiler, the intention being to scald the guard. This was startling intelligence. Immediately gave orders quietly to have the connection guarded, placed the engineer under arrest and Mr. Seymour in charge of the engine.

In a short time the steam went down and the ship progressed slowly, owing to the fact that the firemen had quit work, and Mr. Seymour found it necessary to go down himself into the fire-room. Whatever his arguments or persuasions may have been, they were at least successful; the firemen resumed their duties, and we experienced no further trouble.

At daylight of the 20th I made Southwest Pass, and, seeing no Federal cruisers about, ran for the bar, took a pilot and put the ship on to the bar. She grounded, slewed head out, and I had to go outside again. This had occurred three times when Captain Howe sent for me and told me that the stores for the troops were stowed in the stern of the ship. This was the cause of her drawing a great deal more of water aft than forward, so I put all hands to work and shifted them and soon had her in trim to cross the bar, which I did without further difficulty.

About 1 P. M. I was halted at Fort Morgan by Colonel Duncan, who was in command. As a matter of course he was in high glee, as the captured ship was the "Star of the West," of Fort Sumter fame, and the first Confederate prize, and equally, of course, the event had to be celebrated in jovial style. By the time I was allowed to go on my way the officers were all as merry as generally falls to the lot of lovers of good whisky to become without being boisterous. After a delay of two hours I proceeded up the river, and anchored off Algiers about 4 A. M. of the 20th.

The excitement in the North was intense, and feelings against me ran high. General Butler endeavored to persuade President Lincoln to offer a reward of \$10,000 each for Captain Leon Smith's head and mine. For this reason I declined the command of one of the Confederate cruisers, fearing that it might be his lot to capture me.

Although not in arms, I was captured and held a prisoner two years, until within a short time of the close of hostilities.

SOME LETTERS TO HIS WIFE.

“CORINTH, MISS., May, 12, 1862.

“Mr. Ingraham goes to Port Gibson this morning and has kindly offered to take anything to you I might have to send. I avail myself of his offer to send you my Mississippi sword and a fine gun (a present to me), and this letter containing some money. The sword and gun are in my way. As for my letter, my dear wife, I must be brief. Not only is my time taken up by public affairs of too much moment to be neglected, but my mind at this time is as it should be, given to the preparations for the great struggle about to come off for our liberty and independence. When they shall have been achieved I will return to you and my children with affection renewed by the fire of adversities through which I shall have passed. Now the things around me have drawn a sternness about my heart which forbids my entertaining the soft and gentle matters of life. I must not think of them—when this coming storm is over I will return to you, as I have said, gentler than I have ever been to you. Until then have patience with me and forgive me for my silence. I think of you often. Kiss my children for me, my dear sisters, and those dear to me. I will telegraph to you as we progress. I will telegraph to you when our banners are waving on the shores of the Tennessee and the enemy are flying into Kentucky. We will conquer. Pray for us.

“With many kisses and affectionate love, I am your husband.”

“EARL.”

“PORT GIBSON, MISS., May 24, 1862.

“MY DEAR BROTHER:

“Earl (a nephew and namesake) leaves in the morning for Corinth and your headquarters to become whatever you choose to make of him. He is so delighted to join you and has been anxious so long to go, that it takes half the pain from the separation from him. I send him to you upon your suggestion of

making him a cadet; he seems to think a permanency in the army desirable, and if he proves equal to it, and can succeed in procuring a commission, I shall be proud of him and thankful to you. He is only a boy, and very inexperienced, and your time is too much occupied to be able to give him your oversight. He goes with heart and hand ready to serve his country.

"Your wife and children keep well, and Olivia grows rapidly, and is a little beauty. Both attend school. While you are battling for the country at large, your native place is in danger and entirely unprotected. Marshall would go to the wars too if I would consent. He is as witty and funny as ever.

"YOUR AFFECTIONATE SISTER."

"JACKSON, July 15, 1862.

"TO GENERAL EARL VAN DORN:

"Five companies have gone to the Raft and others will follow in a few days, in all probability one thousand men. I am proud and happy on hearing from the 'Arkansas.' I have said so to Captain Brown.

"JOHN J. PETTUS,
"Governor of Mississippi."

(Telegram.)

"TO GENERAL VAN DORN.

"BATON ROUGE (10 miles from) via

"CLINTON, LA., 4 A. M., 1861.

"I understand your despatch that 'Arkansas' will reach Baton Rouge at daylight Tuesday morning. Everything depends on this and her cooperation. I send this to verify your despatch; can she get there certainly at this time; if not, when? The sound of her guns and our assault should be simultaneous. Two more gunboats there, one up there gone up river. Answer.

"J. C. BRECKENRIDGE."

"VICKSBURG, MISS., July 15, 1862.

"TO THE PRESIDENT,

"RICHMOND, VA.

"The sloop of war 'Arkansas,' under cover of our batteries, came gloriously through twelve or thirteen of the enemy's gun-

boats, rams and sloops of war. Our loss was ten men killed and fifteen wounded. Captain Brown, her commander, and hero, was slightly wounded in the head. The smoke-stack of the 'Arkansas' was riddled, otherwise she is not materially damaged, and can soon be repaired. Two of the enemy's boats struck their colors and the boats ran ashore to keep from sinking. Many were killed and wounded.

"This is a glorious achievement for the Navy, her heroic commander, officers and men. One mortar boat disabled and aground and is now burning. All the enemy's transports and all the vessels of war of the lower fleet have gotten up steam and are off to escape from the 'Arkansas.'

The ram 'Arkansas' is an ironclad vessel of 1,200 tons and was built at Memphis, but was removed from that point in an unfinished condition, previous to the evacuation of that city by our troops. She has since been completed in the Yazoo River."

(Telegrams.)

"PORT GIBSON, July 18, 1862.

"TO MAJOR-GENERAL VAN DORN,
"VICKSBURG.

"Your despatch of the 15th only received this morning. No boats having passed down for several days and your despatch having been so long in reaching me, I think it possible something may have occurred to change your orders. Whilst therefore everything shall be in readiness to move at the earliest hour. I beg leave to say that a battery of six guns was sent to Jefferson County some weeks ago. On last Tuesday a battery of six other guns were started from here to Fort Adams, but General Beall has placed it at Quitman's Landing above Natchez. I have eight guns left, with hardly enough well men to work four of them. Grand Gulf, I think, is stronger than any unoccupied point this side of Natchez. Under these circumstances shall I move? Answer immediately.

"W. R. MILES,
"Colonel Commanding."

(Copy.)

(Telegram.)

"VICKSBURG, July 15, 1862.

"GENERAL RUGGLES:

"Will send you men if possible. Will let you know in a day or two. Steamer 'Arkansas' came out this morning, made the enemy's boats strike colors. Run the gauntlet of the upper fleet of twelve vessels of war and is now safe under our guns. Will attack below as soon as some repairs are made.

(Signed)

"EARL VAN DORN."

UNION TELEGRAMS.

"JULY 7, 1862.

"Deserters from Aberdeen, Miss., say that Van Dorn's division passed down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad *en route* for East Tennessee."

"JULY 13, 1862.

"At La Grange, heard that Van Dorn was approaching the railroad; scouts report all his movements to General Geo. N. Thomas."

"JULY 15, 1862.

"Telegram from Tuscumbia, Ala., from General Thomas tells his scouts to look out for Van Dorn's approach."

"JULY 25, 1862.

"Enemy informed that Van Dorn and Price are marching on Nashville with 30,000 to 40,000 strong."

"PRICEVILLE, MISS., June 9, 1862.

"HIS EXCELLENCY, THE PRESIDENT:

"DEAR SIR:

"I learned a day or two since that General Magruder had been ordered to the command of the Trans-Mississippi Department and immediately telegraphed to you not to send any one at pres-

ent, as it would have a bad effect. General Price goes to-morrow to see you and will explain all on the subject.

"I wish here to suggest to you that the love of the people of Missouri for General Price and his prestige as a commander there is so great that wisdom would seem to suggest that he be put at the head of affairs in the West. I see the alluring bait held out to my ambition—the fall of St. Louis—the reclamation of a rich segment of our beloved South from the grip of the enemy, and the glory that might be mine, but I shut all this out from me because I think that it is the best interest of the country to do so. I hope whatever glory there may be in it may be on the brow of General Price, than whom there is no one more worthy to wear it, and than by whom I would rather see it worn.

"Very truly, sir, your obedient servant,

"EARL VAN DORN."

"RICHMOND, VA., July 13, 1862.

"TO GENERAL EARL VAN DORN, Vicksburg, Miss.:

"Your despatch of yesterday received. Your gallantry has fulfilled my expectations. Accept my thanks and congratulations for what has been achieved. Have ordered more and heavier guns to be furnished to you. What of the gunboat 'Arkansas'? The junction of the departments arose from no want of confidence, but to render the whole force most available to the permanent object—the defense of the country.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

TO HIS WIFE.

"VICKSBURG, MISS., July 22, 1862.

"God bless you, my own dear wife. I received your kind, good letter to-day with one from my dear little angel daughter. You are a gentle, kind, and forgiving wife, and the tone of this letter has pleased me a great deal. You do not scold at me for not writing, because you know how troubled and harassed I am continually with the cares of my position here. I must be unceasingly vigilant and watchful, as the enemy are always in sight, and are furious at being so long baffled where they expected an easy conquest. They will let nothing escape them. In addition to this, I have the control of the district, and have my hands full. You are kind not to expect me to write

often. I had hoped to see you when I left Tupelo, but just as I was about to write for you to come to me I got an order one night after 12 o'clock to come here, and had to leave next morning early. So you see we have less opportunity for rest and recreation than anybody else. And since my chills have left me so healthy, I have not even the plea of sickness to get off. But it is best, as no one should desire to leave a moment this contest. I rejoice that I am able to keep the enemy from here. A portion of the fleet has gone below, and it is said that they have gone to Mobile. But with the example of Vicksburg, Mobile will not give up. We are bombarded here every day more or less, as the enemy feel like it. Sometimes it is grand; we all take it very coolly, however. Have gotten used to it."

* * * "

"TUPELO, MISS., July 31, 1862.

"GENERAL STERLING PRICE TO GOV. JOHN J. PETTUS, Miss.

"GOVERNOR:—The events of each day impress me more deeply with the importance of prompt action on the part of this army, and you will, therefore, pardon me for again invoking your assistance. You can strengthen my army several thousand by calling out about 2,000 of the militia to garrison Meridian, Columbus, Okolono, and Verona, and to protect the railroad bridges and trestle work. This will enable me to withdraw all the Confederate troops from that duty and put them in the field. I must beg you, in the event of your being willing to comply with this request, to act promptly, as I intend to order all the disposable troops forward to Tupelo within the present week, preparatory to an immediate forward movement. I would suggest to your Excellency the propriety of preserving absolute secrecy as to the proposed movement, as the enemy are doubtless impressed with the idea that the whole army is being moved eastward, and as they seem to be acting upon that belief. You may also aid me very greatly by sending forward recruits, and in this connection I may say that Captain Gholson proposes, with your concurrence, to raise a battalion of sharpshooters for service with the Army of the West. I hope that you will give him your assistance in this work. The necessity of immediate action must be my apology for again addressing your Excellency upon this subject without awaiting your reply to my preceding communication, etc."

"TUPELO, MISS., July 31, 1862.

"GENERAL PRICE TO GENERAL EARL VAN DORN, at Vicksburg, Miss.:

"GENERAL:—Official despatches from General Armstrong and the reports of scouts and others, all confirm the fact that General Halleck's army is being rapidly transferred eastward, and that Buell's, Thomas', and Rosecrans' divisions have already passed Tuscumbia, Rosecrans' passing Tuscumbia on Saturday. I do not think that General Grant, who remains in command at Corinth, can have more than 15,000 troops there, though Colonel Wheeler, commanding a cavalry brigade in North Mississippi, reports that the enemy have recently concentrated about 10,000 at Bolivar. This must, however, be an over-estimate. It at all events seems to me unquestionable that they must, in order to meet General Bragg, continue to remove troops eastward, and that they cannot leave more than 20,000 under General Grant. This will be our opportunity, and I am extremely anxious that we shall avail ourselves of it. I, therefore, send a gentleman to Governor Pettus to ask his cooperation, and another, Dr. Luke P. Blackburn, volunteer aide-de-camp, to you to submit the matter to your consideration. It is my opinion that, if we will advance our arms rapidly and concurrently toward Grand Junction or some other point on or near the Tennessee line, at the same time obstructing the railroads, we can move irresistibly through Western or Central Tennessee into Kentucky. The enemy can only confront us by weakening the army opposed to General Bragg. The result will be the same in either case—a victory to the Confederate arms, either through our forces or through those under the immediate command of General Bragg. It seems to me that in view of the great results that would flow from the reoccupation of Tennessee, we ought not to hesitate to endanger every minor one; that the true way, in other words, of completing the work of regaining complete possession of the Mississippi, which you have so gloriously begun at Vicksburg, is to advance with our armies into Kentucky. I can put 15,000 effective men in the field. I am getting them in readiness for instant service. I will gladly place them under your command if you will cooperate with me in the proposed movement, and be proud to serve under the defender of Vicksburg. The Governor of Mississippi can surely increase our forces several thou-

sand, and can garrison the post and continue the defense of Vicksburg with the State militia.

"I am, General, with greatest respect, your obedient servant,

"STERLING PRICE,

"*Major-General Commanding.*"

"RICHMOND, VA., August 4, 1862.

"TO GENERAL VAN DORN, Vicksburg, Miss.:

"The importance of the object at which you aim cannot be over-estimated. I fear General Bragg cannot detail any more of his force. The Secretary of War will send you an order for the Texas Legion. Some heavy artillerists may be sent from here. Colonel Marignay is *en route* to Camp Moore with instructions to collect and organize partisans. From the Florida parish I hope you will get considerable accessions of force. See General Richard Taylor, on his way to Western Louisiana, and General Holmes, to Trans-Miss. Dept., and confer with them as to their ability to aid you.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

"RICHMOND, VA., August 4, 1862.

"TO GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Department of Northern Virginia, etc.:

"General Van Dorn has sent General Breckinridge to attack Port Hudson and Baton Rouge, and if he is successful he will very much need heavy artillerymen.

"De Gournay's battalion, now in the city works, was raised in New Orleans, and could stand the climate. We had better send them out, as the batteries established at Port Hudson will enable us to command the Mississippi River from that point to Vicksburg, including the mouth of Red River.

"G. W. RANDOLPH,

"*Secretary of War.*"

"JACKSON, MISS., August 11, 1862.

"GENERAL EARL VAN DORN TO STERLING PRICE:

"Am directed to take the offensive toward Grand Junction and Memphis. Breckinridge is near Baton Rouge; enemy been reinforced from New Orleans; am afraid Breckinridge is too feeble to make decisive result. It will be two weeks before I can do anything. Very important to secure mouth of Red

River. Can you not, therefore, send Breckinridge a brigade to make sure? They can then go with me to Grand Junction and rejoin you there. Answer. If yes, when will be here? Bragg cannot move, I think, in three weeks yet.

“EARL VAN DORN.”

“CHATTANOOGA, TENN., August 11, 1862.

“GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG TO GENERAL EARL VAN DORN,
Commanding Army of the Mississippi:

“GENERAL:—In view of the operations from here, it is very desirable to press the enemy closely in West Tennessee. We learn their forces there are being rapidly reduced, and when our movements become known it is certain they must throw more forces into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky or lose those regions. If you hold them in check we are sure of success here; but should they reinforce here, so as to defy us, then you may redeem West Tennessee and probably aid us by crossing to the enemy's rear.”

It had been said that General Van Dorn acted upon his own plans without consulting with General Price.

“TUPELO, MISS., August 27, 1862.

“GENERAL PRICE TO GENERAL VAN DORN:

“GENERAL:—I acknowledge with a great deal of pleasure the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, and am glad that you agree to my proposition to unite our forces for an aggressive campaign. I fully concur in the opinion that we should move our combined armies through Western Tennessee toward Paducah, and thence wherever circumstances may dictate. It seems to me that we should first drive the enemy from his position at and near Corinth, so as to retain control of the railroad. I fear that my own forces are hardly sufficient to accomplish this, as the enemy are equal to them in numbers and strongly intrenched, and I am not willing to risk a doubtful engagement under present circumstances. I therefore think that it is decidedly better that we should concentrate our forces at or near this point for the purpose of attacking the enemy at Corinth. This ought to be done straightway, so as to hinder and delay the reinforcements of Buell as much as possible, and also to anticipate any rein-

forcements which may be on their way to Corinth. In both of these views speedy action is very important. Having driven the enemy from Corinth we may then decide upon the future conduct of the campaign. I have sent General Frank C. Armstrong, with almost 2,000 cavalry, upon an intended reconnaissance. He has probably reached Grand Junction. He will make the circuit of Corinth, striking at whatever points may appear most available. I will be able to advise you more particularly as to the enemy's strength and position after hearing from him. Let us meanwhile hasten our preparations to move. I can have my army ready within five days. Our success must depend in a great measure, and may depend altogether, upon the rapidity of our movements. We must attack the enemy before they begin to receive their new levies, and while they are still discouraged by their late reverses. We ought to avail ourselves, too, of the moral force which we would gain by participating in the great forward movement which our armies are now making everywhere. An advance on our part would put the whole line in movement from the Atlantic to the territories, for we alone are stationary. The despatches this afternoon announce that the enemy are falling back from the line of the Tennessee. Let us keep them moving.

"I am, General, with greatest respect, your friend and servant,

"STERLING PRICE,

"Major-General."

"SEPTEMBER 2, 1862.

"General Beauregard urges General Bragg to withdraw the enemy from West Tennessee that the command of the Mississippi River may be resumed. Recommends that the command of Generals Van Dorn and Price and all troops that can be spared from Vicksburg be concentrated at Grand Junction, compel the forces at Corinth and Jackson, Tenn., to fall back, and cut off the communication, pursue him to the Ohio, and then detach General Price into Missouri to support his friends."

"SEPTEMBER 17, 1862.

"General Van Dorn at Holly Springs."

"SEPTEMBER 19, 1862.

"General Van Dorn at Grand Junction, Miss."

"SEPTEMBER 25, 1862.

"General Bragg writes that he hopes General Van Dorn and General Price may clear away his rear and open their base for them—otherwise we may be seriously embarrassed."

"SEPTEMBER 19, 1862.

"LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF WAR TO MAJOR-GENERAL EARL VAN DORN:

"We fear that a serious misunderstanding exists with reference to the movements of Price, Breckinridge, and myself. General Bragg, we are informed, expected Breckinridge to follow Kirby Smith with 7,000 men, and that Price and yourself should act in concert. This cooperation seems to us essential to success, and nothing should be allowed to obstruct it. If Breckinridge cannot go to Smith without endangering the success of your operations he must be retained. When in company with Price you will, by virtue of seniority, direct the movements of the embodied forces.

G. W. RANDOLPH."

"JACKSON, MISS., Sept. 5, 1862.

"General Orders No. 47.

"The Honorable Secretary of War having announced that martial law can only be declared by the President, and that it has not been declared by him in Mississippi, General Orders No. 9, from these headquarters, dated Vicksburg, July 4, 1862, and all other orders arising under the declaration of martial law in this district, are hereby revoked. All provost marshals will be discharged and all prisoners, other than soldiers, will be turned over to the proper civil authorities. The general commanding in declaring martial law was influenced to do so only by what he considered the best interests of the country, and not by any desire to accumulate power. A soldier of more than twenty years in their service, he had no ambition to play the tyrant over the citizens of his own State whom he was sent to defend. The exigencies of the times seemed to him to call for the interposition of a stronger and more prompt hand than the civil authorities were able to hold out against the abuses incident to the times, and with numerous precedents for doing so, he declared martial law. The general commanding hopes that throughout his district the efficiency of the civil authority will

demonstrate that his judgment has been at fault and that there exists no necessity for martial law. He takes this occasion to say, however, that he fears this will not be the case, at least in some parts of the district, and to inform the civil authorities that he will cheerfully cooperate with them, and will come to their aid with the forces under his command whenever legally called upon to do so."

In September and October, 1862, General Van Dorn sent out many orders preparatory to the attack on Corinth, and it will be observed that he had the cooperation of all the leaders in his plans.

" HOLLY SPRINGS, MISS., Sept., 1862.

" TO GENERAL STERLING PRICE, Guntown, Miss.:

" From telegram do not know where you are. I propose that you move towards Rienzi and send cavalry out to meet my scouts. I will move in that direction in a few days, or as soon as my wagons are up. With scouts out we will make junction west of Corinth not far from Pocahontas. Enemy at Bolivar twelve or fifteen thousand. Must try and prevent junction with Rosecrans. Enemy receiving reinforcements at Memphis (new levies). Campaign in West Tennessee imperative and necessary to Bragg. Send reply at once and let us understand. Will write.

" EARL VAN DORN,
" *Major-General.*"

" IUKA, MISS., Sept. 17, 1862.

" GENERAL PRICE TO GENERAL VAN DORN:

" GENERAL:—I entered this town with my army on last Sunday morning, the rear guard of Rosecrans' army evacuating it at my approach and retreating westward. I telegraphed you immediately, proposing a combined movement upon Corinth, and sent the dispatch by special messenger to Guntown, with instructions to forward it to you and to await your reply. This has not been received yet. I hope that you will answer me at once, for General Bragg has just sent me another despatch. . . . "I am anxiously expecting your advance, and trust it will not longer be delayed. Bragg."

"I cannot remain inactive any longer, and must move either

with you against Rosecrans or toward Kentucky. The courier that takes this to you will bring your reply.

“STERLING PRICE.”

“RICHMOND, VA., Sept. 29, 1862.

“TO GENERAL VAN DORN FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

“Assume forthwith the command of all the troops left in Mississippi, including General Price's column. Concentrate them without loss of time; reorganize and arm the exchanged prisoners; make proper disposition for the defense of the Mississippi River, and also for an advance into Tennessee, and acknowledge receipt of this order by telegraph.

“G. W. RANDOLPH.”

General Price states in one letter dated September 28, 1862, that General Van Dorn's forces met him that day at Ripley, and “with the combined armies we will at once proceed northward, endeavoring to overcome the enemy in front of us; with what success I cannot, of course, tell, but we have every confidence in our ability to defeat him. The enemy being in much larger force in the vicinity of Corinth than was anticipated by us, has alone prevented me from carrying out General Bragg's orders.”

General Van Dorn writes to General Price the same date, September 28: “Please direct three days' rations to be cooked; as many wagons emptied as possible, and send them to Holly Springs to be loaded with bacon, flour, and salt. Please send two armed convalescents or weakly men with each wagon as an escort, with one officer from each division. General Lovell will do the same, and the wagons will start back to-morrow via Salem. The chief quartermaster has been directed to hire as many wagons between this place and Holly Springs as he can find. General Lovell will move his division up on the Ruckersville road about five or six miles to-morrow morning. Please hold your army in readiness to move in same direction. They may move to-morrow if the preparations above desired can be made in time.”

General Price writes to General Van Dorn that, “The enemy are transferring their troops from Corinth, and they will by the end of the week have reduced their force to its minimum. We should be quick to take advantage of this, for they will soon

begin to get reinforcements. I earnestly desire your cooperation and will be glad to place my army and myself under your command. The very names of yourself and General Breckinridge would bring thousands to our ranks and carry dismay to those of the enemy."

(Signed)

"STERLING PRICE."

"HEADQUARTERS COMBINED FORCES,

"POCAHONTAS, TENN., Oct. 1, 1862.

"GENERAL VAN DORN TO MAJOR-GENERAL PRICE, Commanding Army of the West:

"GENERAL:—I had intended to call and see you this evening, but have not been able to do so. I have ordered General Lovell to move his division in the morning toward Chewalla, and the cavalry to meet Armstrong near there, and to move forward and feel the condition of affairs about Corinth—that is, the cavalry—also to cut Jackson R. Road. I have ordered General Lovell to leave you twelve thousand rations.

"Please hold yourself in readiness with your army corps to march at short notice. It *may* be that we shall march some time to-morrow. It will depend upon Lovell's report. Fifteen regiments have left Corinth since the 23d. Also three trains of artillery and a large quantity of ammunition. Please order the bridge over the Hatchie at Pocahontas made, if possible, by to-morrow night.

"I send a courier in the morning to Holly Springs. You have an opportunity to write. Send to-night."

TELEGRAM.

"To HON. G. W. RANDOLPH, Secretary of War:

"Despatch October 1, Pocahontas, Tenn. I have made union with General Price and am now before Corinth. Joined forces at Ripley, Miss., on the 28th of September. Expect some of the returned prisoners at Holly Springs within ten days, probably all of them. Will send two regiments to Port Henderson. Sufficient force now at Vicksburg. Expect to take Corinth—move all divisions in the morning to full position and strength and to cut with cavalry the railroad to Jackson, Tenn. One divi-

sion of the Corinth command and some artillery left on the 25th for the North.

"Rosecrans in command with two divisions left at Corinth.

"EARL VAN DORN,

"Major-General."

"OCTOBER 4, 1862, day after Corinth battle.

"TO GENERAL PRICE FROM GENERAL VAN DORN:

"GENERAL:—Please detail from each of your divisions 100 men with one captain and one lieutenant from each division, and a field officer, of intelligence and good address, to go to Corinth to bury our dead. The detail from each division will take a wagon and the necessary implements and will report at these headquarters before the command moves in the morning.

"EARL VAN DORN."

Same to the same:

"GENERAL:—Send some of the cavalry to the rear with canteens for water and to water horses.

"EARL VAN DORN."

Received at Richmond, Va., October 8, 1862:

"HON. SECRETARY OF WAR:

(Despatch from Pocahontas, near Corinth.)

"Attacked Corinth, took all the outer works by storm, and got within the town. Enemy received fresh reinforcements and we could not complete the work—retired. The Bolivar force came down on my line of retreat and prevented crossing of Hatchie.

"Moved south, crossed six (6) miles below, and now at Ripley with all baggage and as many of the wounded as could carry. Bloody affair. Enemy still threaten. Will fight him at all points. There are about forty thousand (40,000) men still in West Tennessee. Will have hard fighting.

"EARL VAN DORN."

(President Davis pronounced the retreat of the army from Corinth "masterly," and that it "evinced the military genius of its commander," but telegraphed General Bragg that:)

“OCTOBER, 8, 1862.

“There was an evident error as to the withdrawal of the army from Tennessee. The battle of Corinth shows the impossibility of the advance referred to as the part required of Generals Van Dorn and Price. It is to be hoped that Kentucky may be held.”

LETTER OF COLONEL YERGER.

“JACKSON, MISS., Oct. 10, 1862.

“MAJOR-GENERAL EARL VAN DORN, Holly Springs, Miss.:

“MY DEAR GENERAL:—Since my arrival here I find it difficult to stay the storm of abuse which is being hurled against you since our unhappy day at Corinth. In fact, so various are the rumors being floated by certain heartless and cowardly traducers, I desire to have something from your own hand by way of refutation, not to be used unless the statements of your friends continue to be doubted. It is current here that ‘every general officer opposed the attack,’ and that you ‘attacked 40,000 behind intrenchments with 30,000.’ Let me hear from you soon, and believe me ever faithfully.

“E. M. YERGER.”

REPLY OF GENERAL VAN DORN.

“HOLLY SPRINGS, MISS., Oct. 15, 1862.

“To the few friends I have in Mississippi, I will say that I have seen no editorial statement in the newspapers regarding me in this matter that is true. It is not true that every general officer opposed the attack on Corinth. I have an official letter from General Price, from Guntown, stating that he was ready to cooperate with me in an attack on Corinth. There was no council of war held, and I did not know the opinion of any other general officer on the subject. I knew that the army was in excellent spirits, and although I have never courted popularity or applause from the army (this you well know), I was cheered by most of the troops passing my headquarters as they filed out of town on their march to Corinth. After the first day’s fighting, as we all stood by our bivouac fires within three-quarters of a mile of Corinth, and when it was thought by all that that stronghold, which had been frowning so long upon the very heart of our country, was won, I received the congratulations of many officers of the highest rank and

standing upon the manner of the attack, the management of the troops, and upon the glorious victory which seemed about to crown our efforts. The next day, when misfortune fell upon me, can it be that any of these gentlemen became my detractors, think you?

'It is not true that I attacked 40,000 with 30,000, nor 20,000 men behind intrenchments with 13,000. The enemy had about 15,000 men in Corinth on the day the attack commenced. I had more, as you know. It is true the enemy had about 8,000 men at Rienzi, Iuka, and Kossuth, who were brought up that night, but it was hoped that Corinth would be carried the first day of the attack, and that the reinforcements would reach the field too late; and but for the lack of water, the fatiguing march through a parched country 10 or 12 miles before commencing the contest, and the unusual energy and skill displayed by one of the most obstinate and astute generals in the United States service, Corinth would have been ours at sunset Friday, as is testified by the enemy themselves.

"Again, the works immediately around the town were constructed but a few days before the attack, and were not known to me in time to guide my actions. I had no means of knowing their existence. All the works known to me, the first and second lines, were carried by our troops in the most gallant manner possible, and Corinth should have been ours under all human calculation.

"The army is now here, in good condition, with the exception of the gallant dead and the wounded. There is another class—these should not be mentioned by the same lips that give utterance to the names of those who fell beneath their glorious colors—I mean the cowards who fell back from the ranks when their brave leaders ordered them on to the attack, and who to the rapid discharge of cannon, the rattling of musketry, and all the soul-stirring sounds of battle were alike insensible, as they fled the field, scattering falsehoods and abuse of generals throughout the land.

"To the censorious public I have but to say I look to time to put me right. I am right; and military men, when the facts are known, will do me justice; so will the public, who now damn me to their hearts' content. I know them too well to die under the infliction.

"Truly yours,

"EARL VAN DORN."

TELEGRAM.

" RICHMOND, October 20, 1862.

" GENERAL VAN DORN :

" The assignment of General Pemberton does not deprive you or General Price of your command, the wants of Mississippi and your own fate equally render me unwilling to withdraw you from your present sphere of duty at this time.

" JEFFERSON DAVIS."

" HOLLY SPRINGS, MISS., Oct. 12, 1862.

" TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR FROM GEN. EARL VAN DORN :

" Orders of General Pemberton just received. Enemy 40,000 in West Tennessee. I attacked Corinth and took it, but could not hold it. Am at Holly Springs. I depend on the railroad for supplies until I can repair my strength, including Price's 22,000. The department has not considered the difficulties before me. Pemberton's order mentions that I take the field for East Tennessee; does it not mean West Tennessee? I have never received instructions of any kind. I shall act for the best, but I am now an isolated body in the field in Mississippi, relieved of command of my department. I hope this will be corrected."

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF WEST TENNESSEE,

" HOLLY SPRINGS, MISS., Oct. 12, 1862.

" General Orders No. 52.

" By direction of the Secretary of War, Major-General Van Dorn assumes command of all the troops in the State of Mississippi including all exchanged prisoners. They will render the returns and reports required by regulations and existing orders to this office. In addition a field return will be made on the 15th of each month giving effective strength.

" By order of General Van Dorn.

" M. M. KIMMEL,

" Major & A. A. General."

* This telegram came in the face of the letter of one James Phelan written to President Davis advising the removal of General Van Dorn, coupled with abuse of everybody and everything in his desire to run the C. S. Government and its President.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE WEST,

"HOLLY SPRINGS, Oct. 13, 1862.

"MAJOR-GENERAL EARL VAN DORN:

"Hearing a rumor that you were charged with being drunk during the engagement of the 3d, 4th, and 5th inst., it is with pleasure that I can testify from frequent personal observations and intercourse with you on the battle-field, that the charge is unjust, groundless, and false. Your conduct there was marked by the same intrepid coolness which I have had occasion to admire in you on other fields.

"I have the honor to remain,

"Very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"STERLING PRICE,

"Major-General."

TELEGRAM.

"RICHMOND, Oct. 21, 1862.

"I do not mean that Pemberton would not command, but that you would not be deprived of your division nor Price of his by the order issued here. How did Lovell get your corps; why will you have no command. I think to remove you now would be injudicious to you; to what other field would you be transferred? Will write by Captain Schaumburg.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."

LETTER TO A FRIEND.

"HOLLY SPRINGS, MISS., Oct. 30, 1862.

"Your kind letter came to me like a ray of sunshine in my clouds. I was happy to learn that you have not believed the villainous slanders against my character. I have been so *well* abused that I thought I had *no* friends whatever—and a friend's silence would have mortified me exceedingly; although I have not deserved much from you—I have been so remiss. Do not believe all that you hear. I shall come out of this as proudly as you could wish, and I shall be vindicated. I scorn to answer the public accusations made without any knowledge of facts or without cause. My official report will be out in a few days and you will see how much cause they have for them. Like the wounded porpoise that is run down by its kind until it leaves its element

and dies on the beach, so are unfortunate men hunted to the death. I am not made of such stuff as to fly from them; neither will I die under their shafts. I live still; and until it pleases God to take me I shall continue to do so unharmed. I shall fight this war out if I am left no friends but my family. Don't be hurt that my character has been assailed. I am not so much affected by it, but that I eat all my meals with a very good appetite. . . .

"The Federal General McPherson, whom I fought the other day, enclosed me a letter a few days since under flag of truce from my sister Jane to him, asking him to protect the grave of her son Aaron. He kindly promised me to do so if I would indicate the spot. . . .

"Affectionately and with sincere love, your friend,

"EARL VAN DORN."

TELEGRAM.

"JACKSON, MISS., Nov. 4, 1862.

"TO MAJOR GENERAL VAN DORN:

"With your infantry and artillery take position behind the Tallahatchie if the enemy advances in force against you; feel the enemy with your cavalry, take measures to strengthen the positions, we may be compelled to occupy at the fords by entrenchments. I will have a train ready to move up if necessary; make every effort to learn where the enemy is moving his whole force. I am anxious to hear from Corinth; advise General Bragg of this movement if found to be correct.

"J. C. PEMBERTON,

"*Lieutenant-General Commanding.*"

The President, in response, wrote:

"RICHMOND, Va., Nov. 4, 1862.

"MY DEAR GENERAL:

"While I was reflecting on your case with a view to meet both your interest and your wish, a telegram was brought to me to announce that you were under charges and that you desired a trial. It was consistent with your character to meet promptly any proposition for investigation. It did not appear to me, however, proper to accept your waiver as to the constitution of a court to sit upon your commission, and therefore I directed that instead

of a trial there should be an inquiry to test the force of the allegations made.

"I need not say to you that the occasion is one which has given me much pain, and hope that your vindication may be as complete as I am sure your motives were patriotic. As the event of which you wrote is to be submitted to inquiry, I will say nothing on the subject.

"The reports to which you refer have to some extent and in various ways reached me. You no doubt injured yourself by attempting to give to officers position and command to which you could not properly assign them, and for which you were sufficiently warned they were not designed by the War Department.

"I write in much haste and will only add that my regard for you and earnest desire for your welfare is undiminished.

"Your friend,

"JEFFERSON DAVIS.

"To General Van Dorn."

TO HIS WIFE.

"COLUMBIA, TENN., March 14, 1863.

"I wrote to you some time ago by a gentleman who was going to Mobile, and much to my surprise he returned here yesterday and gave me back the letter. He did not go as far as Mobile and did not mail the letter. I regret it, as I enclosed you some money which I am afraid you needed. I now have another opportunity to send, and hope you will receive it. . . .

"I fought a battle near here a few days ago and won it. It was a beautiful affair. All in sight in an open plain. I took four regiments prisoners. Have had a rough time, but satisfactory to everybody.

"I am surrounded continually by a crowd and cannot write. I am well, and stand well with my troops. All cheer and serenade me. Children to change with every change of fortune!"

"STEAM RAM *Switzerland*,

"CAIRO, ILL., Sept. 28, 1862.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

"I have the honor to call your attention to a matter that has before been presented to your notice, and that, in my opinion,

is of very grave importance to the public interest, viz.: The providing without delay an iron-clad fleet of rams to meet the enemy's new fleet that without doubt will appear upon these waters with the next flood. You are aware of the frail nature of the fleet of wooden boats that I have the honor at present to command. It is no detracton from the eminent services that they have rendered the country to say that it was mainly attributable to the ignorance of the enemy as to their strength, and to the bold audacity of their former commander. There seems no room to doubt that the enemy are now busily engaged in building a new fleet of formidable rams and gunboats up the Yazoo River and its tributaries, besides what they may be doing up the Arkansas and White Rivers, with the evident purpose of resuming possession of the Mississippi River with the rise of the water in the winter or spring. The reports to this effect are so constant and uniform that it does seem to me the part of prudence to take warning and make suitable provision while there is yet time to meet the probable emergency. It is a fact that few have the presumption now to dispute that our flat-bottomed, slow gunboats are in no way equal to contend against the formidable rams and gunboats that the enemy have heretofore produced and are likely to again bring against us. I trust that it will be regarded as no disparagement to the brave officers and men of the gunboats, nor of the former valuable services of the boats themselves, to say that the latter are in no way suitable to meet the new order of things soon to be produced. It is in view of these, to me, plain facts that I take the liberty of urging upon your notice again the great importance of providing one or more boats of strength and speed equal at least to what we know the enemy have heretofore produced and are capable of reproducing. The disastrous and most mortifying raid of the 'Arkansas' should not soon be forgotten. Recent developments seem to show conclusively that her final destruction was partially, at least, owing to the severe shock she received from the 'Queen of the West,' which disarranged her engine and caused her machinery to break down. If at the time of that action the 'Queen' had been iron-clad, so that she could with partial impunity have for ten minutes longer endured the terrific fire she was exposed to, the 'Arkansas' would never again have left her anchorage.

"ALFRED W. ELLETT,

"Colonel Commanding Ram Fleet, U. S.

"CORINTH, MISS., Sept. 30, 1862.

"MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, General-in-Chief:

"Price is at Ripley, Van Dorn at Somerville, and Villepigue at Salem. It looks as if Van Dorn was trying to effect a lodgment on the Mississippi above Memphis. Threatened at all other points. I cannot send out forces to drive him away. If Helena troops could now be sent across the river I think they would meet with no difficulty in getting to Grenada, and perhaps down on to the Yazoo.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Major-General."

EXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN TO GENERAL LORENZO THOMAS, ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

"WASHINGTON, D. C., December 16, 1862.

"A gentleman who has hitherto communicated valuable information is just in from the Yazoo, where he has business with a planter whose name he gives me; the latter was just in from Jackson, Miss., whither he had gone to solicit permission to load a boat with cotton in the Yazoo above the mouth of Yalabusha and run it to Yazoo City. At Jackson he saw Governor Pettus, General Van Dorn, and Pemberton, who after the abandonment of the Tallahatchie, spoke of this general plan of action as to encourage Grant to advance and proposed great river expedition, of which there was much talk, to pass unopposed to Vicksburg. Then Bragg's army was to amuse Rosecrans near Nashville by feigned attacks, whilst the bulk was to be removed by rail around to the Mobile and Ohio road, to their old ground at Tupelo and Baldwin; at the same time Holmes was to remove the bulk of his army to Des Arc, Arkansas. As soon as Grant and the river expedition passed below these were to close in to the Mississippi above Memphis, near Fort Pillow.

"Of course, my orders are specific from General Grant, and I shall heed nothing else, but merely mention this rumor that the general-in-chief may attach as much or as little importance to it as he thinks proper.

"I think I observe among the people of this neighborhood an improved public sentiment toward our cause.

"W. T. SHERMAN."

GENERAL ROSECRANS TO GENERAL GRANT.

"BARNESVILLE, Sept. 17, 1862.

"I am going to send in a prisoner who gave himself up to our skirmishers yesterday. He gives some very valuable information. According to his statement Price is trying to draw our troops out from Corinth, when Van Dorn and Breckinridge will attack that place."

A WELL-SPENT LIFE.

"There passed away this week at Clifton, near Cambridge, Mrs. Octavia Sulivane, a woman ripe in years and conscious of a well-spent life.

Mrs. Sulivane was born on the plantation home of her parents, near Port Gibson, Miss., a neighborhood noted for its beautiful scenery, and where dwelt many of the richest and most aristocratic families of the State.

She was at the time of her death in her 82d year, and her memory could look a long way back in the early history of her native State, and she knew well many of its greatest sons.

Mrs. Sulivane's maiden name was Van Dorn, and she was the sister of the celebrated cavalry general, Earl Van Dorn, a man who first made a reputation as a dashing cadet at West Point, and later as a gallant soldier when a lieutenant in the Second United States Dragoons, which force was the foundation of the now famous Fifth Cavalry. As captain, Earl Van Dorn made a record in Mexico, and held the rank of major at the breaking out of the Civil War, but surrendered his commission and offered his sword to the Confederacy, his State having quickly followed South Carolina in the Act of Secession.

The brilliant, though short-lived career of Major-General Van Dorn is too well known to comment on here, in referring to the death of his sister, who had the claim also of being the mother of a distinguished Confederate soldier, Colonel Clement Sulivane, now of Cambridge, and ex-State Senator from Maryland.

Colonel Clement Sulivane won his spurs early in the war, and made a record with his sword, he having been an officer on the

staff of his uncle, General Van Dorn, and served from first to last with conspicuous bravery.

Mrs. Sulivane was twice married, her first husband being Mr. Isaac Ross, of Mississippi; her second Dr. Vans Murray Sulivane, of Maryland.

By blood and marriage ties she is connected with many of the most distinguished families of Mississippi and Maryland.

Her long life has been a noble one, and having crossed the threshold of fourscore years, she has sunk to sleep, leaving many to mourn her loss."

MRS. OCTAVIA SULIVANE.

"Mrs. Sulivane was born in Port Gibson, Miss. Her maiden name was Van Dorn, being a sister of the distinguished Confederate general of that name. She was twice married, her first husband being Mr. Isaac Ross, of Mississippi, and her second husband, Dr. Vans Murray Sulivane, of Cambridge, who afterwards removed to Mississippi. Colonel Clement Sulivane, a learned member of the Dorchester County bar, is her only son, and Mrs. Rider Henry her only daughter. Her grandchildren are Miss Ruth Sulivane and Mr. Murray Sulivane, of Cambridge; Mr. Earl Sulivane, of Chattanooga, Tenn.; Mrs. John J. Hemphill and Mrs. John Goldsborough, of Washington, D. C., and Messrs. Clement and Rider Henry, of New York.

This remarkable woman—remarkable alike for her strength of body and mind—lightly bore the burden of her more than fourscore years, and 81 still found her at the post of duty, cheerfully and resolutely sharing responsibilities for the sake of those she loved and who loved her. Hers was a gentle and heroic nature, combining in a rare degree those strong elements of character which in prosperity grace true womanhood and in adversity constitute the heroine.

"Life's race well run ;
Life's work well done ;
Life's victory won ;
Now comes rest."

One who knew her well has this to say of her:

"Lovely in character, beautiful even in old age, in form and

feature, her life was an exquisite poem filled with the rarest gems that adorn noble womanhood. A life of devotion and goodness insures a future of glory from which those who loved her would not recall her."

GENERAL VAN DORN'S SWORD.

The following correspondence with reference to a relic of the war, which has been furnished us by Captain W. F. Evans, explains itself:

"We are in receipt of a letter from Mr. E. D. Kepner, editor of the *Lenox Independent*, Lenox, Ia., stating that he knows of the existence of a sword in his county, presented at the breaking out of the war, by citizens of the State of Mississippi, to Major Earl Van Dorn. He had heard that the family desired to get it, and thinks the person who has it might be induced to surrender it for a valuable consideration."

"OFFICE OF THE Clarion,

"JACKSON, MISS., Nov. 19, 1883.

"DEAR SIR:—Having recently published the enclosed, I have an inquiry from a gentleman in Claiborne County, where General Van Dorn resided, asking how much the party in possession of his sword wants for it, and if the amount is reasonable, an effort will be made to get it back again. Please inform me if you can.

"Very truly,

"J. L. POWERS."

"PORT GIBSON, MISS., Jan. 16, 1884."

"E. P. KEPNER, ESQ., *Lenox, Ia.*, Sir:—In reply to your letter addressed to Colonel J. L. Powers, Jackson, Miss., November 27, 1883, concerning the sword of Major Van Dorn. I have this to say, what evidence can be shown that this sword is the one belonging to the late Major Van Dorn, please ascertain from the present owner all particulars in regard to it and proof of its particular identity. When this is furnished conclusively, then we may make an effort for its return.

"Respectfully,

"FRANK H. FOOTE."

" LENOX, IA., Feb. 25, 1884.

" MR. FRANK FOOTE, *Port Gibson, Miss.*:—Your letter of the 16th of January, in relation to Major Earl Van Dorn's sword, is at hand. I enclose you a sworn description of the same, by and from the party in whose possession the sword now is. You can judge from this whether or not this is the sword presented to Major Van Dorn by the State of Mississippi for gallant services in the Mexican War. The party, Mr. M. E. Burt, lives a distance from town is the reason for delay in this reply, our town now being his business point. Write me.

" Respectfully,

" E. D. KEPNER."

" STATE OF IOWA,

" TAYLOR COUNTY.

" I, M. E. Burt, being first duly sworn, say that I am in possession of a sword presented to Major Earl Van Dorn by the State of Mississippi in 1861. Said sword is gold mounted, has a shield on the handle the shape of a heart, on which shield the name of the State donating and the name of Major Earl Van Dorn is inscribed, and that such donation was made for gallantry during the Mexican War. An inscription on the blade shows that R. W. Fitzpatrick was the maker of said sword. Said sword is encased in a wooden case.

" M. E. BURT.

" Sworn to and inscribed in my presence by the said M. E. Burt, this 25th day of February, 1884.

" G. W. HOWE,

" *Notary Public.*"

" LENOX, IA., Nov. 2, 1883.

" MR. J. L. POWERS, *Jackson, Miss.*, *Dear Sir*:—Your letter of November 19 is at hand. The possessor of Major Van Dorn's sword lives eighteen miles from our town, have not been able to see him since the receipt of your letter, but can say he asks \$250 for the surrender of the sword. Send draft to the Lenox Bank for that amount, payable to the Lenox *Independent*, and on receipt of such draft the sword will be properly packed to the *Clarion* or others address directed. This I am now authorized to say, better terms might be made, but I do not know for a certainty.

" E. D. KEPNER."

Endorsed on the back as follows:

“Clarion OFFICE,

“JACKSON, MISS., NOV. 30, 1883.

“Respectfully referred to Mr. Frank Foote and others, Port Gibson, I hope the avaricious creature will be allowed to keep the sword; such a demand is in shameful contrast to the kindly return of many trophies and relics of war on both sides.

“Yours very truly,

“J. L. POWERS.”

“APRIL 1, 1884.

“P. B. MOORE, *Port Gibson, Miss., Dear Sir*:—As you will probably come in contact with the members of the Iowa press excursion, please use your influence with them and see if not by their effort (not pecuniary) they could effect the restoration of the sword of General Earl Van Dorn, of the Confederate Army. This sword was taken from the residence of his family, near Mobile, Ala., in 1865. The sword was presented to Major Earl Van Dorn, of Mississippi, for gallantry in the war with Mexico and services against the Comanche Indians in Western Texas. His family numbers but one, and he is not able to pay the amount demanded, \$200; nor would he if thrice able, for the sword was not captured in honorable warfare, but was taken from his mother's residence. It is now in the possession of one Burt, residing near Lenox, Taylor County, Ia. I do not say that Burt confiscated that sword, but he now has it in his possession and will return it for the consideration specified in a letter to me through E. D. Kepner, editor of the *Lenox Independent*. The whole correspondence has been conducted with the editor of the *Independent* and myself, and I would like you to interest yourself and see if not the press association could bear something of their influence on Mr. Burt and effect the restoration of the sword without paying anything for its possession. A good era of feeling has always existed between *true* soldiers, and the Blue and Gray have of late restored many colors and flags and other trophies of former owners, and trust such measures may result from this as to promote further good feeling between the soldiers of the Blue of far away Iowa, and those of the Gray in sunny Mississippi. Hoping you may assume this task (a delightful one to me) to try to recover this sword for the children of gallant soldiers,

both of the United States and of the Confederacy through these gentlemen, I remain,

"Very truly your friend,

"F. F. FOOTE."

"*The Weekly Oskaloosa Herald,*

"OSKALOOSA, IA., April 8, 1884.

"*Department Commander of Iowa, Carroll, Ia.:*

"*Dear Sir and Comrade:*—While in Mississippi last week I had the enclosed correspondence placed in my hands, which I submit to you. It seems to me that the Post at Villisca could get hold of the sword and through the department commander be returned to the proper owner. I suggest that a camp fire be held down there and some prominent soldier go down there and so work it around, being careful that the disgrace of paying money to have a soldier do a decent thing be avoided. The correspondence is all to be preserved.

"Truly yours,

"A. W. SWALM."

"HEADQUARTERS GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC,

CARROLL, IOWA, April 17, 1884.

"COL. W. F. EVANS:.. *My Dear Comrade:*—I enclose you correspondence relating to the taking of a sword from the residence of Major Earl Van Dorn, near Mobile, Ala., in the year 1865. The sword is a relic of value to the family and should be returned to them; was presented to him for gallant conduct in the war with Mexico. You are directed to proceed to the residence of Comrade Burt and say to him that it will be very disgraceful for him and the Iowa comrades for him to exact a money consideration from the Grand Army of Iowa, as it is only a short time since the Confederates returned a stand of colors to an Iowa regiment, and in several instances have been very generous in returning articles captured in the late war. If you are obliged to purchase this sword do so, and draw a draft on John K. Deal, quartermaster general, Department of Iowa. Do not pay a cent more than you are obliged to. Bring the sword with you to the encampment and turn it over to Assistant Quartermaster General Deal. Your draft should be sent to Marshalltown for collection. I feel that

I ought to act promptly and see that the sword goes back at once.

"In F., C. & L.,

"JNO B. COOK.

"P. S.—The sword is a double edge, Damascus blade, gold-mounted, gold-plated case. All enclosed in a wooden case inlaid with purple velvet."

"BEDFORD, IA., April 21, 1884.

"JNO. B. COOK, *Carroll, Iowa*:—Have seen Burt; he asks \$225 for the sword. Shall I bring it? Answer me at Lenox to-day sure.

"W. F. EVANS."

"CARROLL, IA., April, 21, 1884.

"W. F. EVANS, *Lenox, Iowa*:—You will bring the sword with you. Try and get it subject to the approval of the encampment.

"JNO. B. COOK."

"CARROLL, IA., April 21, 1883.

"After consideration will say, get the sword, subject to approval of the encampment, if he will not let it come that way, leave it.

"JNO. B. COOK."

"BEDFORD, TAYLOR Co., IA., April 22, '84.

"JNO. B. COOK, COM. G. A. R., DEPT. OF IA., Marshalltown, *Iowa, Sir*:—Acting under instructions received under date of April 17, I, in company with P. C. King, of my post, went through a driving storm to the residence of M. E. Burt, residing 20 miles from our city, for the purpose of trying to get the sword of the late Major Van Dorn. We found Mr. Burt set on the idea that he must have a monied consideration for giving it up, and \$200 was his fixed price. By hard persuasion Mr. Burt consented to deliver the same to me by my guaranteeing him the sum of \$225 or the safe return of the sword to him. On the above conditions I have bought it, in compliance with your instructions.

"Moses E. Burt enlisted as a private soldier September 2, 1862, in Co. G, 77 Regiment Ills. Inf. Was mustered out of service as first sergeant of his company July 17, 1865, at Mobile, Ala. His discharge shows that he participated in engagements as follows: Yazoo Swamps, Arkansas Post, Port Gibson, Champion Hill, Black River Bridge, Vicksburg, Jackson (Miss.) Ft Gaines,

Spanish Ft., and Mobile, Ala. He explains his having the sword as follows: His regiment (77 Ills.), was encamped on the plantation of Van Dorn, on the Tombigbee River, two miles north of Mobile, Ala. The negroes on the plantation informed members of his company that a box containing swords and guns was buried in the yard. The parties having the information proceeded to dig up the box and found that it contained two swords and a three-barreled, revolving gun. The other sword was taken in charge by the captain of Company G, 77th Ills., and shipped home by him, but did not reach their destination and was never heard from by the parties shipping. This sword was given Mr. Burt by a private soldier of his company. The regiment was mustered out at Mobile, Ala. Mr. B. brought it home, thinking in time a large reward would be offered for it. How far his desires may be realized, I leave in the hands of this body. I return all papers pertaining to the matter.

“Respectfully,
W. F. EVANS.”

“We fail utterly to see upon what principle of right or justice Mr. Burt can claim a money consideration as the condition on which this sword is to be given up. He certainly has no property rights in it; it not having been taken in battle cannot properly be considered a trophy of the war, and is of no value to him, except as a means to extort money from the proper owner. If he had taken a child from the widow of Major Van Dorn instead of a sword, and was now holding it for ransom, he would be acting upon the same principle he now is acting upon, and the world would execrate him for it; and unless we greatly mistake the prevailing sentiment among the men who compose the Grand Army of the Republic and of the people of Taylor County, there will be such a feeling of indignation against Mr. Burt as to make him wish in the not very distant future that he had been less avaricious. As we understand the matter, he can no more afford to take this money than he can afford to take stolen money, knowing it to be such, save in the simple fact that in this case he extorts it without violating law.

The world has never beheld a grander, nobler exhibition of true patriotism than that now being exhibited wherein the “Boys in Blue” are exchanging trophies with the “Boys in Gray,” and we

sincerely pity the man who is so sordid in his motives that he can demand money for the surrender of a trophy, because in his possession, and is more highly prized than some others.

We learn that the G. A. R. refused to pay the price demanded by Mr. Burt, and have returned the sword to Captain W. F. Evans."

GENERAL VAN DORN'S SWORD.

Yazoo City (Miss.) Herald.

We published a few weeks since a statement to the effect that a party in Iowa was in possession of General Van Dorn's sword, and that he might be induced to part with it for a valuable consideration. In behalf of some of the citizens of Claiborne County, we made inquiry as to the amount that would be required, and are informed that the sword would be shipped to the *Clarion* office on receipt of a bank draft for \$250. We presume the creature who has it will be permitted to retain it. This demand is in shameful contrast to the kind return of many trophies of the late war, on each side, which we notice in the press as the years go by.

The following letters and newspaper extracts are inserted, according to dates, giving as they do the movements of General Van Dorn and the circumstances which attended his life at various United States garrisons and camps in Texas and other points:

LETTER FROM A COMRADE TO MRS. VAN DORN.

NEW ORLEANS, LA., Sept. 10, 1849.

"ST. CHARLES HOTEL, Monday Afternoon.

"MR3. VAN DORN:

"I arrived here last Thursday, and to my agreeable surprise met the 7th Infantry on their way to Florida. The 7th left New Orleans barracks last Friday at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, on the steamboats 'Ocean' and 'Anglo-Saxon.'

"Van went on the 'Ocean,' much the larger and most pleasant boat. As soon as I heard the regiment was at the barracks, and that Van was with it, I jumped into a cab and went after him. Never was I so glad to meet any one not related to me as I was to meet him. In fact, I love him, Mrs. Van Dorn, better than half of my relatives, anyhow.

"Well, on Friday I went down to the boat with him, he having

stayed Thursday night with me at the St. Charles, and I remained with him until the last minute. He requested me to write to you, as he was very busy, having his company to attend to, besides attending to a lot of commissary stores.

"Of course, I promised to do so with pleasure, as I would not only be obliging him, but availing myself of a great pleasure at the same time. Van wished me to say that as soon as possible he intended to come and see you. But I have told you enough about Van and want to say a little concerning myself. On the 27th of August I left New York on the steamer 'Falcon,' bound for the promised gold in far distant California. I arrived there after a voyage of eleven days, having remained six hours in port at Havana. Cuba is certainly the Eden of the world, and while there I felt almost enraptured as I stood looking for the first time in my life upon a foreign people in their own land; and contemplating awhile I arrived at this conclusion, that we who live in a land of republicanism, even were it the most barren of ocean isles, are far more happy, and better off than the people who hold that lovely island, and owe their allegiance to Spain. There laid Cuba spread out in all her magnificence before me, my native land was not in sight; behind me and my friends whose names and virtues the dews of memory will forever keep fresh in my heart. I left Havana with a light and happy heart, hoping that my anxious eyes would in three days again see the forest trees and fertile fields of America. The time passed pleasantly whilst I enjoyed the society of a few agreeable strangers who constituted my traveling companions. I was not disappointed; the third day came, and not only saw the country I am proud to call my own, but I was permitted to strike glad hands with some of the dearest friends I have. I shall remain here until Wednesday, when I shall sail for California via Chagres. Please answer this direct to care headquarters Second Infantry, California. I shall claim, and anxiously expect an answer. Recollect my initials are N. H. Van promised to write once a month, anyhow, and don't you let him forget it. I made an effort to get back to the 7th, but could not succeed . . . Van is one of my dearest friends, and he knows I esteem him such, and wherever his lot is cast—God grant it may be a pleasant one.

"N. H. McLEAN,

"Lieut. Second Regt. Infantry."

LETTER TO HIS WIFE FROM CAMP COOPER, COMANCHE RESERVATION,
TEXAS, APRIL 27, 1856.

"The last mail brought me nothing, but I will not scold, as you have been very kind and obliging in writing to me of late. I will wait patiently for the next express, and will look with so much the more pleasure for its arrival, as I have some assurance that I will not be disappointed. On the march up from Fort Mason I could not write—I had no opportunity, but I did so as soon as I arrived at this camp. I hope you have received my letter. I believe this is the only express that has left this *pristine contiguity of saddest wilderness* without carrying from it a message of love for you, my dear Carrie. I have written punctually by every opportunity—that is weekly—and I am happy to find that my example in this respect has not been without its effect on you. I love you sincerely for writing to me so regularly, as I ought to do, for if there is a tie on earth that binds me to it, and makes me feel that it is not all a miserable dream, it is my wife and children. Your disinterested love breathed even through the faint medium of a letter, comes to me like the babbling of some pure fountain to the ear of a weary traveler of the desert. 'How weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable' would this miserable, monotonous life seem to me, here in this exile, were it not for the love that quickens the blood in the heart when I think of you and my dear little prattlers, whose hearts beat in return to mine, lonely and far away as I am. Hope, like the sustaining hand of an angel, buoys me up, and I meet you once more—even fancy lends its bubbles to float me to your door, where I meet you—embrace you—kiss you—love you and press your throbbing bosom to my own. The iron hand of reality soon wakens me from such delusive dreams! Ding—dong—ding—dong—ding—dong, O weary, weary, weary days! Life is a stern, sad reality, is it not? Leading to—what?

"I have a new set of paints given to me by Mrs. Colonel Albert Sydney Johnston, and my favorite pastime—painting—will fill up and consume some of these long hours of summer. I will sketch our camp for you soon. I never thought of it before. You would like to know what kind of a place I live at, I know. I am afraid I shall be 'hard up' for something to help me get through these long summer days. My books were nearly all burnt up, you recol-

lect, and one cannot paint always. To me there is nothing so bitter as the cud of idleness, and I am not *dreamy*—those days are gone by when I could forget myself in dreams—of fancy, and wander among scenes of the imagination—the sheen of youth, alas, has faded from my cheek, and eye, too.

“I have been looking for those daguerreotypes you promised to send me. Do not disappoint me, it will be some consolation to see even the faint image of those I love so well. In your last letter you mentioned that you were about to start to Mobile. Did you take the little ones with you? Did you have the pictures taken? I am stopped here by an order for a court-martial—I am always interrupted. This cavalry service is very different from infantry, I assure you.

“Sergeant Chapman, who has just been in, desires to be remembered to your father and to Hollinger. He says, tell them, ‘I am well satisfied.’ He and Wilcox are excellent soldiers and will do good service.

“Take pains to teach my dear little Libbie to be a good and well-behaved little lady, and to learn her letters and spell and write to her papa. Kiss her and my little Soldier a thousand times for me. My best respects to your father and mother, and believe me, my dear wife, with affectionate love, your devoted husband,
“EARL.”

LETTER TO HIS WIFE.

“CAMP COOPER, TEX., May—, 1856,

“As I had hoped, I received a good long letter from you by the last mail, for which I thank you. Your letters are refreshing springs of joy to me in this wilderness. I don’t know what I should do without them. To hear from you and my dear children so often when I am so far off from you makes me feel that though cut off from the world by seas, mountains, and plains, I am not alone—there is a spirit of love with me coming over them all with the breeze, there are hearts beyond that beat for me and send love, as flowers send their fragrance, even here. Is not this something to a heart almost crushed and desolate by untoward circumstances? My little Libbie (Olivia) lisping a kind word to me is heard across seas and deserts, and her dear little lips give an echo to my very heart’s inmost recesses: ‘Tell papa I want to see him so bad.’ ‘Oh, why don’t papa come back again!’ What

could warm a heart that loves more than this? Would one not be a very stone not to be moved by such music from the high-strung chorus of love and memory. I hope soon to have the opportunity to win my boy's love, too—to make him know me. As for your love and affectionate meaning to me—so constant, so unabating and gentle, what could match it? What could do more to win my heart and make me feel the value of woman's love? Here in this solitude, where memory alone gives you to me, where love keeps you ever present, I have more fully learned your worth, and know more appreciatively that you are necessary to my happiness. I long to be with you and look forward with hopeful happiness to our reunion—it shall be soon. In a short time we expect to learn our final destination—whatever it may be, I will send for you as soon as I know what it is. So that you may rely upon it. I do not know that I shall be able to leave Texas to go for you, but can meet you at Indianola, only four days from Mobile, whither I will get some one to accompany you safely in the steamer. I have no officer with my company but myself, and could not hope, under the circumstances, to get a leave of absence. You once here I will make the shady side of a naked rock my home and laugh with joy the balance of my days—if you could be happy with me.

“There is nothing new here—we expect news by the mail next Thursday—confirmation of appointments, promotions, etc., and orders. I will write if anything new turns up. I will also write to Major Reynolds to send you more funds. I will look for those daguerorreotypes, too, very soon. I will not excuse you if you fail to send them. After telling you how much I think of you and love you I am left without a subject for a letter—there is nothing that could interest you. We lead a monotonous camp life so far—drills, parades, etc. A few rapsalion Indians visit our camp every day and bore us to death by begging. It is mortifying to a soldier's pride to know that all his devotion to his country is wasted on such miserable *devils* (nothing else).

“The prairies around us are fragrant with beautiful wild flowers; some of which I recognize as old friends of the pretending gorgeous gardens—verbena, wild pink, lilac, heartease, camomile, daisy, etc. Wolves run through the camp in numbers every night, howling like fiends of the lower world. Springs gush up from unadorned rocks in this region and disappear almost as soon as seen, seeking underground passage to the ocean; long forked-

tailed birds fly about in the stunted groves of trees that do not know how to worship God by singing—Indians, wolves, serpents, scorpions, and such unaccountable works of nature, have made this region their abiding place, and, strange to say, here, in places, nature *smiles*—here beautiful flowers fling their sweetness on the morning breeze and seem as gay—yes, gayer than when they rise and fall on the bosom of the city belle—but fudge——

“Kiss my dear little Libbie and tell her her papa will see her before a great while, and will love her ‘more than tongue can tell.’ Kiss my dear boy, too, bless his little belligerent soul—he’ll fight for his country some day—cotton head, is he? I was once.”

TO HIS WIFE.

“FORT MASON, TEX., July 18, 1860.

“I have been expecting orders every day to go out again, but as yet none have come, although Major George H. Thomas said he would go out about the 1st or 10th of this month. It is now the 18th. I think it doubtful if I go or not, as I expect my promotion by every mail. It is certain now that Colonel Johnston was confirmed by the Senate as quartermaster-general. This will make me major of the Second Cavalry Regiment. If I am promoted before Major Thomas’ order comes I shall not go out under him. I am happy at the thought of going to see you as a *full* major. I wish I were with you that we might rejoice together at the long-wished-for event of promotion to the position of field officer. *Now* there is some reason for the hope that I shall one day be ‘General in the Army!’ I am not yet forty and have no gray hairs. Yet a field officer—it is fortunate, and as the wheel turns around, I must prepare to do credit to the position. I shall wait anxiously for the time when I shall set out on my way to see you, and hope it will fly by rapidly and bring us happily together, with my dear children by my side. I shall find them grown taller and improved; the boy as brave as Julius Cæsar, the daughter as gentle as good little girls should be. We will have a happy time together as in days of old—better. . . .

“This morning the sun was eclipsed and Venus and Mars will soon be in conjunction. Speaking of Mars, by the way, I see that Spain talks of sending her victorious Morocco army over the waters to regulate the Yankees. I think if they do, that they will find we can dress their hides for them and set them up in three-

leagued boots (patent leathers) better than morocco, or prunella, either. . . .

“Your ever affectionate husband,

“EARL.”

After the various expeditions against the Comanches the newspapers of Mississippi and the whole country rang with the gallant deeds of Major Earl Van Dorn and his brave soldiers. A few of these comments are quoted.

TO HIS WIFE.

“NEW ORLEANS, LA., September 17, 1861.

“I arrived in this city from Texas last night under orders to report immediately at the headquarters of the army at Richmond, having been relieved in command of the Department of Texas. I must, therefore, go on in the morning, and it makes my heart bleed to pass so near you without being able to stop and see you. It is hard, but can't be helped. It is said by those just from Richmond, that it is intended to have a large cavalry force in the next battle, and that I was sent for to command it, and that I should not lose a moment in reaching my command, as the two armies were drawing near each other, and any day might bring on a collision. It is a point of honor, therefore, for me to hurry on with no delay that is not unavoidable. I have been twelve days from San Antonio. I have been sick a good deal the last six weeks with chills and fevers, and now have ophthalmia and can scarcely see to write this letter. I have suffered extremely with my eyes on the trip over; they are to-day a little better, and I hope in a few days I will be well enough to see how to conduct my cavalry command where they should go. I do not know how you are, as I have not heard a word from you for more than six weeks. I have not written very regularly because of sickness, but you should have heard from me several times since then. I have not blamed you, though, for the mails are very irregular, indeed, and for weeks at a time we have had nothing at all. I will now, however, be able to hear oftener from you and to write oftener to you. Direct your letters to Richmond, Va., care of the adjutant-general.

“I have telegraphed to Sister Emily to ask if she could not bring Sis' out to Hazelhurst to see me on my way to Virginia. I do hope I shall see her, if I cannot see all of you. I wish you were

more accessible that I might stop a day or two with you ; but you know how much I would lose by going to your father's. God grant that it may not be long before I shall be able to visit you. In these times of trouble and wars everything is uncertain and nothing can be calculated upon. No one knows what to-morrow may bring forth ; but I feel sure that I shall see you again, and before a great while. Pray that it may be so. My country calls me again into danger, but I go cheerfully, feeling that I am doing so in a good cause. Thousands will weep before the close of this unholy war made upon us, but the cup of woe cannot be put aside. I shall do my duty, in order that if I live through it, I may walk erect as a patriot, true to his country, as a father is true to his wife and his children, and if I fall, that the tears shed for me may be softened by pride that I fell as a soldier doing his duty. I shall be preserved, though, and will meet you again. God bless you and my little ones. Good-by. I will write again from Richmond."

" PORT GIBSON, MISS., Sept. 19, 1861.

" MY DEAR BROTHER :

" I cannot tell you how much disappointed Olivia and I were that the storm prevented us from going to meet you at the railroad when you passed on your way to Virginia. Olivia became much excited when your telegram came, and she wept when told that you were going away again. She loves you devotedly, and it is surprising, for children do not often feel such strong attachment for one so much away from them. Dr. and Mrs. Abbay inquire often for you, and are very attentive to your little daughter. Their son George is first lieutenant in Colonel Moody's company of artillery, and Sidney is captain in Jno. T. Moore's. George and Andrew Sevier are both in Col. Henry Hughes' regiment. You will meet many Port Gibson boys at Manassas. We all have great respect for volunteers since the battle of Manassas, and the Southern boys seem to fight as by inspiration. If tears and prayers could save our dear ones and the country the war would soon end. What can I send you in the way of warm apparel? I know from your wife that you never have worn clothing heavy enough for that climate. You are a little over 21 now and cannot endure the exposure you once could, nor will the cold in Virginia warrant light clothing. The ladies give concerts and tableaux for the ben-

effit of the soldiers, and the entrance fee is now two pairs of wool socks, knitted by themselves. Women and girls knit riding in carriages through the country, on horseback, and at all times moving their needles as if the battles depended on socks. Olivia prefers to study at home rather than go to the Academy. She keeps regular hours and recites a lesson in spelling, geography, etc., with French and music to relieve the dryness of the other studies. Did you take 'Fink' (what a name for a noble animal) to Virginia? We are cut off from news from Sisters Jane and Octavia. Clem is in the 10th Miss. Vols. We ladies have become expert coat and pant makers, and you would smile to see the garments turned out for the boys—I suppose they smile, too, when they get them! We are ready to sacrifice everything for the army—blankets, piano covers, and all sorts of things that could be used. We have military aid societies, and the work accomplished is wonderful. Olivia is very happy and contented. Write to her often."

' BAY ST. LOUIS, MISS., Oct. 31, 1861.

"MY DEAR GENERAL:

"I congratulate you on your brilliant career in Texas, and hope that new honors await you in Virginia. We Mississippians were delighted to hear of your transfer to that important line. There is an independent troop of cavalry, the Adams County troops, Captain Martin, now, I believe, under the orders of Z. E. B. Stuart. I hope you will have it attached to your command and near your person. It is composed of natives of Adams County (chiefly), sons of the old friends of your father—mostly young men of large fortunes. I have four nephews and five or six kinsmen in it, and my only son, Willis H. Claiborne, belonged to it. He resigned his seat in the legislature and a staff appointment to enter that troop as a private. He is a man of talents, skilled in the use of arms, and cool and brave. He is the strongest tie that binds me to the world, though I never expect to see him again—I want, if he falls, buried at some farm place where his remains can be identified.

"I am writing the history of this revolution, and my first volume, commencing with the administration of Buchanan and ending with the installation of the provisional government at Montgomery, is nearly completed. For your Texas operations I have reserved a place, and when this war is over we will have an inter-

view, and you must furnish me the necessary outline. I beg you likewise to preserve every paper and memorandum of your operations in Virginia and elsewhere that may be of service to me. My friend, General Beauregard, will do the same. . . .

“J. F. H. CLAIBORNE.

“P. S.—A great alarm prevails along the coast. Ship Island has been abandoned and the United States flag is flying therefrom; so it is on the Chandeleur which they are fortifying. Our coast operations have been badly managed.”

To Richmond, Va., General Bragg writes:

“TUPELO, MISS., July 12, 1862.

“By the latest advices from Vicksburg it seems the enemy has given up the reduction of that place by water. The cut-off is a failure, and it is now said they are constructing a railroad across the neck of land that we can easily render useless by putting up batteries opposite the termini.

“The determined defense of Vicksburg, which I directed General Van Dorn to make at every hazard and to the last extremity, has been highly creditable to him and to his troops, and has disappointed the enemy and disconcerted his plans. He is suffering much, too, from the frequent and unexpected attacks of our troops in ambush on the bank of the river.”

GENERAL VAN DORN AND THE PRESS.

(From the Vicksburg Whig.)

We see several of our exchanges are pretty severe upon General Earl Van Dorn for shackling the press of this department. Although severe, we cannot say they are unjustly so, for his order regarding the press is without parallel in the Confederacy, and will ever remain a blemish upon his escutcheon. When it was announced that General Van Dorn was placed in command of this department, our people were elated. He was a Mississippian, “native and to the manor born,” and we expected him to pursue a policy which would raise him higher and higher in their respect and confidence each succeeding day; but his assuming a power in violation of the Constitution of the land—a power which Congress itself, prompted by wise counsels, would not touch, will have the effect of impairing confidence instead of increasing it. We have

heretofore given our opinion in regard to destroying the liberty of the press, and we have now no reason to change that conviction, so firmly engrafted from infancy. We have been taught since we knew what freedom was, that we were living under a government the most republican that ever the sun shone on; and under the new *régime*—the stars and bars—we have boasted of fighting for freedom's cause—fighting to rescue the torch of liberty from a horde of Northern fanatics who have destroyed every pillar under the temple itself.

But could it be called a land of liberty where a journalist is threatened with a dungeon if he shows up before the world error and wrong? Where is our boasted liberty, if freedom of speech is prohibited, and the press is pared down into bashful irregularity by those in power? Will the sacred word liberty not be an empty sound? The Constitution upon which our government is founded is our shield, and so long as we are permitted to express our sentiments at all, the public will find us true sentinels, ever on the watch-tower, ready to denounce fraud, sedition, and imbecility whenever detected, and to applaud and do homage to those whose conduct whether as private citizens or public functionaries, merit it. We shall always avoid tripping our pen into intemperate expressions—expressions that would prove beneficial to our enemy and detrimental to our own cause. Such a course, we cannot think, will be disapproved of by any freeman, and it is the only line of policy that the press can pursue in justice to itself, the Government, and the people it represents. If there are any who cannot see the necessity of maintaining a press thus, they certainly are lacking in knowledge of the first principles of political philosophy, every page of history, and the fundamental elements of their native country's civilization.*

AUGUST 8, 1863.

General Joe E. Johnston reports to the President with reference to his command that he directed General Van Dorn to form

* Who will not admit that in time of peace the above sentiments are true, but in time of war, invasion, with the peril of losing *all* freedom, not only of the *press* but of *personal liberty* and property in martial law is safety and right? If a General has severity of manner and seeks to impress this spirit and discipline, he will be cut off by assassination or public rebellion. If he is heedless of discipline and careless he will lose the esteem of the people and have the scorn of the public.

two-thirds of the cavalry near Grenada into a division to join General Bragg with it. That these troops were transferred from a country in which they could not operate and a department not threatened, and in which the enemy had just been repulsed, to one in which they were greatly needed, where he had just suffered a reverse and were in danger of another. These troops and their gallant leader rendered very important services in Tennessee; they had several engagements with the enemy to the advantage and honor of our arms, and without them we could not have held the country, which till the latter part of June furnished food for Bragg's army.

In the foregoing pages the writer has frequently referred to and quoted from the most interesting "Personal Memoirs" of General U. S. Grant, and in token of the esteem in which that general has been held by the city which surrendered to him in 1863, for his just and magnanimous treatment of the Southern troops upon their surrender and the Southern people at large while he was President of the United States, these extracts from a memorial meeting called together to do him honor when his noble spirit left the earth after prolonged suffering at Mt. McGregor, are given:

"VICKSBURG, MISS., August 8, 1885.

"After a military and civic procession through the city, the meeting was called to order, and after prayer and music and the usual resolutions of respect, the chairman, Hon. T. Marshall Miller, was introduced and made the following address:

"MY FELLOW-CITIZENS:

"I would ask a moment's indulgence to say a few words before formally calling this meeting to order.

"A stranger from another planet who should be permitted a bird's-eye view of our land under its present aspect might well be astonished and would ask: "Why these long lines of crape-decked houses; whence this unusual lamentation; these slowly winding processions; these mournful chants?"

"A fitting answer would be: "A great nation mourns her greatest—a busy, money-getting, machine-making nation has enough of hero-worship left in it to lay aside all usual occupation; to quell all public animosity; to still all private spite, and as one

man pause to drop a tear and lay a laurel wreath on the grave of her most distinguished soldier.

“Fortunate was his star—great his achievements, and long and loud the applause his career elicited. Yet the most singular and unique tribute that was ever given to any conqueror is his to-day; and it is this: That from the scene of his greatest triumph; the place that he brought all his genius and all his force to siege and batter, and storm and shell; that suffered the humiliation of conquest at his hands—should come a deep and lasting grief for his death—a universal lament over his sufferings.

“Yes, in 1863, General Grant conquered us, and left us with heart sore and bruised. But in 1875, when another hour, as dark, if not darker, came to Vicksburg; when all that honorable men hold dear hung trembling in the balance; when every conceivable pressure was brought to bear on President Grant to induce him to order troops here to keep us down in the dust by brute force, he refused. Then he conquered us for the second time and forever!

“Then men said, the great soldier could never sink to be the mere partisan; the large-hearted President could not be blinded by the wants and needs of his people by sectionalism.

“Henceforth no more shall it be said that to Cæsar alone was it given to be mighty captain, mighty ruler, and mighty writer. Open, earth! for we come to lay within your bosom a greater than Cæsar, in that he adds to the list of honors another and a brighter,—that of Christian gentleman!

“Bury the great dead.
With an empire's lamentation
Let us bury the great dead
To the noise of the mourning of a mighty nation.”

“Then followed other eloquent addresses, and a resolution expressing sorrow and high esteem for the most illustrious citizen of the Republic.”

“TUSCUMBIA, ALA., July 7, 1862.

“FROM FEDERAL OFFICER:

Telegram:

“General G. H. Thomas states that deserters from Aberdeen say Van Dorn's division passed down the Mobile and Ohio Railroad *en route* to East Tennessee, much sickness and discontent in the army and a great many desertions. Van Dorn has scouts out

reporting all our movements; look out for Van Dorn. Informed that Van Dorn and Price are marching on Nashville with 40,000.

"September 23, 1862, Van Dorn is approaching Tompkinsville."

"MEMPHIS, TEN., *en route* to Corinth, April 8, 1862.

Telegram

"TO GENERAL BEAUREGARD,

"Commanding at Corinth, Miss.:

"Boats leave this evening with detachments to execute your order. Cotton will be burned.

"EARL VAN DORN."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE WEST,

"MEMPHIS, TENN., April 27, 1862.

"TO CAPTAIN JOHNSON, MEMPHIS:

"SIR:—You will proceed to the steamer furnished for the purpose by the quartermaster along the Mississippi River. You will inform the planters on the banks that the river is now open to the enemy, and that the interests of our country demand that they shall at once destroy all of their cotton. No time is to be lost in the execution of this duty. Should any hesitate or fail to comply with your call upon them, you will yourself take possession of and burn the cotton, taking care to injure no other property.

"It is made your duty to see that all of the cotton within reach of the river is destroyed at once. The proprietors will take an account of the amount destroyed, as you will of all which you may have to destroy yourself. *These orders are given to you by General Van Dorn under instructions from General Beauregard.*

"In executing the above orders you will go as far up and down the Mississippi as the gunboats of the enemy will allow; and in the event of your being pursued by them, if you cannot run your boat into a place of security from them, you must, on abandoning, destroy her, to prevent the enemy from getting possession of her.

"By order of

EARL VAN DORN."

"CORINTH, MISS., April 23, 1862.

Telegram

"TO GENERAL VAN DORN FROM GENERAL BEAUREGARD:

"Planters along Mississippi hesitate to burn cotton. Order parties under proper officers to go in small steamboats to burn all cotton within their reach along river, and call in public paper on said planters to burn their cotton, otherwise keeping account of number of bales burned."

CONDUCT OF THE ASSASSIN AFTER HIS ESCAPE INTO NASHVILLE.

" October 25, 1901.

" DEAR SIR :

"... My recollection is that it was the *night* after the man killed General Van Dorn that he occupied the same room with me in Nashville in 1863, and not the day of the tragedy. He told me he had come through the lines on horseback, and the distance from Spring Hill to Nashville was too great for him to do that the night of his shooting [this was done early after breakfast in the morning.—Ed.] I was rooming at Ben Weller's boarding house on Clay Street, a large house, when the proprietor told me this man, whom he could recommend, had tried to get a room at the St. Cloud and other hotels, but failed because they were all crowded, and it would be a favor to him if I would permit this person to share my bed for one night. I consented. You ask me to tell you of the conduct of the man. He acted like a crazy man. My room was on the floor above the basement where the dining-room and kitchen were. It was called the first floor, but the distance from the window sill to the ground was too great for one to hurt one by shooting in through the window unless he stood on a ladder. For several hours and until midnight the man occupied the time telling me in detail his troubles, and all the details of the shooting. His conversation was rational, but he labored under great mental excitement, and expressed a fear that some friend of General Van Dorn in Nashville would assassinate him if he stayed in that city. I endeavored to calm him, telling him that no friend of Van Dorn would dare attempt his injury in a city so full of Union soldiers as Nashville. We both retired to the same bed about twelve, leaving a small—very small light from a gas burner. In a moment I was asleep, but within, perhaps, half an hour I was startled by the report of a pistol. When aroused by the shot by the man, through the window, several gas jets were fully turned on, making the room very light. He got out of bed very soon after getting in it, turned on the gas, and with a fully lighted room imagined he had seen an assassin at the window and had shot at him. Jumping up I saw the man standing against the wall in his night clothes, barefooted, and with the pistol leveled, pointing to the window. The bed was directly on a level between the man and the window, and as his hand, holding the pistol, was

shaking like that of one with palsy, I did not feel my position an entirely safe one. I called to him, 'Don't point that d——d pistol this way!' I asked him why he was there and why he had fired. He replied that an assassin on the outside had fired through the window at him and he had returned the fire. As only one shot had been fired it was his own shot. He then talked in a wild crazy way. I tried to assure him nobody had shot at him; that it was an hallucination; but I could not. I then regarded him as temporarily insane, and sat up with him the remainder of the night, as he would not give up his pistol.


"Before he came to my room, about 8 p. m., he had endeavored to get permission from the military authority to go to St. Louis but had been refused. Under the regulations then existing this permission was necessary.

"The day after, or the day of my experience with the man, my father procured for him the permit which enabled him to go to St. Louis.

("Signed,)
"JOHN B. BROWNLOW."

(In this interview with Mr. Brownlow the murderer narrated in a wild excited manner a scene that never could have possibly have occurred. He described General Van Dorn as he saw him in dark, and recognized him, he said, by the feather in his hat—when the General never wore a feather in his life. A staff officer states that General Van Dorn could not leave his quarters without being observed, so great was the publicity of his surroundings, and every hour of his movements could be accounted for for many days before the sad occurrence. This officer writes graphically of the scene of the room and the position of his chief a few moments after the shooting, and a diagram of the room, etc., are given, with a full account of the action of the troops and pursuit of the assassin some miles into the enemy's lines.)

He says: "For days and nights General Van Dorn was not absent from his quarters in Spring Hill. I *know* that the account the assassin gave of his act and escape to be untrue, apart from the dauntless courage of General Van Dorn, which would not have allowed him to submit to the dictation of mortal man. On the morning of the fatal interview, just after breakfast, I was standing



in the yard at No. 6 on the rough diagram, engaged in smoking and desultory conversation with Colonel Dillon. As we stood there the man rode up to the side gate, No. 13 on the plat, dismounted, and threw his horse's reins over the gate post, walked to the front door (No. 11), and entered the house, we officers touching our hats to him and he returning the salutation as he went in. We were utterly unsuspecting of danger, or of course I, or both of us, would at once have followed him to the house on some military pretext. We remained standing at No. 6 for probably five, perhaps ten minutes, when the man came out of the house, walked to No. 13, mounted his horse, and rode away—going out the lane towards the east, and away from the main street of the town. We thought nothing of it, because (1) the family was nearly allied to his wife, and he visited the premises from time to time, as did his wife. (2) We knew that the man (who was a physician) possessed a general order from Gen. Jos. E. Johnston to be permitted to pass our lines at all times, and it had been his habit whenever he desired to do so in our front to come to General Van Dorn and obtain an order from him to our pickets to permit him to pass out and return; and we naturally supposed this to have been his errand on the occasion in question. Well, he came out and rode away, and not exceeding two minutes thereafter a daughter of the house came running out of the front door wringing her hands and crying out to us, 'Come here! come here! Doctor —— has shot General Van Dorn!' We ran hastily into the General's room (No. 2), and found him seated in his chair, his head leaning back against the window pane at No. 7, and his right arm resting on his writing-table that stood between the two windows (Nos. 7 and 8). His left arm was on his lap, blood was flowing from the back of his head against the glass, and he was convulsively shuddering. With that one glance my thoughts turned to the assassin, and I ran out of the back door of the house (No. 12), to order one of the three mounted couriers, whose horses were habitually hitched at the rack (No. 14), to order the commander of the body-guard across the road to mount his whole command in hot haste and he to report at once to me, and the other two couriers to pursue the murderer (pointing out the direction) and to kill him on the spot. But, as would not have happened once in a thousand times at cavalry headquarters, there were no horses there. Two couriers had been sent off on errands, one

had sent his horse to be shod, and there happened to be no visitors. So there was not a mounted man, nor a saddle horse there. I called the dismounted courier and sent him full speed to Captain Bradley of the body-guard, and then returned to the General's room to observe accurately his condition and what had occurred in his room. Other officers had arrived, and they (with Milton, his body servant) were in the act of removing the General from his chair to his bed. I observed that his sword was in its place on the wall next to the parlor; a chair in front of the open wood fire, and no other furniture displaced. There had evidently been no struggle of any kind. A piece of writing paper, and a pen still wet with ink, and the inkstand, were on the table near the General's hand. The pistol ball had entered the center of the back of his head and lodged under the forehead, the right eye soon becoming swollen and dark from the effects of it. There was a *very* small round hole in the head, evidently made by a ball from a parlor pistol, which makes no noise louder than the snapping of a cap, and hence it was not heard in explosion though so near. Indeed, it was not heard in the house through the thick brick partition walls, and the young girl who had been in the opposite room across the hall at the time, heard no shot, but went to the room and made the discovery. She heard the assassin come out and walk rapidly through the hall, and then went to the room on a domestic errand.

"From all this it is perfectly apparent what occurred. Keep the diagrams before you and you will see the situation. I can narrate it as certainly as if I had been in the room, a passive witness: The man knocked at the door, was bidden to enter, and did so. I do not now remember whether Major Kimmel, A.-A.-General, was in the room, as it is affirmed, but if so his business was of a confidential nature as the adjutant-general and he withdrew. After the word good-morning passed, General Van Dorn invited the man to a seat near the fire, it being a raw, damp morning in early May—and he did so, or remained standing, and requested General Van Dorn to give him an order to pass through the lines and return. The General replied 'certainly,' took his seat at his writing-table where he always sat in order to face his visitors and write what their occasions demanded, and began writing the passport. The wash-stand, on which stood basin, pitcher of water, glasses, was in the recess formed by the large inside




DIAGRAM of ROOM NUMBER TWO

No.1. BED

No.2. WRITING TABLE

No.3. GEN. VAN DORN'S CHAIR

No.4. WASHSTAND

No.5. INSIDE CHIMNEY

No.6. DR. PETER'S CHAIR

No.7. WARDROBE

No.8. CHAIRS AGAINST WALL

No.9. DOOR TO ROOM.

chimney, and to the left of the General, about five or six feet away. As he would naturally turn his back while writing, this brought the wash-stand almost back of his head while thus turned. As Van Dorn was writing, the murderer remarked that he would take a glass of water, and suiting the action to the word stepped past the General into the recess, quietly pulled out his pistol, placed it within a few inches of his unsuspecting victim's head and fired, as the latter signed his name to the passport. His fair brown hair was singed by the powder. He, the General, at once fell straight back in his chair, his head resting against the window pane, his right arm on the table and his left in his lap, the very position in which he was writing, while his murderer picked up the passport (to use peradventure he should fall in with any of our pickets as he rode for the enemy's line), put on his hat, walked out of the room and the front door of the house—had he run he would have attracted attention and suspicion, and consequent action—got on his horse and rode off.

“Observe, that General Van Dorn was seated in his chair with his back to the window, and was shot in the center of the back of his head. He was not shot through the window (as some have supposed), because the glass was not broken. There was no struggle of any kind, no furniture disarranged. There was no quarrel, or General Van Dorn would not have permitted the man, unopposed, to have quietly stepped past him into the recess and thus shot him from behind. The General could not possibly have had any intimation of the man's hostile intentions, he would not have been quietly writing while the other stepped past him and then shot him. And he must have been writing at the man's request, because while receiving a visitor he would not have gone to writing except at the latter's instance, and the pen was still wet with ink, yet nothing written was there. The man, therefore, must have been interested in it, for he took it away with him. To me the matter is as clear as daylight.

“In ten minutes the body-guard was mounted and, in different squads, racing along every road that led to the enemy's lines, and the assassin's house, with orders from me to kill him on the spot—that I did not want him as a prisoner—and they were willing enough to obey, loving their General as every man of them did, and infuriated with revengeful feeling. But, as we discovered upon inspection later, the assassin did not keep the roads but made

his way straight across the fields on leaving Spring Hill. We followed his horse's hoofs, and found the stone walls broken down all the way to the woods where we lost his tracks. He had carefully prepared for this the day before.

"The whole affair is almost as vividly before me as if it had occurred last week, and I have given you an accurate account of it."

Telegram from Major-General Earl Van Dorn, commanding Trans-Mississippi District.

"March 9, 1862.

"Fought the enemy about 20,000 strong, 7th and 8th at Elkhorn, Arkansas. Battle first day from 10 a. m. until after dark; loss heavy on both sides. Generals McCulloch and McIntosh and colonel Hébert were killed; Generals Price and Slack wounded—General Price, flesh wound in the arm; the others badly wounded, if not mortally; many officers killed and wounded; but as there is some doubt in regard to several, I cannot yet report their names. Slept on the battle-field first night, having driven the enemy from their position. The death of Generals McCulloch and McIntosh and Colonel Hébert early in the action threw the troops on the right under their command into confusion. The enemy took a second and strong position. Being without provisions and the right wing somewhat disorganized, I determined to give battle on the right on their front for the purpose only of getting off the field without the danger of a panic, which I did with success, but some losses.

"I am now encamped with my whole army 14 miles west of Fayetteville, having gone entirely around the enemy. I am separated from my train, but think it safe on the Elm Springs road to Boston Mountains. The reason why I determined to give battle at once upon my arrival to assume command of the army I will give in report at an early day.

"EARL VAN DORN,

"Major-General Commanding."

"General A. Sidney Johnston, Decatur.

"Copy to Secretary of War, Hon. J. P. Benjamin."

"VAN BUREN, ARK., March 17, 1862.

"*General Cooper, Adjutant-General C. S. Army:*

"GENERAL:—I have the honor to request that the President will be pleased to confer the rank of colonel and lieutenant-colonel in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States, upon each of the following named officers: Capt. W. R. Bradfute, colonel; Capt. W. N. R. Beall, colonel; Capt. Philip Stockton, colonel; Lieut. L. L. Lomax, lieutenant-colonel; Lieut. M. M. Kimmel, lieutenant-colonel; Lieut. F. C. Armstrong, lieutenant-colonel; Lieut. Ed. Dillon, lieutenant-colonel; Lieut. Charles Pfeifer, lieutenant-colonel.

"I need not remind you that all of these gentlemen have been for many years in the military profession. But I desire most earnestly to impress upon you the necessity for my having out here experienced and educated officers of rank, sufficient to enable me to use their information and attainments to good effect.

"In the recent operations against the enemy on Sugar Creek I found the want of military knowledge and discipline among the higher officers to be so great as to countervail their gallantry and the fine courage of their troops. I have no hesitation in saying that could have I substituted some of the officers above named (who exerted themselves most nobly to insure the success of our arms on the bloody field of Elkhorn) for some of the highest commanders, my orders would have been promptly and intelligently carried out, and the enemy's army put to utter rout.

"These gentlemen have been most faithfully serving our cause since they left the Army of the old United States, but they are in false positions, without a degree of rank commensurate with their value and services, and it is utterly impossible to endeavor to use their experience to the best advantage unless this is remedied.

"I cannot convey to you a correct idea of the crudeness of the material with which I have to deal in organizing an army out here. There is an absolute want of any degree of sound military information, and even an ignorance of the value of such information. Nowhere in the Confederacy is it more important that educated officers should be placed in high positions than in the district I have the honor to command.

"The greatest need I have is for good brigadiers, and I therefore hope you will urge immediate action upon the recommendation

I made by telegraph for promotions to this grade. I enclose a copy of those nominations, and am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EARL VAN DORN,
Major-General.

"VAN BUREN, ARK., March 17, 1862.

"General A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. A.:

"I am at Van Buren with the army, preparing to march to Pocahontas. Will get off by the 22d, and will reach Pocahontas by the 7th or 8th of April, with 15,000 men. I will operate to assist the army on the Mississippi. It is reported that the army of the enemy have left Arkansas for Springfield. I will know positively to-morrow or next day. The country in this vicinity will no longer support an army.

"Have any troops been ordered to report to me other than those called for by me from the States of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas?

"EARL VAN DORN,
"Major-General."

DES ARC, ARK., April 7, 1862.

All troops, etc., embarked for Memphis to go to the aid of Gen. Beauregard,

"DES ARC., ARK., April 9, 1862.

"To the Inspector-General:

"Make every effort to get some of the captured arms for my command, or any arms you can get; also all the ammunition you can. Send to General Beauregard in my name. Keep him informed of all arrivals of troops here. Inquire if it will be necessary for me to send over any wagons and teams, and how many. Send more steamboats. I am moving too slowly. Show this to Adams. Impress the quartermaster at Memphis with the importance of preparing forage for me.

"EARL VAN DORN,
"Major-General."

Reports of Brig.-Gen. S. R. Curtis, U. S. A.

"SUGAR CREEK HOLLOW, ARK., March 6, 1862.

"CAPTAIN:—Van Dorn, Price and McCulloch are moving

down on us. Have ordered all my detachments to concentrate here, and I am locating my force to repel an attack. The enemy is reported at from 20,000 to 30,000 fighting men. They burned the Seminole College in Fayetteville, night before last, and last night their advance camp was at Elm Springs, about 21 miles from here. Sigel last night was $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles southwest from Bentonville, 14 miles from here, but he was to march at 2 this morning, and must be near by. A detachment under Colonel Vandever entered and took Huntsville last night, taking two prisoners. That detachment will also be in before the enemy can reach me. We will give them the best show we can. The weather is cold and snowing.

“SAMUEL R. CURTIS,
“*Brigadier-General.*”

“*Capt. N. H. McLean, Asst.-Adjt.-General.*”

“PEA RIDGE, ARK., March 9, 1862.

“SIR:—On Thursday, the 6th instant, enemy commenced the attack on my right, assailing and following the rear guard of the detachment under General Sigel to my main lines on Sugar Creek Hollow, but on that occasion ceased firing when he met my reinforcements about 4 p. m. During the night I became convinced he had moved on so as to attack my right or rear. Therefore, early on the 7th I ordered a change of front to the right on my right, my right thus becoming my left, still resting on Sugar Creek Hollow. This brought my line crossing Pea Ridge, my new right resting on the head of Cross Timber Hollow, which is the head of Big Sugar Creek. I also ordered an immediate advance of cavalry and light artillery—Colonel Osterhaus—with orders to attack and break what I supposed would be a reenforced line of the enemy. This movement was in progress when the enemy, at 11 a. m., commenced an attack on my right. The fight continued mainly at these points during the day, the enemy having gained my position so hardly contested by Colonel Carr at the Cross Timber Hollow, but being entirely repulsed, with the loss of the commander, General McCulloch, in the center, commanded by Colonel Davis.

“The plan of attack on the center was gallantly carried forward by Colonel Osterhaus, who was immediately sustained and superseded by Colonel Davis’ entire division, supported also by General

Sigel's command, which remained till near the close of the day on the left. Colonel Carr's division held the right under a galling, continuous fire all day. In the evening, the firing having entirely ceased in the center and there having been none on the left, I reinforced the right by a portion of the Second Division, under General Asboth. Before the day closed I was convinced the enemy had concentrated his main effort on my right. I therefore commenced another change of my front, so as to face the enemy where he had deployed on my right flank in strong position. The change was only partially effective, but fully in progress, when at sunrise on the 8th my right and center renewed the firing, which was immediately answered by the enemy with renewed energy and extended line. My left, under General Sigel, moved close to the hills occupied by the enemy, driving him from heights and advancing steadily toward the head of the hollows. I immediately ordered the center and right wing forward, the right turning the left of the enemy and cross-firing on his center. This final position enclosed the enemy in an arc of a circle. A charge of infantry extending throughout the whole line completely routed the whole rebel force, which retired in great confusion, but rather safely, through the deep, impassable defiles of Cross Timber.

"Our loss is heavy. The enemy's can never be ascertained, for the dead are scattered over a large field, and their wounded, too, may, many of them, be lost and perish. The foe is scattered in all directions, but I think his main force has returned to Boston Mountains. General Sigel follows towards Keetsville, while my cavalry is pursuing him toward the mountains, scouring the country, bringing in prisoners, and trying to find the rebel Major-General Van Dorn, who had command of the entire force of the enemy at the battle of Pea Ridge. I have not as yet the statements of the dead and wounded so as to justify a report, but I will refer you to despatch I will forward very soon.

"The officers and soldiers in this command have displayed such unusual gallantry I hardly dare to make distinctions. I must, however, name all my commanders of divisions. General Sigel, who gallantly carried the heights and drove back the left wing of the enemy; Brigadier-General Asboth, who is wounded in the arm, in his gallant effort to reenforce the right; Colonel and Acting Brigadier-General Davis (Jeff C.), who commands the center, where McCulloch fell on the 7th, and pressed forward

the center on the 8th; Colonel and Acting Brigadier-General E. A. Carr, who is also wounded in the arm, and was under continuous fire of the enemy during the two hardest days' struggling, where the scattered dead of friend and foe attest the hardest of the struggling. Commanders of brigades Colonels Dodge, Osterhaus, Vandever, White, Schaefer, Pattison, and Grensel, distinguished; but for their gallantry and that of others I must refer to reports of division commanders.

"(Tenders thanks to his staff officers, etc.), Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Ohio, and Missouri very proudly share the honor of victory which their gallant heroes won over the combined forces of Van Dorn, Price, and McCulloch at Pea Ridge in the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas.

"I have the honor to be, Captain, your obedient servant,

"SAMUEL R. CURTIS,

"Brigadier-General."

"Capt. J. C. Kelton, Asst. Adjt.-General.

"PEA RIDGE, March 10, 1862.

"CAPTAIN:—The main force of the Rebel Army, under Generals Van Dorn, Price, and Pike retreated by a short turn and by-road from Cross Timber Hollow toward Huntsville, camping the first night at Van Winkle's Mill, on War Eagle, south of White River. Green, with some 8,000 or 10,000, moved through Bentonville, my cavalry driving his rear guard out of that place, with the loss of one man. These two movements probably contemplate a junction in Boston Mountains."

"I move two divisions a few miles forward to-day. A detachment of 100 men, under Captain Schaumberg, with a white flag, from General Van Dorn, comes to assist in collecting and burying the dead.

"The enemy has lost very heavily. Among their officers are Generals McCollough, McIntosh, and Slack killed; also Colonel McCulloch, a nephew of the General. Captain Clark, son of Major Meriwether Clark, is killed, besides many more whose names may be furnished.

"I send copy of correspondence with General Van Dorn.

"SAMUEL R. CURTIS,

"Brigadier-General Commanding."

"Capt. N. H. McLean, Asst. Adjt.-Gen., St. Louis, Mo.

"HEADQRS. TRANS., MISS. DISTRICT, March 9, 1862.

"To the Commanding Officer of the U. S. Troops on Sugar Creek, Ark.

SIR:—In accordance with the usages of war, I have the honor to request that you will permit the burial party, whom I send from this army with a flag of truce, to attend to the duty of collecting and interring the bodies of the officers and men who fell during the engagements of the 7th and 8th instants.

"Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

"EARL VAN DORN,

"Major-General, Confederate Army."

"PEA RIDGE, ARK., March 9, 1862.

"Earl Van Dorn, Commanding Confederate Forces:

"SIR:—The General commanding is in receipt of yours of the 9th, saying that in accordance with the usages of war you send a party to collect and bury the dead. I am directed to say all possible facilities will be given for burying the dead, many of which have already been interred. Quite a number of your surgeons have fallen into our hands and are permitted to act under parole, and under a general order from Major-General Halleck further liberty will be allowed them if such accommodations be reciprocated by you. The General regrets that we find on the battlefield, contrary to civilized warfare, many of the Federal dead who were tomahawked, scalped, and their bodies shamefully mangled, and expresses the hope that this important struggle may not degenerate to a savage warfare.

"T. I. MCKENNY,

"Acting Asst.-Adjt.-General.

"By order of Brig.-Gen. S. R. Curtis."

"PEA RIDGE, March 11, 1862.

"SIR:—I have finished burying the dead, and made the best provisions I can for the wounded. Two divisions have advanced 6 miles, and my cavalry has scoured the country this side of Fayetteville. The enemy has retreated, as before stated, beyond the Boston Mountains. I send forward prisoners, some 500.

"In reference to a verbal communication from General Van Dorn, I have expressed a willingness to exchange prisoners of equivalent rank, and hope in this way to obtain some officers that

I very much desire. It is warm, delightful weather, and roads are excellent. I move my headquarters near to Bentonville, to get away from the stench and desolation of the battle ground, and the better to overlook the approaches to the Boston Mountains. A scout informs me that forces were to advance from Fort Scott five or six days ago, but that Hunter and Lane were both absent. What is the matter out there?

“ Respectfully,

“ SAMUEL R. CURTIS,

“ *Brig.-Gen. Commanding.*”

“ *Capt. J. C. Kelton, Asst. Adjt.-General:*

“ NEAR BENTONVILLE, ARK., March 13, 1862.

“CAPTAIN:—During the battle we lost six guns, but we recovered all back and took five from the enemy. I have also taken a large number of small-arms which the rebels threw away. My loss of killed and wounded will exceed my estimate of 1,000. General Pike commanded the Indian forces. They shot arrows as well as rifles, and tomahawked and scalped prisoners.

“ Was my dispatch of the 15th instant, telling you of the approach of the enemy and my arrangements to receive him, taken by the enemy or received at headquarters? Much mail matter was taken by him.

“ SAMUEL R. CURTIS,

“ *Brigadier-General.*”

“ *General Samuel R. Curtis.*

“ VAN BUREN, ARK., March 14, 1862.

“GENERAL:—I am instructed by Major-General Van Dorn, commanding this district, to express to you his thanks and gratification on account of the courtesy extended by yourself and the officers under your command to the burial party sent by him to your camp on the 9th instant.

“ He is pained to learn by your letter, brought to him by the commanding officer of the party, that the remains of some of your soldiers have been reported to you to have been scalped, tomahawked, and otherwise mutilated.

“ He hopes you have been misinformed with regard to this matter; the Indians who formed part of his forces having for many years been regarded as civilized people. He will, however, most

cordially unite with you in repressing the horrors of this unnatural war, and that you may cooperate with him to this end more effectually, he desires me to inform you that many of our men who surrendered themselves prisoners of war were reported to him as having been murdered in cold blood by their captors, who were alleged to be Germans.

"The General commanding feels sure that you will do your part, as he will, in preventing such atrocities in future, and that the perpetrators of them will be brought to justice, whether German or Choctaw.

"The privileges which you extend to our medical officers will be reciprocated, and as soon as possible means will be taken for an exchange of prisoners.

"I am, sir, very respectfully yours,

"DABNEY H. MAURY,

"Asst. Adjt.-General."

After General Curtis' long report regarding the disposition of his forces in Arkansas, he states: "That the arrival of Major-General Van Dorn on the 2 of March in the camp of the enemy was the occasion of great rejoicing and the firing of forty guns. The rebel force was harangued by their chiefs with boastful and passionate appeals, assuring them of their superior numbers and the certainty of an easy victory. Despatches were published falsely announcing a great battle at Columbus, Ky., in which we had lost three gunboats and 20,000 men; and thus the rebels hordes were assembled. The occasion was now opened to drive the invaders from the soil of Arkansas and give a final and successful blow to a Southern Confederacy.

"The 5th of March was cold and blustering. The snow fell so as to cover the ground. No immediate attack was apprehended and I was engaged writing. About 2 o'clock p. m. scouts and fugitive citizens came in, informing me of the rapid approach of the enemy to give me battle. His cavalry would be at Elm Springs, some 12 miles distant, that night, and his artillery had already passed Fayetteville."

"Native Americans and foreigners of varied nationalities have been aptly blended, and the fraternity of the troops finds its counterpart in that prevailing between the officers and commanders."

"Hon. J. Benjamin, Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.

"VAN BUREN, ARK., March 18, 1862.

"SIR:—I avail myself of the opportunity offered me by the departure of Dr. O. B. Knobe for Richmond, to inform you that the entire army I marched against the enemy some days since is now in camp a few miles from this place, and that I shall march in a few days for Pocahontas, to make a junction with whatever force may be assembled at that point.

"It is my intention to fall upon the force of the enemy in the vicinity of New Madrid or Cape Girardeau, and attempt to relieve General Beauregard, and if practicable, I shall march on St. Louis, and thus withdraw the forces now threatening this part of the State of Arkansas.

"The army cannot be subsisted here any longer; neither do I think that the enemy can make any serious demonstrations from here until later in the spring.

"I send several thousand cavalry off in a few days via Forsyth, on White River, to burn up the depots of the enemy at Springfield, and to destroy his immense trains, which go to and fro nearly unguarded. They will then join me at Pocahontas. I shall order Pike to operate in the Indian country west of this to cut off trains, annoy the enemy in his marches, and to prevent him, as far as possible, from supplying his troops from Missouri and Kansas. He cannot supply them here. I have debated this movement in my own mind and think that it is the best that I can make.

"I attempted first to beat the enemy at Elkhorn, but a series of accidents entirely unforeseen and not under my control, and a badly disciplined army, defeated my intentions. The deaths of McCulloch and McIntosh, and the capture of Hebert, left me without an officer to command the right wing, which was thrown into utter confusion, and the strong position of the enemy the second day left me no alternative but to retire from the contest. A heavy blow was struck them, however, and they are somewhat paralyzed. I shall march to another field before they recover, and before their re-inforcements arrive, which they are daily expecting.

"If I give battle to the troops near New Madrid I relieve Beauregard. If I find this not advisable or practicable, I shall march boldly and rapidly towards St. Louis, between Iron-ton and

the enemy's grand depot at Rolle. I think I shall accomplish something in that direction... I shall at all events tax my cause, and I earnestly hope that I may be successful.

"I shall not be able to make my report of the battle of Elkhorn for some time on account of the difficulty I have in getting subordinate reports. Our loss was not as heavy, however, as I had thought and as was reported to me, not being more than 800 or 1,000 killed and wounded, and between 200 and 300 prisoners.

"The enemy's loss was about 800 or 1,000 killed, and 1,000 or 1,200 wounded, and about 300 prisoners. We also took two batteries of artillery, one of which was destroyed by fire—burnt up.

"The enemy's position was a strong one, but we drove him from it, and slept on our arms on the field of battle, night closing the first day's battle.

"The second day we found him at daylight in a new and stronger position to the rear of his first, about 2 miles off. From all the circumstances which surrounded me I determined to withdraw. I therefore made a demonstration in front to cover the movement and put the army on the road toward Huntsville, towards the east, and retired with a heavy heart, but with a determination to recover as soon as possible and fight again. I was not defeated, but only failed in my intentions. I am yet sanguine of success, and will not cease to repeat my blows whenever the opportunity is offered.

"Very respectfully, sir, I am, your obedient servant,

"EARL VAN DORN,

"Major-General."

"HEADQUARTERS TRANS-MISSISSIPPI DISTRICT.

"VAN BUREN, ARK., March 16, 1862.

"General Orders, No. 7.

"The Major-General commanding this district desires to express to the troops his admiration for their conduct during the recent expedition against the enemy. Since leaving camp in Boston Mountains they have been incessantly exposed to the hardships of a winter campaign and have endured such privations as troops rarely encounter.

"In the engagements of the 6th, 7th and 8th instant it was the fortune of the Major-General commanding to be immediately with

the Missouri division, and he can therefore bear personal testimony to their gallant bearing.

"From the noble veteran who has led them so long to the gallant S. Churchill Clark, who fell while meeting the enemy's last charge, the Missourians proved themselves devoted patriots and staunch soldiers. He met the enemy on his chosen positions and took them from him. They captured four of his cannon and many prisoners. They drove him from his field of battle and slept upon it.

"The victorious advance of McCulloch's division upon the strong position of the enemy's front was inevitably checked by the misfortunes which now sadden the hearts of our countrymen throughout the Confederacy. McCulloch and McIntosh fell in the very front of the battle and in the full tide of success. With them went down the confidence and hopes of their troops. No success can repair the loss of such leaders. It is only left to us to mourn their untimely fall, emulate their heroic courage, and avenge their death.

"You have inflicted upon the enemy a heavy blow, but we must prepare at once to march against him again. All officers and men must be diligent in perfecting themselves in knowledge of tactics and of camp discipline. The regulations of the army upon this subject must be rigidly enforced.

"By order of Major-General Earl Van Dorn."

DABNEY H. MAURY,

"Asst.-Adjutant-General."

REPORT OF GENERAL PRICE OF BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE OR ELKHORN.

"CAMP BEN McCULLOCH, Mo., March 22, 1862.

"COLONEL:—I have the honor to submit to Major-General Van Dorn the following report of the part taken by the Missouri troops in the action of the 6th, 7th, and 8th instant:

"That officer having arrived at Cove Creek and assumed command of the Confederate forces in Western Arkansas, I gladly placed myself and my army under his orders, and in obedience to these took up the line of march in the direction of Bentonville on the morning of March 4, provided with three days' cooked rations, and having my baggage and supply trains to follow slowly in the rear.

"My forces consisted of the First Brigade Missouri Volunteers, Colonel Henry Little commanding; the Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Slack commanding; a battalion of cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Carnal, and the State troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Raines, Green, and Frost, Colonels John B. Clark, Jr., and James P. Saunders, and Major Lindsay, numbering in all 6,818 men, with eight batteries of light artillery.

"With these I reached Elm Springs on the evening of the 5th, and on the morning of the 6th advanced to Bentonville, where burning houses indicated the presence of the enemy. Colonel Gates' regiment of cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Carnal's battalion, and the mounted men of General Raines' command were rapidly pushed forward to the east of the town, and soon became briskly engaged with what proved to be the rear guard of General Sigel's forces, the main body of which had passed through Bentonville that morning in the direction of Elkhorn Tavern, near which the enemy were encamped in force and strongly entrenched.

"Skirmishing between our advance and this rear guard was kept up throughout the day, and resulted in the capture by us of quite a number of prisoners, from whom we gained much useful information.

"Towards evening we bivouacked as if for the night within 5 or 6 miles of the enemy, but resumed the line of march at 8 p. m., and, in spite of the impediments with which the enemy had sought to obstruct our way, reached a point on the Telegraph road to the north and in the rear of the enemy's position. A march of about 2 miles along the deep valley through which the road leads brought us within view of the plateau upon which the enemy were posted, and which lay to the north of the Elkhorn Tavern.

"Our advance had already begun to skirmish with the vedettes of the enemy, when I discovered that they were about to place a battery in position to command the road. I at once deployed the brigades of General Slack and Colonel Little to the right, and the rest of my forces to the left and took possession of the heights on either hand. This movement gave my artillery on the left a very commanding position from which they were enabled not only to check the enemy's advance upon our left, but also to support our right in its advance upon the enemy.

"The brunt of the action fell during the early part of the day upon

my right wing, consisting of General Slack's and Colonel Little's brigades. They pushed forward gallantly against heavy odds and the most stubborn resistance, and were victorious everywhere.

"At this time, and here, fell two of my best and bravest officers, Brig.-General William Y. Slack and Lieutenant-Colonel Carnal, the former mortally and the latter severely wounded.

"I now advanced my whole line, which gradually closed upon the enemy and drove them from one position to another, until we found them towards evening in great force on the south and west of an open field, supported by masked batteries.

"The artillery and infantry of my left wing were brought up to attack them, and they did so with a spirit and determination worthy of all praise. The fiercest struggle of the day now ensued; but the impetuosity of my troops was irresistible, and the enemy was driven back and completely routed. My right had engaged the enemy's center at the same time with equal daring and equal success, and had already driven them from their position at Elkhorn Tavern. Night alone prevented us from achieving a complete victory, of which we had already gathered some of the fruits, having taken two pieces of artillery and a quantity of stores.

"My troops bivouacked upon the ground which they had so nobly won, almost exhausted and without food, but fearlessly and anxiously awaiting the renewal of the battle in the morning.

"The morning disclosed the enemy strengthened in position and numbers, and encouraged by the reverses which had unhappily befallen the other wing of the army, when the brave Texan chieftain, Ben McCulloch, and his gallant comrade, General McIntosh, had fallen, fearlessly and triumphantly leading their devoted soldiers against the invaders of their native land. They knew, too, that Hebert—the accomplished leader of that veteran regiment, the Louisiana Third, which won so many laurels on the bloody field of the Oak Hills, and which then as well as now sustained the proud reputation of Louisiana—was a prisoner in their hands. They were not slow to renew the attack; they opened upon us vigorously, but my trusty men faltered not. They held their position unmoved until (after several of the batteries not under my command had left the field) they were ordered to retire. My troops obeyed it unwillingly, with faces turned defiantly against the foe.

"It was then that I lost two officers of whom any nation might be proud. The one, Colonel Benjamin A. Rives, fell in the prime of his manhood, at the zenith of his usefulness. No braver or more gallant officer, no more accomplished gentleman, no more unselfish patriot ever led a regiment or died for his country's honor. The other, S. Churchill Clark, was, as Colonel Little justly observes in his report, 'a child in simplicity and piety of character, a boy in years, but a soldier in spirit and a hero in action.' They fell at the very close of the hard-fought battle, well deserving the glowing praises which their immediate commander bestows upon them.

"My forces were withdrawn in perfect order without the loss of a gun. For the details of all this I beg leave to make reference to the accompanying reports of my subordinate officers.

"The conduct of nearly every officer and soldier under my command was such as to win my admiration; it is the less necessary that I should commend any one particularly to the notice of the Major-General commanding, as the operations of my arms were conducted under his eye, while his presence and gallant bearing, as well as his skill, contributed immeasurably to the success of our cause.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"STERLING PRICE,

"Major-General, Commanding Missouri State Guard."

"Col. D. H. Maury, Asst. Adjt.-Gen."

NOTE.

The father of Judge P. A. Van Dorn at the close of the Revolutionary War, bought large tracts of land of John Cloves Symmes (Judge Symmes, afterwards father-in-law of General Wm. H. Harrison), in what was then called the "North West Territory," and went on horseback to what was then an unknown wilderness, and located his land. He took 1,000 acres where is now the city of Cincinnati, and other tracts north of that place in the Miami Valley, the richest part of Ohio. But unfortunately Judge Symmes, though getting his money and giving title, had himself no title from the government, from whom he had purchased the lands; but learning of the hardship of the case the government allowed him to keep the 1,000 acres at the site of Cincinnati, and to exchange his other tracts for land in other parts of the Territory not so rich or valuable. After getting this land he offered any of his sons 1,000 acres if they would go and settle on it. Jacob the father of Judge P. A. Van Dorn, and the oldest son, accepted the offer and took the Cincinnati tract and went on it, about the year 1786, there being a block house near the tract called "Fort Washington." He, with two young men, went to work, and one day while hoeing their corn the Indians crept up, fired on them, killing one of the party; the others outran the savages and escaped into the fort. Jacob was so much disgusted at such conduct that he *sold his land for five dollars and a silver watch*, saying he would not stay there to be shot at by Indians! He then started on foot and alone for Jersey, which, after many hardships and narrow escapes from the Indians, and nearly starved, he reached home to be reproached by his mother, she saying: "Ah, Jacob, I am afraid I shall see you carrying the pillow-case to mill," referring to a custom of poor people who went to mill on foot with a pillow-case to hold the few pounds of flour or meal they could afford to buy. But she was mistaken,—Jacob went to New York and settled in the Mohawk Valley on Schoharie Creek, married, and owned when he died a fine property, in land and mills.

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